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‘Just Like Hitler’ explores the manner in which Nazism is used within mass American 
culture to create ethical arguments.  Specifically, it provides a history of Nazism’s usage 
as a metaphor for evil.  The work follows that metaphor’s usage from its origin with 
dissemination of camp liberation imagery through its political usage as a w y of 
describing the communist enemy in the Cold War, through its employment as a vehicle
for criticism against America’s domestic and foreign policies, through to its usage as a 
personal metaphor for evil.   
 
Ultimately, the goal of the dissertation is to describe the ways in which the metaphor of 
Nazism has become ubiquitous in discussion of ethics within American culture at large 
and how that ubiquity has undermined definitions of evil and made them unavailable.  
Through overuse, Nazism has become a term to vague to describe anything, but 
necessary because all other definitions of evil are subject to contextualization and become 
diminished through explanation. 
 
The work analyzes works of postwar literature but also draws in state sponsored 
propaganda as well as works of popular culture.  Because of its concentration on Nazism
as a ubiquitous definition of evil, it describes American culture through a survey of its 
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INTRODUCTION   
NAZISM AS AN EPITOME OF EVIL FOR AMERICAN ETHICS 
Jackbooted, he descends the curtain garbed in the kind of military uniform the 
audience has since come to associate as traditional for a despot.  Only moments earli r, 
promises of world domination and the god-like adoration of his people, offered by his 
minister of propaganda, Herr Garbitsch, literally drove him up the wall with anticipation 
and excitement.  Now, he is alone with the object of his passion, an enormous shining 
globe, reminiscent of Atlas, exaggerated and bombastic much like the rest of the décor in 
Hynkel’s office and the real office, designed for Hitler by Albert Speer, upon which it is 
based.  The audience will soon learn that the globe is only a balloon.   
The great dictator, Adenoid Hynkel, having come down from the curtain, first circles 
his globe like a predator upon a wounded animal, and then, with a kind of drunken 
passion in his expression, he lifts it up into the air,  balances it on his fingers, and rolls it 
down his arm to flap in a slow languid acrobatic; a kind of familiarity that suggests the 
romantic, if not sexual, play of seducer and seduced, conqueror and conquered, sending 
the globe ever higher to silhouette against the signs of the double cross that hangs be i d 
Hynkel’s desk.  Adenoid Hynkel, Charlie Chaplin’s famous stand-in for Adolph Hitler, 
bats his eyes at the world, looks at the globe lovingly, and even purses his lips as if 
readying a kiss.  He is dizzy with passion; stupefied by the promise of power.   
The globe responds to Chaplin’s movements by floating slowly and then bouncing 
high in the air even when sent there bounced off of Hynkel’s rump as he lays face down 




score behind the action is appropriate to a love scene.  Even Hynkel’s last words to 
Garbitsch before this act with the globe suggest the sexuality implied in this play between 
dictator and free world: “Leave me. I want to be alone”—alone with his globe and his 
fantasies. 
What is Hynkel in this scene?  What is Chaplin’s critique of Hitler such that this 
balloon sequence so sums up the problem with Hitler, Nazism, and maybe even fascism 
for his audience.  Hynkel isn’t particularly evil with his globe.  He isn’t violent or 
horrible.  He’s ridiculous.  He desires to play with the globe the way one does with a
lover.  He flirts; he tickles; he directs it as a submissive.  Years later, Susan ontag 
comments on the various levels of submissiveness present in the crowds at the 
Nuremberg rallies, marking Hitler as their hypnotic and dominating lover in her essay 
“Fascinating Fascism” (1974):  “Hitler regarded leadership as sexual mastery of the 
‘feminine’ masses, as rape. (the expression of the crowds in Triumph of the Will is one of 
the ecstasy; the leader makes the crowd come.)” (Under the Sign of Saturn 102).   
Chaplin has already seen and commented on the sexual character of Nazism in the 
late 1930s as an intercourse between leader and the led; between the ruler and the 
enslaved.  He has turned it into the ridiculous interplay of domination between a man and 
the inanimate.  He both reduces Hynkel’s desires to a fetish-based sexuality and the
crowd that would give up its humanity to become the inanimate fetish.  The globe, the 
world, plays the ultimate submissive, it can do nothing to resist, until finally, in a single 
moment of assertion, it escapes Hynkel’s grasp by popping.  The Great Dictator, left only 




Ultimately though, Hynkel is submissive, too, in Chaplin’s depiction—he is 
submissive to the definition of Hitler that Chaplin brings out through his character.  
Hynkel of The Great Dictator isn’t the Hitler of history.  A postwar audience, armed with 
an awareness of the Holocaust, knows the difference implicitly.  Hynkel may be a stand 
in for the tyrant, but, in the end, the resemblance between Hitler and Hynkel is simply
cosmetic—a creation of satire that allows Chaplin to poke fun at the Fü rer and offer 
human, albeit silly, reasons for why Hitler acts the way he does.  Hynkel is a 
conglomeration of the assumptions that Chaplin anticipates for his audience about Hitler 
turned funny.  The film is successful precisely because it fits its contemporary audience’s 
own desires so well.  It is as if Chaplin said, “this is how Hitler acts; isn’t it ridiculous,” 
and the audience, finding its own fantasies represented in the film, agreed and began 
purchasing movie tickets in great abundance. 
The question, then, isn’t whether Hynkel is a historically accurate depiction of Hitler 
in The Great Dictator, but what the audience thought about Hitler such that Hynkel is a 
successful stand-in.  Hynkel isn’t particularly nasty, he’s simply in love with the 
possibility of power.  In humanizing him through the film, Chaplin invites the audience to 
deflate him like his balloon globe—to make him into a human being, where the 
superhuman aspirations of Hitler for world conquest seem ludicrous.  It isn’t even clear 
what he thinks he would do with this power.  The title alone “Aut Caesar aut nullus,” 
offered first by Garbitsch and repeated as Chaplin first approaches the globe seems to be 
the goal of the Phooey of Tomania (Chaplin’s derivation of the title of Führer and the 




This romp with the ball, ridiculous as it is, is a continuation of a more serious scene in 
which Hynkel has received a report from Herring’s agent B76 of an impending strike at 
the arms factory.  She has had the strike leaders all rounded up and shot.  Hynkel 
suggests that the 3,000 workers threatening to strike, be shot as well.  He is urged against 
the mass execution by Garbitsch who cannot lose the workers or else risk “the rhythm of 
production.”  What this scene does, then, moving from the possibility of mass execution 
to its scathing critique on Hynkel’s desire for world domination, is to emphasize the 
carelessness and removal of the tyrant and his inner circle from the concerns of veryday 
human beings.  
Hynkel is so mesmerized by his own power in dealing with the strikers that he has 
become callous to the brutality that he is capable of ordering with only a word.  As with 
the dance he performs after this encounter with agent B76, he is enamored with the 
moves he makes in his dance of power, but has lost cognizance of the repercussions.  In 
like manner, Garbitsch has lost his connection with human concerns and cares only about 
people as a manufacturing resource.  Hynkel’s more jolly sidekick, Field Marshall 
Herring, is as vulnerable as his more sinister compatriots in the inner circl  of the Double 
Cross (Chaplin’s version of Nazism): just before B76 tells Hynkel about the strike, 
Herring enthusiastically reports, “We've just discovered the most wonderful, the most 
marvelous poisonous gas. It will kill everybody.” 
The dialogue with agent B76 roots the violence of Hynkel and his followers in a 
particularly economic setting.  The people rounded up and shot are factory workers 
planning a strike.  They are not Jews, gypsies, or homosexuals, but are rather, regular 




American audience with Bolshevism and socialism.  Those watching T e Great Dictator 
at its premier would have seen union organizers and Marxists as both cut from the same 
cloth, and would have recognized the continuation in The Great Dictator of the pro-union 
themes Chaplin had portrayed in Modern Times when the tramp would accidentally find 
himself at the head of a union parade until attacked by union-busting cops. 
The stance of The Great Dictator with its portrayal of Hitler as anti-union, though 
potentially controversial, would be subsumed by the more imminent controversy 
surrounding the film for its attempt to criticize Nazism and Hitler.  The Great Dictator 
released just before the war, had to be produced by Charlie Chaplin independent of 
Hollywood’s major film studios despite Chaplin’s enormous successes at the box office.  
Because of the film industry’s fear of losing the American market in Germany and Italy, 
and of offending supporters of fascism in America, Chaplin could find no backers for his 
film project.  Despite his enormous celebrity, a film that criticized Hitler was too risky a 
business venture when the project began in 1938.   The last and only anti-Hitler 
production backed by a major Hollywood studio is Warner Brothers’ Bo co’s Picture 
Show, premiering in 1933, which included only a 10 second animated newsreel-like 
segment in which a cartoon Jimmy Durante is chased, while on vacation in Prezel 
Germany, by an ax-wielding Hitler.  In real newsreel coverage until late in the 1930s, 
Hitler and Nazi Germany were conspicuously missing. Even in speeches given by 
Roosevelt against fascism in the late 30s, he fails to mention Germany specifically:  
“Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations, not because the people of 
those nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment 




desperation, they chose to sacrifice liberty.” (Universal Newsreels, 1938 04-20).  Clearly, 
the “other great nations” alluded to are the fascist powers, but as America has not 
declared war on Germany or Italy, Roosevelt, the President of the United Stats, is 
unwilling to cite them specifically in his critique and even offers sympathy with their 
problems by rooting the draw of fascism in the successful economic recovery in fascist 
nations.  It is not really an indictment of fascism except that it reminds Americans of the 
importance of liberty.  Roosevelt, recently re-elected and one of the most powerful 
leaders in the world, was unwilling to indict, in 1938, the violence of the Nazis or their 
ideology of world domination.  America was not yet in a war and its President would n t 
risk making enemies. 
Chaplin, however, was willing to take large risks when making films.  His film 
Modern Times (1936), for instance, critiqued the assembly line industry by turning 
Chaplin’s character into a human component of the complex (and fairly large) machinery 
of modern industry.  When the tramp escapes work by hiding out in the bathroom, he is 
found by the ever watchful eye of the factory owner who appears on a giant screen
behind Chaplin.  The factory owner looks suspiciously like Henry Ford.  Throughout the 
filming of The Great Dictator, Chaplin was warned against continuing with the film by 
his peers, but he continued on despite, and as he continued, Germany became 
increasingly belligerent: by the time the film was released in March of 1941, America 
was only months away from the brink of war.  When Chaplin announced the making of 
the film in October of 1938, the British, anxious to appease Hitler, said they would ban it 
(The Tramp and The Dictator).  Understanding the importance of Chaplin’s film, in terms 




would be released in America.  What Roosevelt could not say as President, Chaplin 
would say as world-acclaimed celebrity.   
The film fulfills two important functions as an artifact to be studied in terms of it  
relevance in American culture.  The first is that The Great Dictator created a depiction of 
Hitler that was understandable as a victim of human folly; he wasn’t so much evil as he 
was stupid.  It is easy for an audience informed about the Holocaust to look back on the 
prewar world and assume that the nature of Nazism, its homicidal anti-Semitism, was 
well known, but it simply isn’t true.  People knew what they saw, read, or heard, and for 
various reasons, those sources were confusing to many Americans.  There was a dearth of 
actual criticisms of Hitler in national news (as evidenced by newsreel footage and the 
speeches of Roosevelt) and there were conflicting reports concerning Germany in 
American newspapers and on the radio.   
The confusion is evident even in The Great Dictator where Chaplin is trying to 
portray the Nazis in the worst possible light.  In Chaplin’s movie, Jews live in a ghetto, 
political dissidents go to concentration camps, and union organizers are shot.  The ghetto 
itself isn’t a walled-in place separated from the rest of society; it’s just another part of 
town particularly populated by Jews ethnicity.  Jews who have assimilated and the issues 
associated with defining a Jewish race in Nazi Germany are missing ent rely from the 
film. One is either a Jew or one is not, and the differences, as depicted by Chaplin, are 
quite clear.   
The average Jew, in Chaplin’s movie, does not go to a concentration camp; it is a fate 
reserved for political dissidents like, Schultz.  Part of the reason the Jewish inhabitants of 




In terms of Chaplin’s portrayal of Nazi anti-Semitism, Hynkel’s persecution of the Jews 
seems, at times, more to be a function of keeping his people distracted than any real 
personal stake in the racism.  Just before he is left alone with his globe, for instance, 
Hynkel professes to Garbitsch that he also hates brunettes.  Hynkel’s hatred is made to 
seem, by Chaplin, capricious and even self-destructive (Hynkel is a brunette and later in
the film, he is mistaken for a Jew). 
Using the film’s success as an indicator, The Great Dictator says a great deal about 
the audience and their beliefs and concerns about Hitler and the Nazis.  The Nazis of 
Chaplin’s film are against unions.  They are intent on turning people into human 
machinery.  They either shoot or imprison anyone who speaks or acts against them, and 
they preach the oppression of the Jews to keep the country distracted from its real 
problems, just as there speeches lionizing pure Aryan blood cannot be taken seriously as 
no one giving the speeches seems to fit the description of a superior specimen, including 
Hitler himself. The film’s success indicates a belief in its audience that, t e Nazi leaders 
have become seduced by the thrill of world domination, and because of this seduction 
have lost sight of the human costs for their schemes.  Their separation from the world of 
human happiness and suffering has turned them into self-important buffoons. 
As these are the problems of Nazism as interpreted by Chaplin through the action of 
The Great Dictator, the film performs a secondary role by offering a solution to the 
troubles of Nazism through the Jewish barber and his final plea for humanity made at the 
film’s denouement: 
We all want to help one another. Human beings are like that. We want to live by 
each other's happiness, not by each other's misery. We don't want to hate and 
despise one another. In this world there is room for everyone, and the good earth 




we have lost the way. Greed has poisoned men's souls, has barricaded the world 
with hate, has goose-stepped us into misery and bloodshed. We have developed 
speed, but we have shut ourselves in. Machinery that gives abundance has left us 
in want. Our knowledge has made us cynical; our cleverness, hard and unkind. 
We think too much and feel too little. More than machinery, we need humanity. 
More than cleverness, we need kindness and gentleness. Without these qualities, 
life will be violent and all will be lost. (The Great Dictator) 
 
In the barber’s speech, Chaplin calls out for human compassion as an answer to the 
problems engendered by fascism.  While he also phrases the world’s problems as 
stemming from excessive reliance on machinery—technology has caused us to become
overly clever, overly hateful, and overly isolated—the speech goes on to suggest 
alternative, good ways to use technology for the betterment of human kind: “The airplane 
and the radio have brought us closer together. The very nature of these inventions cries 
out for the goodness in men; cries out for universal brotherhood; for the unity of us all” 
(The Great Dictator).  By suggesting this alternative capability for modernization, he 
refocuses his concerns about new technology on the overall point of his speech: 
acceptance as a force to rival and combat the intolerance preached by Hynkel, and 
through Hynkel, Hitler.  Later in his speech, he offers, “Let us fight to free the world! To 
do away with national barriers! To do away with greed, with hate and intolerance! Let us
fight for a world of reason, a world where science and progress will lead to all men's 
happiness. Soldiers, in the name of democracy, let us all unite!”  (The Great Dictator) 
Here again, the barber calls for the world to learn to understand each other’s beliefs so as 
to unite.  The speech is, interestingly enough, both an endorsement for democracy and 
global citizenship:  hate and intolerance are the problem—democracy and the 




Through Chaplin’s two roles, that of Hynkel and that of the Jewish barber, Th  Great 
Dictator provides a description of why despots act like despots, what our attitude should 
be about them, and what our attitude should be to make the world a place unfit for their 
success.  It is morally instructive in this sense and divides the world between utopian and 
dystopian visions:  a world where technology and modernization are used to subvert 
acceptance of each other’s belief is dystopian; a world in which everyone’s beli f  are 
valid and worthy of respect is utopian.  The film provides a kind of ethical formula for 
separating a right kind of world view from the wrong.  The generation of this formula 
using Nazis to provide ethical definition will become increasingly more frequent after 
Chaplin’s film, so frequent, in fact, that it will complicate notions of evil outside of Nazi 
analogy and even the stability of the definition of Nazism used within these analogies.  In 
The Great Dictator, however, the formula isn’t necessarily about good and evil; Chaplin 
makes fictional Nazis to help understand the reasoning of the real Nazis, and by 
understanding it, to show it as ridiculous.  
In his autobiography, however, Chaplin retracts the pedestrian humanization of the 
Nazis whom he criticizes in The Great Dictator. He writes of the film, “Had I known of 
the actual horrors of the German concentration camps, I could not have made The Great 
Dictator; I could not have made fun of the homicidal insanity of the Nazis” (392).  The 
retraction centers on Chaplin’s depiction of Hynkel and the Double Crossers.  He does 
not indicate a regret for the sentiments offered by the barber at the film’s end.  Hynkel is 
simply not evil enough to be representative of Hitler, and this is precisely because he has 
been humanized by Chaplin.  Real Nazi evil is not understandable as a function of 




representation of Nazism precisely because Hynkel is ludicrous and not evil incarnate.  
His contextualization by the movie makes Hynkel, and by extension Hitler, seem 
ridiculous, but it is irresponsible to contextualize Nazis to make them look ridiculous—it 
belittles the horror of their crime.  The millions dead, the bodies stacked up like 
cordwood and covered with lime, the mass graves, the horrors of the crematorium—none 
of these can be responsibly explained through the foibles of Adenoid Hynkel.  The moral 
lesson delivered by Chaplin’s Phooey of Tomania is, according to Chaplin, rendered 
impotent.  One does not fictionalize Nazis in order to understand real Nazis—one refers 
to Nazis in order to understand evil. 
Yet, in some ways, Chaplin’s film sets up a kind of model for all Hitler analogies to 
follow.  At the heart is the introduction of an ethical dilemma—it points out and 
characterizes two kinds of attitudes: one right, one wrong.  In Chaplin’s original 
depiction, the wrong attitude is helped in its depiction by placing it within a comedic 
context to help accentuate that it is wrong precisely because it is ridiculous, but in 
Chaplin’s autobiographical retrospective statement, it is precisely this context, which he 
regrets.  The Nazis, Chaplin seems to say in his autobiography, were so evil that their 
depiction as anything other than definitively evil is impossible.  Nazi analogies, in 
general, work on this principal.  Nazism is evoked because it is resistant to 
contextualization—its definition as evil is fixed and is referenced because of this fixity.  
It is the evil against which other, less fixed, evils can be compared to determine their 
intensity.  
The advice given by the Jewish barber against Nazism, however, remains approprite.  




creatures driven by their need to do evil, tolerance remains the answer to th Nazi’s 
intolerance.  The film’s message calls for the world’s innovative drive to move forward 
in a spirit of understanding between all people and peoples.  This, too, seems to be an 
ethical model based in the fixed value of Nazis as evil.  The Nazi evil is refigur d as 
resultant from a lack of understanding; goodness stems from open-mindedness and the 
ability to judge each person, and their actions, by an individual and unique standard.  It 
would make no sense, for instance, if at the end of Chaplin’s speech, he were to say that 
so long as everyone acts according to American values, they deserve the Earth’s bounty.  
Instead, however they act, they are judged according to their own standard.  If Hitler 
judges according only to his own singular standard, then acting against Hitler means 
taking context into account when judging the difference between good and evil.  The 
alternative leads to a death camp. 
Here, immediately, is the paradox to which all such analogies must succumb—
because, of course, if everyone is to be judged according to their own individual context, 
then the decision to judge Nazis as evil beyond context is problematic.  Chaplin suggests 
in this film, that the Nazis are the impetus for a change in ethical evaluation.  In The 
Great Dictator, the occasion for the Jewish barber’s call for greater tolerance is precisely 
the great intolerance of the Double Crossers of Tomania.  Because their intolra ce is 
ruining the world, tolerance is required.  This indicates that the paradox of the Nazis 
place within the context of universal tolerance need not be resolved—it can and must go 
ignored: the reason that tolerance is needed is precisely because we cannot tolerate the 




Like Chaplin, with greater revelation of the atrocities, the world would find the idea 
of silly Nazis problematic.  Even during the war, To Be or Not To Be (later remade by 
Mel Brookes) failed at the box office because it depicted the Nazi as humorous, a 
characterization of Nazism that would not jibe with its audience’s vision of the Nazi as 
based on their brutality.  Once footage of the death camps was revealed, the capability to 
show Nazis as figures derided by human weakness would become increasingly more 
difficult.  
And yet, the Nazis would not disappear.  In fact, if The Great Dictator provides an 
early model of the ways in which Nazis are employed to denote evil, then it is a model 
that has been used many times since its inception.  Nazi references have proliferated 
since Chaplin, growing in scope every year, until now they are nearly ubiquitous in 
American culture—appearing in film, literature, popular music, television, and video 
games, political speeches and debates.  The proliferation suggests a national definition:  
Nazis are evil, and evil is Nazi.  
While Chaplin met with controversy in criticizing Nazis, there are now few aras 
where a Nazi analogy is considered off limits, their usage has become nearly ubiquitous 
and obligatory.  Since its encounter with Nazism, American culture has become single 
minded, and more tolerant, as if following the advice of Chaplin’s Jewish barber, but as a 
result of this tolerance, acceptable definitions of evil become harder to find.  The function 
of Nazism, then, is to provide an acceptable and stable definition of evil for a culture tha 
has, in reaction against Nazism, contextualized its ethics to become more open-mind d.  




These analogies, now found throughout American culture, speak volumes precisely 
because of their national scope of their success. The choice of Nazism as a stable
definition of evil for American culture says something as well about that culture’s ethical 
values, just as the need for a stable definition of evil alone speaks to how ethics operate in 
a society that prizes open-mindedness.  How does the endorsement of the Jewish barber 
for world-wide acceptance affect the acceptance, or lack thereof, that might be extended 
to Hynkel’s beliefs, and if it doesn’t, where should the line be drawn between who 
deserves acceptance and who doesn’t?  It is clear that Chaplin wouldn’t have included 
acceptance of the Double Crossers’ ideology even before revelation of the Nazi 
atrocities—the piles of the murdered dead were not a prerequisite for leaving them out of 
the Jewish barber’s call for tolerance.  After the revelation of the atrocities, even 
humanizing the Nazis so as to put them into a position where the choice between 
tolerating or disallowing tolerance becomes a moot point.  Their ideology ceases to 
become the result of human weakness and becomes the result of an irrational attraction to 
evil which Chaplin, in his autobiography, calls insane. 
Chaplin’s retraction in his autobiography also suggests a kind of regret about 
depicting Hynkel as a figure of human weakness.  By putting Hynkel and fascism into a 
human context, Chaplin achieves comedy, but he also undermines the presence and the 
danger of real evil.  The problem as Chaplin comes to see it in his autobiography is that 
Hynkel belittles evil, and evil, real evil like the kind evidenced by the Nazis’ atrocities, is 
not something that should be laughed away.  This is a grim warning:  Charlie Chaplin has 




It is this point, finally, that needs address, for if Nazis are employed with regularity to 
serve as a definition of evil for ethical analogies, then they are prone, and evil through 
them, to the kind of diminishment through contextualization warned of by Chaplin in his 
autobiography.  When employed with such frequency and in such diverse circumstances, 
what, finally, does being a Nazi mean and what does it mean to be like them? 
In my dissertation, I follow out the themes native to depictions of Nazism that I have 
begun already to describe in relation to The Great Dictator and describe what their 
presence has meant since World War II.  I examine popular media in order to provide a 
history of Nazism’s usage by the U.S. mass media to define a nationally recognizd 
ethical system, and to determine what is implied about the beliefs of the American public 
by the acceptance of those publicly disseminated ethics.  In particular, images of Nazism 
distributed throughout the culture in popular media, such as film and literature, are 
indicators of a national conversation surrounding definitions of good and evil which are 
not always based in historical accuracy.   
Like Hynkel, the Nazis of the American mass media are, more often than not, 
reflections of American beliefs about Nazis, and less about the Nazi’s historically 
accurate ideology or actions. Through analysis of the various agencies of this 
conversation, it is possible to say something about the way in which America creates, 
displays, and reinforces beliefs about morality for the culture in general. 
 The ethics of postwar America have increasingly tended towards theories of 
nature and nurture to explain the acts of humankind as the results of social constructi, 
language usage, dysfunctional families, biological predisposition, popular fads, untreated 




explain action, compassion and understanding become the basis for ethical evaluation.  
The narratives of good and evil, as independent forces, have had decreasing influence on 
ethical responses nationwide and especially within mass produced discourse intended to 
represent and appeal to an average American viewpoint.   Part of this shift is related to 
the backlash against the intolerance of the Nazis as suggested by Chaplin through the 
speech given by the Jewish barber.   
Like Chaplin’s original plea in The Great Dictator, mass culture in America tends to 
rely on an ethical rhetoric based on appeals to understanding problems individually.  
Thus explanations of aberrant behavior, avoiding the use of good or evil as forces, utilize 
new forces.  When horrible crimes are committed, for instance, they are explain d 
through mass culture by way of psychology, biology, or socio-economic conditions, just 
as Hynkel was explained through the human weakness of ambition and greed.  We may 
as easily think of mass murderers as crazy as we would be to think of them as evil, and if 
not crazy, then reacting to some social condition such as a childhood defined in street 
violence, or an apathy bred from watching too many violent images on television.  Evil 
ceases to be a recognizable characteristic even in the worst of society’ horrors. 
But just as Chaplin’s autobiography warns, with the loss of evil, ethics, as a system, 
must change tenor as well.  If every instance of ethical analysis must be analyzed on its 
own terms then categories such as good and evil, right and wrong, or perhaps just 
acceptable and unacceptable do not carry from situation to situation.  An ethical system
that provides individualized explanations through these overarching descriptions of 
influence (whether social, genetic, pharmaceutical, or other) becomes, by definition, 




descriptions of influence deny—in this scheme, the influence is responsible for the 
actions and not the individual and thus the individual can’t be evil.  
Fortunately, despite the number of influences that now take responsibility for our 
actions, most Americans still know what evil is.  When they think of it, they are likely to 
think of Nazis or, perhaps, the devil, the presence of the latter being increasingly muted 
within public circles due to the concerns of America’s polytheistic society and 
contemporary concerns of contextualizing evil rather than mythicizing it.  The devil is a 
creature recognizable, to some Americans, as real, but to many others as a cre ture of 
superstition:  a symbol of evil with no real historical presence.  Moreover, it lacks the 
necessary consensus to be ubiquitous throughout national culture.  In the image of the 
Nazi, however, Americans continue to acknowledge and personify an evil in historical 
example that is above explanation, apology, or comprehension.  No appeal to influence 
may adequately explain Hitler—even the attempt to explain Hitler seems morally 
misguided as if it risks diminishing the severity of his horror.  The crematorium is a place 
where an evil happened that is resistant to diminishment through study or theory—a place 
that the majority of the postwar rhetoric insinuates should be met with a reverent silence, 
not with words of explanation. 
Depictions within mass culture demonstrate that America recognizes the evil of 
Nazism, but they also demonstrate a belief which Chaplin could not have anticipated in 
1938 when he began making The Great Dictator.  America would see itself postwar as 
the defeater of Nazis, not through an increase in tolerance or the breaking down of 




tolerance preached by the Jewish barber virtuous as a way to defeat Nazism, so too did 
victory over the Nazis make Americans virtuous through their war effort.  
Through reminders of this victory, America acknowledges itself as inherently good; 
he who slays the dragon is, by definition, a dragon slayer.  Thus, at times when the nation 
needs reminders of its inherent national goodness, films set in World War II become 
suddenly popular again.  The ‘good war’ is hauled out to take yet another victory lap 
around the patriotic track of our sentiments.  Some sixty years after the defeat of Nazism, 
Hitler and his followers are still, for many, the epitome of what Americans thik of as 
evil, even during an era in which notions of good and evil are increasingly abandoned in 
favor of individual explanations of behavior related to various influences. 
Chaplin saw the isolation, greed, and intolerance of the Nazis as a function of the 
modern age.  He was not alone in seeing the world’s political and social problems as 
resultant from modern industrialization.  In Walter Benjamin’s account of the Nazi’s rise 
to power within “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), for 
instance, he explains modern politics as the effect of an increased reliance on machi es 
and automated industry.  His essay is, ostensibly, a political theory of aesthetics.  He sees 
the ability to mass produce art as causing the death of art’s capacity to evoke truths which 
act independent of explanation or influence—mechanical reproduction prevents art from 
defining good or evil for its audience.   
For Benjamin, the reaction against the death of this “cult value” for art—the loss of 
its capacity to act as a conduit between its audience and transcendent truths—is a 
prerequisite for the rise of fascism.  By experiencing art, a person, before the age of 




Similar to Chaplin’s argument through the Jewish barber, Benjamin argues that the 
mechanical age has made it difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to have such a 
singular, personal, experience.  Instead, the relationship of individual to art became one 
of influence, and the experience of the art became political. 
Benjamin suggests that art from the modern period, with its concentration on the 
inner life of the average person, was an extension of the democratization that had killed 
cult value.  Instead of a private one-on-one relationship with essential truths, the 
experience became public, the inner life revealed.  The essential truths ceased to be of 
importance, the experience of those truths having overtaken them in prominence.  
Eventually, identity became truer than essential values.  Truth depended on experience, a 
view that Chaplin would endorse with The Great Dictator. 
According to Benjamin, this concentration on the individual is paradoxically the 
cause of the great rallies at Nuremberg. Nazism is, from this standpoint, an at empt to 
reinvigorate art with its cult value—to make it, once again, act as a conduit to essential 
truths.  The relationship is, however, modified by the fascist concerns of the art—
particularly the stigma attached to private thoughts, acts, and opinion.  Through the ritual 
and regalia of Nazism, the goal was to create a simultaneous and homogenous experience 
of the transcendent, not just for the individual but for the nation.  Thus, Ein Land, ein 
Volk, ein Führer.  As with Chaplin, Benjamin felt that the corruption of the process by 
which people (before mechanical reproduction, individuals, and after, the masses) were 





The aesthetic purpose of Benjamin’s essay is of course its most salient feature, but 
Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” is not just about 
the work of art; it is about the capacity to receive transcendent truths given the ase with 
which versions of the truth can be reproduced.  It is as much about history as it is about 
art.  Benjamin writes, for instance, that “the situation into which the product of 
mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the 
quality of its presence is always depreciated” (Benjamin 221).  What this means for 
something like Chaplin’s The Great Dictator is precisely the regret suggested in 
Chaplin’s autobiography:  The Great Dictator doesn’t, necessarily, touch Hitler (though 
there is some speculation that he did see the film)—it doesn’t cause him to change his 
action—the existence of the film, however, depreciates Hitler’s presenc as a monster.  
Benjamin continues, “This [depreciation] holds not only for the art work but also for 
instance, for a landscape which passes in review before the spectator in a movie. In the 
case of the art object, a most sensitive nucleus—namely, its authenticity—is interfered 
with whereas no natural object is vulnerable on that score” (Benjamin 221).  Thus, The 
Great Dictator has an authenticity that is interfered with—the natural object upon which 
it is based, the evil of the Nazis, is not immediately at risk.   
As, however, Benjamin posits that “the authenticity of a thing is the essence of all 
that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its 
testimony to the history which it has experienced,” he is creating a condition based in 
narrative.  The essential characteristic as it is transmitted constitutes authenticity.  This 
transmission occurs in two ways:  through the thing’s condition as an existent, its 




authenticity of Nazis is generated not only from their presence of actual proponents of an 
ideology, but also through the way that the term, Nazi, can signify a historical account 
involving Nazism.  On this point, Benjamin concludes, “since the historical testimony 
rests on authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive 
duration ceases to matter.  And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is 
affected is the authority of the object” (Benjamin 221). 
Benjamin’s point, then, is that reproduction of a thing, once it is only an agent of 
historical testimony (when it has otherwise ceased to be), risks the item’s authenticity—it 
becomes the stories told about it.  Any affect on those stories, then, also has an effect on 
the thing itself as a creation of the stories.  Nazism after the Second World War, for 
instance, lacks substantive duration (or more to the point, its substantive duration has run 
out through their defeat), and thus, Nazism becomes stories about Nazism.  If the stories 
become affected, for instance, by portraying Hitler as Hynkel, then the authority of 
Nazism is affected as well—and in Benjamin’s terms, this authority repres nts a 
transmitted essence. 
What mechanical reproduction allowed for, according to Benjamin, was not just 
conglomerate experience, but also the revelation of the mechanisms of experience, and its 
separation from essence.  By revealing the aesthetic of the inner life, by promoting the 
transmission of essential truths above the essential truths themselves, modern art had 
effectively created a blueprint for improving propaganda:  one need only point to the 
celebration of experience rather than essence as cultural decadence.  Hitler and his ilk 
used this new propaganda to create their patriotic ritual to otherwise wipe out the 




providing new ways of approaching essential truths in a manner like that of art’s purpose 
before mechanical reproduction; to reinvigorate art’s ritualistic function inside of its new 
political schema by creating political ritual.  The “art” associated with mechanical 
reproduction was self-destructive because its logical end result was the fascism that 
would destroy it. 
Benjamin did not live long enough to see fascism destroyed nor did he speculate as to 
what art would look like, still mechanically reproduced, in the age after its antithesis had 
reached its end.  It’s erroneous to think of ages ending in discrete stops.  The Romantic 
era did not end with the beginning of the Victorian, the Victorian with the beginning of 
the Modern.  The aesthetics and philosophy associated with an era may wane in 
popularity but rarely does the new age eradicate all evidence of the old.   
The same holds for the post-fascist age:  as surely as Nazism was defeated, the 
political ritual of patriotism that empowered fascism had also empowered its defeat 
(when manifested in its enemies) and remained to bolster its enemy’s national self image 
after the prominence of fascism had ended.  America’s own national ritual of imagining 
itself the rescuer of Europe was otherwise engendered by the defeat of Nazi Germany 
which would become, in that new narrative, the epitome of evil for the ethics of a new 
age. 
Though America entered the postwar period partially reliant upon a nationalistic 
vision of the immutable truth of its own virtue (the mobilization of that opinion had, after 
all, gotten the nation through a Second Great War), the terms of that truth were very 
different from those of the Nazis.  The Nazis had followed a rigid codification of ethics in 




any, moral grey areas or blurred lines; the rigidity of American postwar ethics resulted 
from its reliance on a particular exemplification of evil:  Nazi Germany.   
In national outlets of the America media, iniquity and injustice began increasingly to 
be portrayed postwar through analogies to Nazism.  Their evil was useful as a point of 
comparison for other evils.  This use of Nazism as an epitome of evil was neither 
arbitrary nor exclusive.  It was located in the wartime enemy, an emblem available for the 
hatred of all Americans through the conglomerate patriotic project of war.  Chaplin used 
an indictment of Nazi intolerance to endorse universal compassion.  The American mass 
media indicted Nazi’s most salient features (racism, imperial belligerence, 
authoritarianism) to endorse the virtue of the ‘American way’ or to attack enemi s of the 
state.   
The result was similar to the division implied by Hynkel and the Jewish barber—
division between Democratic America and Nazi Germany naturally created a division 
between utopian and dystopian social values. America in its national discourse could call 
upon the Nazi to act as a recognized definition of essential evil in order to provide an 
example of what one should not do, how one should not behave, and what one should not 
want to become—one should avoid being like the Nazis.  Not only personal but national 
ethics could be created through this analogy. 
This dissertation shows how postwar America developed, and continues to develop, 
its national ethic through the use of an epitome: Nazism, how it reproduces this epitome, 
and what this reproduction to the authority of the essential ethical positions of good and 




atrocities as evidenced in sources ranging from before the war until now, and the use of 
that knowledge within its nationally disseminated ethical arguments.   
The use of Nazism as an ethical epitome is fraught with a paradox similar to the one 
produced by Chaplin through the appeal of the Jewish barber—in their historical 
testimony, the Nazis are depicted as strong advocates of essential value: racial 
supremacy; Deutschland über alles; Ein Land, ein Volk, ein Führer.  Thus, anti-Nazi 
sentiments naturally imply a movement away from systems that rely on esse tial 
immutable values and towards values that change depending on the context of the 
evaluation. Ultimately, my claim is that America, in propagating an anti-Nazi self image, 
publicly advocates for context dependent ethics in which right and wrong or good and 
evil are judged from situation to situation.  This reaction, however, is the result of a belief 
in an ethical epitome:   it implies that the choice of context dependent ethics was an 
attempt to not be like the Nazis, particularly because the Nazis are deemed essentially 
evil.   
The choice to evaluate ethics through analysis of contexts and their influences is 
complicated because it depends on a belief in the non-contextual, essentially vil nature 
of the Nazis.  In a context dependent system, one would expect to find no place for 
immutable values (like Nazism as inherently evil), but in fact, as the perseverance of 
Nazism as an epitome of evil intimates, this is simply not the case.  Nazism beco es the 
apparent immutable truth which American mass culture’s reference system, otherwise 
concentrated on issues of influence, employs as a measuring standard against which it can 




Because Nazism is used to establish an ethical standard in a variety of disparate 
situations, however, its definition is subject to the changes warned of in Chaplin’s 
autobiography and Benjamin’s theory:  over time and through usage, the value of Nazi 
evil, too, becomes context dependent—it becomes a value determined by the stories and 
analogies in which it is evoked.  Like art, mechanically reproduced, the usage of Nazism 
as a standard ceases to be a function of its appropriateness to context.  Nazism rema ns in 
each of these cases an epitome, but the implication of being evoked in a variety of 
context is that the point of reference implied by Nazism—its meaning—changes in 
nature.    
The nature of evil, described by analogy to this protean Nazi, must also change, 
becoming diffused and confused through over-contextualization. Postwar American 
ethics has become a complex interchange between the context dependent values it 
publicly recognizes and the essential value it must habitually reference.  The result is a 
kind of irony, like Chaplin’s tolerance: tolerant to all but the intolerant.  This paradox, 
ultimately, undermines the stability of definitions of good and evil upon which the ethical 
system must rely.  Nazis are evil, but which Nazi are being discussed: soup Nazis, 
historical Nazis, Nazis from Mel Brooks’s films or from Stephen King’s stories, the 
cybernetic villain from Hellboy or Joseph Mengele from The Boys From Brazil?  Who 
should one not be like?  What are the Nazis of the American imagination, and how did 
they come to be that? 
In some ways, I am documenting a history of the American imagination as it creates a 
fictional place: the Nazi Germany that America accepts as real.  My goal is not to suggest 




heinous; I am neither a Holocaust denier nor a Nazi apologist.  However, America’s 
version of Nazi Germany as a real place is as problematic as Chaplain’s Tomania as an 
accurate depiction of Nazi Germany.  For instance, discussions of America’s 
considerations of the Holocaust committed by Germany are necessarily embedded in 
context.  When Americans have discussed the Holocaust they constructed their 
understanding, first from camp liberation newsreels (which barely mentioned Jews), later, 
from newsreels that discussed the Nuremberg trials (also equally reticent to mention 
Jewish victims), from the film Judgment at Nuremberg, and later still, from Schindler’s 
List?  Which of these are real?  From which of these does America gain its definition of 
evil?   
My suggestion is that ‘real’ is not a criterion which can be relied upon for analyzig 
America’s ethical systems.  Even accuracy is problematic since remarkably inaccurate 
representations of Nazi Germany are both allowed and widely disseminated (witness 
Hogan’s Heroes, the Empire of Star Wars, or Ralph Bashki’s Wizards) and relatively 
inaccurate depictions have still impacted America enough for Nazis to attain the position 
of ultimate evil.  In mass American culture, for instance, notions of totalitari nism were 
founded upon an anti-Semitic enemy, but the undercurrents of the enemy’s racism were 
otherwise ignored allowing America to ignore, by extension, its own prejudices well into 
the 1950s.  The enemy’s anti-Semitism was made to seem somehow different than its 
homegrown counterpart—a position which the civil rights counter culture argued against 
also through the metaphor of Nazism. 
Regardless of its artifice, the Nazi Germany of America’s imagination is very real in 




that are certainly as real as biological determinism and social construction, and in 
validating America’s ethical system, this false Germany is made to seem even more real 
then its historical counterpart.  
Because my project concerns national values, I draw source material for my analysis 
from sources that were distributed nationally.  I recognize value in literatur  s 
representing the acceptable arguments of a certain portion of America’s population, and I 
certainly see the value in literature of successful social critique and satire as offering 
insight into American values.  However, next to authors like Ernest Hemingway, 
Flannery O’Connor, James Baldwin, Sylvia Plath, and Thomas Pynchon, my analysis 
also relies heavily on nationally available examples of American ethics at work such as 
popular film, public political statement and action, magazine stories meant to appeal to a 
wide audience, and various forms of state and privately sanctioned propaganda.  Publicity 
is better than obscurity for evidentiary support of arguments about national narratives.  
Chaplin works as an example of a depiction of Nazism precisely because of the scale of
its success. 
The goal of this work is to provide cultural criticism which is sometimes at odds with 
the special place afforded the idea of literary criticism.  This consideration is guided by 
two distinct principals.  First, that in a consumer culture, the success of a medium in 
regards to its capacity for cultural dissemination can be determined by its financial 
success.  Essentially, people are willing to pay for the visions of culture which they hold 
to be accurate or to which they aspire.  Thus, such visions that receive public support as 
measured by financial success represent visions which are advocated for by ala ge 




description of popular culture and its capacity for reading mass culture is derived from 
Siegfried Kracauer’s assumptions in From Caligari to Hitler.  Central to his assumption 
is the underlying principal that “films address themselves, and appeal, to the anonymous 
multitude.  Popular films—or , to be more precise, popular screen motifs—can therefore 
be supposed to satisfy existing mass desires” (Kracauer 5).   
In some ways, my own work here represents a next obvious step to the work done by 
Kracauer:  he attempts to show evidence of the coming of the Nazis in the products of the 
culture that preceded Hitler’s ascendancy; I am demonstrating the manner in which the 
presence of the Nazi echoes in the mass cultural artifacts of the society that caused his 
demise. 
Kracauer is an obvious antecedent to this reading of mass culture, but he is not the 
final word.  His position is to choose between cultural artifacts—film rather than 
literature.  I am not so convinced of the efficacy of one or the other (or even that these 
two combined can adequately represent mass culture).  Instead, I concur with John Carlos 
Rowe and Rick Berg in their introduction to The Vietnam War and American Culture: 
It is, of course, no longer possible to speak of some clear distinction between 
“mass” and “popular” media, just as it is impossible to imagine any specific 
boundary separating mass culture form popular culture.  But this confusion of 
realms need not mean merely that popular resistance to mass domination is 
impossible; it can also mean that the genuinely popular and critical media might 
find a larger and more sophisticated audience than expected. (x) 
 
Berg and Rowe go on to suggest that through the lens of mass culture, literature mus b
seen as performing ideological, rather than humane, work.  Literature, when used in the 
task of analyzing mass culture, acts then as a reflection of mass cultural desi es, an 
attempt to indoctrinate the culture to those desires, and finally as a critique of those 




Finally, literature alone cannot perform the necessary task of describing what 
Kracuaer calls the inner dispositions of a people (11).  As Berg and Rowe suggest, 
“cultural criticism cannot contribute significantly to cultural politics until it investigates 
carefully the ways in which apparently discrete media work in more profoundly 
coordinated way” (x).  It is necessary, then, in a work of cultural criticism to examine the 
places where sites of acculturation intersect:  not just books, not just books and film, but 
books, films, political speeches, works of obvious propaganda, manifestoes, broadcasts, 
television shows, and so forth.  Only through such a polymath method can the 
dispositions of a culture be properly vetted. 
Part of the design of this Polymath method is to demonstrate the ubiquity of a specific 
motif:  in this case, Nazism as a metaphor for evil.  My examples, then must perform two 
functions: not only must they show the operation of American ethics but they must also 
provide a cross section of contexts in which American ethical values manifest.  The goal 
of this analysis is not to provide comprehensive analysis or in-depth readings of 
particular works.  I cannot, here, list all the places in American culture where Nazis are 
referenced in the name of establishing a definition of evil, nor would it serve to offer 
entire chapters to readings of Gravity’s Rainbow or Langston Hughes’s testimony before 
Joseph McCarthy and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.  Ubiquity
suggests that there will always be another context in which Nazis are referenced and 
another example in which Nazism is evoked to provide a definition of evil.  The one’s I 
provide are simply demonstrative of a trend in mass culture, an establishment of the 
length of time in which that trend has been evident, and a description of the way that 




provide a wide enough base for my argument in order to support concerns about inclusive 
representation, historical attitudes, and contemporary attitudes without their becoming 
too facile to serve due to the limited scope of the examples.  I am producing a means by 
which to study Nazi analogies within American culture, ethical systems based in analogy, 
and the dependence that mass American culture has on ethical systems based in analogy. 
By necessity, I am attempting a much larger critique of America’s context dependent 
attitudes by showing their paradoxical reliance on a fixed and essential value.
No study of this kind has yet been produced to explain America’s compulsion 
towards reproducing the image of Nazism decades after Nazi Germany’s defeat.  As I’ve 
already mentioned, the work of Siegfried Kracuaer provides a kind of foundation for my 
own but ends where my own work begins.  Saul Friedlander has done notable work on 
the post-war fascination with the Nazi figure in Reflections of Nazism: an Essay on 
Kitsch and Death, but his work concentrates on the unique position of postwar Germany 
and its attempt to rescue its traditions from the rhetorical ploys of Hitler and his cronies.  
Similarly, a considerable body of scholarship exists concerning the Holocaust and 
American culture, but these works generally focus on Jewish identity, the potential 
problems with mass producing images of atrocity, and the aftereffects of widespread 
trauma.  They are only marginally concerned with representations of the perpetrators, 
especially representations for which historical accuracy is not a consideration. 
There are numerous works to which my own is second cousin, particularly works that 
deal with the Holocaust in mass culture.  I owe a great deal to these works, but in some
ways, this book is a response to the erroneous assumption that America’s fascination with 




America’s mass cultural ethical language predates the modern understaing of the Nazi 
atrocities as crimes predominantly against Jews by many years, arguably even decades.  
The success of Schindler’s List (1993) was likely owed to a national fascination wi h the 
Holocaust.  The success of The Dirty Dozen (1967) likely was not.  Even now, post-
Schindler’s List and the National Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C., Nazi analogies 
are still employed and often without any overt reference to the Holocaust whatsoever.  
Are opponents of national health care insisting that President Obama wants to kill 6 
million Americans when they call him a Nazi? 
Part of the confusion about what is implied by a reference to the Nazis, Nazi 
Germany, or Hitler owes to the protean meaning of Nazism in American mass culture.  
Nazism is sometimes linked directly to the Holocaust.  Other times, it implies invasive 
imperialism, other times totalitarianism, and still other times authoritarianism.  Moreover, 
the specific history of Nazism, particularly their atrocities and their defeat by American 
forces have made Nazis symbols for human rights violations in general as well  
powerful symbols in America’s arguments about its own national virtue.   
Finally, even the definition of Nazism is confused in this rhetoric.  While the use of 
Hitler or Auschwitz obviously refer to a cultural definition of Nazism, but terms like 
fascism, totalitarianism, and nationalism are far less obvious.  The latter term has come to 
mean militant patriotism and is most often ascribed to terrorist sensibilities.  The Irish 
Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organization are nationalist 
organizations as is Storm Front and the Ku Klux Klan.  Yet, while nationalism is often 




enthusiastically referred to themselves as Black Nationalists suggesting that they either 
ignored the implication or invited it.   
Because Nazism is a nationalist ideology (it professes the superiority of the German 
people to all other people and the German nation to all other nations) arguments about 
nationalism employ references to Nazism, and vise versa, with such frequency that the 
two terms seem indistinguishable.  Likewise, fascism is essentially the sam  as Nazism in 
the American imagination and is used interchangeably with Nazism even in rhetoric 
employed  as early as in speeches immediately following the Second World War.  
These terms, however, are as subject to change as the meaning of Nazism to which
they refer.  Fascism sometimes means right wing nationalism (as it does for Angela 
Davis, for instance), other times, it means anti-democratic principles (as it does for 
Theodore Adorno), and other times, it means obsession with rules or procedures.  In most 
cases, it means its meaning can shift between all three in a single work.   
The definitions of these words are, then, contingent upon another definition, Nazism, 
the meaning of which is the subject of this work.  To be fascist, to be a nationalist or 
totalitarian, has meant different things at different times, but it has generally denoted a 
reference to Nazism which has, itself, meant different things at different times.  Thus, the 
bulk of this work is devoted to elucidating the changes in Nazism’s meaning as it is used
in American mass culture. 
In my first chapter, Reductio Ad Hitlerum Ad Nauseum:  Finding the Meaning of Nazi 
Analogies for American Culture, I discuss the theoretical concerns that relate to, or are 
necessitated by, my argument concerning the interplay between context dependent 




problems evoked by this study:  my assumptions about the possibility of a unifying 
feature in American culture which undergird my presumptions, and second my 
management of logical paradox that is inherently produced from the subject matter.   
In this chapter, I address the repercussions from my consciously making claims about 
American culture as a singularity.  What I am specifically suggesting is that there is a 
shared value for American ethics and, therefore, a commonality in American experiences.  
Ultimately, in studies of American culture, suggesting unification of natio l culture, 
even as singular as its ethics, is taboo—a transgression of rules put in place for good 
reason.  Nonetheless, my argument is not about a subgroup within America, and it is 
certainly not about one aspect of American life.   
In a very restricted sense (that of American ethics as evidenced in national medi  and 
their operation for national, activist, and identity politics), I am, in fact, making 
assumptions about a shared experience by Americans:  the belief that Nazis are evil nd 
the belief that their evil is not dependent on context.  Of course, there are always 
exceptions.  Nonetheless, an argument that concerns ubiquity in culture, by necessity 
must show saturation within that culture—the capacity for Nazi analogy to appear 
appropriate no matter the context in which it is made.  
In order to create the history of America’s imagination, as represented by its mass 
media, then, I first address the concerns about American myths (how they are made and 
what they come to mean) and then provide a description of the analytical process 
necessitated by culture-wide phenomena such as these myths.  In particular, this method 




mythological system of ethical meaning making.  By comparing real action to 
assumptions related to the myth, ethics are analogously generated. 
I use established cultural theory to address the rather significant problem of paradox 
resultant from talking about essentialist truth within a context dependent system 
especially through the evocation of epitome.  Epitome implies an essential etern l truth 
which has been epitomized—the kind of essential value that Benjamin suggested was 
once accessible through art.  Postwar America has tended towards context-dependent 
descriptions of influence, and essentialism has been made to bear the stigma of nostlgia: 
it recalls a naïve age when people believed in such things as Truth and Justice, Good and 
Evil.  Nonetheless, I am arguing that at the heart of context dependent evaluation is n 
appeal to essentialism through the ethical epitome of Nazism; far from clai ing that 
paradox dissolves America’s ethical system, I am arguing that American ethics is fueled 
by it.   
To describe this process, I utilize critical positions that reconcile systms of essential 
value with systems of context-dependent values—namely the philosophies of neo-
pragmatism and postmodernism in which values, and therefore diametric opposition, are 
rooted in utility and the occasions of language.  I do not take either of these philoso cal 
positions at their extremes, which would suggest either that I am examining the 
appearance or function of paradox instead of its reality.  Instead, I posit the real n ed to 
navigate a paradox, and suggest tactics to be employed in this navigation.  Ultimately, 
though, the paradox remains and must be recognized if not reconciled.  The remaining 
chapters bear out these maneuvers and their repercussions through the history of postwar 




Finally, much of the reason that theoretical frameworks are so heavily relied on in 
this dissertation is related to the scope of the argument being made.  Suggesting that 
Nazism as an ethical trope in mass American culture would suggest finding evidence of 
that trope and explaining those evidentiary moments, but claiming that the trope is 
ubiquitous in the sense that it is available to any mass American argument or depiction of 
evil, and that this availability has meant that the trope is put to use with increasi g 
frequency and scope is to suggest that there are likely to be countless examples of 
Nazism being used in the manner I am describing.  Part of my larger argument concerns 
scope of use and overuse precisely because of cultural saturation.  Theoretical 
frameworks are necessary, then, to describe the countless examples that simply could not 
be included for reasons of space.  I have put the theoretical concerns in place to show 
how one might read Dr. Strangelove, for instance, but the implication is that that same 
methodology can be used to read the other cultural artifacts, as valid as Dr. Strangelove, 
that could not be addressed here. 
In a sense, I am creating a theoretical system by synthesizing the ideas present in 
various cultural theorists, thinkers, and artists to create a single method that can be 
applied and then proving, through its application, its validity.  I am not, however, 
choosing examples at random.  The Nazi analogies discussed throughout this work were 
chosen to not only show the validity of the evaluative system but to also show history of 
an ever widening scope for Nazi analogies.  They then perform a kind of triple duty by 
showing a system of evaluation in practice, to show the proliferation of Nazi analogies, 




Chapter two, From Hun to Holocaust:  America’s Depictions of Nazism Before and 
After Camp Liberation, describes context dependent evaluation as a reaction against 
fascism and elucidates the particulars of that reaction’s process.  In particular, I look at 
fiction’s reactions to essentialism in general, and Nazism in particular, prewar and then 
the postwar change in those reactions.  My goal is to make plain the shift in political and 
ethical climate against the belief in essential truths, and to give some indication of how 
that particular shift came about.  The language of this shift is one of utopian and 
dystopian visions—how does America envision in its mass disseminated sources, the 
notion of a perfect world, or more commonly, its vision of a world set to self destruct 
because of its values. 
The history of Nazi analogy is utilized in this chapter by first looking at the ways in 
which mass American culture’s version of the Nazi developed, how they were utilizd in 
the war (Nazi analogies used to describe Nazis in wartime propaganda), and the ways in 
which aspects of this depiction became difficult to reconcile with the self-image America 
disseminated in the agencies of its postwar mass culture. 
Chapter three, America Über Alles:  The Lure and the Danger of Postwar American 
Patriotism, looks to fiction to provide a description of how America moves from one 
kind of utopian vision in which traditional values are seen as leading to a better world to 
another kind of utopian vision in which those same traditional values engender disaster, 
corruption and tragedy.  The goal of this chapter is to provide a counterpoint to the 
impending sense of American patriotic valor that increasingly describes Am rica’s 




Chapter Four, The Third Reich and the Red Menace: The Use of Nazis in American 
Anti-Communist Propaganda, concerns America’s national narrative and its usage of 
Nazism as an epitome of evil, especially as it concerns the fabrication of patri tism for 
the purpose of justifying war and demonizing Communism as the enemy.  Whereas 
chapter two and three examine the use of Nazism to endorse explanations of aberrant 
behavior through influential contexts and the critique of evaluation through essentiali m, 
the fourth chapter describes the transformation of the national myth concerning Naz 
Germany through its various uses against non-Nazis, which are, because of analogy, 
imbued with Nazi evil.  If Nazis are the result of the stories told about them, then they 
become, also, the result of stories told about non-Nazis that evoke Nazism in analogy.  
Namely through the auspice of “totalitarianism,” Nazism is used to demonize its political 
opposite:  communism, thus, the definition of Nazism becomes informed by stories told 
about communists.  The process of castigating the non-Nazi enemy according to an 
ethical epitome has already been described in theoretical and fictional terms.  The 
historical record of this process, through its utilization in Cold War propaganda, validates 
the theoretical assumptions and provides real world political examples of the process 
within mass American culture. 
Chapter five, The Matinee War: Selling the War Against Communism with World 
War II, continues this process by examining the use of Nazism for America’s fight 
against Communism against the backdrop of the popularity of World War II narratives 
within the popular culture of that era.  The analysis demonstrates that, since the close of 




Nazi Germany so as to raise support for whatever conflict it finds itself in, eve  when the 
nation’s enemies bear no resemblance to their Nazi stand-ins. 
Chapter six, Nazism, McCarthyism, and the Counterculture:  The Place of Race in 
Nazi Analogies, examines the use of Nazism in American domestic political language.  
By first showing how the anti-Communist community rooted out its traitors utilizing a 
revised definition of Nazism as an epitome of evil, I show how completely this ethical 
language is diffused throughout American culture.  Its use within the official language of 
the American state allows for the use of Nazism as a mechanism of Cold War prop ganda 
both at home and abroad.  In this sixth chapter, however, I begin to widen the usage of 
Nazism to extend to non-state sponsored political movements—the definition of Nazism 
becomes the result of political language like that used in McCarthyism, civil rights 
activism, and anti-war protest.   
Chapter seven, The Repercussions of Ubiquity: A Context for Every Evil and an Evil 
for Every Context, shows American political organizations and their use of Nazism 
against their enemies:  often counting the American state or “establishment” within that 
number.  By utilizing the rhetoric of the civil rights and nuclear disarmament movements, 
I show how easily any group can adopt the Nazi as their own for describing their 
enemies.  Through these examples, I demonstrate that the Nazis characteristics are 
subject to flux depending on the issues for which they are utilized.  Most importantly, I 
show that historical accuracy is not needed for this utilization.  The Nazis of American 
rhetoric need only bear passing resemblance to the Nazis of history. 
Chapter seven serves to show the scope of Nazism’s use and the resulting effacement 




issues directly related to Nazism to, second, utilizing Nazism to demonize American 
enemies to, third, American organizations’ use of Nazism to demonize their enemies to, 
fourth, individual use of Nazism to demonize personal enemies, the end result of these 
comparisons is that anyone can bring up Nazism to castigate whatever opponents or 
positions they wish to protest.   
The meaning of Nazism, stretched to fit every instance of its evocation, becomes 
facile, as does the meaning of evil itself through Nazism’s use as an epitom of evil.  
Nazism loses its significance as an essential evil and takes on a value dependent to the 
argument in which it is evoked.  Paradoxically, the frequency of its utilization betrays the 
belief that Nazism is still essential—it must be; otherwise, it wouldn’t be put to such 
widespread usage.     
Nazism’s position reveals two paradoxes at the center of American ethics, the same 
two paradoxes discovered early on by Chaplin and Benjamin.  The first is that the move 
away from inherent values was a reaction to the Nazism’s essentialist ch racter, but that 
the resultant system required Nazism for stability.  This is the paradox of the Jewish 
barber who preaches universal tolerance as a position intolerant of Nazi intolera ce.  
Second, though Nazism as an epitome of evil has provided stability for a system which 
changes depending on evaluative context, overuse has quietly removed that stability.  The 
result is that America’s obligatory definition of evil has become divorced from its ethical 
or historical validity.   It is, as Benjamin predicts, the sum of the testimony (however 
fantastic) about its history, and not of the history itself.   
To examine this paradox, chapter seven examines two varieties of texts: first, texts 




satirize the implication of that personal invective for American culture.  The first variety 
of texts is utilized especially to highlight the confused nature of ethics when the position 
of evil is epitomized by Nazism in sources which nationally disseminate American 
culture.  The satirical texts lay bare the structure of this confusion—why it occurs, its 
causes, and so on.  The second and seventh chapter bookend the subject, in that ethics 
turn away from essential values because of the damage they wreaked upon the landscape 
of ethics worldwide through the Nazi atrocities, and the last chapter shows how context
dependent ethical evaluation has all but eliminated mass American culture’s capacity to 
make any ethical evaluation whatsoever.    
If, as Benjamin posited, ethics in the age of mechanical reproduction began to wane 
with the loss of individual access to transcendent values like good and evil, and continued 
its decline through the corresponding endorsement of statewide definitions of ethics, then 
the final step of this decline has been the replacement of ethics with politics: truth with 
propaganda, and inequity with its exemplar.  Finally, when mass produced, even the 
exemplar evil of Nazism loses meaning, leaving only the vaguest notion of evil to prompt 
ethical evaluations, but not enough to give those evaluations any validity.   
American culture is, thus, surrounded by evils which it is at odds to identify with 
consensus.  While personal definitions are still perfectly valid in private beliefs, without a 
social impetus of a conglomerate definition of evil to act against, public acts of refutation 
and activism are rendered impotent through an ever growing multitude of contexts with 
equal claims to attention.  All arguments have equal claim to utilize the Nazis to 




repetition to the point of ubiquity, have become also obligatory; their significance muted 




CHAPTER 1  
REDUCTIO AD HITLERUM AD NAUSEUM:  FINDING THE MEANING OF NAZI 
ANALOGIES FOR AMERICAN CULTURE 
 
In the public arenas of the Internet, the inevitability of Nazi analogy is described by 
an adage known as Godwin’s Law.  Named for Mike Godwin who originally coined the 
phrase in 1990, the law states:  “As a Usenet discussion grows longer, the probability of a 
comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1,” or put another way, the longer any 
debate runs, the greater the likelihood that Nazis will be mentioned.  Still in use, Usen t 
is a forerunner to Internet posting boards, chatrooms, and similar on-line features in 
which participants post comments and reply to others’ comments on nearly any subject 
conceivable.  Godwin’s law is used to determine when a Usenet discussion has 
effectively ended and when participation has devolved into mud slinging. 
According to the Usenet Frequently Asked Questions archive: 
 [Nazis] are generally considered the most evil group of people to live in 
modern times, and to compare something or someone to them is usually 
considered the gravest insult imaginable…As a Usenet discussion gets 
longer it tends to get more heated; as more heat enters the discussion, 
tensions get higher and people start to insult each other over anything they 
can think of.  Godwin's Law merely notes that, eventually, those tensions 
eventually cause someone to find the worst insults that come to mind - 
which will almost always include a Nazi comparison.  (Skirvin) 
 
The applicability of Godwin’s Law is partly a product of its context.  As Skirvin points 
out, Usenet is often the site of heated debate and the voicing of unpopular opinion.  They 
and their contemporary electronic descendents also serve as public meeting places for 
strangers and for people who know each other only through their online presences. 




as a sane and decent member of society (or lack of that reputation) cannot normally be 
damaged by things said online because identities are hidden behind user names and a lack 
of physical presence.  The existence of Godwin’s law suggests, however, that people who 
could take any position whatsoever without fear of real world repercussions still 
acknowledge the evil of Nazism.  Even in these circumstances of total anonymity, a 
reference to Nazism always devolves the conversation.    
Much of the reason that arguments on Internet posting can turn into the trading of 
vicious insult is because of this anonymity.  The lack of social constraint, hallmark of 
Internet communication, often translates into a lack of personal restraint, the casualties of 
which are the shared cultural values that would guide social interaction in normal 
circumstances.  In this environment, Godwin’s Law works because, as people argue over 
values that they do not share, abandoning more and more of the rules of social decorum 
and debate, their need increases for some touchstone position that is uncontestable and 
above reproach—a stable set of values that everyone can recognize, even as all other 
social values fall away.  Those engaged in online debate desperately finds themselves in 
need of something to which they can appeal which will instantaneously decide, however 
tenuously, between right and wrong.  Thus, as values become less and less stable in the 
online argument, the greater the likelihood that someone will bring up Nazis, Hitleror 
Nazism in order to artificially concretize morality.  The result is, of course, either that 
whatever is compared to Nazism, becomes like Nazism, and therefore wrong, or in 
supporting something that shares a similarity to Nazism, one’s opponent is marked as 




Godwin’s Law is successful at predicting human behavior only because Nazis are 
popularly recognized as evil—popular enough for this recognition to have a 
colloquialism associated with it.  Godwin’s Law would not work if this recognition were 
not widespread throughout the culture of those on the Internet.  It would not work, for 
instance, if one did not recognize that being like a Nazi is bad.  Nazis are referenc d with 
such frequency because it is commonly acknowledged that whatever is like the Nazis, 
however tenuous the connection, is deemed morally wrong.  Moreover, a denial of this 
logic carries with it the stigma of Nazi sympathies.  One must, in effect, either accept or 
acknowledge others’ acceptance that Nazis are evil lest one be branded evil as well.  If 
this were not all true, one could not trust Godwin’s Law to work.   
This is not to suggest that the Internet does not have its share of blatant anti-Semites.  
While identification with Nazism is, unfortunately, common enough practice on the 
Internet, the reaction to electronic Nazi sympathizers is never serious debate.  In fact, to 
be taken seriously on the Internet one must avoid being branded as acting like a Nazi and, 
therefore, being dismissed out of hand.  According to Skirvin’s description of Godwin’s 
law, debate with Neo-Nazis is “probably the quickest path to getting Nazi invocations, 
because, well, they’re actually accurate.”  Skirvin goes on to caution against use of Nazi 
analogy with Neo-Nazis because, “it’s not terribly original and they’ll probably get off on 
it anyway.”  This seems to indicate that, at least from Skirvin’s point of view, the Neo-
Nazis are as cognizant of what it means to be compared to Nazis as anyone else is, except 
that their reaction to the insult is one of encouragement rather than outrage.  They, too, 
understand what Nazis mean in dominant culture (even if it is a condition to which they 




The existence of Godwin’s Law suggests that participants in Internet communication 
understand what Nazis are, that whatever Nazis are, they are evil, that whatever is like the 
Nazis is evil as well, and that failure to understand these axioms indicates sympathies 
with Nazism and is, therefore, also evil.  What it suggests, also, is that Nazism has taken 
on a folk value which is equivalent to evil and that widespread use of this value suggests 
that it is popularly recognizable—that one does not need to understand much about Nazis, 
their history or their politics, in order to accept their ethical equivalence to evil.  
These same sentiments hold true for terms which are generally associated with 
Nazism including obvious terms like ‘Final Solution,’ ‘genocide,’ ‘Auschwitz,’ ‘I was 
only following orders,’ etc., and for less obvious but related terms like ‘fascism’ and 
‘nationalism.’  In terms of how they are used, fascism and Nazism are almost 
interchangeable, rhetorically, such that, for instance, black nationalist and activist Angela 
Davis may speak of the American prison system as a tool for fascists resembling a 
concentration camp.  Strangely enough, ‘nationalism,’ when used as a pejorative, implies
a deviant loyalty to one’s country akin to that of the Nazis and generally denoting 
terrorist-like sensibilities.  The term ‘nationalism’ has, however, another complementary 
meaning which implies simply patriotism:  its meaning depends wholly on its usage. 
Instead, the equivalence between Nazism (and related terminology) and the ethical 
value of evil is based on current cultural values provided by sources like history, but also 
sources like blockbuster movies, television shows, comic books, the rhetoric of political 
and private organizations, and of course, the Internet.  Moreover, as there are no other 
forms of Godwin’s Law, no other laws pertaining to widespread equivalences with evil 




other acts or actors is relative to context.  There is no law like Godwin’s Law pertaining 
to extreme moral transgressions like rape or child molestation, for instance1.  Finally, 
Godwin’s Law covers the usage of Nazism specifically because it is an ethically stable 
position; on-line communicants use Nazism, and only Nazism, to dictate a moral position 
precisely because all other moral positions are up for debate.  Indeed, what Godwin’s 
Law suggests is that Nazism, and Nazism exclusively, is available to a wide audience as a 
description of evil for an ethical system wherein descriptions of evil are, otherwise, 
contestable and immediately unavailable through any agency other than through a 
comparison to Nazism. 
Godwin’s Law is itself a computerized version of the logical fallacy, Reductio ad 
Hitlerum, coined in 1953 by Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History:   
Unfortunately, it does not go without saying that in our examination we 
must avoid the fallacy that in the last decades has frequently been used as 
a substitute for the reductio ad absurdum: the reductio ad Hitlerum. A 
view is not refuted by the fact that it happens to have been shared by 
Hitler. 
 
While Godwin’s law may locate the logical fallacy for a computer age, Struass’s reductio 
ad Hitlerum suggests that the problems associated with comparisons to Nazism have 
plagued American ethics since the beginning of World War II.  Strauss’s fallacy has all 
the same implications as Godwin’s Law but elevates them beyond the scope of 
cyberspace and into all of postwar American culture.  As both Godwin’s Law and the 
reductio Ad Hitlerum cite logical fallacies, both dictate a kind of argument that lacks 
cogency.  Outside of concerns about appropriateness, however, the existence of these 
fallacies, and their special designation suggests a habitual dependence on Nazism as an 




usage precisely because the tendency to conflate Nazism and evil through epitomeis 
widespread. 
The frequency of this usage of Nazism demands investigation and analysis, as the 
ethics created through this system are indicative of the nature of a shared cultural va ue 
and the ethical beliefs it engenders.  Namely, it suggests that American culture, like the 
participants in online discussions, is without stable ethics, and that Nazis, whatever they 
are in this system, provide stability in that they are always evil. 
This ethical system is rife with paradoxes.  American ethics create a presumably 
stable definition of evil through comparison to Nazism but its source for these Nazis is, 
itself, given to change from being evoked in a variety of disparate contexts. This practice 
of ethical evaluation through analogy is problematic also in that it resembles the method 
of ethical evaluation practiced by the Nazis themselves: historically, Nazis created their 
ethics by equating Jews with evil and then utilizing comparison—Bolshevists were, for 
instance, condemned as Judao-Boshevists.  What does it suggest about those who make 
similar comparisons to those made by the Nazis except by using Nazism as the definition 
of evil?  Does it matter that the subjects of comparison are Nazis rather than Jews?  Are 
such comparisons inherently evil, or is this another instance of the reduction ad Hitlerum 
fallacy?  Finally, the usage here is defined by its scope—Strauss suggest that the 
comparison is available and recognizable nationally, and in this way it suggests 
something about American national character, but exploration of national character in this 
manner has become passé and somewhat taboo.  It runs dangerously close to the 
nationalism touted in Nazi ideology.  The nation’s ethical ambivalence (such that it 




against fascist ethics (comparative ethics like those described by Godwin’s Law and the 
reduction ad Hitlerum fallacy).  Nazism’s presence within America’s ethics accentuates 
the inability of an anti-Nazi ethical system to escape Nazism as a comparative.   
This study of Nazism as an ethical epitome is, then, a response to the growing belief 
that subjectivity and moral relativity is, first, possible, and, second, universally 
acknowledged as being better than belief in and reliance upon essentialist and immutable 
values.  It is not, however, an endorsement of either.  Instead, my work has two 
fundamental goals:  the philosophical and the cultural.  My philosophical goal is to 
illustrate three major points in this shift.   First, this increase of skepticism oncerning 
essentialist values comes from a particular historical break with essentialism (caused by 
the Nazi atrocities and the ideological philosophy that motivated those atrocities).  
Second, the subjective view put forward as an alternative to essentialist evaluation can 
not be sustained without reference to some fixed value (Nazism as evil).  Third, a 
subjective system cannot help but alter, through overuse, the supposedly fixed value upon 
which it relies for evaluation (Nazism signifying evil but otherwise having no other fixed 
value or meaning).  In essence, I’m providing reasons for the postwar shift in utopian and 
dystopian visions, from the conservative to the liberal, and arguing against the possibility 
for the moral subjectivity by showing how that subjectivity has ultimately undermin d its 
own system of evaluation, allowing it to be replaced by nationalist virtue at best (a 
condition it hoped to replace) and total moral confusion at worst.   
To illustrate these points, I explore the usage of Nazism as an ethical metaphor 




irony as an ideological tool and Baudrillard’s opposite assertion of liberalism s 
dystopian through its association with simulation and the hyperreal. 
The second goal of this work, its cultural goal, is to demonstrate how the national 
definition of ethics, culled from the revelation of the Nazi atrocities, have sinchaped 
major foreign and domestic events in America.  By describing a national definition of 
good, evil, right, wrong, the proper, and the improper, I necessarily shed new light on the 
underlying assumptions of American movements and events from such disparate subjects 
as the protests of anti-war demonstrators, the rhetoric of arm’s buildup, the speeche of 
civil rights activists, the arguments concerning national health care, the justifications 
provided for the Red Scare, etc.   
I do not see my two goals, the philosophical and the cultural, as separable.  History 
bears out the philosophical and theoretical concerns that I address just as that same theory 
and philosophy is chosen precisely because of how easily it is suggested by the history.  
They are complementary such that the scope of the project requires an analysis of a 
fundamental American value system and the analysis on a fundamental value system 
demands the project’s scope. 
This leads naturally to assertions about the role assigned the United States through e 
process of its evaluations.  However mythological the representation of Nazis become in 
these analogies, America’s vision of itself in relation to the Nazis is unique:  according to 
its national myth, America saved the world from the evils of Nazism.  Thus these 
reminders of evil serve not only as a reminder of the Nazi’s evil but also of America’s 
virtue.  Thus a study of Nazism as an ethical epitome within the culture of America is 




American culture.  The first problem that must be faced is the manner in which Nazism’s 
role creates shared national value and the way that his national value is to be recnciled, 
theoretically, with the contentious belief in studies of American culture that shared 
national value is the elitist, racist, sexist precursor to belligerent patriotism and 
nationalism.  In general, this contention is characterized in studies of American culture by 
the reaction against a single unifying methodology as a symptom of a single unifying 
imperialistic and exclusive definition of an American experience.  
In 1957, when Henry Nash Smith first posed his now canonical question: “Can 
American Studies Develop a Method,” the answer was a celebratory “no.”  The study of 
American culture, past and present, as a whole, “requires its scholars to move across 
cultural and academic boundaries in order to cull together the subject for their study with 
the end result of questioning power structures like, for instance, a unified method” (Smith 
197).  Since Nash, the study of American culture has been defined by this lack of method 
with a greater and greater sense of celebration.   
The inaugural speeches given by the various ASA presidents over the years, for 
example, have actively lionized the inability for the discipline to come together under o e 
large methodological umbrella.  Denise Radway in her 1998 presidential address to the 
American Studies Association commented on the work now being done by American 
Studies by saying, “this new work has insisted on the importance of difference and 
division within American history, on the significance of "dissensus," in Sacvan 
Bercovitch's suggestive phrase” (2)  Patricia Nelson Limerick, two years prior to 
Radway, offered in her friendly style, upon her inauguration into the ASA’s presidential 




the more conventional neighborhoods, the sanctuary for displaced hearts and minds, the 
place where no one is fully at ease” (451).  Michael Frisch, taking that same podium in 
2000, offered, “Instead of focusing diversity into the laser's concentrated and powerful 
stream, the prism [as a model for cultural studies] deconstructs a beam into its constituent 
spectrum, allowing us to inquire into the composition, distribution, and relationships of 
its various components” (194).  It is as if the study of American culture, so keen on 
disrupting monolithic social power structures, is obsessively afraid of becoming ne 
itself. 
To answer “yes” to Smith’s question, then, is the mark of scholarship working outside 
the discipline, and also strangely aligned with the spirit of dissonance upon which the 
discipline is built—an assertion of consensus is a refusal to cooperate with the scolars 
who refuse to cooperate.  The idea of a single method has, however, always been part of 
the discipline’s description of itself, even when it became the mantel the discipline’s 
scholars refused to don—a definition in negative like defining goodness as the opposite 
of being like a Nazi.  The discipline of American Studies has defined itself as an attempt 
to figure out the limits of America as a collection of cultural values, if only to celebrate 
complicating, or even the impossibility of locating, those boundaries.  The problem of a 
method is part of the scholarly tradition precisely because it is so compelling.   
As George Lipsitz points out in his essay, “In The Midnight Hour,” when our 
traditional views of space confront and disturb our notions of achieving social justice, 
“older narratives about national identity, citizenship, and subjectivity do not 
disappear…but they do become recontextualized in emerging understandings, ideas, an  




re-contextualizing it in the rhetoric that has followed since Nash.  In particul , I am 
turning the American Studies argument against itself by offering that those scholars who 
operate under the assumption that there is no shared method are, themselves, utilizing 
that precise position as the shared starting point for all their methods.  For them to b  
against method, then, is to accept a provisional, rather narrow, and ultimately 
unacknowledged definition of method.  I am simply calling out their methodless method 
as a method, though in acknowledging it, I cannot help but invite complications so 
vigorous as to be self-denying.  
For the success of this effort, then, I must appeal to a theoretical base which can 
encapsulate diametrically opposed theoretical positions to deal with a paradoxical method 
that is definitively against method.  To put forward an argument about a unifying 
characteristic of the American experience, my analysis of American culture operates in 
the spirit of irony, as described by Richard Rorty, to provide a utilitarian position for 
cultural theory.  His suggestion is that the absence of dogmatic truth—the belief that one 
idea or value is always correct or incorrect—taken to the level of belief structure, leaves 
only pragmatic value for what were once held as truisms.   
If we could bring ourselves to accept the fact that no theory about the 
nature of Man or Society or Rationality, or anything else, is going to 
synthesize Nietzsche with Marx or Heidegger with Habermas, we could 
begin to think of the relation between writers on autonomy and writers on 
justice as being like the relation between two kinds of tools—as little in 
need of synthesis as are paintbrushes and crowbars. (Rorty xiv) 
 
Nothing for Rorty has Truth, but anything might become useful in context.  Forwarding 
mutually exclusive ideas, then, does not result in a paradox because they are not 




Irony, as Rorty describes it, is already an important feature in studies of American 
culture:  thus, the divisiveness of the scholarship over a definition of America or the 
method to study it.  But Rorty’s irony also calls for an interrogation of the basic notion 
that the absence of method is a disciplinary necessity.  Should the right need aris  (the 
right subject need to be studied), it may prove useful to, instead, accept a disciplinary 
method, and accordingly, criteria for recognizing national character.   
The use of Nazism as an ethical comparative in the nationally disseminated mass 
culture suggests a popular ethical system rooted in America’s defeat of Nazi Germany.  
In this system, Nazism is seen as the epitome of evil, and the act of defeating Nazi 
Germany and, therefore, America’s victory are seen as inherently Good.  I am proposing 
that ethics rooted in this belief are culturally American and provide a common element in 
the rhetoric of ethics. Common acknowledgement of the Nazis as evil binds together th  
nation’s various cultures into a single provisional culture and allows for an analysis of 
America’s ethical character.   
As what I’m describing is a “national narrative” (even if only in the particularly 
special case of post-World War II American ethics), I would like to emphasize the 
problems associated with this term in anticipation of the kinds of arguments I will 
necessarily have to make in its defense.  Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., in his description of the 
beginnings of the move away from the idea of national narrative in history states, “he 
exemplary works [of American Studies] have moved from stressing the American mind’s 
basic homogeneity and uniformity of the American character to noting the diversity of 
the American population and divisiveness of the American experience” (589).  Certainly 




decentralization of culture, but it is not altogether clear that all aspects of the American 
character are necessarily susceptible to this divisiveness.   
Berkhofer describes a general prejudice against a unifying definition by replacing 
essentialist value with his term “contextual fundamentalism,” but his description 
otherwise betrays the original meaning that supposedly no longer serves. 
At the heart of contextual fundamentalism is the premise that documents, 
artifacts, or texts are basically self-interpreting without recourse to any 
explicit framework. As practice, such an approach acts as if the text’s 
words or the artifact’s existence were determinative, that is conceptually 
coercive, of the “reading” they are to receive—regardless of the reader’s 
values, politics, interpretive paradigm, or interpretive community.  Thus 
“facts” are discovered, not created or constituted by the frameworks that 
enable their existence.  (Berkhofer 589) 
 
Berkhofer, by using terms like “determinative” and “conceptually coerciv ,” clearly 
means foundational—a point of definition in utero.  His description of contextual 
fundamentalism harkens to a point before the explication of text or the application of 
context—it is his name for essentialism.  He cannot, however, escape the verbiage:  he 
phrases the lack of context as a symptom of context by suggesting that meaning is 
coerced and that its context is a fundamental.  Thus instead of meaning being a-
contextual, as it is for an essential value, it is “contextually fundamental.”  What is the 
context under consideration in this fundamentalism?  Existence?  
Berkhofer, locked in a context dependent evaluative mode is at odds to describe the 
evaluative modes that belong to other “contexts.”  As Rorty points out,  
“The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time 
honored vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that very 
vocabulary.  They are expected to show that central elements in that 
vocabulary are ‘inconsistent in their own terms’ or that they ‘deconstruct 





Berkhofer wants to recognize essentialism in his argument but he can’t do it because his 
language no longer will accept essentialism as anything but another context—a term that 
would, likewise, mean something else in an essentialist argument.  The mistake is not, of 
course, just Berkhofer’s to make, but represents an entire skewing of evaluation away 
from belief in essential truths and towards a reliance on explanatory contexts.  The hift is 
so dramatic that the re-writing of intellectual history becomes inevitable.  Sources once 
based on assumptions about transcendent truths are made to seem, because of alterations 
of language, to be supportive of a general skeptical position against such truths.  Rorty, 
himself, in expressing his point, maintains that the British romantic movement was an 
attempt to change social context through the faculty of imagination (7).  In suggestin  
this version of romanticism, he ignores the romantic belief, central to the argument of 
Walter Benjamin’s assessment of art before the age of mechanical reproduction, that 
imagination also served as a tether between human faculties and higher forces.  F 
Rorty, it’s not so much that “the world is too much with us, late and soon,” but rather that 
this world is too much with us (Wordsworth 515).  In terms of American romanticism, 
the transcendental holds only political implications and loses all access to the spiritual.  
Enlightenment which was seemingly the goal of both Thoreau and Emerson2, is reduced 
to a better sense of citizenship because in context dependent evaluation, there is no other 
state to which they can be enlightened.  The context of essentialism then becomes the 
hallmark of thinkers whose beliefs in evaluative systems have turned out to be naïve and 
essentially wrong. 
I use the word ‘essentially’ here on purpose, because the error of believing in 




is wrong in its entirety because it is founded upon faulty principles.  Those who believe 
in essential truth fail to understand, from the viewpoint of those who place their faith in 
evaluation through explanatory contexts, that all values are relative. Nominal ax omatic 
morality loses ground to the subjective, making claims about the nominal (and those who 
made them) false, accept that this exclusion requires the subjective, liberalcontext 
dependent position to make a single, paradoxically axiomatic, claim: there is no nominal 
truth.  This strange provision is resolvable only through the general climate of Rorty’s 
irony which prevents total philosophical usurpation by allowing for exceptions in the
name of utility. 
Berkhofer’s examination of contextual fundamentalism (what I call essentialism) 
hints that this same paradoxical process is also inherent to Nazism’s role as an pitome of 
evil for postwar American ethics:  as the ethics are dependent on the context in which 
they are explained, Nazism as an epitome is out of place, but as ethics require some 
nominal truth (some definition of evil) against which evaluations can be made, an 
epitome is needed for validation.  The context dependent system allows for one 
nominally true position: Nazis are inherently evil.  Notions of good and evil are 
conceptually coercive in ways that are no longer acceptable for a culture that prefers 
context dependency, but Nazism supplies an acceptable context for evil.  However, when 
used ubiquitously for American ethics, the evil of Nazism ceases to be context dep ndent 
and becomes definitive.  The occasion for contextualization becomes continuous and 
suffused throughout the culture’s ethical system.  Whatever is being compared to Nazism 
is necessarily compared to evil as well.  In this way, Nazism becomes evil’s epitome.  




comparisons to Nazism), the two terms become synonymous: evil and Nazism are the 
same thing. 
Rorty’s definition of irony allows room in American ethics for both concerns 
simultaneously: ethical evaluation that may be taken case by case, and an overarching, 
essential ethical force that creates value for all cases, but this imples the opposite use of 
irony from that which Rorty clearly intended.  The point he makes through his analysis is 
that the introduction of context dependent evaluation into essential systems is necessary 
for the creation of what he calls a liberal utopia; “one in which ironism, in the relevant 
sense, is universal” through ubiquitous deconstruction—including the deconstruction of 
deconstruction (Rorty xv). 3 But if ironism is the position where one’s beliefs are always 
provisional to the situation in which they are utilized, then there must always be a guard 
set up at the gates of this utopia.  Some appeal must be made to another characteristic, 
efficiency for instance, to decide which belief works best for a particular situation.   
This characteristic will have a methodology whether it is tautological or not.  As 
Voltaire famously said, “if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him.”  The 
same is true for the arbitrating power of any meta-rhetoric.  If one must decide, per 
situation, whether one should be an advocate of global citizenship or jingoist nationalism, 
like in the speech given by the Jewish barber at the end of Charlie Chaplin’s The Great 
Dictator, an appeal must be made to some value system.  If no methodology presents 
itself immediately, it too will need to be invented.  Chaplin, for instance, must, in his 
indictment of Nazism, focus on Hitler as a figure of brutality rather than of national 
prosperity—a delineation that is easier to support in 1940 than it would have been in 




neither position is true in the sense that compassion is always more important than social 
stability, but rather is valued depending on its circumstances. 
Rorty attempts to divorce this evaluation from outside reference to a world of value as 
a point of necessity in his rhetoric of irony.   
“When the notion of ‘description of the world’ is moved from the level of 
criterion-governed sentences within language games to languages games 
as wholes, games which we do not choose between by reference to 
criteria, the idea that the world decides which descriptions are true can no 
longer be given clear sense” (Rorty 5). 
 
This, however, can only serve to accentuate the function of value systems to decide 
between contested language games (meta-rhetoric, or the rhetorical system of rhetorical 
systems). If the world does not set in stone compassion as more important than social 
stability, then what system does?  Obviously, the context for Chaplin’s speech is 1940 
Germany.  The depression is over and the Nazis are brutally oppressing German Jws.  
Such a value system must appeal to precedent and, at the same time, will need to become 
mythic in its instructive nature because no meta-meta-rhetoric to legitimate it.  Though it 
is provisional, however, it cannot seem so or else lose its capacity to validate other 
provisional states.  Chaplin declares compassion as the antithesis of Nazism and makes it 
seem eternally more important then all other conditions.  In a sense, he performs a 
reduction ad Hitlerum which sets being like a Nazi as a mythical value signifying, and 
always signifying, evil. 
In his analysis of the Myth and Symbol school of studies of American culture, Bruce 
Kucklick asserts, “Symbols and myths at best reflect empirical fact:” experience of the 
world acts as the final arbitrator (436).  To use the above example, one may decide 




about greatest personal freedom for those involved, but then a provisional evaluative 
method will be needed to determine who is involved and how one measures personal 
freedom (and why personal freedom, after all?).  These evaluative system, too, will be 
dependent on the circumstances (context dependent) and will need another system to 
stand in judgment of each (and in judgment of each of those, and so on so long as the 
criteria are context dependent).  The system is already susceptible to infini e recursion, 
and only becomes more complicated if the meta-evaluative systems contradict the 
evaluated systems (say, for instance, if a global citizenship criterion is used to validate 
jingoist nationalism rather than the spirit of globalization).  In a universe of possibilities, 
the ad hoc philosophical positions are in danger of producing untenable evaluative 
statements, and even when tenable, no process of evaluation is self-terminating; without 
an essential value, it must always appeal to empiricism or to a higher authority (in his 
speech as the Jewish barber, Chaplin quotes from the gospel according to St. Luke).   
Rorty points out that “the temptation to look for criteria is a species of a more general 
temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature, an 
essence” (Rorty 6).  Rorty’s suggestion is that the belief in an essence is the product of a 
misguided world view, but then it is only through an appeal to essence that the non-
criteria based evaluative system can reach conclusions.  Despite his assertion that 
essentialism and context dependency can both be employed, it is clear that, for Rorty, 
essentialism only works if phrased out of context (he phrases it as a value that is, 
paradoxically, context dependent).   
Kucklick, in his critique of the humanist principles in early works within the 




humanists “have no immediate way of determining which states of consciousness are 
‘imaginative’ or ‘fantastic’ or ‘distorted’ or even ‘value laden’ for there is no standard to 
which the varying states of consciousness may be referred” (Kuklick 438).  There is a 
similarity at the extremes in that the believers in an intrinsic self have no criteria by 
which to dispel their dualism (they are confused to determine which essential to use for a 
specific context), and Rorty, who professes against a belief in the essential lf, 
disregards criteria as well because he cannot find an essential to determin  validity for 
any particular language system.  Rorty differs from Kucklick’s view of the humanists 
only in that he is celebratory—the lack of criteria isn’t a fault of the system but its 
predominant merit. The valueless world requires an infinitely open mind, and thus, the 
result is the liberal utopia espoused by Rorty and Chaplin’s Jewish barber. 
In order to make delineations of value, however, one must supplement Rorty’s 
pragmatism with a methodology of evaluating pragmatics in order to construct the liberal 
utopia.  As this methodology is both mythic and validated by empirical precedent, the 
utopian vision suffers the same concerns as elaborated by Warren I. Susman concerning 
the American intellectual’s use of historical narrative: 
The myths are sufficient to unify the whole, to answer the largely 
emotional needs of the members of the community and to provide, when 
necessary, the collective dreams of the society about the past, the present 
and the future in the same instant.  The myths “explain” all.  The function 
of myth is largely utopian: it provides a vision of the future without 
providing in and of itself any essential dynamic element which might 
produce the means for bringing about any changes in the present order of 
things. (244) 
 
Thus, Rorty’s liberal utopian vision is ultimately unattainable.  In attempting to ins igate 
such a vision, what becomes immediately apparent is how quickly the mythic position 




past to construct utopias, but as the moral precedent they employ to differentiate in the 
ironic mode is, for them, a product of nostalgia (a past with values that are no longer 
recognized), the result is dystopian—a future built on flawed present values.  
When some appeal is made to decide which framework will decide the difference 
between the right way of thinking and the wrong way, it must be produced in accordance 
with experiences of the past and the un-ironic position is simply pushed back a step.  For 
Chaplin, The Great Dictator as an appeal to a more liberal humanity with more open 
minds concerning the political climate of modernization relies completely on irony as 
Rorty understands it, but is absolutely un-ironic in that this irony is a reaction to the 
closed mindedness of the Nazis which Chaplin abhors.  
The introduction of Myth, here, solves the most pernicious of problems associated 
with contextualized history as presented by Berkhofer. However deep his skepticism 
concerning contextual fundamentalism, Berkhofer’s analysis is reminiscent of Walter 
Benjamin’s, especially as it concerns authenticity as the result of a capacity for historical 
testimonial—the effect that the story of history has on the authenticity of the historical 
event. Berkhofer writes:   
Such an approach to contextualism [contextual fundamentalism] 
postulates at bottom that a historical narrative is verified in its essential 
structure by its parallel in past reality. In the end the variant versions or 
interpretations could—and should—be reconciled as constituting a single 
(hi)story from a single viewpoint of presentation told by a single voice. 
This understanding of the past as the “Great Story” presumes that all the 
various documents and artifacts can—and should—be “woven” into some 
sort of overall story. (Berkhofer 590) 
 
Berkhofer’s protests are not that a historical narrative has an essential structure but that it 
is verified according to its ability to achieve a single essential storyabout the past (in this 




For Berkhofer, the single voice story misrepresents history whereas a multi-vocal 
version would be preferable.  The difference of values is based on essential criter:  his 
point is that contextual fundamentalism (essentialism) needs to be abandoned because it 
is essentially wrong.  His prejudice of language indicates skepticism towards all values 
determined by modes other than contextualization. History bears no essential truth; it is 
just a story (and a story is a kind of history).  Berkhofer chides the idea that multiple 
threads of narrative can be reconciled by setting off the word “woven” with quotation 
marks (thus marginalizing its meaning to irony and the superstitions of a woe beg tten 
age before this mystique-free era of American Studies).  Regardless, to decribe the 
philosophical drift towards subjectivity and pluralism requires that he acknowledge the 
very characteristic, essence, which he hopes to refute. 
Despite his prejudices against essentialism, however, his ultimate point is that the 
things of history are actually concerns, not of the past, but of the present.  History is n t 
the thing that happened; it is the story we tell about the thing that happened:  the myth 
(the inauthentic myth according to Benjamin).  In reality, even the event lacks the power 
of verification since there’s no guarantee that the witnesses of history will emain alive to 
tell what really happened and no guarantee that their story will be what really happened 
should they have survived to tell it.   
For the cultural critic, the real purpose of history is to analyze it as if it too were a 
kind of story being told in the present—a modern day rendition of a past event told as a 
kind of period piece.  Thus, the stories told about Nazis are less important for their 
creating a kind of historical verity but rather for their capacity to tell us about the culture 




stories in this way.  Chaplin’s Hynkel isn’t a caricature of the Hitler of Nazi Germany, 
but the Hitler of Nazi Germany as America imagines the place.  The image of the Nazi, 
so seemingly rooted in history, becomes a kind of Rorschach test for America’s ethical
psyche.  That Hynkel is historically inauthentic wouldn’t matter to Berkhofer—Hynkel is 
authentic to a different evaluative system based on mass cultural desires. 
What views of history like Berkhofer’s cannot account for, however, is that if history 
is used by the culture to generate epitome, then the culture does not hold its belief as just 
a belief.  It is a belief that is held to be true, and is thus promoted to the position of myth.  
America believes that Nazis are the ultimate evil precisely because they are the ultimate 
evil…according to the American myth.  What such a belief ultimately becomes is a 
cultural construct (which allows for analysis and evaluation like that describ d by 
Berkhofer), a truism (insofar as it can be evaluated according to analytical criteria for 
truisms), and an aberration (insofar as it is inauthentic, in the sense implied by B njamin, 
and likely to result in the corruption of transcendent value). This kind of belief 
necessitates a theoretical position that operates in the ironic mode as myth and, in doing
so allows for criteria of evaluation of context dependent systems even though it too is a
context dependent evaluative systems (masquerading as an essential characteristic). 
To give a rather obvious example of all this, if we imagine an attempt to look at Nazi 
Germany through a critical lens, we might note immediately how dangerous the multi-
cultural viewpoint, in particular, becomes for such an evaluation; while it is fine to think 
of every culture as having a right to express itself and hold its own beliefs despite the fact 
that they might run counter to the dominant culture, giving respect to genocidal 




According to Rorty, irony allows us to maintain the tenets of multiculturalism despite the 
contradiction; we simply have to agree that there are better frameworks to be used in this 
particular situation.  But what does “better” mean exactly?  According to Rorty, better 
refers to the path leading to the liberal utopia, but how does one decide which framework 
is more or less likely to lead to the liberal utopia?  Irony was supposed to guide this 
journey, but irony fails to answer questions about how to choose between the differing 
views which irony has produced.   
It is ironic when a multiculturalist recognizes the limit of multiculturalism in dealing 
with Nazism and chooses another viewpoint, but how is that limit recognized except with 
an appeal to some value system developed empirically (and therefore through the past 
and history) and above context.  One must succumb to the kind of skepticism voiced 
centuries ago by Montaigne:  “For that Academic inclination, and that leaning toward ne 
proposition rather than another, what else is it but the recognition of some more apparent 
truth in this one than in that?” (422).  In any case, if such a value system is appealed to in 
order to determine when there is need for Rorty’s ironic sensibility, then isn’t that value 
system free of irony?  If the multiculturalist determines that Nazi culture needn’t be 
respected because they were dangerous then doesn’t this suggest some independent 
system, like Montaigne’s appeal to “apparent truth” which divides the dangerous from 
the harmless?  What suggestion is there at all that this irony-free evaluati e system will 
lead to Utopia?  Eventually, the only conclusion that can be reached is that we do not 
want to offer respect to the culture of tyrants, but once we have made that decision, irony 




them; if the conditional is constantly present then the evaluation isn’t conditional but 
tautological.   
We have made a rule that is not context dependent, but is inherent and based on our 
‘understanding of things.’  The conundrum becomes only more complicated once we 
acknowledge that myths change. According to Warren I. Susman, “there is also a drive to 
make the myth something historically real; that is, to turn the utopian promise into a 
specific kind of ideology” (Susman 247).  What must we do with the Nazis, for instance, 
that live only in popular culture (Nazis in movies, for instance) when they too describe 
the U.S.’s understanding of the Nazi as an epitome of evil?  An understanding of how 
ethical epitome operates within a context dependent framework is absolutely nec ssary in 
order to understand the limits of irony. 
What irony does, in the general case, is allow for statements to be made about a 
unified American culture while still acknowledging the prominence of cultural plurality 
and contextual dependent evaluation.   In the specific case of this argument, it allows he 
procession of an investigation into a system that is likewise rooted in both the essential 
and the context dependent:  namely the system of post-World War II American ethics as 
they are distributed by mass culture and absorbed by the national population.   
The questions I am attempting to answer with this study center around the use of an 
epitome (an essential value) within a system which is dependent on context (and that does 
not, therefore, value epitome).  Does America’s mythical self image as the defeater of 
worldwide fascism resemble the Nazi narrative in that it too constructs an inherent 
national virtue?  Does the use of Nazism in this manner suggest contextual value, and if it 




context dependent values?  If it is context dependent, what does that mean about Nazi 
villainy and the ethical systems that rely upon that definition? 
Obviously, these questions rely on the ability to move back and forth across the 
borders of the essential and contextual—thus, the need for irony, but irony only serves to 
make such arguments possible.  The problem remains of how to deal with the Nazi’s 
existence in postwar American Culture as a thing that is simultaneously contextual, 
presumed tautological, and able to validate contextually dependent ethics according t  its 
presumed essential state.  Irony may describe this problem but it cannot, ultimately, 
provide a solution.  Myth constructs a didactic position from artifice, and as such, allows
for a reading of the effect of mass produced Nazis throughout American culture.  But 
myth excludes the ironic mode through dogmatism, even as it exemplifies it by 
presenting a culturally embedded (and, therefore, context dependent) value as an 
immutable (and, therefore, essential) truth. 
What is needed then is a supplemental theoretical position that describes specifically 
the interplay between the fluidity of context dependent evaluation and the seeming 
stability of appeals to essential values (like Nazism as the epitome of evil).  As the 
constructed Nazi takes the place of the real Nazi in American ethics, it is marked, 
ultimately, as a simulation of an historical Nazi that then ceases to exist (either in the 
world or in the imagination).  Whatever place the real historical Nazi might have had in 
the mass audience’s intellectual and moral life is replaced by this simulacrum. 
Benjamin describes the persistence of simulacrum as the conveyance of history 
through testimony, but he only posits that it is through the lack of authenticity of the 




transcendent value through the dissolution of this authenticity.  Jean Baudrillard takes 
Benjamin’s positions a step further by marking the inundation with simulation in 
American culture as a shift in foundational terms of causality—real things are now 
produced through unreal pre-figurations: unreal cause produces real effect.  Hynkel and 
his descendents create history, and not the other way around.  He calls this causal 
relationship the “hyperreal.”   
The repercussions revealed by his analysis seem apropos for representations of the 
Nazi as the position of historical information about real Nazis has otherwise been usurped 
through mass reproduction of the image of Nazis.  The Nazi is, for Americans, the 
creature created in Saturday matinees, newsreels, comic books, Holocaust films, and so 
forth.  Their essential evil is designed for mass consumption.   
According to Baudrillard, creations for mass consumption are as likely to be 
constructed in previous fabrications as they are on concrete reality.  Thus, the 
amalgamation that is the image of a Nazi is constructed from other images pres nt in 
previous media, in previous propaganda and even in second hand accounts of history: it is 
a hodge podge of cultural detritus (high and low) pieced together to make the villain, 
which lacks any real (or at least a reality that can be acknowledged as such) Nazi against 
which this hyperreal Nazi might be compared for accuracy, there is no force outside of 
shared cultural value that can invalidate the image. Lacking comparison, the constituti  
of the Nazi “no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures itself against 
either an ideal or negative instance” (Baudrillard 2).  It has surpassed it substantive 




becomes a case of propriety rather than verity: how does the image jibe, not with 
historical truth, but with other images?   
The hyperreal as a critical framework is vital to understanding repres ntations of 
Nazism and their placement within culture because it implies the repercussions di cussed 
by Baudrillard in demoting real to simulation.  It supplements Benjamin by producing a 
hyperreal version of authenticity—authentic to historical testimonial and not to historical 
event. If American culture has become nostalgic for a period of time when a sense of 
reality was indisputable, then its interest in Nazism (and thus the ubiquity of 
representations of Nazism) is explainable through Baudrillard’s position on culture, 
simulation, and history.  As with Susman, Baudrillard also sees a mythology as being 
integral to a teleological view of American culture.  Baudrillard, however, cl arly sees as 
the myth’s most important component, its capacity to remain, not just topical, but 
experiential.  It is a story about the past, but it functions as an element of the present.  
“We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures 
us about our end” (Baudrillard 10).  Mythology becomes an image of itself—a past 
reproduced in simulation and constructed in order to make the passage towards Susman’s 
utopian vision constantly a thing of the present moment.  In literature, Susman sees this 
immanence as an obsession with mythology that contravenes history as knowledge and 
reproduces it as an empirical phenomena: “Many of our newer literary vogues—some of 
them brilliantly evocative of major moral dilemmas of our time to be sure—are 
deliberately wedded to the present moment alone” (Susman 261).  His assumption is that, 
in such a wedding, “we are left with a mythic past, an anxious present and an anti-




by the writers of his time (roughly, 1940-1960) as a project against ideology.  “In these 
works we look in vain for a vision of the past that will enable us to remake the present 
and the future.  Here ideology is specifically rejected” (Susman 261).  He seems to be 
working in the same vein of Nietzsche’s vision of radical history, from On the Advantage 
and Disadvantage of History For Life, in which the past is mined specifically to fuel 
revolution, but for Susman, this revolution is non-ideological and not simply counter-
ideological. 
Baudrillard’s position seems to be far less dialectical.  For Baudrillard, the 
construction of the dystopia is not the process of removing moral structure, but rather he 
reaffirmation of a structure that has become a simulated version of itself in order to 
disguise ethical collapse.  “Formerly one worked to dissimulate scandal—today one 
works to conceal that there is none” (15).  What has presented itself as scandal is simply 
the order of the day; if it is Orwellian, then it is Orwellian without the critical view of 
Winston Smith to alert us to the inconsistencies of Ingsoc; if it is inauthentic, then we 
cannot turn to Benjamin to learn that what passes for authenticity is a sham.   
But Ingsoc is a poor example for the apathy engendered by the hyperreal as the 
“party” in Nineteen Eighty-Four is an edifice for which Baudrillard does not allow, and 
which represents a major divergence between Susman and Baudrillard’s sense of the 
utility of history and myth.  In a hyperreal model, “a single fact can be engendered by all 
models at once” and as such prevents the dominance of any particular ideology:  no 
edifice, no monolith, just an endless precession of equally valid causes, all vying for 
cogency and all canceling each other out (16). It is this holistic feature of truth, as present 




particulars of validation)—and it is this simultaneous validation that requires some model 
for deciding between competing values (Rorty’s conception of Irony).  In the hyp rreal, 
there simply is no anti-ideological position—only an infinite number of ideological 
models with equal claims to validity and cause.  According to Baudrillard, an inability to 
decide between competing explanatory models forces the ambiguous discourse “to deire 
its own repression and to invest in paranoid and fascist systems” (18).   Context 
dependent philosophy’s inability to self-terminate produces infinite evaluative syst ms, 
effects without causal truth, and “discourse that is no longer simply ambiguous, as 
political discourses can be, but that conveys the impossibility of a determined position f 
power, the impossibility of a determined discursive position” (Baudrillard 17).  The 
hearkening towards fascism, towards a system that makes definite evaluations and insists 
on essential causal relationships is a form of nostalgia that reproduces itself as hyperreal 
into a real manifestation—a real effect with an unreal cause. 
 Baudrillard’s reading of culture, his conception of the hyperreal, is then a direct
negotiation of evaluative systems—either context dependent or dependent upon 
transcendent value—which he sees as having a direct effect on the ethical systems 
simulated.  Rorty provides an optimistic profile for the competition between language 
systems; Baudrillard does not.  For Baudrillard, disagreement can never be resolv d as 
the past provides no precedent, the future does not depend on the present, and the present 
itself is a construction of a hyperreal past.  Philosophical disputes remain in dispute.  All 
are equally valid—all equal in their capacity to explain phenomena:  what criteria, then, 




What Baudrillard fails to address is that, as with any hyperreal phenomena, 
construction proceeds from a model and not from an existent.  “Need” then, is a kind of 
model. Necessity, within the framework described by Baudrillard, can agairesume her 
role as the mother of invention.  If a criteria is needed to explain between equally valid 
causes, then one may easily be constructed.  As such a construction is necessarily 
hyperreal (all things are hyperreal in this context), it requires no precedent:  “it travels all 
discourses without them wanting it to” (17).  What is needed is a discourse which decides 
between equally verifiable (and, therefore, equally valid) discourses of cause; that 
discourse is the image system of the hyperreal Nazi. 
For Baudrillard, the proliferation of the Nazi’s representation is simply a form of 
nostalgia.  Its ubiquity within mass culture is presented as related to its manifest tion as a 
fetish—both in its religious and sexual connotation.  He cedes to this fetishization the 
“the omnipresence of fascism and of war in retro” seeing the fascination with fascism less 
as an irreconcilable position between hyperreal values than as another instance of the 
hyperreal stripping away the aura of the real (and the horrible). 
“[It is a] coincidence, an affinity that is not at all political; it is naïve to 
conclude that the evocation of fascism signals a current renewal of fascism 
(it is precisely because one is no longer there, because one is in something 
else, which is still less a musing, it is for this reason that fascism can again 
become fascination in its filtered cruelty, aestheticized by retro.” 
(Baudrillard 44) 
 
His reading of cinema’s role in this representation is no less pessimistic: “History thus 
made its triumphal entry into cinema, posthumously…Its reinjection has no value as 
conscious awareness but only as nostalgia for a lost referential” (45).  Thus, the period of 
the Second World War and that decade preceding it, for Baudrillard, is an era before th  




corrupted by their character as simulacra.  Reconstructions of the era are then made from 
a model, but a model without real authenticity (the authenticity of the real).  He does not 
suggest that the model can differentiate between other models:  the hyperreal is 
characterized by its indeterminacy and lack of character.   
Baudrillard places the onus of evaluation, instead, on the individual.  It is the 
individual that must bear witness to the mechanisms of the hyperreal, and in bearing
witness, cease to play a passive role in the system.  Adjudication, even at the role of 
popularizing, is, itself, participation.  “‘YOU are the model!’  ‘YOU are the majority!’  
Such is the watershed of a hyperreal sociality, in which the real is confused with the 
model, as in the statistical operation, or with medium…” ( Baudrillard 29).  As with 
Rorty, however, the means of participation seems to be balanced on intuition.  How does 
one know how to decide between hyperreal models?  How does one keep from suffering 
an existential dilemma resulting in total stasis?  Baudrillard does not elaborate except to 
evoke a capitalist ethos, but then, why validate a capitalist ethos over some other 
evaluative system?  They are all plainly just simulations:  “In the absence of real syntax 
of meaning, one has nothing but the tactical values of a group in which are admirably 
combined” (Baudrillard 46).  It is not clear why they are to be admirably combined, nor is 
it clear why one should choose that particular group’s values over some other. 
If instead of accepting Baudrillard’s evaluation as totalizing, if it is, in short, seen as a 
tool in Rorty’s ironic sense, then one may answer questions concerning modes of 
differentiation.  Applying Rorty’s idea of irony by applying the tenants of the hyperreal 
to the hyperreal itself, one can read the hyperreal as itself a simulation.  As Baudrillard 




inconsistency, he must bear witness to the construction of the past as a simulation (and in 
bearing witness, participate).  
 The move away from essential truths and towards context dependent evaluative 
systems implies historical basis for the hyperreal as a mode arising out of needs to change 
behavior from models of utopia.  Thus, one needs to envision the change in order to 
produce it, and often in the face of historical precedent.  If one wants to change, for 
instance, attitudes about race, one must provide a model for the different attitude—
especially if such a model does not already exist except as a myth.  The goal, then, is to 
construct from that myth a real improvement. Construction from the myth is, then, 
necessary, but as it is a myth, it dooms the attempted construction of the real to the 
hyperreal.   
Baudrillard cannot acknowledge this historical vantage point because it points to a 
model for models and establishes causality.  His vision of the hyperreal seems to erge 
from the vacuous indefinitude of culture and eradicates all traces of its origin in the 
hyperreal plurality of cause. His model for this is clearly the Holocaust:   
“Forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the 
extermination of memory, of history, of the social, etc.  This forgetting is 
as essential as the event, in any case unlocatable by us, inaccessible to us 
in its truth.  This forgetting is still too dangerous, it must be effaced by an 
artificial memory.  (49) 
 
If one acknowledges this vantage point, it is clear that this model for models is, itself, 
largely utopian and ethical.  Models are created that point to a better world and real 
(hyperreal) phenomena are created from those models. 
This re-examination of the hyperreal does not deny its repercussions.  Questions still 




on?  If the manifestation is initially modeled on utopia, does it matter that it has the 
character of the hyperreal rather than the real: is a simulated utopia different than a real 
utopia?  How can one tell the difference?   
The answers to these questions are indicated within the examination of nostalgia by 
which Baudrillard, ironically enough, dismisses Nazism.  If nostalgia is the attempt to 
imagine a real (and thus to construct a hyperreal reality), then though the model for th  
real is hyperreal, it is nonetheless a model (and immediately recognizable as such or else 
it wouldn’t inspire nostalgia but satisfaction).   
Thus, when the culture becomes nostalgic for the era of fascism, it is attempting to 
recall the real, though what it recalls is simulacra.  The image system surrounding the 
Nazi is the production of this nostalgia and acts as the seemingly real, seemingly essential 
ethical value by which other seemingly real ethical statements may be judg d as to their 
capacity for utopia (which is equivalent to their capacity to be unlike Nazism).  What
remains to be discussed, then, is the repercussions implied by this delineator’s obviu  
hyperreal character:  what it means when, in summoning up an image of real evil, the 
tendency is to think of fake Nazis.  What does it mean that the system deciding between 
hyperreal systems is itself embedded within the framework of the hyperreal? 
Arguably, the delicacy with which deconstruction of Nazism must proceed already 
reveals the ethical position of essential evil held by Hitler and his minions in the 
American imagination.  Deconstructing Nazism as a simulation and its reflective 
patriotism is to skirt the cell of the revisionist historian and to question values that 
Americans hold sacred.  The use of cultural theory in relation to Nazis runs the problem 




analyzing that evil will detract from its impact.  The fear is that cultural heory, when 
applied, will justify Nazism or remove the onus of responsibility from the Nazis 
themselves; either position may suggest why an analysis of context dependency and 
Nazism has not been forthcoming in the six decades following the end of World War II.  
It also suggests why Godwin’s Law can accurately predict that a conversation which 
evokes Nazism has ended any rational discourse and reverted to on-line mud slinging. 
What should be clear, however, is that what is not being deconstructed here are the 
actual Nazis themselves, Nazi Germany, or any other things with historical veracity, but 
rather the images produced of these things, the hyperreal versions derived from the codes 
burned into the imagination by the very real atrocities.  The real counterpart to the 
hyperreal image system is inaccessible given this species of analysis.  Arguably, 
mythicizing the past is as ethically troubling as denying, but if this is so then more deeply 
troubling is our incapacity to know the past except through myths.  Isn’t it betterto know 
the stakes of corruption, if such a corruption is inevitable, then to deny corruption 
altogether for the sake of nostalgia?  If our confused definitions of evil have, too, become 
meaningless in their hyperreal character, then we must see the ethics founded upon our 







CHAPTER 2   
FROM HUN TO HOLOCAUST:  AMERICA’S DEPICTIONS OF NAZISM BEFORE 
AND AFTER CAMP LIBERATION 
America’s postwar beliefs about the Nazis did not build only upon the evidence of 
their atrocities at war’s end.  They were constructed from the America’s understanding of 
Nazism and dystopian ideology from the interwar years combined with its anti-N zi 
wartime propaganda campaign.  Nazis had been vilified during the war, before the 
revelation of their attempted genocide, and before public understanding of the Holocaust 
as we understand it now4.   
The postwar vilification of Nazism modified beliefs already in place to accentuate 
differences between America and Germany, which absolved the U.S. of its resemblance 
to the Nazi state.  Over the decades following the war, the tension between what America 
understood about the Nazis and what it had to explain through that understanding would 
result in a redefinition of Nazism that matched its understanding of Nazism as evil, ev n 
as that definition threatened national self-image. 
Wartime beliefs were built upon the prior peacetime beliefs of the interwar period, 
and these, in turn, were derived in reaction to the wartime beliefs of World War I.   As
Jean Francois Baudrillard posits, what is thought of as Nazi Germany, now, is informed 
by a long precession of simulacra—depictions of Nazis by the American news ad 
media—making the “real” Nazi now in use for comparisons the hyperreal next step o 
these depictions. The current validity of these depictions can only be measured against 
the previous models upon which they were based.  Thus, the definition of Nazism is 




definition decided by historical veracity.  The culture, prior to the war, was ill-informed 
of the dangers presented by Nazi Germany and so it constructed a definition of Nazism 
based primarily on its own concerns. Nazi Germany became a nation that, like America, 
was afraid of outside forces because it believed that foreign corruption could threaten its 
traditional and national values.  Unlike America, however, the Nazis had turned their fear 
of liberalism into justification for global imperialism.   They didn’t just close their doors 
against their world; they attacked their neighbors in an attempt to subjugate them.  
America worried about issues of immigration, the dangers of communism, and the 
ravages of economic depression.  It preferred depictions of Nazism defined by these 
factors.  America was not, by and large interested in issues of racial toler nce or the 
plight of the Jews, and so these issues were less associated with the Nazis by the 
American mass media.  Perhaps the best account of this coverage is Robert Abzug’s
America Views the Holocaust, 1933-1945, which surveys the various stories concerning 
Nazi Germany and its anti-Semitic politics.  The survey demonstrates that many prewar 
news outlets, sympathetic to the plight of Jews, reported on the brutality in Germany 
when they could, but just as commonly, other news outlets, sympathetic to the Nazis, ran 
stories that subverted the tales of violence to propaganda by the Jewish and anti-German 
communities.  
  The roots of American opinion concerning Nazism began as an extension of what 
Americans thought about Germans during and after the First World War.  During that 
war, America ran a propaganda campaign against Germany as its foe which presented the 




decent, the Germans were made to seem flamboyant, rude, and above all, brutal.  The 
Germans were brutally imperialistic, regimented, and out for world domination.    
At the end of the First World War, the antipathy towards Germany cooled to 
reserved apathy, which then spread to America’s attitudes regarding the res  of Europe as 
well.  American bohemians may have gone to France and Italy to drink coffee and bgi  
literary careers, but for most Americans, Europe was a strange place that started wars for 
no good reason, had too many nations filled with people who obeyed strange customs and 
cultures, and who, all too often, wanted to immigrate.  Many Americans viewed Europe 
as a breeding ground for extreme ideologies like Fascism, anarchy, Socialism, and 
Bolshevism. The open letter from Lenin to the American Worker in 1918 and the ensuing 
Palmer raids of 1920 — which had led to the deportation 246 men and 3 women5 t  
Russia — had originally created the image of the Bolshevik as a foreign-born political 
radical indistinguishable from an anarchist (Barson 19).   
In a 1920 letter meant to counter Lenin’s, Palmer explains the nature of 
communism as criminal: 
Robbery, not war, is the ideal of Communism.  This has been 
demonstrated in Russia, Germany, and in America.  As a foe, the anarchist 
is fearless of his own life, for his creed is a fanaticism that admits no 
respect of any other creed.  Obviously it is the creed of any criminal mind, 
which reasons always from motives impossible to clean thought.  Crime is 
the degenerate factor in society…An assassin may have brilliant 
intellectuality, he may be able to excuse his murder or robbery with fine 
oratory, but any theory which excuses crime is not wanted in America.  
This is no place for the criminal to flourish. (174). 
 
What Palmer also suggests is that he couldn’t distinguish between the strike-incit ng 




conception of the communist: a robber, an assassin, an orator, but not a tyrant, a 
hypnotist, or a power-mad imperialist.   
The first Red Scare, which reached its political zenith in 1919 and 1920, was located 
in the heart of American isolationism.  For instance, in 1920, Stoddard published his 
extremely popular eugenic work against immigration entitled The Rising Tide of Color 
Against White World-Supremacy in which he argues, “Unless man erects and maintains 
artificial barriers, the various races will increasingly mingle, and the inevitable result will 
be the supplanting or absorption of the higher by the lower” (301).  Stoddard’s views 
were echoed culturally by the revitalization of the Ku Klux Klan that same year, after its 
reorganization in 1915 under leader William Joseph Simmons.  Much of the Klan’s 
resurgence owed to the Red Scare (“William Allen White” 284).  1920 also saw the 
arrests of Bartolomeo Vanzeti and Nicola Sacco for robbery and murder, a case that 
would polarize the nation up until their execution in 1927.  The 1921 inaugural address of 
Warren G. Harding promised a “return to normalcy” which constituted America’s retreat 
from foreign affairs and a promotion of America’s problems and issues before attempting 
to intercede in the affairs of Europe (“Warren G. Harding”).  From 1920 until the 
beginning of the Second World War, the subject of immigration and immigration reform 
would be the focus of heated national; the inability of displaced Europeans to find refuge 
in America during the ’30s had its roots in American xenophobia. 
The effect of the first Red Scare was native to the American desire for solation 
following the First World War.  Even after Palmer’s political career ended (leaving 
Herbert Hoover in control of the FBI), anti-Communist sentiments continued to affect




fascist nationalists6 to compete for power in vulnerable nations because of their inherent 
anti-Bolshevist attitudes (Hobsbawn 31).  The House Un-American Committee, set up in 
1934 to investigate Nazi propaganda, changed three years later to look at the danger of 
communist infiltration.   
The after-effect of the First World War was that America otherwise recoiled from 
foreign elements and began to entertain xenophobia as a general social and political 
policy; they called this sentiment ‘isolationism’. Often, attitudes towards foreign 
immigrants were generalized from encounters with alien radicals who had been forced 
out of their home countries for political reasons and who found themselves in America 
attempting to indoctrinate and sabotage7.  Just as often, attitudes towards immigration 
were based on racism.  Many Americans associated Jews with communism just as the 
Nazis would, and saw an influx of refugees as an importing of Bolshevism.  Others 
opposed immigration of German refugees for reasons of simple racism: they did not want 
America to import Europe’s ‘Jewish problem.’    
Though Palmer and his tactics would eventually be denounced first by the ACLU and 
then by the House Rules Committee, the feelings of anti-Communism, and anti-
immigration would continue throughout the decade of the 1920s and to a lesser degree, 
the 1930s.  When Benito Mussolini and his fascists took control of their government and 
kicked the Bolsheviks out in 1922, they earned the respect of most of the Western powers 
and defined a political dichotomy that would continue until the Second World War:  
fascism as an ideology that prevented communism.  America could not follow the same 




individual rights, but many Americans saw an intuitive wisdom to the fascist approach 
and even envied it for its ability to deal with social issues directly8. 
The rise of Fascism, and even the rise of Bolshevism, however, paled in significance 
to the country’s severe economic collapse.  In 1929, when the Great Depression hit 
America, rampant poverty and unemployment at home became far more pressing than 
any other issue, domestic or foreign, and immediately more important than the affairs of 
old Europe.  
During that time, extremist groups stepped up to answer the clarion call to rescue
America from its troubles. Communism, for instance, grew in influence despite a decade 
of having been demonized (later, in the late 40s and early 50s, those who attended 
communist meetings were called before the House Un-American Activities Committee to 
explain themselves).  Rallies and marches were common among the unemployed and 
disenfranchised of America looking for hope or someone to blame—a situation mirrored 
in many other countries around the world including Germany.   
In America, the 1920s saw the revival of the Ku Klux Klan, the discussion of 
eugenics in respectable medical journals9, and the rise of well received investigations 
concerning the dangers of miscegenation10.  The conditions that led to the rise of Nazism 
in Germany, then, were not so different than those of America except in degree.  
Americans, like Germans, needed jobs and food.  Neither brown-shirted men marching 
down the street promising both nor racist demagogues with master plans were odd 
enough to have made Germany’s nationalist movement stand out from America’s.   
In Germany, the parades and demonstrations resulted in Hitler who claimed to be able 




America, economic turmoil allowed for FDR and his WPA projects—his critics called 
these projects socialist.  Hitler promised to pull his nation out of the Great Depression, 
and as far as public opinion was concerned, he succeeded11.  What Hitler had done in the 
eyes of the world was to save Germany from economic ruin and to purge his nation of 
communism and socialism.  He had, in effect, achieved for his nation the very ends that 
most Americans hoped for theirs.   
Though the Nazis were brutal and hated Jews, they made good on their promises 
concerning employment.  Moreover, the grim passion of the Nazi statesmen wasn’t 
particularly dissimilar to what any American would have seen from their own orators.  
American politicians were equally practiced at grandstanding messages of blatant racism, 
and unlike their German counterparts, most American statesmen had proven ineffective at 
dealing with the Depression.  Belligerent political posturing was simply the interwar 
manner of campaigning in America, and if Americans accepted such theatrics (more 
precisely, hysterics) as harmless from their politicians, why should they have assumed 
anything different about Hitler?  They had learned not to take such invectives too 
seriously12.   
In fact, it was criticism of Hitler, not praise, which was regulated in the Am rican 
popular media until the beginning of the forties, first by the Production Code Association 
and then by various state departments.  Political cartoons against the Nazis existed in 
abundance, but there were very few theatrical films made about the dangers or evils of 
fascism.  The regulators of the film industry did not want to risk foreign markets by 




clout to make films condemning Hitler anyway, but Chaplin did so at great risk, and not 
until 1940.  For most movie studios Hitler and the other great dictators were off limits14.   
America’s literati by the 1930s had become disillusioned with Europe and 
concentrated instead on troubles at home15.  Hemingway wrote For Whom the Bell Tolls 
(1940) about fighting against fascism in the Spanish Civil War, but the subject of Nazism 
was never explored in much detail during the thirties by any prominent American writers. 
When Hitler began annexing countries in Europe, there was some cause for American 
concern, of course, but then England and France didn’t seem too overly distressed by 
Germany’s expansion.  Even when Hitler began to rearm, the world of Europe seemd 
nonplussed that the treaty of Versailles had become meaningless.  In actuality, worldwide 
depression had made answering the threat of Germany a more difficult task than had been 
anticipated at the signing of the treaty, but as far as most Americans were concerned, if 
England didn’t care, they needn’t either.  Nazi Germany, if it was a problem, was 
Europe’s problem.  
Stories of Nazi brutality were inescapable during the 1930s, but Americans were at 
odds to know what to think of them.  Though they were publicized with great zeal by the 
foreign and even by the German press, stories of socialists being put into camps could not 
have won popular sympathy from Americans who hated socialism and bolshevism far 
more than Nazism or fascism.  In any case, the threat of Bolshevism in Nazi Germany 
was presented as grave:  they were accused, after all, of having burned the Richstag.   
Stories about Nazi mistreatment of Jews emerged with great frequency as well, in 
both the secular and religious presses16 but the American public had difficult believing 




American war because of “Yellow Journalism.”  What’s more, eyewitness reports of the 
Nazi brutalities were often rebuffed by conflicting viewpoints in other papers and by 
other media personalities including media celebrities like Father Coughlin wose 
invectives against a world-wide Jewish conspiracy were extremely popular.  According to 
Robert H. Abzug, “By 1938, [Coughlin] had become the most powerful and popular 
purveyor of anti-Jewish propaganda in the nation” (77). 
When foreign cameras came into Germany for the 1936 Olympics, Berlin presented a 
notoriously sanitized version of itself to the world, making reports of street-level terror 
seem unrealistic.  Throughout his reign, the Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, 
was infamous for leaking fake stories to the world press and then demanding retractions 
because of the baseless information that he himself had secretly disseminated (Birdwell 
14).   
Even when the stories of Nazi atrocities were believed, it wasn’t always clear that the 
acts of violence were organized.  Within Germany’s national borders, many Jews saw the 
brutality as acts of extremism by party members, and not necessarily the result of party 
line; once Hitler felt secure in his position, they believed, he would put an end to the 
random acts of violence against Jews (The World at War, A New Germany).  Hitler had, 
after all, eliminated the most radical elements from his party when he murdered the 
leadership of the SA17.   This suggested that the revolutionary days of the Nazis were 
behind them, and that some of its younger members just hadn’t settled yet into their r le 
as members of a national party that no longer needed revolution to have its demands met. 
Jewish refugees in America were, of course, in a very good position to verify the 




escape it, but of course, their oppression in Nazi Germany had begun with their being 
singled out as Jews; they were in no hurry to repeat the process in their new American 
home.  Assimilation was, foremost, a very important goal18.  For others, the goal was 
immigration to Palestine, and changing the attitudes of Americans seemed unimportant.  
At the same time, Jewish immigrants were aware of their friends and family left behind in 
Nazi Germany and the nations threatened by that country.  Stirring up trouble against 
Germany in America meant making things worse for German Jews.  When Americans 
attempted to organize boycotts of German products, the movements went, by and large, 
unsupported by the American Jewish community.  In any case, during the ’30s, Jewish 
emigration from Europe was made as difficult as possible by politicians with isolationist 
sentiments and even by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt who would not risk the 
power base of Southern Democrats whose votes tended towards isolationism19. 
Explaining a lack of outrage by the American public through the silence of the Jewish 
community is not meant to exonerate Americans of their racism—merely to point out that 
there were many factors other than racism that kept America from understanding the 
danger posed by Nazi Germany.  A large population of Americans ignored the tales of th  
Nazi brutality against the Jews because they didn’t particularly care about the suffering of 
Jews.  The success of radio personality Father Coughlin’s media empire acts as  
testament to the anti-Semitic climate in America in the 1930s (Abzug 77).  In fact, 
Coughlin’s sermons were comparable to any speech given by a Nazi orator.  The 
Christian Front, an organization to which Coughlin was informally associated, 
“threatened Jews in the streets and defaced synagogues with swastikas” (Abzug 77).  




demagoguery and anti-Semitism.  Although some moderate and liberal Catholic leaders 
publicly criticized him for his inflammatory rhetoric and especially his anti-Semitic 
diatribes, most were either silent or openly supported him” (Abzug 77). 
Ultimately, many Americans gave their support to anti-Semitism becaus its 
repercussions had not yet made themselves abundantly clear.   In the ’20s and ’30s, the 
possibility of something like the Holocaust was difficult to anticipate20— after all, it was 
the modern age.  The world was believed to have moved on from its history of brutality, 
and Germany, even though hobbled by Versailles and the Great Depression, was a 
civilized nation.  If its leadership shouted racist epitaphs from podiums and blamed its 
problems on a worldwide Jewish conspiracy, then it seemed only exaggerated political 
rhetoric.  The term “genocide” would not exist until 1944 and would be introduced, in 
particular, to describe the Nazi’s attempt to destroy all European Jewry.21  Soon after its 
introduction, the term would come to imply all the Nazi’s mass murders and not just 
those inspired by racism.   
In depictions by American postwar Universal Newsreel footage, disseminated 
nationally, the crimes committed by the Nazis were not particularly denoted as racist at 
all.  Pronouncing sentence against Rudolf Hess, Hermann Goering, Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, and 18 other members of Nazi leadership, the judge read their crimes as: 
“mistreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity” (1946 10-08).  The film footage that is displayed as 
the judge reads these crimes are images taken by the signal corps during camp liberation 




the words that go along with the images make no reference to the race of their vic ims at 
all.  Of the Universal Newsreels footage of the trial coverage, three separate short films 
meant to update the American public on the trial proceedings in Nuremberg, none 
mention that the victims of the camp are Jewish.  At their sentencing, the judge continues 
with the list of crimes to include “crimes against humanity, namely: murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts against any civilian 
population before or during the war.” If even after the war, the Nazis weren’t depicted as 
homicidally racist, how much less clout would be carried by that depiction in the interwar 
and war years? 
Before America saw images of the camps, Hitler’s brutality was depicted n the 
American mass media as directed against his political enemies, especially prisoners 
captured as parts of dissident and underground organizations.  Jews had been rounded up 
and beaten, some murdered, but many Americans assumed that the Jewish prisoners were 
dissidents and political enemies22:  why else would Hitler have arrested them?  Their 
beatings and death, if not justified, were at the very least explainable, and explainable 
with the same narrative that explained Germany’s brutality against its other enemies:  
they had resisted the will of the Führer.  When stories of the mistreatment of Jws 
emerged, as they often did during the war, they were told alongside stories of 
mistreatment of Czechs, Poles, prisoners of war, socialists, American G.I.s, and 
Communists.  Moreover, stories of Nazi brutality competed with stories of the brutalities 
committed by the Japanese against their prisoners of war.  There was nothing about the 




Ultimately, the reason that America could not identify the danger of Nazism was 
because the Nazis were instigating policies in their country that fell in line w th popular 
American sentiments.  A belief in racial stratification and the fear of Bolshevism (and, 
therefore, Jews) were as native in America as they were in Germany.  Nazism simply did 
not appear to be enough of an alternative value system that it could threaten the manner 
in which America determined value.  Ultimately, what America could not do in interwar 
years was to turn what it knew about the ideology of Nazism into a dystopian vision of 
social order.  It is easy enough after the war to look at the German totalized stat  as 
dystopian, but its mannerisms were not depicted, before the discovery of the camps, as 
resembling the kind of ideology that could lead to a dystopian society23.  Even its 
totalitarian elements (which would be the subject of America’s definition of Nazi
dystopia after the war) were not particularly striking.  Through the WPA, FDR had 
prepared American to accept the benefits of a state-sponsored total mobilizatin of i s 
citizenry.  Nazi Germany appeared to be involved in a similar project, only with more 
fanfare, more brutality, and less democracy24. 
 Instead, America identified dystopian social orders during the 1920s and ’30s as 
systems of value which threatened to replace traditional values, deemed inherent and 
necessary for a healthy and moral society.  The replacement would result in a complete 
loss of ethical foundation; the corruption depicted in American dystopian fiction from the 
period was a satirical reply to encroaching value systems, political and ethical, hat 
deviated from those of the status quo.  Production of a dystopian vision during this period 
was a reaction to new ways of making value like communism or anarchy.  Essentially, 




Richard Rorty, including open-mindedness, subjectivity, and the replacement of truth 
value with utility — were seen a capable of undermining the traditional values that 
allowed for and maintained social order. 
The problem with depicting Nazi Germany as a dystopia was that there wasn’t
anything particularly out of the ordinary to recommend it as a new way of making value:  
Nazis hated foreigners and communists as did many Americans; they wanted to give 
everyone a job as did Americans; they believed in pulling yourself up by your bootstraps 
as did Americans; they believed that they didn’t deserve their poverty, nor did 
Americans; and they believed that everyone had to work together towards a solution, as 
did Americans.  What was particularly novel about Nazism was how they enforced their 
value: they did not stop to take a vote before deciding on a course of action that they felt 
would be best for the country.  Nonetheless, in each case, the values that were enforced 
were similar, if not the same, to the traditional values that many Americans believed were 
necessary for social order.   
It is clear from the literature of this period that the xenophobia of the First Red Scare and 
the general climate of isolationism created a description of dystopia for Ame icans that was 
based on fears of usurpation by rampant liberalism and its capacity to damage the traditional 
modes of evaluation and the social order as it stood.  The tragedy of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The 
Great Gatsby (1925), for instance, is that Jay Gatsby does not understand the propriety 
inherit to social station and thinks that he can simply buy his way into the lifesty e of the 
wealthy in West Egg, New York.   
Because Gatsby does not appreciate the rules of the social order of wealth, he is best d by 
his rival for Daisy’s affection, Tom, who is presented as such an exaggerated cad that the 




believes in the power of love, and in the American dream of raising one’s self up by one’s 
own efforts.  Armed with these two beliefs, he contends for Daisy’s love by building an 
empire of wealth for himself to rival that of Tom’s through the only avenue available to him:  
bootlegging.   
The social system of extreme wealth, however, has replaced Gatsby’s other, more 
conservative, definitions of worthiness.  Ultimately, Gatsby is allowed little access to the 
world of Tom Buchanan in which Daisy now resides because the values which should decide 
between worthy and unworthy have been replaced by a new system not based in essential
definitions of virtue but in money.  Gatsby may throw his parties, but he’ll never r ally 
belong in that society and his attempts to win Daisy’s love are doomed to failure.  In the 
novel’s denouement, the reader learns that Gatsby has sacrificed himself by taking the blame 
for the death of Tom’s mistress Myrtle Wilson and is murdered by Myrtle’s husband George.  
Like Jay Gatsby, George Wilson is utterly beaten by the system of values native to Tom 
Buchanan and the residents of West Egg.  He’s hard working, loves his wife, but, becase he 
lives in poverty, his wife is taken from him first by Tom through an affair and then by Tom’s 
wife, Daisy, in a crime motivated by jealousy.  In the end, Daisy kills Myrtle because of 
infidelity, George kills Gatsby because of infidelity, and George kills himself because he 
feels somehow responsible for the death of his wife just as Daisy assents to a loveless life 
with Tom out of a sense of self-sacrifice.   
Where traditional values remain in The Great Gatsby, they become the source of tragedy 
precisely because newer values make ambivalence and callousness more valuable than 
compassion.  In fact, compassion and fidelity become fatal flaws in The Great Gatsby 
precisely because the American social order satirized by Fitzgerald is corruptively amoral.  




entrepreneurial spirit—have no value at all when set next to the quasi-aristocratic system of 
value as represented by Tom which threatens the American sense of self determination.  
In Babbitt (1922), likewise, the titular character, George Babbitt, buys his way into the 
comfort of the newly empowered middle class and gains the appearance of wealth.  Without 
the ability to change his traditional values, however, he is unable to feel fulfilled by what 
turns out to be a fraudulent existence.  As with Gatsby, Babbitt points to American fears of 
the potential for systems like communism to upset the status quo; new economi systems 
complicate supposedly natural orders.  In The Great Gatsby, the new economic system is an 
American aristocracy; in Babbitt, it is the rise of the middle class and their artless middle 
class values.  The narrative satirizes the manner in which schools becme valuable only for 
raising property values, art becomes valuable only for advertisement, and friends become 
valuable only as business connections. Everything is valuable only in its capacity to make 
money.  When the puerility of this evaluative system drives George Babbitt’s best friend to 
attempt his wife’s murder in order to escape to a more meaningful existence, Babbitt is 
inspired to rebel against the shallowness of his life by seeking out another way of creating 
value.  Even an escapade in the world of the bohemians, however, gives him no joy.  Though 
he finds a way to live outside his position, his success invites sympathy from the reader
rather than congratulations. The lifestyle of art and celebration seems to be yet another fad 
missing the essential value that would give Babbitt’s life meaning.  By novel’s end, George 
Babbitt has reverted back to his old self.  His ill-fated attempt to find a more eaningful set 
of values by which to live his life has been forgotten.  Even rebellion, for Babbitt, is only a 
banal version of itself.  
Seventeen years after the release of Babbitt, the compromise of traditional values for 
systems of value making, especially morality, is still seen as the causfor dystopian social 




loosely on the economic devastation of the dustbowl and the reception of migratory workers 
into California’s lush farmlands, depicts California land owners as callous towards the 
suffering of their fellow human beings.  Disregarding long standing values about decency 
towards fellow human beings who are down on their luck, the land owners make every 
attempt to force the price of labor down below a living wage and to force the work rs 
themselves into indentured servitude.  The novel posits numerous responses to the horrors 
that the Joads ultimately face as migrant farmers in this system, including Connie’s 
abandonment of the family and his pregnant wife, Rose of Sharon, for other possibilities.  
Perhaps the most famous response to the system of oppression levied on the Oklahoma born 
immigrants is that of Tom Joad, the eldest son, who escapes the repression by entering into 
the life of a revolutionary along with the preacher, Jim Casey.  After a fi y soliloquy (in 
which he ironically keeps telling Ma Joad that he’ll “be there”), he and the preacher are 
absent altogether from the novel, as if to suggest that neither God nor revolutionary ideas can 
save the Joads from indentured servitude set up by the migrant farm worker system of 
California agriculture.  Again, the instability of the economic system in The Grapes of Wrath 
undermines traditional morality by introducing its dystopian liberal counterpart through 
economic upheaval.   Neither revolution against the new values nor conformity a e endorsed 
by Steinbeck as valid choices for the Joads.  Steinbeck shows, instead, that only a return to 
human decency through the literal milk of human kindness, given by the character Rose of 
Sharon to her fellow dispossessed, has any value in a California ruled by tyrants and 
revolutionaries, but even compassion is rendered impotent by the newly introduced 
economics of migrant labor.  Somewhere around Yuba City, Ma and Pa Joad, Uncle John, 
and Rose of Sharon are abandoned to the caprices of a world that no longer understands 




novel’s end, they’ve done all they could, but there is no helping being victimized by these 
new sets of values. 
By locating dystopian characteristics in their capacity to supplant conventional morality 
through radically alternative moral systems, it became impossible to vilify Nazism or fascism 
as dystopian: both ideologies centered on protecting traditional values and the place of 
essential truth at all costs (including, most notably at the time, the corrupti n of democracy).    
Fascism would have never allowed for the kind of opportunism exercised against one’s 
fellow citizens in The Grapes of Wrath, nor would it have allowed for the facile existence of 
materialism denoted by Babbitt or the supremacy of the aristocracy implied by The Great 
Gatsby.  Fascism purported to protect the kinds of values that would prevent the dystopian 
visions depicted in these novels.  Most notably, fascism had portrayed itself under Mussolini 
as anti-Communist.  Proponents of nationalism often received foreign aid to help safeguard 
their nations from coming under the control of the Bolsheviks. In fighting Communis, 
fascism was positioned against the kind of liberalism that went with economic restructuring 
and which, ultimately, led to dystopia. 
The excesses of Nazism, then, were excused through its definition as an anti-ideology 
and were, in many respects, seen as in line with American attitudes towards Communism, 
immigrants, economic recovery, patriotism and the value of being American, and even issues 
of race.  Americans, by and large, didn’t embrace the anti-Democratic philosoy of Nazism 
but neither did they depict Nazi Germany, prewar, as dystopian.  Few works in either 
literature or film explored the repercussions of an American embrace of Nazism.   
In fact, negative depictions of Nazi Germany were banned in film even as American 
films like Gabriel Over the White House (1933) “toyed with the idea of subverting the 
Constitution in order to end the Depression and questioned the validity of the American 




(Birdwell 15).  As a result, when World War II broke out and it became necessary for 
America to vilify Nazi Germany, American propagandists suffered from a dearth of source 
material from which to construct depictions of its new enemy.  They were forc d to fall back 
on old stereotypes borrowed from the First World War concerning the Germans as marauding 
Huns. 
The American propaganda community had very little to fuel its attempt to turn 
American hatred against the new enemy.  The film Casablanca presents the limits of 
American propaganda, at the outbreak of war, to demonize the Nazis, having failed to 
develop a way of imagining Nazi ideology as dystopian. Casablanca typifies this 
impotency precisely because the film exemplifies American pro-war propaganda.  Unlike 
films that demonized Nazi Germany like The Great Dictator or Sergeant York, 
Casablanca was filmed after Germany had already become our wartime enemy.  
Hollywood had been routinely censured from depicting the villainy of Nazi Germany 
because America had not been at war, but Casablanca faced no such censure. In fact, as a 
piece of wartime propaganda, the movie was designed to make Americans, with two 
decades worth of isolationist politics behind them, see a war in a faraway land like 
French Morocco as having a direct relation to them. The film’s goal, then, is to present 
Nazis as so dangerous that stopping them requires our sending men overseas to rescue 
any nation that they threaten. To perform this function, the film was obliged not to pull 
any punches for its audience. One would expect from such a film not only full disclosure 
of the terrible nature of Nazi Germany, the threat that the Nazis posed to the American 
way of life, but even exaggeration of these themes in its service as pro-war prop ganda. 
Casablanca represents, furthermore, the first time that the movie studio Warner Bros. 




Jewish immigrants who had fled Poland to escape a pogrom.  In 1932, Harry had seen 
first hand the blatant anti-Semitism of the Nazis when he went to Germany in a deal to
purchase the German film studio, UFA.  The deal fell through when the Warner brothers 
decided that the politics of Germany were too volatile.  In 1933, Warner Bros. released 
Bosco’s Picture Show, which depicted “‘Prezel, Germany,’ ruthlessly governed by a 
buffoonish, lederhosen-clad Adolf Hitler.  The cartoon marked the first appearance of 
Hitler in American film other than newsreel footage” (Birdwell 20).  After 1933, Warner 
Brothers Studio actively crusaded against Nazism and fought against privateand public 
rules concerning unfavorable depictions of foreign countries.25  It is no coincidence, then, 
that Casablanca, a pro-war anti-Nazi propaganda movie, came out of Warner Bros. 
studio, but was, rather, part of Harry Warner’s ardent desire to use film as an American 
fight against Nazism.     
The film’s initial success was owed partly to its capitalization on contemporary issues 
surrounding the war:  the Casablanca Conference to determine the allied plan to attck 
Europe through the Mediterranean.  Casablanca was released one day before the close of 
that conference on January 23rd, 1943.  The film’s setting in Casablanca put it at center 
stage to explain to America’s citizenry why they were at war with Germany.  In a sense, 
all Americans became Rick and were asked to reconsider our one-time love affair with 
Europe over the evil menace that was Nazi Germany. 
The abundant opportunities and motivations for the demonization of Nazi Germany in 
Casablanca should have made the film a scathing critique of Nazism.  Strangely enough, 
however, the Nazis in the film aren’t particularly horrible, and the critique made by the 




film was made, partial reports had already emerged of the Nazis pogrom in Poland26.  
The Nazis are the villains in Casablanca only because they are bent on world conquest.  
The Nazi character, Major Strasser, reminds the audience that "Germans must get used to 
all climates from Russia to the Sahara" (Casablanca).  He even tries to get Rick to 
imagine New York under Nazi occupation.  If the Nazis are evil because they are 
imperial, however, the viewer cannot ignore that the film is set in the French territory of 
Morocco.  It isn’t immediately clear that foreign control is being actively criticized in the 
movie except that one doesn’t want foreign control by Nazis.   
Even the imprisonment of Victor Laszlo, central to the depiction of Nazis as brutes, is 
undermined of its barbarism; Laszlo is a member of a Czechoslovakian underground 
organization and is an enemy combatant, not an innocent victim.  His incarceration by the 
Nazis is to be expected in a time of war.  Moreover, Victor is as preoccupied by 
nationalism as the Nazis. He encourages the band to strike up the French national anthem 
in Rick’s bar as a sign of resistance to the Nazi’s presence.  Even the bar itself, “Rick’s 
Café Américain” is suggestive of the movie’s awareness of national identity.  If the 
Germans feel they are better than everyone else because they are German, their position 
is hardly unique, even in the globally cosmopolitan world of Casablanca’s refugees.  
It is clear that if Casablanca intended to exaggerate the things that Americans should 
have hated about Nazis, then Americans really weren’t clear as to the reasons for their 
antipathy.  The best the film could do was to offer the Germans as instigators of the 
war—hardly original since this was precisely the way Germans were demonized during 
World War I27.  The film’s inability to vilify was otherwise evident by its setting.  Why 




see the Nazis at their worst?  Or England where defeat seemed imminent?  By setting the 
movie in Casablanca under the Vichy regime, Jews were naturally excluded from the 
film’s depiction and issues of anti-Semitism became impossible to address28.  
Forgetting the Germans, for a moment, the real dilemma in the movie is that Rick, an 
expatriate in Casablanca has given up his involvement in world politics.  He is clearly
meant to exemplify American isolationism.  He offers his philosophy early on in the 
movie when he says, “I stick my neck out for no one.”  To which his competitor Ferrari 
offers, "When will you realize in this world today, isolationism is no longer a p actical 
policy" (Casablanca).  It is isolationism that has made Rick morally ambiguous and in 
doing so, the film attempts to show the philosophy as dystopian.  Thus, while the Nazi 
enemy isn’t dangerous in a dystopian sense, American isolationist foreign policy is and 
so must be abandoned.   
Rick must learn that it is morally necessary to take a stand and that to live otherwise 
is to live in a corrupted state.  Ultimately, this means learning to place value again on 
universal virtues like love and the fight of the underdog against its oppressor.  When Rick 
learns these things, he realizes too that he must resist Nazi imperialism29.  Together he 
and his new friend Captain Renault will fight as the “good guys” against the German bad 
guys.  It would be American essentialism versus German essentialism, but the basis for 
the battle would still be based on an understanding of inherent value, and not a utopian 
versus a dystopian world view.  The battle is not phrased in Casablanca as ideological 
but a function of unjustified patriotism against the unexplained enemy.  Essentialism is 




important only because it is France, and the German enemy needs to be stopped only 
because it is the enemy.   
The worst that America was willing to put forward about the Nazis was that they hav  
world domination as their prime motivation.  In 1943, Frank Capra received a 
commission by the Defense Department to create the pro-war propaganda film series title 
Why We Fight o be shown to the American troops.  Upon completion, the first 
installment of this series, Prelude to War was widely circulated, not just to the military 
but also to civilians. Its goal was to give the basic underpinning arguments for the war 
effort, to elaborate what it was, exactly, that made American involvement against the 
Axis powers necessary.  In effect, it is an enumeration of all the means by which America 
would demonize the enemy and a corresponding list of characteristics which made 
America admirable.   
The narrator of Prelude to War begins his explanation with a slowly recited list of 
countries attacked by the Axis powers in order to give Americans an idea of the war’s 
scope and the necessity for their involvement.  The implication is clear: America’s efforts 
were needed precisely because the Axis powers were trying to take over the world.  The 
difference between the Axis and Allied powers is described as hinging on the Allies’ 
desire to take care of their own problems and the Axis desire to fix their troubles by 
forcing others into slavery—generally by duping their own populations into giving up 
their freedom.  Germany is aided in this endeavor by its “national inborn love of 
regimentation and harsh discipline” (Why We Fight: Prelude to War, 1). The villainy of 




attempts to resist.  In this aspect, Nazi Germany isn’t particularly unique from Italy or 
Japan.  
In terms of ideology, Capra depicted the Nazi’s predominant characteristic as their 
hatred of Christianity.  The narrator of Why We Fight:  Prelude to War offers:  “The word 
of God and the word of Führers cannot be reconciled…Then God must go!”  The film 
shows the Nazis disbanding religious groups, destroying churches, murdering priests, and 
giving speeches which replace Christ with Hitler as the intermediary between God and 
man.  The Nazis treatment of Jews are an afterthought in the film—their persecution is 
mentioned only once, vaguely, and only after the persecution of Protestants and 
Catholics.   
Propaganda may have mentioned the terrible nature of German occupation, but in 
retrospect, it failed miserably to show the atrocities to which the Nazis would prove 
capable. Only two American wartime posters suggest Nazi atrocities in a way particularly 
recognizable to a postwar audience.  The first depicts Frenchmen with their hands aise  
in surrender. The caption reads, “We French workers warn you… defeat means slavery,
starvation, and death30” (Shahn We French Workers).  The poster offsets the image of the 
French attempting to thrive under occupation as they seemed to be doing in Casablanca.  
While its text speaks of the kinds of things which Americans would later, postwar, come 
to associate with Nazi atrocities, the paintings visual language is timid: French holding up 
their hands, rather than French up against a wall facing a firing squad, or French awaiting 
the torture of which the text speaks.   
The other poster released, also a work by Ben Shahn31, which depicted real Nazi 




Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich.  In retaliation, Hitler ordered that vengeance be taken out 
on the town of Lidice, Czechoslovakia.  The poster showed a man dressed in a suit 
shackled to a brick wall with a burlap sack over his face.  The caption reads, ‘Radio
Berlin—it is officially announced:  all men of Lidice—Czechoslovakia—have been shot: 
The women deported to a concentration camp:  The children sent to the appropriate 
centers—the name of the village was immediately abolished.’  6/11/42 115p32” (Shahn, 
This is Nazi).  The poster illustrates an actual atrocity committed by the Nazis in Ldice: 
the men were all murdered, as were most of the women and children, who were taken to 
Ravensbruck.   
The poster, titled This is Nazi Brutality, was the only poster manufactured by 
Americans for the war effort that drew from an actual story of a Nazi atrocity to create its 
propaganda, despite the fact that there were hundreds of towns just like Lidice with 
equally horrifying tales to tell of the Nazis as murderous brutes33.  Altogether, the United 
States designed only two posters to address real war crimes committed by th ir foe.  
Comparatively, they made about the same number of posters which discussed the 
strength of a racially integrated army, about twice as many discussing the dangers of 
syphilis, and many times as many for its various campaigns (posters which encouraged 
women in the workforce, buying war bonds, rationing, donating for the war effort, not 
taking a sick day, etc.).  
America’s campaign to demonize the Germans relied, instead, on theoretical dangers 
(loose lips sink ships), archetypical tragedies (churches or the Statue of Liberty on fire, 
drawings of American neighborhoods hit by shelling), and exaggerated caricatures of 




the real acts of the Nazis were far more disturbing than any image of a blood-craze  
Adolf Hitler with a combat knife34. The atrocities committed in towns like Lidice all over 
Europe, unmentioned by Capra, films about Nazis, or the numerous posters made to serve 
the war effort, could not be made to fit into America’s vision of their enemy as world
conquerors or Americans as particularly patriotic for doing our part (the oft rpeated 
slogan in so much war propaganda intended to offset isolationist views).  As a result, 
actual Nazi crimes were seldom employed.  Even in the image of Lidice, the man 
standing at the center of the picture is alive, the women mentioned in the text will remain 
alive, and the children will be taken to relative safety.  In Why We Fight, Capra’s 
propaganda includes dead women and children, but their deaths are the accidents of 
shelling and high altitude bombs.  No one is accused of having targeted them specifically 
because America would have thought that degree of brutality outside their defin tion of 
the enemy.   
Though America’s wartime propaganda campaign demonized the Nazi as a military 
enemy and a brute, it did neither in any particularly exceptional or novel way.  In Capra’s 
second film in the Why We Fight series, The Nazis Strike, Hitler is compared to Genghis 
Khan, recalling how, in WWI, Kaiser Willhelm II was referred to as the Hun.  The World 
War II Nazis were only as evil as any other wartime enemy (they certainly weren’t worse 
than Japan or Italy).  If Nazi Germany proved exceptional, it was in their military 
strength and their unwillingness to honor treaties.  Unlike Italy, which had attcked 
undefended Ethiopia, Hitler attacked well-prepared Europe and had all but succeeded by 




Because American had never before shown the danger of Nazism as being capable of 
more pronounced corruption—the corruption of value, the Nazis couldn’t have been 
depicted as morally alien at the outbreak of war—it simply wouldn’t have made sens to 
Americans. The image of the Nazis as worthy and potent military adversaries was much 
more accessible because it didn’t require a re-imagining of Nazism and it, of course, 
made the Americans who fought against the Nazi military strength that much ore 
valiant.  It emphasized the value of American patriotism not the horror of Nazi 
occupation. 
Americans were, then, ill prepared to accept the nature of Nazism made self-evid nt 
with the liberation of the camps.  The films of camp liberation, disseminated to millions 
of Americans through newsreels released just before the German surrender, are 
demonstrative of the resiliency of the America’s understanding of its role in th  war, and 
its definition of Nazism as brutally imperialistic rather than anti-Semitic.  The films 
nearly completely overlook Jewish suffering.  More often than not, Jews aren’t 
mentioned at all as Jews, and when they are, they are subordinated to a long list of other 
victims.  The narrators of the films either describe the prisoners as political or group them 
according to nationality.   
In the liberation of Ohrdruf, for instance, the narrator relates that the victims include 
Poles, Czechs, Russians, Belgians, German Jews, and German political prisoners.  In the 
liberation of Leipzig and Penig, no mention whatsoever of Jewish prisoners is made.  In 
the filming of the liberation of Hadamar, the narrator explains that the victims include 
“Poles, Russians, and Germans, sent here mainly for political and religious 




most Americans what had happened in the camps:  Hitler’s political enemies were 
tortured and starved.   
The Army Signal Corps — who made the films — had watched Why We Fight as part 
of their preparation for war, and they continued the national narrative of the enemy in that 
same vein when they began to film.  They went in looking for the military and political 
enemies of Hitler, and those were precisely the people they found.  The result of the film
is a universalization of the suffering caused by the Nazis.  The Jewish identity of the 
victims is undermined, as is the racist ideology that motivated the atrocities. 
These films were widely disseminated as newsreels and were shown to large 
audiences in American movie houses nationwide.  According to Jeffrey Shandler, “The 
Film Daily announced record-breaking audiences…In an unprecedented move, the RKO 
Pathe newsreel containing this footage was screened for both houses of the U.S. Congress 
on 30 April and 1 May” (10).   
The newsreels did not, however, represent the only way in which Americans learned 
about the conditions in the camps.  Time magazine published its expose on the Majdanek 
camp on September 11, 1944 under the title, “Murder Inc.”  The article is a retelling of a 
guided tour of the camp given to the article’s author, Richard Lauterbach.  In two 
separate instances, Lauterbach suggests the identities of the victims.  In the first, he 
writes, “On one day, Nov. 3, 1943, they annihilated 18,000 people—Poles, Jews, political 
prisoners, and war prisoners” (Abzug 180).  In his second description, he writes, “Back in 
the camp we saw a room full of passports and documents.  Papers of Frenchmen, 
Russians, Greeks, Czechs, Jews, Italians, Belo-Russians, Serbs, Poles” (Abzug 181).  In 




longer list of other kinds of victims.  In his second description, Jews are the fifth group
mentioned out of nine.  The effect is to deemphasize the Jews as a group singled out for 
extermination by the Nazis, and to turn the Nazi atrocities into an example of rampant 
imperialism instead of homicidal racism. 
The confusion of the nature of the crimes is endemic of almost all the various outlets 
by which Americans learned about the camps.  When, for instance, on April 15, 1945, 
famous broadcast journalist and war correspondent Edward R. Murrow broadcasted to 
America his experiences at Buchenwald, he mentions all manner of victims — Czechs, 
the French, the mayor of Prague — but he makes no mention of Jews.  Murrow describes 
the camp’s population as a grouping of Hitler’s military enemies, emphasizing the 
tyrannical villainy of the Nazis and not their particular racism or their propensity to 
torture and murder innocents.   
According to Murrow, the Nazis are guilty only of mercilessly punishing their 
enemies.  Near the broadcast’s end, Murrow draws a connection between the camp’s 
liberation and the death of Roosevelt: 
I was there on Thursday, and many men in many tongues blessed the name of 
Roosevelt. For long years his name had meant the full measure of their hope. 
These men who had kept close company with death for many years did not know 
that Mr. Roosevelt would, within hours, join their comrades who had laid their 
lives on the scales of freedom. (Abzug 200) 
 
Clearly, the point of the broadcast is that the enemies of Hitler have been sav d, and 
Roosevelt is their savior.  The implication, too, is that Roosevelt died fighting for their 
freedom, implying that FDR had, all along, been pushing forward to find the camps and 




In Murrow’s message there was no hint of acknowledgment that his lionization of a 
national leader was reminiscent of the motives for Buchenwald’s construction: that the 
officers of the camp had offered up their “Heil Hitlers” at the same place that he, then, 
offered up his praises of Roosevelt.  Just as Murrow does not recognize the implied 
similarity between American and German values, he clearly also does not realize that the 
unquestionable sanctity of national virtue has been tested and shown to be dangerous in 
places like Buchenwald.   
The mindset of Murrow and his listeners was that America should take the usual 
laurels offered the military victor at the end of a war: the enemy had been showto be 
horrible, the victor assumes a position of valiancy, heroism, and above all, moral right.  
That the nature of victory had been changed in battling the essentialism of the Nazis 
would not complicate American morality, so long as the United States could depict 
Nazism as a defeated military enemy and not as a nation that had committed atrocities 
guided by an ideology similar to that held by Americans.  
Though the Nuremberg trials later enumerated the crimes of the Nazis and revealed 
their genocidal nature, the manner in which Americans learned about the trials was also 
through the same newsreel footage that carried with it the same desire to universalize the 
Nazi’s crimes and to avoid mention of racism.  The stories simply recast the Nazi war 
crime tribunals in terms they had used earlier to describe camp liberation.  The atrocities 
would not take a predominantly anti-Semitic tone until the 1960s.  Up until then, the 





What is clear from these examples is that America entered the war under the pretense 
that the Nazis were imperialistic in their desire to rid the world of rampant liberalism and 
that it was the excesses of their tactics and the resulting need for world dominati n that 
necessitated America’s military action in Europe.  Racism was rarely cit d in popular 
American culture as a pretense for war, even if it was acknowledged that Nazism was a 
racist ideology.  The wartime propaganda that was built from these assumptions, 
continued in the same manner. By vilifying the imperialistic drives of the Nazis and 
mentioning only in passing the issues of race and racism, such that when the camps were 
discovered and evidence was given of crimes which, according to General Dwight . 
Eisenhower, “beggar description,” the media produced descriptions as best as possible 
from the propaganda as it had stood, although though the crimes themselves were far 
worse than what even the wildest of propaganda had considered possible.  The overall 
effect of which was to leave most Americans on shaky ground.  
The problem with the descriptions of the camps as they were given by the mass media 
was that America was ill-prepared to understand Nazism as a dystopian ideology, and 
thus was ill-prepared to understand the obvious images of a dystopian society that were 
displayed through the camera lens of the camp liberators.  America had not been called 
upon to ask whether the values it shared in common with the Nazis might be dangerous, 
and had instead been allowed, for the most part, to ignore those commonalities in favor of 
some other characteristic of Nazism that recommended their villainy.  Such an 
interrogation would have endangered the postwar narrative of America as a victorious 




How could America be good in defeating the Nazis if it also resembled the Nazis through 
their racism? 
What places like Buchenwald, Dachau, and Bergen-Belsen should have suggested 
was that without provocation, a people convinced of their own superiority: could murder 
innocent men, women, and children without any obvious feelings of guilt; that they 
would, in fact, call their crimes patriotism or see their violence as enacted in r sponse to a 
higher calling; and that these mass murders were more a matter of course rather than an 
exception. If the victims of Nazism proved casualties of a belief about a master r ce or 
the inherent superiority of one nation, however, then America could not tout its own 
superiority without appearing similar to the enemy it had just defeated.  The Why We 
Fight film series began with a quote from Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of War: “We 
are determined before the sun sets on this terrible struggle our flag will be recognized 
throughout the world as a symbol of freedom n the one hand…and of overwhelming 
power on the other” (Prelude To War). The viability of Stimson’s language after the war 
all but depended on how one imagined the Nazi enemy after the revelation of their 
atrocities.   If one understood the Nazi enemy as ideological and dystopian, then 
Stimson’s language eluded to an American narrative similar to that used by Nazi 
Germany to vindicate their entrance into war.  One had to but understand the “terrible 
struggle” in terms of Hitler’s struggle (Kampf in German).  To believe America 
inherently great, as was the climate following the war, one was all but required to 





The shock of the camps, however, proved a force not so easily ignored.  If perhaps 
the American mass media had attempted — accidentally or otherwise — to eradicate 
racism as a key motive for Hitler’s crimes, it did so conspicuously.  Suddenly, here was 
an example drawn from the real world of a dystopian society, which had not been built on 
rampant liberalism but rather on dogmatic defense of traditional and national values: a 
dystopia built from the far right rather than the far left.  The result was a necessary 
change in world views about what constituted a dangerous society. At the very least, the 
effect of this was the inability to return to a prewar mindset where the main threat to 





CHAPTER 3   
AMERICA ÜBER ALLES:  THE LURE AND THE DANGER OF POSTWAR 
AMERICAN PATRIOTISM 
The end of the Second World War affirmed, in America, the country’s inherent 
greatness.  Its survivors were awarded the title: ‘The Greatest Generatio ’ precisely 
because of their defeat of Nazism as the greatest evil.  Those who believed in the natural 
superiority of the American way, however, could do so only by ignoring that such beliefs 
were a contributing factor to the idea of national identity which the Nazis had proven 
untenable and which had led to the infamous death camps revealed to the public through 
the burgeoning American mass media.  Nazis had shown the inhuman limits of a belief in 
the natural superiority of a people and had called into question the virtues of nationalism.  
This paradox between rampant nationalism as evil, on the one hand, and battle-proven 
patriotism as good on the other, made it difficult to reconcile a belief in the superiority of 
America without ignoring the basic tenets of Nazism.  Those who began to describe 
America as an inherently great country could do so only by ignoring the lessons learned 
by the war.  Criticism of the patriotic attitude began to be heard through redefinitions of 
utopia particularly within the media of literature and film as artists attempt d to reveal 
and navigate the paradox that came with defeating the essentialist philosophy of the 
Nazis, while still maintaining the essentialist attitudes that supported the greatness of 
America.   
Not surprisingly, the most able to critique the patriotism of Americans as akin to the
essentialism of Nazi philosophy were those outside the country.  Authors and filmmakers 




encounters with Nazis and Nazi Germany precisely because they lacked America’s 
impetus towards a patriotic self-image that depended heavily on defeating the Nazis and 
rescuing Europe.  England had, for instance, won the war, but they had to be rescued by 
America for that victory.  Some writers, like George Orwell and Jorge Luis Borges, were 
obviously skeptical that the world had learned the lessons it was supposed to learn in its 
defeat of Nazism, but the critics of nationalism were not all foreign born.  Numero s 
American writers challenged the old utopian notions through tragedies which showed a 
belief in traditional values as being baseless and self-destructive.  
Perhaps the least able to deal with the change in attitudes necessitated by America’s 
encounters with the camps were those who had already staked a career on the utopian 
vision that had prevailed before the Second World War.  Writers like Ernest Hemingway 
and Gertrude Stein may have played heavily with form and concepts in the modernist 
tradition, but in the end, they were driven by prewar values that were being contested 
through the discoveries of the war. 
In Baudrillard’s analysis of the effect of simulation within culture, he posits that the 
expected reaction to the hyperreal is nostalgia for the real, and in particular, according to 
Baudrillard, a nostalgia for fascism.  Nazism represents, in this sense, a hyperreal ethical 
position.  The Nazis are used as a model for, not an example of evil—the confusion 
concerning the motives for the camps only reinforces this point.  What Baudrillard mens 
by the term fascism, however, differs from the pedestrian meaning of the term and, 
therefore, bears some explanation.  Baudrillard suggests that when an evaluative system 
becomes a simulation, such as when essentialism survives only as a belief structure rather 




systems were stable—not beliefs but facts—and Baudrillard suggests that forcing a vision 
of stable values based on that nostalgia is fascistic. 
Once Nazism ceased to be evil because of inherent rules about good and evil and 
became a system by which such rules were devised, comparison to Nazism became th  
basis for a hyperreal ethical system.  One of the side effects of this hyperreality, 
following from Baudrillard’s analysis, is that people began to yearn for a system of ethics 
founded upon inherent rules and to view this yearning as nostalgia for a time before 
Nazism had complicated ethical analysis.  
Perhaps the most succinct of these postwar positions of nostalgia was that of Gertrude 
Stein, elucidated in her short essay “Reflections on the Atomic Bomb:”  “I had not been 
able to take any interest in it” (823).  She goes on to explain that “it’s the living that are 
interesting not the way of killing them.”  The threat of the bomb would prove 
instrumental to the development of Cold War culture, but Stein is simply uninterested.  
Her analysis is, however, either incredibly naïve or stubbornly ambivalent.  If Stein isn’t 
concerned about the dead, if she is not fascinated and horrified by the death camps, then 
she is in the minority.  The rest of the postwar world will increasingly use Nazism as a 
metaphor for evil precisely because the dead do demand attention. 
For Stein, what is clearly the source of her duress are two evaluative system  in 
competition, both of which utilize values that are supposed to be universal. The older of 
the two value systems imagines Americans in their romantic expatriated st  a  world 
travelers like Rick Blain of Casablanca, who are able to rub elbows with anyone 
anywhere and who are universally respected by all foreign cultures.  The newer value 




America against an ideological enemy that could pop up anywhere in the world and 
against whom the threat of atomic weaponry is necessary to divide the globe up into 
spheres of influence.  Stein calls the latter system uninteresting precisely because it 
impedes on the modernist, and by 1945, nostalgic view of America within a global 
framework—the atom bomb is counterproductive to the expatriate mission as American 
cultural emissaries and hearkens to the Nazi ideal of achieving national virtue by 
threatening the world.  It curbs the experiences of trans-nationality among the living.   
This change in character of America’s national narrative is, nonetheless, nece sary 
because the fight against fascism has greatly affected it.  Stein’s view of American 
essentialism simply cannot hold in light of Nazism and the atrocities that had become 
associated with the war. The Parisians one sups with might well be Vichys or the anti-
Semites that prompt Sartre to write J w and Anti-Semite (1943).  One cannot retreat to 
Trieste for some years to live amongst the good decent Italians there who just appened 
to have been of late among Mussolini’s fascist power base.   
The image of Europe is degraded by its late horrors.  It is no longer feasible for 
Americans to supplant the native politics with the Yankee dollar.  Bacchanalian revels 
lose their charm in the world of the conquered.  The American must change from the 
visiting artist, to the defending soldier, to the political overlord in order to prevent local 
politics from going bad.  The image of Americans from the modern period would no 
longer hold, except naively.  If it is only the living that are interesting, then one must 
wonder at one is to say of Buchenwald. 
Further evidence of the nostalgic position’s failure can be seen in Hemingway’s 




visits Venice after the war, a city which he defended as a young man and which he thinks 
of as his home.  He passes by the old haunts of his former friends, some of whom have 
gone, others remain, only to settle into the hotel of a friend, the “Gran Maestro” where he 
rendezvous with his 19 year old lover, Renata.   
The story is ostensibly about the aging Colonel, his life as a real soldier, and the way 
in which the world passes over a “tough boy” like the Colonel in favor of Generals who 
have never fought a day in their life.  The story reveals that the Colonel was a Gener l at 
some point but was demoted because of battlefield decisions and a general sense of 
prejudice in American military command against actual soldiers. 
The Colonel’s friends in post-fascist Italy are all clearly the kind of European one 
expects to see in expatriate literature, but who are remarkably out of place after 1945.  
They smile, they’re witty, they have endured various trials with the Colonel and are thus 
fiercely loyal like Italian Gunga Dins.  The Gran Maestro, in the midst of a war shortage 
in a defeated nation, feeds the Colonel and his young mistress bottle after bottle of win .  
The gondoliers enthusiastically row the couple about Venice as the elderly Colonel paws 
at 19 year old Renata. 
Hardly a squeamish writer, Hemingway visits wars often in his novels, especially the 
First World War in A Farewell To Arms and the Spanish Civil War in For Whom the Bell 
Tolls, but Across the River and into the Trees took Hemingway years to complete 
precisely because of his difficulty writing about the Second World War.  That difficulty, 
whatever the aesthetic achievements or failures of Across the River and into the Trees, is 
writ large in the world of Hemingway’s Venice.  As the Colonel attempts to tip a waiter, 




“You already made the notation on the check.  Neither you nor I nor the Gran 
Maestro are starving.” 
“What about the moglie and the Bambini?” 
“I don’t have that. Your mediums smacked our house in Treviso.” 
“I’m sorry.” 
“You needn’t be,” the second waiter said.  “You were a foot soldier as I was.” 
“Permit me to be sorry.” 
“Sure,” the second waiter said.  “And what the hell difference does it make?  Be 
happy, my Colonel, and be happy, my Lady.” (Hemingway 150) 
 
The waiter, whose wife and child were killed by American forces, is not angry t the 
Americans; he recognizes, as a soldier, the horrors of war and forgives.  His family dead, 
he doesn’t bear a grudge at all, but wishes his would-be benefactor happiness.  Does 
Hemingway simply not understand that this isn’t how people react after war?  That 
grudges will be born for the horrors conducted?  One has trouble imagining a Pole 
offering the same sentiment to a commander of the German Wehrmacht.  It is as if it is 
impossible for Hemingway to write a character who holds America accountable for its 
actions because to do so would be to put American beliefs under scrutiny.  America, ever 
virtuous, is even the good guy to people whose families have been killed by United States 
military forces.  The scene is deplorable in its naiveté.   
Hemingway’s novel envisioned America’s place in the world in a way that had 
simply become no longer valid.  The Italians all greet the Colonel as a liberator ven 
though he and they had been wartime enemies.  For many, he is a conqueror.  Fascism is 
all but missing from the novel.  The Colonel seldom runs into any Italian who doesn’t 
immediately like him, and in fact, shares enough freedom in Venice that he can, at 51, 




Hemingway simply refuses to associate his vision of Europeans with the atrocities 
committed by fascists.  When Renata asks the Colonel if he likes many Germans, he 
answers: 
“Very many.  Ernst Udet35 I liked the best.” 
“But they were in the wrong.” 
“Of course.  But who has not been?” (122) 
 
 It is a strange response for anyone who has seen the piles of bodies in the news reels 
which presumably Hemingway had. But like Stein and Murrow, Hemingway’s goal was 
not to present an essentialist dystopia but to revel in the unquestionable virtue that had 
always been a laurel of the military victor.   
Failure of the nostalgic position is in no way historically or rhetorically insured.  
There was no inherent reason that America could not reconstruct images of Europe, and 
Americans there, in terms of its romantic prewar value.  Had the enemy simply been 
defeated and allowed to fade into history books, this might precisely have been the case.  
It hadn’t been Americans, after all, who had corrupted international politics, but the 
Nazis.  In fact, if America’s self image after World War II, as the defender of the free 
world, the force of liberty, the guardian of democracy, and the rescuer of Europe all 
depended upon essentialism (which all of these epitaphs surely do), then it was 
counterproductive for America to recognize the dystopian possibilities in essetiali m lest 
it risk losing its position.   
The pictures of the camps, however, kept Nazi Germany in the minds of Americans 
and made it imminently available for analogy as an example of cruelty, brutality, and 
evil.  Susan Sontag says of the photographs of the camps, “that [they] have gained the 




photographs that “keep their emotional charge” (On Photography 21). For Sontag, whose 
analysis of photography suggests their transitive and contextualized meanings, only 
images of the camps are exempt from the principles that otherwise follow from her 
argument.  They are ethical reference points in a world that has abandoned stable 
reference.  Their position as exceptions suggests them as a cause for this abandonment. 
As it is natural for a victorious nation in war to pronounce itself virtuous in that 
victory, so, too, is it natural for the victor to portray the defeated enemy as dec dent, 
corrupted, or otherwise deserving of its defeat.  To this end, America used the film and 
photographs of camp liberation to validate itself ethically.  In a sense, the Nazis were 
natural candidates for analogy to evil simply because they were the defeate  enemy, but 
the Nazis excelled at this position because of the scope of their crimes and the sheer 
audacity of their motives:  the Nuremberg defense will always mean “I was only 
following orders,” not because no one before had followed orders but because no one 
before had committed such horrible acts with no other motivation than obedience.  The 
largesse of the crimes makes them exceptional, and through analogy, exemplary.   
The crimes nature, too, contributed to the frequency by which analogies to the camps 
could be used. When, in 1948, it became clear that Russia hoped to starve its portion of 
Germany out of existence, how could Americans not recall the images of the starving 
prisoners from only a few years before?  The Berlin Airlift as the opening shots of the 
Cold War naturally (and ironically) built upon the images of Nazi atrocities.  Even if the 
image system had not proven evidence of a dystopia based on a belief in universal value, 





Finally, the surprise of the crimes gives the Nazi atrocities a kind of valueas a 
description of evil.  Because the discovery of the camps so shocked their liberators and 
the American public, they came to hold a value of evil above and beyond the 
exaggerations of wartime propaganda.  How America had depicted Nazi Germany during 
the war was nothing compared to what the Nazis had actually done in places like 
Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen.  Their evil was worse than America could have 
imagined, thus the Nazis became synonymous with an evil that was beyond reckoning.  
America envisioned itself as heroic in equal measure to the villainy it had defeated. 
George Orwell, in his essay, “Politics and the English Language” (1946) complains 
about the lack of fixity for the term fascism which he observed had begun to be used as a 
general political invective.  His commentary suggests that even just after the war 
analogies involving Nazism were already in use in the context of political arguments to 
create a stable meaning against which other governments could be compared and 
critiqued, and with such frequency that they demanded his commentary (The Orwell 
Reader 359).  Assuming that these analogies were commonplace, one must assume that 
the question of Nazism is likely to be necessarily asked to some degree in each instance:  
if one compares something to Nazism, one must have some idea in mind what exactly 
Nazism means.   
Use breeds familiarity and highlights problems in definition and earlier 
assumptions—the hyperreal model validates itself based on earlier models which must 
come to mean something else—a belief in fixity is, according to Baudrillard, fascistic and 
according to Richard Rorty, an impediment to the mindset necessary for a liberal utopi .  




political posturing, began increasingly to mean something more after the footage of the 
camps.  As one heard comparisons to Nazism again and again, one remembered the 
values espoused by the Nazis to mobilize their nation for war.   
The question of what Nazism had meant for the Postwar culture is intrinsically linked 
to what Americans had thought about the dangers of Nazism during the war and how that 
understanding was supplemented and changed by images of camp liberation.  I have 
argued, thus far, that mass American culture reacted to Nazism predominantly as an 
ideology bent on global conquest and that, ultimately, racism had very little to do with 
how America imagined the Nazi enemy or the Nazi’s crimes.  I have suggested, likewise, 
that this reluctance to recognize racism as the driving force behind Nazi ideology was a 
product of America’s own reluctance to acknowledge the dangers of racism within its 
own borders.  Clearly, then, my description of mass cultural beliefs is related not only to
attitudes attributable to a democratic majority but also to the population which held 
power:  namely white Americans. 
For African Americans, the assumptions about the dangers of Nazism and what the 
war meant were obviously different, as is evidenced by the artistic works and political 
rhetoric fostered in African American culture during this period.  According to Gunnar 
Myrdal in his essay “America Again at the Crossroads” (1944): 
In this War the principle of democracy had to be applied more explicitly to race. 
Fascism and Nazism are based on a racial superiority dogma—not unlike the old 
hackneyed American caste theory—and they came to power by means of racial 
persecution and oppression. In fighting fascism and Nazism, America had to stand 
before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance and cooperation of racial 






What Myrdal identifies in this sentiment is that America, in fighting against the 
essentialism of Nazi Germany, made manifest by their racism, would have to 
acknowledge its own essentialism as dangerous and corruptive.  The sentiment is 
mirrored in the snippets of speech from the African American community concernig the 
war recorded by Sterling A. Brown in “Out of their Mouths” (1942).  For example, 
Brown records: 
A Negro bragging at a gas station: “I done regist.  Expect to be called soon.  That 
Hitler.  Think he can whup anybody.  I’m gonna capture Hitler. I’m gonna deliver 
him to President Roosevelt.  At the door of the White House.” 
The white bystanders applauded. 
“Then I’m gonna fight for some rights over here.” 
The whites froze up.”  (Brown 34) 
 
Clearly, the suggestion that Americans unanimously ignored racism as the primary 
danger of Nazism is to miss the mark that it was, for many Americans, this very 
characteristic which provided a reason to fight against Hitler.  In fact, the fight against 
homicidal racism was seen by experts like Gunnar Myrdal as a reason for hope that the 
relationships between white and black Americans would improve.  The eyes of the world 
were, after all, watching. 
To a degree, the change hoped for by Myrdal and for many members of the African 
American community actually did result from the confrontation with Nazi Germany.  
Race and racism ceased to be definitive in America’s description of its enemies.  
Russians were rarely vilified by their race but by their ideology and even in combat 
situations where the enemy was Asian, ideology was emphasized over race, by linking 
communist enemies together into a single enemy of democracy. Anti-Communist 
sentiments subsumed America’s racist attitudes until the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision 




The reemergence of American racism as motif in the mass media only a decade after 
its involvement in the war, stirred African American’s to critique America’s reluctance to 
change.  Assumptions about a postwar America that had learned its lesson from its ight
with Hitler, ultimately, incited the issue of civil rights for three decades to come.  African 
Americans assumed that America would change; when it refused, its reluctance, even 
when presented with the dangers of racism through the horrors of the camps, would be a 
signal that change would not come without protest, struggle, and threat.  
To say, then, that Americans slowly came to understand the dangers of essentiali m 
through its war with the Nazis is to ignore that many Americans were already well 
steeped in the danger of that essentialism through racism, and that a great many o her 
Americans were unwilling to give up their essentialist views precisely because of their 
own racist sensibilities.  Fort the latter group, it was easy enough to rephrase the danger 
of the Nazis as rampant imperialism.  By removing race from their discussions of Hitler 
and the Nazis, they could continue on with previous theories of utopia.  
In 1953, Leo Strauss, for instance, defends essentialism in virtue (calling it “Natural 
Right” to imply things that are naturally, or inherently, right) by claiming that all too 
often the belief in the “natural right” is disparaged because of its implied associ tion with 
Nazism.  From this complaint, he coins the phrase Reductio Ad Hitlerum in which one 
fallaciously posits that anything relatable to Nazism must be bad.  Ironically, he attempts 
to recall older dystopian models by suggesting that the Nazi’s view of morality w s based 
in historicism, or the understanding that, historically, moral values had been different and 
that the Nazis, thus, believed that moral values were arbitrary:  context dependent 




Leo Strauss attacks context dependent value through a Reductio ad Hitlerum.  Because 
analogies to Nazism became frequent after the war, risking disillusionment with universal 
value, the United States would require a new vision of dystopia with which to describe 
the Nazis, one that took account of their enemies’ essentialist motives. 
Such models for dystopia certainly existed, but weren’t popular in America before, 
during, or immediately after the war.  Outside the U.S., Argentinean writer Jorge Luis 
Borges had developed such a model and had used it, prewar, in both fiction and non-
fiction to critique Nazism in particular.  He did not emphasize their brutality, but the 
moral ambiguity that allowed for them to justify their actions.  Borges saw the Nazis, 
much as Strauss would 12 years later, as ideologically able to ignore universally 
understood values in order to fulfill their fascistic notions.  Particularly, he accused the 
Nazis of exploiting fluidity in ethics in order to render right and wrong into meaningless 
terms.   
In Borges’s short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” (1941) the main character 
stumbles upon a vast conspiracy to document the minor details of a fictional place (the 
world of Tlön).  When these documents are released to the world, Tlön finds full 
acceptance and a world eager for emulation.  The world becomes Tlön.  The narrator 
writes: 
“Almost immediately, reality “caved in” at more than one point.  The truth 
is, it wanted to cave in. Ten years ago, any symmetry, any system with an 
appearance of order—dialectical materialism, anti-Semitism, Nazism—
could spellbind and hypnotize mankind.  How could the world not fall 
under the sway of Tlön, how could it not yield to the vast and minutely 
detailed evidence of an ordered planet?  It would be futile to reply that 
reality is also orderly.  Perhaps it is, but orderly in accordance with divine 
laws (read: “inhuman laws”) that we can never quite manage to penetrate.” 





Tlön’s most salient feature is the planet’s language.  It lacks any nouns and relies instead 
only on grammatical cases which develop context:  adjectives and verbs.  The artificial 
language of Tlön suggests Borges’s own feelings about the dystopian nature of Nazism.  
To the Nazi there does not seem to be any specific definition of a thing like ethics or 
morality, or at least, no divine force to validate these laws.  Instead they are replaced by 
human laws which are simply used as justifications for whatever act the Nazi wants to 
commit.  
 In his essay “Definition of a Germanophile” (1940), Borges describes a discussion 
of Germany with a Nazi sympathizer.  He writes:  
“I always discover that my interlocutor idolizes Hitler, not in spite of the 
high-altitude bombs and the rumbling invasions, the machine guns, the 
accusations and lies, but because of those acts and instruments.  He is 
delighted by evil and atrocity…The discussion becomes impossible 
because the offenses I ascribe to Hitler are, for him, wonders and virtues” 
(Selected Non-Fiction 205).   
 
The inability to concretize language in the face of ideology is, for Borges, specific to this 
political context:  a discussion of Hitler and especially of the war, but there ar  hints that 
the situation has an ethical basis for Borges as well.  The Germanophile, for instance, 
seems to hold to his position because he is a brute, but he cannot openly claim this 
brutality and must, therefore, cloak his respect for violence in meaningless language.   
Even in this particular description, Borges was still unable to simply say that the 
Germanophile’s deception is an act of malevolence; it is still just a differenc  in opinion 
that is insoluble because the language between the two sides has broken down.  One 
might just as easily admire the brutishness of France, England, and the United States in 




 A study of Borges’s depiction of Nazism may seem out of place in a description 
of America’s construction of its image of Nazism.  He was, after all, an Argentinean 
writer operating out of Buenos Aires, writing in Spanish, part of a cultural obviously 
dissimilar to America, and with political sympathies and obligations wholly different 
from those of the United States.  Pre-war, Argentina was sympathetic to Nazi Germany, 
which accounts for much of why Borges is capable of documenting with such aplomb the 
experience of talking to Nazi sympathizers—they were all too common in his nation.  
Moreover, his view does not conform to the idea that fighting the Nazis will save the fr e 
world.  Argentineans had reason to see England as their oppressor.  The Ottawa Pac of 
1932, according to Daniel K. Lewis, made “Argentina appear to be an economic colony 
of Britain” (85).   Argentineans were not inclined to jump to England’s defense.   
 What Borges created through his observations of Nazism is a language through 
which the dystopian elements of Nazi ideology can be described—a manner which 
America would gradually take up with increasing frequency.  Borges does not serve a  a 
model, per se (Americans did not look to Borges to learn how to talk about the evils of 
Nazism), but as a lucid and early description of the critique to which Nazism was 
susceptible and that America would use while employing Nazism as a metaphor for evil. 
His critique concentrates on two major points: the stability of fixed meaning, and the 
tension between essentialism and context dependent evaluation. 
 On the first point, Borges is clear enough.  Things do not have value of their own 
outside of social context or language in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.”  This critique 
manifest through the narrator’s exploration into forged entries in otherwise real 




for no stable existence, and by the political fickleness that allows for the propagation of 
Tlön.  The simple nature of his critique is that, if fascism is to work, ‘right’ will have to 
have a way of meaning ‘wrong.’  In essence, language, according to Borges in “Tlön,”
has no constant value, and control over language allows ideology to effectively change 
the nature of what it means to mean.   
 In 1948, this sentiment was echoed by Orwell’s critique of Totalitarianism, 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, and in particular his invention of Newspeak.  In the appendix to 
his book, Orwell’s description of his language bears striking resemblance to the odditis 
of Tlön.  “Any word in the language (in principle this applied even to very abstract words 
such as if or when) could be used either as verb, noun, adjective, or adverb” (Nineteen 
Eighty-Four 374).  As in the Borges story, ideology forces nouns to lose their power to 
point to things.  As they might as easily point to verbs or adjectives, the central theme to 
Newspeak is that nouns have no inherent fixed meaning. The language of Newspeak 
allows supposedly fixed states to become malleable and thus amplifies the power of 
propaganda since supposedly universal values are made susceptible to change through 
ideology.  The language is mirrored by the villainous O’Brien who tells Smith during his 
interrogation:  
You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right.  
You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident.  When you delude 
yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees 
the same thing as you.  But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external.  Reality 
exists in the human mind, and nowhere else.  (Nineteen Eighty Four 261)    
 
The key to dystopian thinking in both “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” and Nineteen Eighty-
Four continues to be based in rampant liberalism, but now it is not simply liberality with 




For Orwell, postwar language had been reduced to a tool of deceptive rhetoric and 
has lost its capacity for elaboration.  It holds no descriptive power because it can not 
permit a stability of meaning. Orwell, for instance, in 1946, writes: 
The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice have each 
of them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another. 
In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, but 
the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that 
when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders 
of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they mighthave 
to stop using that word if it were tied down to any one meaning. (The Orwell 
Reader 359) 
 
The political language has no basis for meaning; it points to nothing in particular out in 
the world.  A democracy in this sense is not a noun (a type of political structure) but an 
adjective (a form of praise).  Fascism is not a political attitude but a pejorative.  No one 
wants a democracy to refer to a specific definition as this would preclude their own 
government from defining itself as a democracy36.   
 The very dichotomy between fascism and democracy suggests just how 
completely ideology has affected definition, because they are not mutually exclusive—
Hitler was initially voted into power.  Capra, during the war, could not make this 
distinction (the Nazis are against democratic principles in Why We Fight, not democracy 
itself); after the war and ideological disillusionment with fixed meaning, as Orwell points 
out, one can say anything at all about the nature of fascism without worry of 
misrepresentation since there is no fixed definition to which one might compare for 
inconsistencies.  Political language is dominated by words that point back to ideology but 
which do not represent anything in and of themselves out in the world. 
Obviously, the effacement of language for Borges, and for Orwell, Strauss, et. al. 




according to the setting in which the act was committed and in which the evaluation of 
the act occurred.  In such a system, language would have to lose its rigidity, and 
essentialism would have to be avoided as a system by which exclusionary dictums could 
be pronounced as if validated from on high.  Moreover, the propensity of these writers, 
carried over from before the war, was to see such systems as dystopian, though Orwell 
and Borges seem to suggest that they are also unavoidable.  No part of the world in 
Nineteen Eighty Four, for instance, is free of a totalitarian government.  Tlön is accepted 
unanimously by the masses of the world.  Strauss’s natural right is na urally right. 
Following the dissemination of images of the camp, Borges’s vision of Nazi 
Germany changed drastically to reflect a changed understanding of dyst pian values.  In 
“Tlön,” the loss of nouns acted as the precursor to ideological malformation and the end 
of the world as it stands.  Ideology takes what people hold to be true and shows it to be 
malleable:  universal values are revealed to be functions of belief and are rendered 
arbitrary and subject to change.  “Tlön” bemoans the world’s loss of the ability to believe 
in the universality of truth and the inherency of value.  However, in his 1948 story, 
“Deutsches Requiem,” Borges rescinds this position through a fictional account of the 
death camps.  His assertion is that the loss of essentialism is not something to be mourn d 
as it was precisely a belief in inherent values that originally helped to motivate he Nazi 
atrocities.   
Borges explores these implications through the monologue of the Tarnowitz 
Concentration Camp’s assistant director Otto Dietrich zur Linde.  Zur Linde sees his role 
at the camp, and especially his role in destroying the Jewish artist David Jerusalem, as an 




“Nazism is intrinsically a moral act, a stripping away of the old man, which is orrupt and 
depraved, in order to put on the new” (231).  Zur Linde’s important distinction presents 
the supplication to Nazism as an ethic, an ethic which he, hours before his execution, 
hopes to refute.  
For zur Linde, the moral act is one of sacrifice.  He sacrifices his compassion to 
achieve an essential ‘good’ only to realize, at his end, that he and his philosophy have 
turned monstrously evil.  But zur Linde’s monstrosity is, according to him, redeemed as 
well.  “There are many things that must be destroyed in order to build the new order; n w 
we know that Germany was one of them” (Collected Fictions 234).  His monstrosity, and 
his execution for being a monster, ushers in a new moral order that will pronounce him a 
villain worthy of destruction.  It is this moral facet to zur Linde’s sacrifice, to Nazism, 
and to the order that replaces Nazism that is missing from the usurpation of the world by 
Tlön.   
Tlön is attractive not as a moral alternative to Nazism but rather because it establishes 
“an ordered planet” according to human laws (Collected Fictions 81).  Moreover, it does 
not attempt to supplement divine laws (which are to be read, according to the narrator, s 
“inhuman laws”) but rather replaces them completely (81).  Ethically, the incursion of 
Tlön is an anti-redemptive apocalypse; in its abolition of evaluative criteria, it acts as a 
reverse judgment day by abolishing universal values for good and evil. 
Zur Linde in “Deutsches Requiem” suggests an ethical move towards context 
dependent evaluation by ironically providing a universal definition of evil to react
against: himself.  The new system will denounce as villainy his belief in esse tialism, and 




world, is set in this story as preventive of the rise of fascism—all it needs, ironically, is 
some inherent evil to give it stability—zur Linde offers himself.  After exposure of the 
Nazi atrocities, Borges posited the evil of Nazism as inaugurating context dependent 
ethical evaluation by creating a single value operating beyond context to anchor the 
system and to assign an ethical definition against which all context dependent definitions 
might be measured37.  His story suggested that in order for context dependent ethics to 
work it would need a universally accepted definition of evil for an anchor:  Nazism 
provided that definition. 
Zur Linde’s position as a figure of essentialist philosophy is clear from the beginning 
of the story when he offers, “During the trial (which fortunately was short) I did not 
speak; to explain myself at that point would have put obstacles in the way of the verdict 
and made me appear cowardly” (Collected Fictions 229).  His silence prevents the 
contextualization of his act—it prevents explanation, justification, and exoneration and 
allows him to maintain his position outside of context dependency as inherently evil.  
Later, zur Linde expands his own view in parallel to that of George Berkeley’s 
ontological position of subjective idealism.  Zur Linde writes,  
Theologians claim that if the Lord’s attention were to stray for even one second 
from my right hand, which is now writing, that hand would be plunged into 
nothingness, as though it had been annihilated by a lightless fire.  No one can 
exist, say I, no one can sip a glass of water or cut off a piece of bread, without 
justification. (Collected Fictions 230)  
  
For the theologians, zur Linde explains, this demiurge is the attention of God, but clearly,
the validating force he himself recognizes lacks embodiment:  justification gives 




In this private moment, after he is off the stand and no longer playing the villain, he 
has already succumbed to the new order for which he will martyr himself.  He isputting 
himself into context, and by doing so, putting his victims into context as well.  Those 
whom he made sip water and live off the crusts of bread are now justified:  their 
extermination and his monstrosity serve as the impetus for an ethical system tha  no 
longer relies on the attention of God for ontological existence. Now the human order is 
something to be coveted because inhuman orders and universal values, even those 
designated by the divine, lead to monstrosity.    
The irony of zur Linde’s position is all important as it is precisely irony, i the same 
manner later described by Richard Rorty that will allow for movement away from a 
position of nostalgia towards essentialism.  Irony allows for an understanding of 
essentialist values as having dystopian possibilities, and just as importantly, i  endorses 
liberalism and open-mindedness as utopian.   
To wit, satirical attacks began as the first real critique of the nostalgic position 
implied by the reliance on hyperreal ethics, especially those satires which showed 
America’s essentialist narrative as leading to a Nazi like state. The surg  of postwar 
patriotism stirred by America’s fight against communism made such satires rare in 
America during the years immediately following the Second World War even as more 
frequent analogies were required to demonize America’s newest enemy to Nazi 
Germany.  These few instances, however, began to create a new way to discuss the 
context dependent ethical system that was beginning postwar to evolve and emerge in 




 In the British film The Third Man (1949), for instance, Orson Welles stars in a 
scathing critique of the belief in inherent virtue afforded to Americans by virtue of their 
having defeated the Nazis, forcing the viewer to come to terms with the complexities of 
morality that follow from causing and preventing atrocity.  The film forces th  
questioning of distinctions such as good and evil especially in the face of crimeswhich 
resemble those of the Nazis and in values touted as American.   
 The film centers on its main character, Holly Martins, who is invited to Vienna to 
help out his friend Harry Lime, only to find upon his arrival that Lime is already dead—
killed the day before in an auto accident.  Unable to believe that the accident was only n
accident (and somewhat offended that the English police responsible for the middle 
“zone” of divided Vienna would suggest that Lime was something of a criminal), Martins 
vows to get to the bottom of things.  Martin’s brash American ways (reminiscent of the
Westerns which he writes for a living) end up nearly destroying everyone around him.  
The porter who helps Martins is killed, Lime’s girlfriend Anna is discovered to bea 
Czechoslovakian posing as an Austrian in order to escape deportation to the Russian 
sector, and Holly Martins, himself, is followed and threatened by Lime’s “associates.”   
Martins’s investigation is otherwise bungled because of his American 
overconfidence.  Ignorant of the city’s political and economic operation, the only thing he 
manages to discover about Lime’s death through his interrogations is that there was a 
mysterious third man who helped carry Lime’s body across the street after being hit by a 
car.  His attempt to clear his friend’s good name among the city’s authorities is 
catastrophic and proves pointless once after he reveals that, even as children, Lime was a 




refuse to believe that Harry is a criminal even though Anna has a fake passport made by 
Lime and Martins has been a party to numerous of Lime’s childhood and adolescent 
scams.  As in Hemingway’s postwar novel and the film Casablanca, being American is 
made to seem more a condition of virtue rather than nationality.  
 When all seems at its most hopeless, Martins stumbles accidentally upon Harry 
Lime (played by Orson Welles) who is perfectly alive.  Lime, himself, was the 
mysterious ‘third man’ present at the accident to which the title of the film eludes.  After 
a brief separation, Lime meets Martins again in a giant Ferris wheel re Harry Lime 
seems only too proud to admit that he could care less about the victims of his latest scam.  
He has stolen penicillin from military hospitals, watered it down, and sold it on the black 
market.  His victims fill a hospital: children who, originally suffering from meningitis, 
now suffer equally from Lime’s black market drugs, Martins is positioned by the zone 
police to take down Lime, but only because they are willing to help Anna.  Otherwise, 
sick children or no, Martins will stick by his friend.  He is an American too, afterll, and 
therefore, fiercely loyal.  When Anna refuses to be helped, Martins aids the polic only 
because he is taken on a tour of the hospital so that he can physically see the suffering of 
the children.  Eventually, the zone police and Martins chase Lime through the Vienna 
sewers, hunting him down, and shooting him. 
 The attack on the inherent virtue of Americans comes under constant attack in 
The Third Man.  Martins’s career as a writer of Westerns makes him a caricature of th
American hero who is brash and bold, will stop at nothing until injustice is righted, who 
stands by his friends, and does whatever it takes to save the damsel in distress.  In the 




his attempt to defend his friend against the “unfair” accusations of Major Calloway, he 
gets the girl into trouble and ends up causing the murder of the only person in Vienna 
unlucky enough to offer him help (the porter).  Of course, ill informed about his 
surroundings and unwilling to take his ignorance into consideration, he turns out to be 
wrong about all things pertaining to his friend Lime; Lime actually is responsible for the 
deaths of a hospital full of children.  And the damsel in distress, Anna?  She refuses to be 
saved at the sacrifice of her child-murdering boyfriend. 
 Most of the action in the plot is driven by Martins’s reliance on the 
unimpeachable virtue of his (and Lime’s) condition as Americans.  He believes, against 
all evidence to the contrary, that he knows what’s going on in this foreign city (the zone 
division makes the city foreign even to its natives).  Consequently, he is impervious to all 
advice.  At one point, Martins pushes curiously into the midst of an angry mob that 
believes he’s murdered an old man.  As he presses in to see the corpse, those around him 
whisper accusations in a foreign tongue against him; this scene serves as a model for 
Martins’s quest.  He doesn’t know he’s in trouble and doing the exact wrong thing; he 
refuses to see that there is a different code of conduct among the inhabitants of the zoned 
off Vienna—a language of behavior that he does not speak. 
 While the presence of the Nazi atrocities is not immediately apparent in The Third 
Man, the after effects of the war are imminently available.  The overall effect can be quite 
disturbing.  Where ever Martins goes (or is chased) the landscape is crater pock d, and 
littered with destroyed buildings and piles of rubble.  It is unclear whether the view r 
should applaud the director’s ability to have brought war-torn Europe to the screen as it 




destruction of Vienna so soon after the war.  Ruin and city are interchangeable terms in 
the language of the film though their meanings are, generally, mutually exclusive.  The 
normal linguistic relationship between a city and a ruin is that of before and after, full and 
empty; in The Third Man, the ruin is just another state of the city.  Martins is chased 
down city steps in the same manner as a character might be chased down a set of steps in 
a film set in another city—they just happen to have a crater in the middle of them in The
Third Man.  No one notices the ruins.  No one seems to react to them or even mention 
them.  Somehow, without a single block of the city unscathed, the allies are able to carve 
the urban landscape up into closed off zones. Even the film’s creators seem at odds to 
describe their position as a-moral agents transforming the destruction of property and 
lives into a location for a movie shoot:  the ever present zither shows the viewer the lack 
of seriousness with which Martins and Lime understand the tragedy of Vienna (the ruins, 
the piles of rubble, the dead, the incarcerated, the unmentioned victims), but the zither 
score also suggests that the playfulness is unfounded, that the situation is neurotic, 
uncomfortable, and foreign.  Among all the characters, only Harry Lime understands the 
city as a new kind of territory.  He uses the now opened sewer as a passage between
zones and clambers over the heaps of rubble instead of keeping to the thoroughfares.  
Near the film’s conclusion, the zone police guard a building as Martins lures Lime into a 
trap, but Lime doesn’t approach from the watched street.  He climbs over a neighboring 
ruin which no one thought to watch.  Opportunity, tragedy, ruin, city—these have all 
become just words to Harry Lime, none of which are due more or less reverence. 
There’s something ghoulish about the scenes that carries over from the film’s real 




Vienna, Martins doesn’t seem to acknowledge that he’s in a warzone only a short time 
after the end of the war, that the people he is talking to were only recently wartime 
enemies, or that he has power over these people by virtue of his nationality.  When Major 
Calloway asks Anna for her identification, Martins advises her “don’t you give it to him,” 
as if Anna has a choice—as if resisting in this fashion would not end up with her in jail or 
deported (The Third Man).  Later, in private, Anna has to explain to Martins why having 
her identification papers taken away will have catastrophic results.  Though he is 
surrounded by ruins in a territory that a few short years before was part of Nazi Germany, 
he simply assumes that everything works according to his American view of things. 
 Part of this view is the notion of Americans as good guy saviors and defeaters of 
the great Nazi evil—the natural extension of which is a unilateral exoneration of 
Americans; they can do no wrong.  Holly Martins insists that his friend Harry Lime is 
innocent though he has no idea what Lime has been doing since the war.  He knows, of 
course, that Lime was a small time crook before the war, but protests any presentday 
accusations about Lime.  Why Martins thinks Lime went to war torn Vienna in thefirst 
place is never quite clear, but he clearly doesn’t suspect Lime of taking advant ge of the 
traumatized and destitute Austrians.  When Calloway shows him a slide show of Lime’s
many crimes, the results are indisputable.  Even then, Martins isn’t willing to betray his 
friend.  After Lime reveals himself, admits his crime, and threatens to push Martins out of 
a giant Ferris wheel, Martins still has the fierce loyalty that pervades the American 
romantic notion of its heroism.  He has to be physically taken to see Lime’s victims 
before he’ll intervene.  This reticence to intervene is reminiscent of America’s prewar 




thing, but a direct look at the children victimized by the monster.  The loyalty of Rick 
Blaine in Casablanca, manifested now by Martins, seems idiotic and stubborn. 
 The orphans suffering from meningitis, and whatever poisoning they’ve suffered 
through the tainted antibiotics of Lime, represent mass atrocity and perhaps represent the 
film’s attempt to revisit issues of genocide, but in this instance, it is not fascist tyranny 
that’s causes the suffering.  Rampant capitalism is to blame in the form of the black 
market perpetrated by the always smiling entrepreneur Harry Lime.  Th  “American 
Dream” seems just as capable as Nazism of crushing people like ants and treati g its 
victims to inhuman torture without mercy. 
 The American notion of heroism is exposed in The Third Man as xenophobic, 
racist, arrogant, ignorant, and homicidal.  Furthermore, the movie is suffused with Nazi-
like activities being committed by non-Nazis.  Major Calloway wants to look at Anna’s 
papers and once he learns her heritage, he wants to transport her East.  Vienna itself is 
closed city, like a ghetto.  No one gets in or out.  The zone police ransack houses without 
warning or explanation and are indistinguishable from images of the Gestapo in other 
movies.  The Nazis, the Holocaust, the American messianic image are all availble in the 
film language of The Third Man, but they are jumbled and do not correspond to the 
things to which they ought to refer. 
 There is no point in The Third Man where the nominal state of language breaks 
down as it does in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”—nouns remain nouns, adjectives remain 
adjectives.  Instead the certainty of the particular language breaks down between the 
French, Russian, American, and English Zones with the Austrian nationals speaking their 




vocabulary unavailable to a speaker at any given time unless that speaker is a mult -
lingual, and therefore, able to more capably traverse the new language system.  
Otherwise, like Martins, there is no navigating one’s way through the zones without a 
translator.   
The system of ethics within The Third Man is only jumbled further.  The 
Austrians are criminals because they are associated with the crimeso mitted by the 
Nazis and also because they must rely on the black market in order to survive.  The real 
crime in the film seems to be the locking down of the Austrians by the regime that is e 
zone authority, but that regime (located in the shared central zone) is actually m ltiple 
regimes.  What’s more, the power players in the black market are not the Austrians at all, 
but citizens of the countries that occupy and control Vienna.  These foreign nationals 
have shown up in Vienna like carpetbaggers of old to use their considerable political 
clout as members of the “good guy” countries so as take advantage of the defensless 
Viennese (the criminals incarcerated in their city-prison).  If the Viennese r quire 
penicillin, they have no access from legitimate authority.  There only hope is that a 
criminal from France, America, England, or Russia will come to their rescue. 
Is there still nominal value in The Third Man?  Yes, because Calloway can still 
bring Martins to Lime’s victims and know that they will have the desired meaning for 
Martins.  It is this victimization that most closely resembles the crime of Nazi Germany 
and it is the value of this victimization which is immune to being philosophically 
demoted from nominal meaning to one of context dependence.  As with “Deutsches 




anchors its ethics.  In The Third Man that epitome is created through the evil of an act 
that brutalizes children for money.   
These ideas of essentialism as utopian and context dependency as dystopian were 
already coming under criticism, however, even before the 1950s.  In Miller’s D ath of a 
Salesman (1949), for instance, the audience witnesses the downfall of Willy Loman, who 
is among other things, a representation of the ‘American Dream’ at work.  He is the ideal 
salesman, a hard worker, and an obvious participant in consumer culture.  The play 
shows, however, that not only is that dream dead, but it had been a lie all along.  Willy’s 
son, Biff gains no inherent virtue from the decency of his father and family name, just as 
Americans can no longer rely on the nationalist virtue of being good simply in the nam  
of their country.   
By the play’s end, Willy Loman has been driven insane by his romanticized idea 
of his own self worth as a salesman and the incongruence between that vision and his 
own decrepit morality, while Biff has come to realize that all of the values upon which 
his family relies are founded upon lies.  He represents the American consciousness 
becoming aware that its belief in fixed value have the potential to cause great ho ror.  
The revelation of the demise of the American dream is a product, in Miller’s play, 
of language which has come to fail in its signification.  The family learns about Willy’s 
dilemma because he is given to episodes during which he holds conversations with 
people who aren’t there.  These conversations are both flashbacks and delusions so that 
while the audience is presented to the characters’ past, it is all a function of madness.  In 
the present of the play, the other members of the Loman family also carry through the 




past and present jobs.  When Biff goes to see his old boss, whom he is sure will 
remember him for his success as a salesman, he realizes that he had never ctually held a 
position in sales and that he had, in fact, only been a shipping clerk.  His brother Happy, 
who considers himself an assistant buyer, is only the assistant to the assistant buyer (321).  
When reminded by Biff of this position, he responds “Well, I’m practically—” (321).  
Even in the face of the truth, Happy will not give up his lie.  The deceptions in Death of a 
Salesman confuse signification and result in a break down of language in the manner 
suggested by Orwell and Borges, and just as with Orwell and Borges, this confusion of 
language seems to be a sign of dystopian principals: language without meaning leads to
tragedy, though in this case, the ideology that corrupts the language is particularly 
American.  
Miller, however, presents no easy conclusion about the implications of this 
befuddlement. It isn’t, for instance, clear that more honest language would have 
prevented the death of the American dream.  Though the audience sees Willy Loman as a 
man driven and betrayed by his illusions, he is a character who invites sympathy not 
scorn.  While Biff comes to realize through the action of the play that he is essentially 
“one dollar an hour” and the audience comes to admire his bravery in discovering that 
knowledge, he is still, in the end, Biff—a petty thief who has a history of getting too 
rough with the ladies (322).  Though the play is ostensibly about his finding his limits, 
the audience knows that he will not surpass them.  Biff’s discovery of the truth is not a 
success story.  In Death of a Salesman, truth is not salvation—it does not become 
Strauss’s utopian natural right—it is as likely to lead to dystopia as are illusions except 




Miller presents a vision of a world that is not in transition, but that has gone extinct 
leaving no hope for the next generation, but of course no one in the play is a returning 
soldier:  the thriving force that will come to drive the economy over the next decade is 
otherwise missing as a witness or cause for the Lomans’ downfall.  Because of this 
absence, Miller is capable of discussing the changing values in America without having 
to acknowledge the amplification of patriotic value inherent to victory.  The play 
insinuates that the Lomans of the world must realize that living through the assumptions 
concerning the American dream is not enough to keep their romanticism afloat, but for 
WWII vets, it was precisely this romanticism that opened up a new world for them and 
was key to the affluent society of the 1950s.  The salesman may die in 1949, but patriotic 
essentialism will not, necessarily, die with him. 
The soldier, though absent from Miller’s play, is not immune to the degradations of 
the American dream through stubborn belief in essentialism.  Flannery O’Connor 
explores the morality of the postwar American character through the perspective of the 
returning soldier in her 1952 satirical novel, Wise Blood by referencing Nazism to 
validate its ethical stance.  The ethics of the novel, and the Nazi ethics upon which they 
are based, deny the ethical state of victim-hood in an appeal to evolution which forces a 
reevaluation of Christian salvation dogma.  Reacting against the atrocities caused by Nazi 
essentialism, the novel explores the need to abandon all essentialism and then 
demonstrates the resultant dangers.  It performs this examination through the theological 
arguments of its principal character Hazel Motes.   
The novel’s protagonist, a one time war hero and aspiring preacher, returns to the 




duty in Europe, presumably during and right after the Second World War, is utterly a 
mystery to the reader save for a few scenes in which Hazel recalls resisting the 
temptations put to him by his fellow soldiers, generally involving prostitution.  What 
happened in Europe to cause Hazel’s crisis of faith, the reader does not know. 
 Hazel returns home without any belief in Christ as a savior:  Christ has lost his 
essential meaning.  Hazel’s postwar goal is to found the “Church Without Christ,” which 
he preaches from the roof of his car to crowds entering and leaving movie theaters.  Th  
tenets of Motes’s church are otherwise vague, but its central philosophy is offered rather 
plainly:  human beings are not cursed with original sin, and therefore, they do not require
someone to redeem them.   
 The Church Without Christ is fairly unsuccessful in the novel, but not 
completely—Motes manages to attract one follower:  Enoch Emery.  Emery, a young 
man who works as a guard at the local zoo, has an antagonistic rivalry with animals.  He 
thinks that they are lazy as they do little work while he, on the other hand, is forced to 
guard them.  Emery’s fascinations also include a mummy in a museum near the park 
where he works, which seems to stem from its age and its physical degradation over time.  
The mummy is proof of a non-Christian antiquity, and its condition suggests a kind of 
removal from physical time.  Unlike human beings, the mummy continues, but it is a 
human being, and therefore, it ascribes divine power to the mundane.  Emery’s rivalry 
with the animal kingdom stems from a competition between biological entities that are, 
more or less, on equal spiritual footing with him, if Darwin and the mummy are to be 




The antagonism culminates in his attendance at a matinee for a children’s movie 
where Emery, having been converted to the Church Without Christ and context 
dependent ethics rather than those based in inherent value, stands in line to meet an ape-
actor named Gonga.  His goal is, at first, to insult the animal, but when he reachs the 
front of the line, he is tongue tied.  He finally manages to stammer out, “My name is 
Enoch Emery… I attended the Rogemill Boys’ Bible Academy.  I work at the city zoo.  I 
seen two of your pictures.  I’m only eighteen year old but I already work for the city.  My 
daddy made me com…” at which point his attempt to put himself in context is interrupted 
by the cracking of his own voice (O’Connor 182).  Faced with a celebrity, even an animal
celebrity, Enoch cannot respond.  The indisputable presence of the celebrity is here 
satirized. Now it is not the essentialist savior Christ who one sees as eminently awe-
inspiring, but film celebrity at its most ridiculous extreme, a man in an ape suit 
attempting to frighten children.  The ape-man Gonga, a grotesquerie of essentiali m, 
having caused a crisis in Emery’s context dependence faith, tells him “You go t Hell,” 
and sends him on his way (O’Connor 182). 
Emery’s spiritual quest ends in his final salvation after he has stolen the mummy, 
taken it to Hazel Motes, accosted the actor playing Gonga, and stolen the ape suit which 
he puts on as if to continue in life as nothing more than a gorilla—if the gorilla celebrity 
is the pinnacle of essentialism, a parody of Christ as savior—then Emery, in his new 
religion, becomes his own savior by donning the costume and putting himself into that 
context.   
But this is satire and O’Connor is attacking the dogmatism of context dependency as 




Darwinian denial of Eden.  Emery’s submersion into the simian persona, as well as his 
general attitude towards animals, suggests a strong tie in the novel towards theories of 
evolution as a replacement for godly orders.  According to the narration, “No gorilla in 
existence, whether in the jungles of Africa or California, or in New York City in he 
finest apartment in the world, was happier at that moment than this one, whose god had 
finally rewarded it” (O’Connor 197).  In a sense, Enoch Emory and the animals he guards 
are all equal, but he is subservient because he has to work for food and for relationships.  
His animal counterparts do not.  His donning of the costume alleviates Emory of his 
human drawbacks. 
When Enoch Emery is faced with Gonga, he sees an animal that has entered a world 
that is closed to him even though he is supposedly privileged as a human and it an ape.  
Inevitably, Enoch Emery will never matter as much as Gonga.  By putting on the monkey 
suit, Emery is choosing to trade species—assuming that all are equal, it’s just a matter for 
him to find the one that is treated the best.  The ape does not have to work, is not despised 
by women, and doesn’t have to worry about its superior genetic state being trampled 
upon by the beginnings of civil rights.  Emery, who is white, feels his world slipping 
away to a new economic class of African Americans created by the war.  People who he 
once considered brutes, like the animals, are doing better than him.   
In many ways, Emery’s conversion to the Church Without Christ is as much about 
changing racial politics in America and an attempt to secure status as a superior species.  
It is Nazism depicted with animals as the inferior species.  Emery acts as O’Connor’s slap 
at those theories of racial superiority derived through notions of fit and unfit specie as 




the novel think themselves superior, envy the state of animals, and are willing to go so far 
as to exclude God so as render their souls unnecessary. 
In the shadow of the novel reside notions of superior and inferior species introduced 
by Darwin, defended in America at the Scopes Trial of 1926, and used by the Nazis to 
validate their crimes.  Whatever has happened to Motes, he has seen the mass power of 
Darwinism and has seen people whom Christ, in his more traditional incarnation, should 
not redeem, but will regardless.  His entire spiritual system must go, because he cannot 
believe in a Christ that would redeem such people.  Instead, he returns from the war 
believing in the inherent innocence of human beings that, being above context, can 
survive the transgressions of experience.  Having faced a nation that has allowed 
unspeakable evils to be performed in its name, Motes finds damnation and salvation to be 
otherwise meaningless terms.  The Nazis have made him spiritually incredulous. 
Clearly, the novel presents Motes as protesting too much in his abandonment of 
Christian tradition.  He goes to a prostitute in order to prove that going to prostitutes 
doesn’t bother him.  He attempts to seduce Sabbath Hawkes who is in turn attempting to 
seduce him.  He even murders a man who has attempted to steal his identity, all wih the 
point of proving that he is above traditional notions of good and evil.  It is also clear that 
O’Connor means to critique Hazel’s moral position.  Through the satire, she means to 
denounce the ethics created by a Church without Christ.  Because Motes has become 
amoral, he cannot castigate and has become, like Enoch, nothing more than an animal.  
He sees all those around him living in a state of inherent ignorance and innocence, but in 
reality, they are neither.  Motes lives among the wicked, but he cannot recognize the evil 




What the works that emerge after the war suggest is that the postwar world could no 
longer sustain a dystopian image in which ideologies of context dependence led 
necessarily to amorality, nor could they sustain the utopian image in which the goodness 
of Americans naturally redeemed the world.  Instead, the dystopia of Nazism had resulted 
from the dogmatism that went hand-in-hand with the belief in inherent values, and as
Richard Rorty has posited, utopia began to be viewed more and more a product of 
liberality. 
The frequency of Nazi invocation produced increasingly greater instances in which 
utopian implications of essentialism proved subject to argument, and, in many cases, 
became too problematic to sustain.  This loss of faith in inherent or universally accepted 
values marked the need for a different kind of evaluative system and began the rise of 
context dependent ethical frameworks.  The utopian implication of contextualized ethics 
began to take hold in rhetorical environments where Nazism was most frequently evoked.  
Postwar, the most common occasion for analogies to Nazism occurred in national 
politics, just as Orwell had predicted.  Fascism and Nazism gained the makings of a 
ubiquitous pejorative, eminently useful in American propaganda which would, postwar, 
launch into a new fight against a new enemy, and would need to bring its old enemy 




CHAPTER 4  
THE THIRD REICH AND THE RED MENACE:  
THE USE OF NAZIS IN AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 
 
Fascism and Nazism gained the makings of a ubiquitous pejorative, eminently useful 
in American propaganda which would, postwar, launch into a new fight against a new 
enemy, and would need to bring its old enemy along as a reminder of America’s inherent 
greatness. 
Postwar, America would almost immediately begin the era of diplomatic and military 
maneuvers against Communist Russia known as the Cold War.  During this era, 
Americans would learn to live with the possibility that, at any moment, the Russians 
might start a nuclear war that would, more than likely, end civilization, and perhaps all 
life on Earth.  Like other conflicts, the Cold War utilized propaganda to arouse popular 
support for America’s efforts in the conflict and to unify the nation in a common purpose 
of opposition for communism and as with World War II, this propaganda came in two 
very distinct forms.   
The first form, discussed at length in this chapter, concerns the official narrtive of 
anti-communist efforts in America as delivered from sources sponsored by the state and 
defense departments.  Efforts made by official propaganda from the end of the Second 
World War until the end of the Cold War were almost always phrased in the evils 
common to Russia and Nazi Germany, and their success often hinged on the ability to 
conflate the enemy in this manner.  The overwhelming presence of Nazism in anti-




for America to maintain its understanding of itself as a virtuous nation.  The use of 
Nazism as part of descriptions of Communist Russia suggests, also, that referenc  to Nazi 
Germany had become obligatory in describing the national enemy, whether that enemy 
happened to be Korean, Russian, or Vietnamese.  In fact, the race of the enemy, and 
therefore the question of race and racism, was sublimated once that enemy simply 
became the next manifestation of the Nazi menace through the drive in propaganda to 
Nazify Cold War conflicts.  
The obligatory nature of this imagery was in measure to its effectiveness.  Depictions 
of Nazis were more effective at describing the danger of communism than were actual 
communist enemies, despite the fact that the Nazis were defeated and passé and 
communists were routinely accused of indoctrinating American supporters and aimi g
enough weapons at the United States to destroy the world many times over.  The Nazis 
provided a real world example of evil which, attached to Communism, provided a visual 
and historical basis for why the communists were dangerous and justified the cost of 
American anti-communist efforts. 
The effectiveness of depictions of Nazism in describing communist Russia relied 
upon the appearance of the Nazi atrocities in the media.  The prime example of Nazi 
brutality came from the camp liberation films which misrepresented the danger of Nazi 
ideology by universalizing the suffering of the Nazi’s victims and failing to address the 
atrocities in specifically anti-Semitic terms.  These two factors allowed Nazism to be a 
symbol that was at once both powerful enough to rally American reaction and vague 
enough to allow for usage in propaganda outside of the limited scope of Nazi Germany—




seem like Hitler on the basis of their shared desire for world conquest, and in doing so, he 
could be associated with the images of camp liberation that exemplified evil many 
Americans. 
Signs that this conflation would become an essential part of America’s postwar image 
of Russia began almost immediately following the war.  On October 27th, 1945 in New 
York City, before the dawn of the Cold War, Harry Truman divided America’s postwar 
role into twelve points.  The fifth of these points concerned Nazism specifically: “By the 
combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we shall help the defeated enemy 
states establish peaceful democratic governments of their own free choic .  And we shall 
try to attain a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist” 
(“Harry” 343).  Truman’s speech sets the stage for America’s postwar self image in that it 
charges the United States with the task of rescuing the world from Nazism in perpetuity.  
The nation’s aim would be, according to Truman, to help stamp out future fascism just as 
we had stamped out the incarnation which had only recently been defeated.  The United 
States, with the help of its allies, had defeated evil.   
Points one through three of this same speech directly addressed invasive imperialism 
such as practiced by the Nazis, while point four (obviously directed at Communist 
Russia) would, ironically, have validated Nazi Germany:  it allowed for any nation to 
choose its own leader, which Germany surely had done in 1932. 
The problem with Truman’s vision of America’s postwar purpose was, of course, that 
the world no longer needed a defender against Nazism.  Nazism had been defeated, both 
physically through the defeat of its followers and conceptually by the revelation that the 




to such an extent that its existence as a serious political force was no longer c c ivable, 
and fascism, if not defeated outright, had been thoroughly demonized38.   
Nationalism, in the form of patriotism, was, however, still alive and well as evidence  
in Truman’s speech. According to Truman, America was to shoulder the responsibility 
for rescuing and defending the free world.  It was empowered to do this because it had 
proven itself inherently virtuous.  The task charged by Truman for America would soon 
after require the build up of a nuclear arsenal to enforce worldwide respect for freedom 
rather than tyranny.  The Soviets would drop their answer to “Fat Man,” dubbed “Joe 
One,” in August of 194939. 
If the Nazis disappeared from the world physically and politically after thei defeat in 
1945, however, they certainly were not forgotten.  Postwar, the dissemination of 
American culture would recall Nazism and America’s fight against NaziGermany 
compulsively.  In the unofficial propaganda of American mass culture, World War II 
films and literature emerged as financially successful entertainment genre that had mass 
appeal across American geographic and cultural boundaries.  Films inspired by the 
Second World War and especially the fight against Nazism would grossly outnumber 
films made about all other American conflicts combined and have since continued to 
remain popular.  
At the beginning of the rise in popularity for depictions of Nazism, America’s 
recurrent depiction of its recently defeated enemy was unsurprising.  Historically, nations 
bolster up the patriotism of their citizenry through reminders of recent military victories; 
America was no different. These particular reminders were, however, odd in that they 




Russia. Strangely, that American propaganda, official or unofficial, which attemp ed to 
sell the Russian enemy without reference to the Nazis proved unsuccessful (and certai ly 
could not compete with depictions of military victories over Nazi Germany) despite their 
topicality. 
Overt attempts made during the war to rally Americans to the plight of their Russian 
allies undermined the effectiveness of once proven methods for demonizing communism 
which had been employed since the Russian revolution. The idea of the bomb throwing 
saboteur who went from factory to factory stirring up strife among workers had become 
hackneyed through overuse and its obvious contradictory message to the depictions 
disseminated during wartime of Russians as hardworking decent folk. American 
propaganda reinvigorated the threat of Communism by merging commies and Nazis into 
a single conglomerate enemy of America.  The affect was to make communist and Nazi 
characteristics seemingly interchangeable.  Thus, the defeats of the Nazis served 
American propaganda as symbolic references to hypothetical defeats of Rusians, and 
communism took on the stigma of evil for being made to seem similar to Nazism.   
Likewise, by conflating Russia with Nazi Germany, America reassured itself of the 
need to stand up against communism as a fight against inherent evil and in this way 
justified the excesses of the domestic anti-communism campaigns and its military 
obligations as a super power.  Images of the defeat of Nazism, then, weren’t just 
reminders of American combat valor but nationalist verifications of the ethical virtue 
inherent to being American.  We had defeated the dragon of Nazism and he who slays the 




This propaganda was clearly based on images and not historical veracity even asit 
came through official channels.  Historically, Russia did as much to win World War II as 
America had, and in terms of sacrifice, Russia took more casualties than all the other 
warring nations combined.  In terms of its capacity to make war after World War II, 
including nuclear war, Russia was far outstripped by the American military.  Whether the 
Russian domestic or foreign policy actually resembled that of the Nazis is a position that 
is certainly subjective.  In the movie theaters, however, communist Russia was defined 
for the American audience as a nation as virulently imperialistic, as given to violence, 
and as fanatical to ideology as Nazi Germany.  They might, at any moment, drop a 
hydrogen bomb on Portland, Oregon or take over the free presses in some town in 
Montana.  That the Russians would have had trouble delivering a nuclear or 
thermonuclear payload to American soil was not a factor in the effectiveness of Cold War 
rhetoric as disseminated to the mass American public through channels of propaganda 
that were both conscious and accidental, public and private.   
Americans were reassured by their propaganda that they had wiped the world clean of 
Nazism and fascism almost single handedly.  It assured them also that it was only natural 
that communism would be next.  Because the images of the camps defied explanation, 
they were susceptible to re-contextualization.  Propaganda utilized the tenuous lack of 
resolution implied by the atrocities to imply America’s new enemy as well. Communist 
Russia was made to seem Nazi Germany, part II. 
The threat of liquid powered rockets was deemphasized in the minds of the American 
public as soon as the V-2 launch sites fell silent.  Even the implications of genocide, as 




mass media which preferred to identify the corpses in the camp as political dissident  and 
foreign patriots rather than innocent Jews.  America had not received answers, but its 
media, nonetheless, stopped asking questions. 
Issues raised by the war (the scope and nature of the atrocities, what to do wih the 
refugees, what to do with the war criminals, etc.) were replaced, postwar, by the much 
more immediate threat of worldwide communism, the Iron Curtain, the Cold War, and 
the ever present possibility of, first, nuclear, and then thermonuclear, attack.  Stalin and 
his H-Bomb left no time for meditation on the meaning of Buchenwald, except for when 
propaganda cryptically attempted to conflate the motivations of Buchenwald with the 
motivations of Russia’s H-Bomb.   
What is clear, however, is that the postwar communist caricature portrayed in 
American propaganda was foreign to its depiction in the long prewar tradition of vilifying 
communism. Whereas the prewar communist was a character gifted in the skills of 
oratory and demolitions (often of Jewish ethnicity), the new communist was a shadowy 
master who never appeared from behind his army of brainwashed slaves:  the prewar 
communist was a zealous revolutionary indistinguishable from anarchists; the postwar 
communist was a war mongering overlord whose techniques included mind control, the 
closed border of the annexed state, the secret police that carried dissenters away in the 
night to parts unknown, and the capacity to incinerate entire populations, remotely and 
without mercy.  The image of the Communist menace seemed a close cousin to the Nazis 
as described by Frank Capra in Why We Fight. 
Communists were no longer depicted as interested in stirring up disgruntled workers 




entire world—bending everyone everywhere to their will by erasing their minds and 
replacing their thoughts and opinions with party ideology.  The communist leadership 
was depicted in America of wanting to make soldiers who would burn the world in a 
great conflagration and who would do so without argument because they would always, 
and only, follow orders.  In short they’d become Nazis. 
The new communist was Orwell’s totalitarian “boot stamping on a human face – 
forever” (Nineteen Eighty-Four 277).  In fact, Nineteen Eighty-Four became the 
American literary touchstone for the Cold War precisely because it was taken as detailing 
how a totalitarian government, presumably communism, would operate if allowed.  The 
mythical nation of Oceania in the novel is clearly meant to mix the dangers of 
communism and national socialism through its political orientation of English Socialism 
or Ingsoc.  
The manner in which American agencies formed their anti-communist propaganda 
after World War II suggests the transformation from Nazi to Communist rather than a 
return to the old habit of fueling anti-Communist sentiments through America’s prewar 
pattern.  The open letter from Lenin to the American Worker in 1918 and the ensuing 
Palmer raids of 1920 which had led to the deportation 246 men and 3 women40 to Russia 
had originally created the image of the Bolshevik as a political radical indistinguishable 
from an anarchist (Barson 19).   
In a letter meant to counter Lenin’s, Palmer explains the nature of communism as 
criminal: 
“Robbery, not war, is the ideal of Communism.  This has been demonstrated in 
Russia, Germany, and in America.  As a foe, the anarchist is fearless of his own 
life, for his creed is a fanaticism that admits no respect of any other creed.  




motives impossible to clean thought.  Crime is the degenerate factor in 
society…An assassin may have brilliant intellectuality, he may be able to excuse 
his murder or robbery with fine oratory, but any theory which excuses crime is 
not wanted in America.  This is no place for the criminal to flourish.” (A. Mitchell 
Palmer 6). 
 
What Palmer also suggests is that he couldn’t distinguish between the strike-inciting 
communist and the bomb throwing anarchist.  His description is indicative of the prewar 
conception of the communist—a robber, an assassin, an orator, but not a tyrant, a 
hypnotist, or a power mad imperialist. 
The effect of the first Red Scare was native to the American desire for solation 
following the First World War.  Even after Palmer’s political career ended (leaving 
Herbert Hoover in control of the FBI), anti-Communist sentiments continued to affect
national policy.  The victorious nations of the First World War, for instance, encouraged 
fascist nationalists41 to compete for power in vulnerable nations because of their inherent 
anti-Bolshevist attitudes (Hobsbawn 31).  The House UnAmerican Committee, set up in 
1934 to investigate Nazi propaganda, changed 3 years later to examine, instead, the 
danger of communist infiltration.   
Attitudes towards communism were, however, enormously divided in America.  The 
Great Depression made the ideology attractive at least to people who were curious about 
its tenets, and throughout the thirties, anti-Communist sentiments were met with growing 
ambivalence.  The film Ninotchka, for instance, which revolved around communist party 
politics and the interaction between the communist and capitalist world, was rele ed six 
weeks after the signing Russians non-aggression pact with Germany.  Ninotchka was “not 
only a commercial success, but was also nominated for several Academy Awards” 




between communist women and capitalist men, and also a commercial success.  
Communism, even during this politically charged time, faced a rather tepid res onse by 
most Americans.  According to Barson and Heller, “the fact that communism was only 
occasionally a focal point of American popular culture…is a tip-off that it was perceived 
rather ambiguously by much of the nation” (32). 
By the time America entered the war in 1942, the era of the First Red scare had 
already ended with Russia as a watered down enemy.  America’s entrance into th  
Second World War reinvigorated the American propaganda machine but put it in the 
awkward position of having to undo the image created by twenty years of red baiting and 
the employment of communists as the go-to enemies of the state.  Film and print would 
require an immediate overhaul of this image if they were to convince the American 
public of the necessity of working alongside the enemy of democracy.  This refitting 
would not only shape the nature of propaganda during the war, but it would usher in a 
new mode of creating a national enemy that would shape the postwar American 
propaganda landscape. 
More thorough histories exist to cover the ways in which America turned the “Bomb 
Throwing Commies” into the “Heroes of Stalingrad” within the print and film media (as 
well as the postwar repercussion by the House Un-American Activities Committee 
against those who made pro-Russian propaganda during the war).  Suffice it to say, every 
step made in the public arena towards closing the gap between America and Russia 
during the war, was a concession that would complicate the peacetime bellicose foreign 
policy of the U.S. towards Russia postwar.  Hollywood had rallied to the war effort by 




(though a bit more artistically and intellectually minded).  This image was repeat d in the 
respectable press.   
The American media, during the war, seemed bent on fostering public sympathy for 
war-torn Russia.  These depictions almost unanimously relied on the premise that, though 
communism was bad, the new communists loved their land like we loved ours, and hated 
oppression in the same way that we did.  The Russians fought valiantly against Hitler so 
as to defend their homeland and repel foreign invaders. Additionally, the Soviet Union 
was sold to America as the extreme melting pot with its continent wide expans of land 
from which to draw its ethnicities.42  In short, America was urged to forgive them the 
naiveté of their communism. 
Part of the promise of Russia as it was presented in the wartime movie theaters was 
that of a new citizenship coming to power a generation after the revolution.  Thesenew 
Russians were depicted as a people who might be open to the freedoms democracy had to 
offer, especially after seeing the denigrations of tyranny first hand while fighting back the 
Nazis.  Political spin doctors predicted a backlash away from extremism to a ore level-
headed, and therefore American, view of politics.   
The goal of the American cinema had never been to seriously or realistically explore 
Russian attitudes towards democracy.  Instead, Hollywood quickly created an image of 
Russians with which Americans could identify and sympathize.  It depicted the average 
Russian as being similar to the average American, save their political affli tion, and for 
this purpose, it was much easier to invent such Russians than it would have been to 




This propaganda, however jarring its switch in tenor from that of the first Red Scare, 
succeeded in changing America’s basic view of communist Russia, albeit briefly, from 
one of fear to one of hope. What it suggested was that we had been wrong about the 
commies, and they could be trusted and even admired.  This new hope built off of 
American attitudes as reflected in the mass media and by members of America’s 
intellectual community.  After the war, it would be this new vision of Russia that stood in 
the way of reemploying prewar depictions of the communists when it turned out that they 
had no intention of becoming democratic, and instead, had designs on most of Eastern 
Europe.  Hollywood had spoiled the possibility of the Russian on the factory floor 
spouting ideological nonsense and throwing bombs at prominent political figures.     
The new depiction of the commie menace began in 1947 in response to the 
uncharacteristically sympathetic wartime depictions of Russia.  The absorption of anti-
Nazi rhetoric into anti-communist propaganda allowed America to demonize its n w 
enemy in a novel way.  Before the Nazis, the Russians had been, to some degree, 
dangerous, but Hitler and the reality of Nazi Germany’s crimes had taught America to 
think of its various national causes and conflicts in terms of good and evil just as the 
images of camp liberation had set the national standard for that evil.  
America drew upon its recent foe to construct propaganda that altered the communist 
enemy from its previous incarnation through the employment of an overarching 
ideological term: totalitarianism.  Communism became evil after the Second W rl  War 
because, like Nazism, it was totalitarian.  To facilitate this conflation, however, the 
meaning of totalitarianism had to be changed from its previous meaning during the 1920s 




vilify Communism, then, American propaganda modified the idea of a totalitarian 
government and then depicted Russia’s totalitarian leaders as using the ideology of 
communism to bring the nation’s citizens under its control.  The average Russian, who 
had been lionized during the war, was now depicted as a slave in the schemes of 
totalitarian masters43. 
At its inception in 192644, totalitarianism had a very specific political meaning (a 
government embraced so totally by its population that they surrendered their identity to 
it).  The term had, more or less, been used in conjunction with Russia since the mid-30s.  
Before the end of the Second World War, however, the term lacked the degree of 
pejorative inference it would hold after the war.  It was used in a complimentary term to 
refer to Mussollini, for instance, to indicate the degree of acceptance afforded his 
government by the people.  Its usage suggested ubiquity or unanimity45.  Nazi Germany 
sold itself to the rest of the world as a total state, a term which it used to denote 
efficiency, like Italy, ubiquitous acceptance by its citizenry, and finally the state’s total 
responsibility to all aspects of its citizens’ lives.46  
Postwar, the definition of totalitarianism changed from a state unanimously supported 
by its citizens to something closer to its current meaning in which the state forced
ideology unanimously upon its citizens through terror.  This pejorative description was 
then ascribed to Nazi Germany under Hitler and Russia under the leadership in the 
Kremlin.   
By delineating between totalitarian masters and their helpless victims, A erican 
postwar propaganda avoided invalidating the messages it disseminated about the Russian 




The message as it related to Russia was simple: America had gone to war to secure the 
freedom of the Russian people but was betrayed in that endeavor, postwar, by their 
totalitarian leadership which held the country in thrall.  In his 1946 speech to 
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill admonishes Russia for the 
spread of the Soviet sphere (he introduces the all-too-familiar Cold War phrase “Iron 
Curtain”), but he begins by offering “deep sympathy and good will” to the Russian 
people:  “Above all, we welcome constant, frequent, and growing contacts between the 
Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic” (Churchill 804).  Thus, 
in a speech aimed at chastising the Russian leadership for pulling the world’s capitals 
away from Western eyes and into the nefariously silent political realm of soviet influence 
and after admonishing Soviet-run countries for instituting totalitarian regimes47, Churchill 
is careful to point out that his criticism has nothing to do with the Russians themselves, 
only their leadership. 
 The change of Totalitarianism’s definition was first made possible through the 
work of American political theorists trying to come to terms with the character of the 
defeated Nazis in light of the atrocities.  Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
describes the totalitarian state as a result of a mass disillusionment against the structures 
that differentiate society.  According to Arendt’s view, because of calamity, the 
individual ceases to see him or herself as loyal to a differentiated group and reacts by 
heaping derision on the power structures that follow from or support such differentiation.  
As soon as the individual comes to believe that the governing political group, kept in 




en masse, who blame the ruling system for a prevailing sense of hopelessness and 
isolation. 
Arendt’s study of totalitarianism was seminal in that it represented the culmination of 
political theory concerning totalitarianism up until its publication.  She formulates 
totalitarianism as the result of mass disillusionment which leads first to an adverse 
individualism (breeding loneliness and helplessness), then to the scapegoating of a 
recently disempowered social or political group, then to mass uprising as the 
individualism is purged, then finally, to surrender of all aspects of the life of the 
individual as the cause cements itself into a totalitarian regime.  Thus, absorption f the 
individual into the mass is total.   
Arendt’s general political analysis, however, reveals its Nazi roots.  Depite her 
assertion that the choice of scapegoats is arbitrary, the first third of her book explaining 
totalitarianism is devoted to anti-Semitism—which inevitably links the totali arianism 
with anti-Semitism through intellectual scholarship.  Moreover, even as Arendt explained 
totalitarianism in terms of a popular movement carried to a nightmarish extrem, both 
political fiction and theory continued to contradict the basic definitions of her analysis 
(though it claimed to absorb her work as an intellectual basis).  Despite Arendt, 
Totalitarianism came to be decreasingly defined by a citizenry voluntarily surrendering 
their individuality en masse by becoming swept up in the cause.  Instead focus shifted 
towards an indictment of a small cadre of the ideologically elite who forced the masses to 
accept a government based in fear.   
Those responsible for providing definitions of totalitarianism in popular culture 




the term favored the latter of the definitions.  Eventually, the reason depicted for the loss 
of individuality became irrelevant.  Whether dissent was impossible given the 
attractiveness of the cause, or made to seem so at gunpoint—whether the surge towards 
totalitarianism was the mandate of the people, the party, or the dictator—so long as 
individuality was lost, the governing ideology was labeled totalitarian.   
 The common term created a standard for dealing with the non-cadre populations 
of the totalitarian nations, presumably to free them from censure concerning the 
propaganda created on their behalf on one hand, and the crimes carried out in their name 
on the other.  The common citizenry of a totalitarian regime, under the original definition 
of the term, could not be exonerated.  If Nazi Germany were the result of mass action, 
then the masses were guilty and could not be turned into allies postwar.  Moreover, if 
Russia was the result of mass action, then the masses which had been lionized would 
need to be demonized—a propaganda trick that simply wasn’t possible.   
In placing blame on a smaller group of ideological supporters that America could 
demonize and blame for the totalitarian regime, the U.S. could make enemies, post-war 
out of the governments of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia but not the Germans or 
the Russians themselves.  The Russians could be exonerated of their leaders’ ideological 
mindset, and be seen as brainwashed victims, precisely because this was the post-war
view of Germans who had ceased to be Nazis and were now simply a nation that would 
need to be carved up and cared for. 
The recently defeated Nazi Germany was held up as the prime example of this new 
model of totalitarianism, and because of this exemplification, it also acted as proof that a 




Dealing with Germany’s crimes, using this revised definition, allowed the allies to 
centralize blame and avoid the legislative and logistical nightmare of trying to punish 
everyone involved in the genocide.   
While the comparison between Communist Russia and Nazi Germany required the 
third term of Totalitarianism, the term as it had originally been defined, or even its 
redefinition by people like Karl Popper and Hannah Arendt,48, simply could not 
simultaneously hold for America’s attitudes towards both of the Totalitarian states it 
needed to demonize.  There was no ideological basis for comparison between Nazi 
Germany and Communist Russia; the two ideologies saw themselves as opposed to one 
another.  Communism was as natural an enemy to the Nazis as were the Jews;49 th  
communists themselves were some of the first of the Nazi’s enemies to be round d up 
and put into camps50.   
Totalitarianism makes such a comparison possible without being hampered by the 
specifics of ideology.  In truth, ambiguity is central to the concept of the term 
totalitarianism which has had a long history of theoretical shifts in its definition that its 
only current solidity seems to be that it refers to the governments of Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Russia.  Totalitarianism, like fascism or democracy for George O well, is a term 
useful as universal pejorative precisely because its meaning is fluid and dependent on its 
usage. 
Cold war propaganda acquainted America with the designs and dangers of its current 
totalitarian adversary by equating it with the designs and dangers of its previous 
totalitarian adversary—the most immediately recognizable to the American public was 




convinced to enter war in Europe.  The Soviets’ attempt to set up communist 
governments in Eastern Europe and Asia were depicted by America in this language:  
first, that it was a power grab for domination of Europe, and second that such power 
grabs were reminiscent of Nazism51.  As it was conceived by the majority of Americans, 
expansive world domination defined the totalitarian mindset towards the rest of the 
world.  Some critics, such as William Henry Chamberlain, went so far as to claim th t 
Russia, in allying itself with the U.S., succeeded in achieving Germany’s wartime goals:  
Hitler had won the war—“in the person of Stalin” (Chamberlin 342).52    
Against such an enemy, America would need to remain constantly on guard for the 
belligerence of their foe, as Truman had warned, and the enemy would need to be 
envisioned always as a military adversary, not just in a time of war, but in times of 
relative peace as well.  As the notion of a Cold War came into being in 194753, the U.S. 
was preparing to treat “the peace” as an era of global military maneuvering against the 
Soviet Union to be characterized by an arms race, occasional hot zones of combat (Korea, 
Vietnam, Afghanistan), virulent espionage tactics, and a philosophy of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (M.A.D.) regarding the stockpiling of nuclear and, then, thermonuclear 
weaponry.  The point was to be prepared at any moment to face the enemy and the model 
for that enemy was Nazi Germany—a nation which might, at any moment, launch an 
attack. 
This interchangeability was mirrored in political rhetoric.  Where totalitarian had 
already been reduced from a kind of rogue populism, locating its origins in the masss, to 
a subset of despotism, locating its origin in a political elite or finally in a tyran , usage of 




with only two governments: that of Nazi Germany and that of Communist Russia.  At 
first, these two nations were used as examples of totalitarianism, but their exclusive use 
in this role, produced the effect that these two nations were the only totalitarian 
governments.54    According to Benjamin Alpers: 
“By 1945 the term “totalitarianism” had established a firm foothold in 
American political culture.  Its meaning had become in some ways 
extremely clear, and yet in others it remained entirely protean.  What was 
unambiguous about it was that it referred to Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, and that it was highly pejorative…The protean quality of 
“totalitarianism” can be seen in virtually every other aspect of the term.” 
(251) 
 
Totalitarianism became a political ideology that had examples but no definition, and thus, 
empowered propaganda with great ease by simply lumping Nazism and Communism 
together as duel faces of a single enemy.  Whether one considered Communist Russia to 
be the natural offspring of Nazi Germany or whether Nazi Germany was simply the first 
symptom of what would become Communist Russia, the two nations were utterly 
interchangeable.  Propaganda against one worked just as well to vilify the other. 
That the conflation of Nazi and Communist ideology is absurd is a problem avoided 
through the use of totalitarianism and its self-referential definition.  What is p rticularly 
evil about these states is implied, but unspoken, so that either may share the villainy of 
the implication.  The nebulous nature of totalitarianism insured that specific evils like 
genocide could not be a definitive feature of the totalitarian state (because the Soviets did 
not commit genocide), nor is belief in racial stratification, deification of the nation state, 
fascism, potential nuclear attack, atheism, closed borders, or democracy55.  Where Russia 




homicidal racism.  Where Nazi Germany turned to fascist nationalism, Russia supported 
a worldwide workers revolution across national borders.   
The vast differences between the two nations would suggest that Nazi Germany and 
Communist Russia should not be categorized together, but the definition of 
totalitarianism allowed for an avoidance of these particulars in favor of an ambiguously 
defined category.  Yet still, Russia was like Nazi Germany which had committed the 
Holocaust.  Russia controlled its citizenry through an elite cadre of political ideologues 
and Nazi Germany was like Russia.  The two nations were condemned as a vaguely 
defined totalitarian amalgamation over loaded with implications, and as totalitarian sm 
was presented as the “demonic Other of democracy,” it’s condemnation was an act of 
patriotism (Alpers 301). 
Postwar, the military presence of Nazi Germany survived in the imaginations of the 
American public requiring the U.S. to prepare itself to fight against Nazis in perpetuity 
and at a moment’s notice.  Specifically, this variety of a militant national identity was 
necessary because the foes of America had transformed to a new, more dangerous, 
variety that premiered with the Nazis and continued, in totalitarian kind, with the 
Soviets—the totalitarian economic machine made continuous preparations for war and so 
those who defended against it would need to be equally prepared. 
It was the idea of Russia as a totalitarian state that provided the necessary vilification 
of the nation by contextualizing the danger of its arsenal.  Russia might be forgiven this 
buildup of conventional weaponry, and possibly even its nuclear weaponry, if America 
were convinced that a rational body was governing Soviet Russia and its military 




communism, starved cities behind blockades, and threatened to make spies out of our 
neighbors and children simply could not be trusted.  The Iron Curtain across Europe was 
political evidence of their desire to conquer and corrupt; it exemplified what Winston 
Churchill called “their expansive and proselytizing tendencies” (804).  Instead of the
world wide worker’s revolution, called for in the communist manifesto, the Russians had 
become bent on total world domination—they planned to force capitalists out of power 
and needed no uprising of the proletariat to do it. 
The wartime depiction of the Russian people as similar to Americans, was, in a 
limited way continued after the war because it amplified the implied danger of the Sovi t 
Total state and its employment of communism.  If they could be made to embrace 
Communism, the propaganda suggested, so could we.   Sympathy for the Russians 
became a sign of weakness towards their ideology which could be exploited by 
communist infiltrators and red organizers.   
To obviate this danger, propaganda made reference often to what Nazi Germany, a 
comparable totalitarian regime, had been capable of convincing their citizens o do.  
Routinely the American anti-communist propaganda conjectured about life in communist 
Russia by employing images drawn from Hitler’s Germany.  In the 1952 Coronet 
Instructional film “Communism,” for instance, the narrator’s words “traito s may be 
immediately executed or sent off to prison” is paralleled on screen with a railw y car 
being filled with people followed immediately by an image of prisoners in a camp behind 
a barded wire fence. 
Finally, the anti-Communist propaganda suggested a marked difference between the 




they did, it could only be because our government was not totalitarian.  Thus any 
similarity one might see between the communist Russian state and the government of the 
United States of America was illusory—we were not like them, they were like the Nazis; 
to say otherwise marked one as a communist sympathizer, a fellow traveler, or an enemy 
of the state.  
The combination of Russia and Nazi Germany together into a single ideology allowed 
the U.S. propaganda community to create a freely applicable image which could be called 
forth whenever anti-Soviet sentiments were needed, especially given that the greatest of 
these fears was nuclear attack.  Jacques Derrida has pointed out that one of the defining 
characteristics of nuclear destruction is its embeddedness within the world of narrative56.  
Because nuclear war has not yet occurred, all aspects of it arise from the language used to 
describe it and the language it threatens to destroy.  This creates an amazingly rich 
critical framework with which to discuss nuclear Armageddon but what it doesn’t do is 
provide real examples from which to draw what Nietzsche described as “monumental 
history.”57  America required historical examples of Soviet villainy for its anti-Soviet 
sentiments, but it had no examples that are relevant enough to serve.58   
Russia’s danger was only a potential because it hadn’t launched any of its missiles.  
At best, America had the bomb throwing anarchists who had incited the Palmer raids to 
remind the public about the danger of communism, but they certainly weren’t enough to 
insight national panic especially for a nation that had recently seen the horrors of Nazi 
Germany.  If, on the other hand, Communist Russia and Nazi Germany were conflated 
through totalitarianism, examples became immediately available for state sponsored 




The newsreel film 1947:  Year of Division (1947) demonstrates the way that anti-
Communist propaganda at its inception had to navigate the lack of real Russian atrocities 
by which to vilify the America’s new enemy.  The film manages a depiction of the 
dangers associated with communism by showing a real American town pretending to turn 
communist.  It simulates the danger of infiltration and centers it on small town life—the 
uncorrupted heart of America.  In this simulation, the film’s pretend commissar and his 
cronies arrest the chief of police, form a bread line, stop the local press, and form a pr-
Stalin parade offering, as they pass the cameras, the Nazi salute.   
This final touch to the film is obviously unintentional, and yet, extraordinarily telling.  
The director of the film, or perhaps its actors, when asked to call to mind what it would 
be like to be taken over by an evil government instinctively raise their hand to the 
camera.  The Nazis are their vision of an evil government, and in expressing cultural
values through this simulation, they naturally phrase their beliefs in the rhetoric of 
Nazism despite the fact that they are supposed to be play acting the part of Communist 
converts.  The film predates Arendt’s conflation of communism and Nazism by 4 years 
and represents a natural supposition concerning the two ideologies that would later be 
elucidated, explored, and analyzed.  Even without the backing of theoretical reasoning, 
however, the Nazis had already, by 1947, become definitive of evil through the images of 
their atrocities. 
Once the relationship between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia became 
codified in the term totalitarianism, the American propaganda changed to reflect the 
value systems deemed indicative of the theoretical framework.  Usage of totalitarianism, 




a slave like populace.  This difference is explained by the narrator of the 1952 Coronet 
educational film Communism: 
But what about the people?  The proletarian who had fought to win a new world?  
Their ‘new world’ might look promising, but though the land had been taken 
away from the capitalists, the workers didn’t get it.  Under communism, virtually 
everything belongs to the state.  The individual has little right to own property or 
to plan his own life—he’s told where to work and his employer—little freedom to 
leave his job or seek a new profession.  Whereas we believe, and our religions 
teach, that the individual is all important, communism denies religion and debases 
the individual to a part of a vast machine that powers the state. 
 
The dichotomy here is pronounced, obviously, so that the communist government is the 
victimizer and the people its victim—the ideology of communism is nothing but the 
means of oppression for totalitarian overlords.  The individuality of the average Russian 
is burned away through its crucible.   
The Coronet film makes mention of religion so as to remind its viewers that the 
communists are godless—their subjugation has robbed them of their souls.  Ultimately, 
the totalitarian leadership, through the ruse of communism, renders its subjects into 
pieces of a political machine, limits their potential as human beings to that function, and 
then cuts off their connection to spiritual salvation. 
The language of the Coronet film is indicative of the ways in which the tenor of anti-
Russian rhetoric had changed after the Berlin airlift and the failure of the Marshall plan to 
secure peace in Europe.  It had become evident that the post-war world would not be 
shared by the victorious powers but would fall into political “spheres of influence.”  After 
that point, the danger represented by Communist Russia began to be phrased in a 
language of morality, the stakes of the battle in terms of a holy war, and the combatants 




on the tone used to describe Nazism near the end of the war, after the atrocities had b en 
discovered.   
Notably, the language also follows the pre-war pattern of utopian and dystopian 
thinking.  It is clear from the narration, for instance, that liberality invites tragedy and that 
traditional values are a necessary component for a moral society.  The logic of the anti-
Communist rhetoric in the newsreels follows from the essentialist philosophies that 
would become increasingly challenged through the same vehicle of Nazi analogy.  These 
early films show, however, that this tension was not immediately recognizable in the 
circles of official state-sponsored propaganda. 
The lack of anti-communist monumental history to validate the tone of the anti-
Communist newsreels was handled through the use of the hypothetical attack scenario  
much as had been used in 1947:  The Year of Division.  By 1949, these scenarios 
included two particular kinds of dangers:  the first, ideological corruption like that of 
1947, and the second the demonstration of what would happen to America in the case of 
nuclear war.  In A Day Called X (1957), for instance, a staged attack on Portland, Oregon 
is documented so as to show how civil defense and a calm mind will insure the survival 
of an attack by hydrogen bomb.  At multiple points throughout the film, words are put up 
on the screen to alert the audience that “An Attack Is Not Taking Place.”  Th  movie is 
only the recording of a drill.  Still, it promises to show what people would do (or should 
do) in case of atomic attack.   
What one detects immediately from the film is the sheer unreality of it.  People 
calmly pack up their belongings and head off to a bomb shelter to wait out the 




locations.  “Then there’s men like Tom Cook who can’t go.  He’s one of the power load 
dispatchers for all electric power in the Northwest.  These men are expendable.”  
Amazingly, Tom’s reaction to his imminent destruction, as well as his unfortunate 
expendability, is one of calm.  Of course, realistically, all of the people in Portland 
Oregon would probably be vaporized by a Hydrogen bomb—their calm and its 
appropriateness are only a function of the film as propaganda. 
The film can, of course, do nothing by way of showing the effect of an actual nuclear 
attack because it has no idea what such an attack would look like.  The danger and 
destruction it shows are hypothetical, even laughable, as the film attempts to show 
viewers what real people, not actors (the film stresses this point in its introduction), will 
do in the case of a bombing attack, but fails because these real people have no guide to let 
them know how they should act.  The best that they can manage is a kind of morbid 
efficiency by not reacting to their imminent destruction.  As the end draws nigh, the city 
of Oregon fades out and the narrator Glenn Ford comes back onto screen to offer, “what 
happened after that moment, we leave you to contemplate.”  The audience’s guess i as 
good as the narrators.   
Between 1947 and 1957, a change has already occurred in the manner in which the 
Communist threat is to be discussed.  The action of A Day Called X does not reinforce 
tradition except for a vague notion of citizenship.  The people calmly act through their 
jobs and routines either in the hope of ensuring their survival or the survival of their 
loved ones.  They do not particular advocate for a vision of utopia that is either liberal or 
conservative.  At best it’s utilitarian:  if the citizens of Oregon do their job, they will live.  




case basis as the day called X, when it occurs, will cause the routine to usurp all previous 
value systems.  The situation is hardly liberal, though, in the sense implied by Rorty. In 
the film, Tom Cook can’t have an open mind about his job or else the entire Western 
seaboard may lose power. 
Ultimately, official state sponsored propaganda relied on essentialist and nationalis  
methods of making value despite their similarity to Nazi philosophy or the images of 
camp liberation that had made such methods suspect. It simplified the conflict as a 
nationalist struggle of ‘us’ against ‘them’ with increasingly less specific details about 
what it was about American values that made them more worthwhile (except that they 
were American).   
Because Cold War propaganda employed the powerful image system of World War II 
to incite the patriotic fervor of their readers and viewers, the American public became 
acclimated to the use of Nazism in political arguments related to their enemi s even if the 
exact logic of those analogies was less than cogent.  Not surprisingly, the state beg n to 
incorporate these analogies into its statements to justify official foreign and domestic 
policy to the very Americans who were audience to these films.  In an oft-quoted 
comment concerning the structure of the military industrial complex, for instance, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower offered the American public this sentiment in his 1961 
farewell address:  
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments 
industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make 
swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of 
national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments 





By situating his critique in reference to the “latest of our world conflicts,” Eisenhower is 
effectively suggesting that the arms stockpiling of the Cold War is a continuatio  of 
practices put into place to fight Nazi Germany fifteen years prior.  
The military industrial complex, critiqued by Eisenhower, was engineered to make 
America a viable participant in the Second World War.  In actuality, the fight against 
Nazi Germany had changed the way that America conducted war because it 
fundamentally changed the way America imagined a threat to its “way of life” by 
modeling such a threat on the fanatical “Total War” campaign of the Nazis, but it also 
changed the way America sold war to its citizenry.  Eisenhower’s reference to World 
War II is both anachronistic and paradoxically apropos.  The method in which America 
prepared to fight against communists had nothing substantive in common with its fight 
against Nazi Germany except that such a fight could not be validated otherwise.   
Certainly the danger of combat with the Russians (generally sold as World War III), 
even if ambiguous, was horrifying, because America did not know what the Russians 
might do; the horror was that they might do anything.  But it did not serve attempts to 
depict communists as inhuman when the deviltry of the Russians was only some hinted at 
potential or the result of a hypothetical scenario; anyone and anything might turn 
dangerous in theory.   
Propaganda is most effective when it stems from villainy that is part of the historic 
record—the more widely known, the better.  Condemnation of Russia needed to come 
from crimes or atrocities that had actually been committed but those crimes wer  few and 
far between, happened behind the Iron Curtain, and were otherwise unavailable.  In 




entire language and image system which had potential to serve as reminders of real 
atrocities.    
In another short work of propaganda, Red Nightmare (1962), a Twilight Zone-esque 
nightmare is created in which the film’s main character awakes in a town g ne 
Communist.  Unlike A Day Called X, the film does not concentrate on the devastation of 
atomic attack.  Instead, Red Nightmare explores the hypothetical horror of an America 
that one day, while the story’s hero sleeps, turns communist.  Like 1947:  The Year of 
Division, the film hopes to show what would happen to small town America gone Red, 
and with the same problem, its creators do not know what a “Red town” would look like.  
Main Street is guarded by sand bag bunkers, barbed wire, and machine gun nests.  One 
cannot use the phone without a permit number from the commissar and everywhere one 
looks, there are uniformed and armed men sporting jack boots and looking suspiciously 
like Nazi guards.  The communist town looks like a prison camp.  Every street corner is a 
Check Point Charlie.  Eventually, the hero of Red Nightmare is turned into the local 
authorities by his children who have already begun indoctrination into party politics 
through youth groups (reminiscent of the Hitler Youth). 
Interestingly enough, the reason that Jerry Donnovan, the hero of Red Nightmare has 
his Red Nightmare is because he doesn’t want to go to a community meeting.  He is, 
according to narrator Jack Webb, “proud of his country, but prone to take his liberties for 
granted.  He’s aware that someone must assume responsibility for those libertis and for 
our free way of life.  Yet, when there’s a job to be done, Jerry, like so many Americans is 
apt to ask, ‘why me?’”  Not only does the film suggest American nationalist values—




must be enacted specifically in that opposition.  The movie implies that if Jerry 
Donnovan doesn’t do his part to make America safe, the communists will take over.   
Jerry has no options on how to act.  If he, for instance, chooses not to go to a 
community meeting, he’s all but allied himself with the Communist.  In this way, the 
utopian vision of the film is clearly not liberal, but then, neither is it conservative in that 
it doesn’t make a case for traditional values.  If Jerry Donnovan doesn’t hate communists 
enough to go to a community meeting, then he is endangering the infiltration of America 
by Communists.  
Interestingly, these films share a similar reduction of Communist and anti-Communist 
sentiments to absurdity.  The communists, as depicted in state sanctioned anti-
Communist propaganda like 1947: Year of Division or Red Nightmare, have very little 
definition of their character except that they are opposed to the American way oflife.  
What attitudes or habits they have that further mark them as un-American make them, at 
the same time, appear to be Nazis.   
While these films consistently evoke the word “freedom” to describe the American 
way of life, American attitudes were generally depicted as contingent upo their anti-
Communist function.  In A Day Called X, Tom, as a good American, must go to his grave 
in the case of a nuclear attack.  He has no freedom when the air-raid sirens sound.  Jerry, 
as a good American, has to gather with other members of his community to stop the 
spread of communism.  He is not free to idly sit on his couch and enjoy his favorite show 
on television.  Thus these films convey the reflexive idea that Communists wants to 
destroy the American way of life which consists principally of anti-Communist activities.  




justification for the good guys’ goodness and the bad guys’ badness.  The Nazi cosmeti  
characteristic of the argument serves as the only justification that the films o fer for the 
tension between Communist and anti-Communist forces, aside from, of course, nuclear
annihilation which is, also, described through a kind of Nazi metaphor: nuclear holocaust. 
Though short state-sponsored propaganda films accustomed American audiences to 
the threat of communism, their manner of treating the subject reduced American vi tue to 
a simplified and somewhat outmoded nationalism.  They had little to offer Americans 
whose relationship with essentialist philosophy was becoming more complex through 
increased interrogation of what it meant to have beaten Nazi Germany, rampant 
nationalism, imperialism, and to a lesser degree racism.   
America’s increasing interrogation of essential values was reflectd, instead, in 
private feature-length films which were driven economically by the mass viewing public 
to address the particular desires of that audience.  State sponsored propaganda could 
operate outside of a business model—it needn’t have made money to be successful—and 
thus, it was not necessary for the film makers to temper their propaganda with what the 
American public would ‘buy’ about the threat of communism.  These films, therefor, say 
more about what government agencies wanted Americans to think about communists, and  
less about how Americans actually wanted to think about this threat.  The private film 
industry, at the same time, took up similar anti-Communist sentiments as those voiced in 
official state propaganda but in ways which reflected these increasingly complex 
relationships recognized by the American public.  Their financial success depen ed on 
giving American film viewers a version of the communist threat that they were willing to 






CHAPTER 5   
THE MATINEE WAR:  SELLING THE WAR AGAINST COMMUNISM WITH 
WORLD WAR II 
 
State Sponsored propaganda provided depictions of communism (heavily influenced 
by American assumptions about the Nazis) in order to elucidate the dangers of the 
communist threat to the American way of life.  In this way, these films weredirect in 
their anti-communist sentiments even when they were not always accurate concerning 
what it was about the communists that made them dangerous to the American status quo.  
More often than not, Americans were told, through political analogies, that the 
communists were dangerous because they were like Nazis.  These films were distributed 
to schools and shown before feature films to a captive audience; they were not 
commercially distributed.  No one bought a ticket to see A Day Called X.  
Feature films released during the Cold War, especially during the decades of th  50s 
and 60s, suggest that depictions of the threat of communism weren’t particularly 
successful either commercially or critically despite their being releas d during an 
enormous state-sponsored propaganda campaign and during a time when the threat of 
communism was a definitive factor in the operation and development of American 
Culture.  America feared the communist enemy, especially in the possibility of the 
Hydrogen Bomb, but nonetheless, this fear only occasionally manifested at the box office 
in films that directly addressed this threat.  Had film makers seen the Red Scare as a 




communist threat, or the horrors of communist Russia.  The lack of these movies in 
American theaters at the time suggests that, in fact, film makers of that era did not see the 
Red Scare as a particularly fecund subject for financially successful movies.  Movies 
released during that time involving patriotism and national enemies dramatically favored 
depictions of America’s wartime enemies instead.  
Though there were some exceptions, of the many anti-Communist films made during 
this era, most have since faded into obscurity.  Even at their release, however, anti-
Communist films received little fanfare from America’s movie going public.  Though 
films like I Married a Communist (1949), The Red Menace (1949), The Iron Curtain 
(1948), and the strange note in John Wayne’s career, Big Jim McLain (1952) were 
released to capitalize on the early furor surrounding postwar Russia, Hollywood soon 
realized that World War II combat movies were more viable financially than movies 
about the evils of Communism.  Movies set in and about the Second World War 
essentially capitalized on the inherent virtue that went along with military victory, and by 
doing so, provided Americans with a sense of their own valor and nobility as they entered 
into a fight against their new enemy.  The fact that World War II movies were mor  
popular and made in greater abundance than movies about the threat of communism 
suggests that America wanted reminders of the virtue they had earned through victory in 
World War II more than they wanted explanations of their enemy’s villainy. 
In this way, American culture sold the Cold War through the vehicle of World War II.  
Nazism was evoked to remind Americans that their way of life was worth defending 
through war and often by making the ultimate sacrifice.  As the Cold War became an 




literature that advocated against military aggression and especially aginst the use of 
nuclear weaponry.  What’s interesting is that, though the anti-war movement gen rally 
opposed the foreign policies of the state in regards to its various conflicts world wide, this 
opposition was voiced in a pattern firmly established through pro-war propaganda:  if 
Nazis could be used to sell war, then they proved equally employable for selling peace. 
The usefulness of Nazi comparisons both for and against war is worth extended 
analysis particularly because it suggests that these comparisons had a utility beyond that 
of patriotic propaganda, and therefore, beyond that of just the dominant culture.  That the 
symbol of Nazi evil could be used equally by both the dominant and the counter culture 
suggests that the symbol had national appeal, but more so, if the symbol was used 
differently by different groups, it suggests that the meaning of the symbol was subject to 
change through usage. 
To illustrate these important points, then, it is necessary to look to a few key roles in 
which the Nazis served, symbolically, to sell war and then to sell peace.  By examining 
these roles, I hope to highlight not only the function of Nazism but also the means by 
which that function, and therefore the symbol’s meaning, changed depending on its 
usage.  A few key questions pertaining to this usage will serve to accentuate these 
characteristics.  First, we must ask the obvious question of why the threat of communis  
was better represented through comparisons to Nazism than by actual depictions of the 
threat of communism.  Second, if references to World War II served to sell war against 
the communists, then why was the European theater more useful in this capacity then the 
Pacific theater given that both major wars waged by the United States again t 




that America chose to depict its enemies through the increasingly anachronistic metaphor 
of Nazism when more current and more appropriate depictions of the nation’s enemies 
were possible.  This suggests that, for Americans, depictions of Nazism were mor 
compelling than even the threat of nuclear annihilation in stirring national fervor towa ds 
America’s foreign policy.  Third and last, we must ask how depictions of Nazism 
informed the American public’s ideas about the nature of evil such that these depictions 
could be used both as descriptions of the Communist enemy and also as depictions of the 
evils of war against that Communist enemy? 
The first of these questions has already been partially addressed in the previous 
chapter.  The communist enemy, in state sponsored propaganda, was vilified as 
totalitarian and was, thus, compared to Nazi Germany through a tenuous definition 
particularly because wartime had made direct vilification of the Russian people difficult 
and had made previous methods of vilifying communism passé.  Straining against the 
lack of original reasons for why America should fear the communists, American 
propaganda suggested that Russia’s leaders were dangerous in the same manner as Nazi 
Germany’s leaders—that they were both totalitarian and, therefore, dangerous.   
The term ‘totalitarianism,’ however, came to increasingly have only a pejorative 
meaning: a government which resembled Communist Russia and Nazi Germany.  For the 
term to have any other, more specific meaning, would have been to render it useless in 
describing the similarity between Communist Russia and Nazi Germany needed as fuel 
for anti-communist propaganda.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the term, in being 
vague, allowed the new enemy, Russia, to be compared to Nazi Germany, and thereby,




The lack of depictions of communist evil cannot be overstressed.  Despite a national 
hysteria against Communism, neither literature nor film made a great showing as to what 
America should fear from communist takeover.  The great novel of the anti-communist 
canon is George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four which was embraced by Americans and 
made required reading in a large number of American public schools.  Despite its 
popularity as a Cold War vision of dystopia, Nineteen Eighty-Four is not about what 
might happen if Russia got its way—it’s about the dangers of English Socialism (Ingsoc).  
The totalitarian government of the novel, whatever else it might be, is home grown.  
Clearly, the government of the fictional nation of Oceania (under the guise of Big
Brother) is totalitarian, but beyond that designation, it’s unclear whether the novel is an 
indictment of communism or fascism.  In fact, one of the important features of the novel 
is that it mixes the two ideologies together under the single definition of totalitarianism, 
just what American propaganda was attempting to do in its state sponsored films.  
The vagaries of the definition of totalitarianism, as the term had come to be used in 
American propaganda, suggests the universal power of Nazism as a symbol for evil:  if 
the only consistent definition of the term ‘totalitarianism’ was that it implied a similarity 
to Nazism, then anything that might be comparable to Nazism was, by this implied 
definition, totalitarian.  Furthermore, as was so often pointed out in anti-war rhetoric, if 
Russia was totalitarian for being like the Nazis, and America was totalitarian for being 
like the Nazis, then Russia and America weren’t so different from each other.
Interestingly, some counter cultural groups operating during the 60s, preferring 
Russia to America because of socialist leanings, employed the image of America as 




Germany (and generally not Italy which was historically fascist) and which excluded 
Russia from the comparison.  These groups are discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
Nonetheless, outside of Orwell, and a few box office flops there are very few other 
novels and films about the Red Menace to accompany the cultural era and hysteria known 
by Cold War historians as the Second Red Scare.  The communist bogeymen that drove 
the excesses of that era are strangely missing, and when existent, are curiously 
unsuccessful.  The economic failure of anti-communist art, and the preeminence of 
narrative art (film, literature, comic books, etc.) set in World War II, suggests that the 
part of the communists in the American imagination was being played by the Nazis.  
Reasons for this idiosyncrasy range from the mundane to the ideological.  The most 
urbane reason for the rise of World War II films during the Cold War is related to the 
censure of war reportage during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Media, books and 
films especially, which concentrated on the current war were prohibited for distribution 
to soldiers on base—the very men who were generally seen as audiences for these media.  
Men’s magazines like Real Adventure, Man’s Book, and True Men turned to stories of 
combat in previous wars in absentia.  In anti-Nazi fiction, the transient nature of th  Nazi 
is obvious.  Throughout the fifties and sixties, the cover of men’s magazines promised 
tales of evil communists and Nazis almost interchangeably.  “Many of the stories in 
Man’s, All Male, Men’s Stories, and Siren were originally about Nazis; only the uniforms 
were changed” (Barson 12).  In terms of patriotic comic books, the arch villain of 
Captain America, The Red Skull, who had been a Nazi all throughout WWII when the 




40s.  Captain America went out of business before the 1950s when there were no more 
Nazis left to fight.  Collins and Hagenauer point out another reason that WWII stories 
predominated:  “it was a war the United States had won” (236).  Thus, stories that 
concentrated on WWII were simply more marketable to people directly involved in 
American combat. 
Members of the military, however, constituted only one kind of audience for World 
War II films.  Censorship did not extend to civilian theaters.  Movies about the Korean 
conflict could have been released to the mass audience off-base, but no movie about, and 
released during, the Korean conflict had the commercial success of their World War II 
competition at the box office.  The Bridges of Toko Ri, for instance, was a commercial 
success and was based on a book written during the Korean conflict but it was released 
after the Korean conflict and after censorship would have prevented its viewing.  Its main 
competition at the Academy Awards that year was The Caine Mutiny—a film set during 
World War II. 
Though the Korean War had not been won in the way that the United States had won 
World War II, movies released during the Korean conflict had the potential to fce the 
ongoing drama of war with far more immediacy.  While it was still being conducte, th  
Korean conflict could have provided prime examples of American valor working directly 
against a communist enemy, but the Korean conflict was never employed for this task.  
Instead American film hearkened back to the World War II.   
Veterans of the Second World War were willing to pay to see more of that particular 
war on screen. They were not as willing to pay to see other wars.  Men awaiting combat 




occasionally the American Film Academy.  While other wars had been won by the U.S., 
men’s magazines rarely ran stories about WWI or the Spanish-American war nor did 
Hollywood make many movies about these wars.  The Alamo had a certain appeal to 
younger viewers, but it was nothing as compared to WWII for a mass American 
audience.   
In Jeanine Basinger’s work on World War II combat films, she explores a basic idea 
that their popularity was related, initially, to their ability to answer wa time questions for 
their audience:  questions about whether we can win the war and how, whether fighting is 
ever necessary, what made the enemy “the enemy,” etc.  She suggests that to answer 
these questions, the movies had to define Americanism. “What did it mean to be 
American?  What was America’s history, and who were her heroes?  We had to think 
about what nice guys we were, and about how we always played fair and about how 
much we liked our moms and apple pie” (Basinger 79).  According to Basinger after the 
war, World War II combat films continued to be popular because of their ability to 
answer different questions for a world that was no longer at war.  WWII movies offer a 
serious meditation on what qualifies as a good life, what makes a struggle valiant, if and 
how reintegration is possible, and the capability of a person and society to forgive.   
Basinger abandons her first line of questions because they relate directly to the war, 
and at war’s ends, she assumes that America no longer needs wartime answers. What she 
ignores in her assumptions is that, because of the Cold War, America does not find itself 
in a lasting peace after World War II, and thus, the nation never gets a reprieve from its 
wartime questions.  In World War II such questions were, naturally, answered by WWII 




anachronistic, especially when the film’s echo neither the geography, the ethnicity, 
religion, nor the political ideology of the enemy.  These are, historically, the reasons that 
nations enter into war against one another.  That these anachronisms and incongruities 
were tolerated and even encouraged by the American public suggests that the fight 
against Nazi Germany answered questions about its wartime identity, like thos  posed by 
Basinger, better than could the fight against other, more appropriate, enemies.  If the 
purpose of these films is to answer a nation’s questions about the virtue of its patriotic 
identity, then their purpose is, first, to evoke that patriotism and then to depict it as 
culminating in its fight against Nazism:  America was, as far as popular opinion was 
concerned, at its best when it fought against Hitler. 
For a moment, it might do well to think of this problem from another angle:  what 
was it about Nazis that made them inherently good villains in the cold war.  After all, the 
two major hotspots of action in the Cold War were both in Asia.  The enemies in both 
those conflicts were Asian.  In terms of stirring up national fervor against tho e enemies, 
reminders of America’s involvement against an Asian enemy during the Second World 
War are appropriate—reminders of America’s involvement against Germans are ot.  
Events like the Eichmann trial (1962), television shows like the Holocaust mini-series 
(1978), and films like Schindler’s List (1993), and to a lesser extent, Judgment at 
Nuremberg (1961), produce an image of Nazi Germany that is genocidal,59 but the Nazi 
as America’s arch-enemy predates these works and come from a period in which 
depictions of the Nazi atrocities avoided mention of anti-Semitism, concentrating instead 




World War II combat films set in the European theater avoided issues of race by 
reminding Americans of their recent racist enemy.  Likewise, they allowed America to 
concentrate on ideology rather than racial differences by substituting America’s current 
enemy with a German Nazi.  Jews and the Holocaust are consciously absent from 1950s 
World War II films set in the European theater and appear in films released during the 
1960s only through subtle hints and images that are reminiscent of the growing visual 
vocabulary surrounding the Holocaust.  The image of the crematorium, for instance, 
plays a significant role in the narrative of The Dirty Dozen (1967).  The camps are 
depicted by 1980 in The Big Red One, but receive only passing reference in Saving 
Private Ryan, released in 1998, by Stephen Spielberg who was also responsible for 
Schindler’s List (1993).  Images of the Holocaust distract from the military valor evoked 
by these films even if it is the Holocaust, in abstention, that contextualizes World a  II 
valor by showing good Americans killing evil Nazis.  In the case of Saving Private Ryan, 
for instance, the film makes a point to show that Private Stanley Mellish is Jewi h, that he 
is fighting against the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, but the interplay between Mellish 
as a Jewish soldier and his racist enemy is underrepresented by Private Mellish w eping 
over a Hitler Youth dagger given to him as a souvenir by a comrade in arms after landing 
on Omaha Beach (later he will be killed by a German soldier wielding a simil r weapon).  
This hint of the Holocaust is delivered up for an audience who, knowledgeable in the 
history of genocide, fills in the information which the film leaves out, just as Mellish 
himself weeps over the knife fighting his own personal demons without explanation for 
his peers who fight the war for other reasons.  The film’s tagline suggests the tension 




Greatest Danger for Eight Men was Saving... One.”  It creates an image of WWII as a 
rescue mission and accentuates the greatness of the war.  Obviously, a large part of why 
WWII was a “great” war was because it is understood as a fight between good and evil—
an understanding that relies on the Nazis as genocidal, even though the film avoids direct 
mention of the genocide.  The Holocaust is implied. 
This emphasis on the Greatness of World War II has been native to American 
national rhetoric since the end of the war in popular media and in other venues for 
national conversation—it is as present, for instance, in the designation “the great st 
generation” (part of their greatness rests in their having helped stop Hitler) as it is in 
President Barack Obama’s 2009 speech commemorating the 65th anniversary of the 
Normandy invasion.  In that speech, Obama asks, “Of all the battles in all the wars acros  
the span of human history, why does this day hold such a revered place in our memory? 
What is it about the struggle that took place on these sands behind me that brings us back 
here to remember year after year after year?” (“Obama D-Day Speech”)  President 
Obama asks, in a sense, what was it, in particular, that makes the Normandy invasion a 
‘good’ battle.  Later in that speech, he answers that question:   
We live in a world of competing beliefs and claims about what is true. It is a 
world of varied religions and cultures and forms of government. In such a world, 
it is rare for a struggle to emerge that speaks to something universal about 
humanity. 
 
The Second World War did that. No man who shed blood or lost a brother would 
say that war is good. But all know that this war was essential. For what we fced 
in Nazi totalitarianism was not just a battle of competing interests. It was a 
competing vision of humanity. Nazi ideology sought to subjugate, humiliate, and 
exterminate. It perpetrated murder on a massive scale, fueled by a hatred of those 






Saving Private Ryan’s message about the war is the same as that of President Obama:  
Omaha Beach was a good battle because it led the way to victory against the Nazis who 
were evil in an indisputable manner.  The justification for the ‘goodness’ of D-Day is the 
rescue of the Jews, just as the goodness of the Saving Private Ryan’s justification of its 
fictional D-Day is a rescue mission.  Despite the fact that no Jewish prisoners were 
liberated on Omaha Beach, it is the liberation of the concentration camps which remains 
central in our consideration of that historic battle. 
If World War II movies do not (or perhaps can not) vilify the Nazi directly through a 
language of genocidal racism, what language do they then employ?  Obviously, with 
hundreds of movies, television shows, magazine stories, etc., the villainy of the Nazis is 
likely to include a variety of disparate characteristics, but commonalities exist enough to 
bear analysis.  For the most part, the image of the wartime German is alwaysdivided.  
Often, there is a military German character and a Nazi German character.  In such movies 
where the military German is given a personality, they are a wartime adversary, like their 
American counterpart, but otherwise, not particularly evil.   
Commandant Von Luger in The Great Escape presents a notable example of this 
military German character.  He is efficient, cold, and determined, but his goal is only to 
run his camp efficiently—not to torture or murder.  When he first introduces Richard 
Attenborough’s character, squadron leader Roger Bartlett, to the camp, he offers, “you 
will not be denied the use of facilities: sports, library, recreation hall, and for gardening, 
we will give you tools” (The Great Escape).  Even as he catches prisoners attempting 
escape, he locks them away in solitary confinement rather than putting them up against  




SS have shot all of his escaped prisoners, he is appalled.  The camp commandant in Stalig 
17 (1953), though more odious, operates under the same principal.  He makes the 
prisoners stand out in the rain, but he is not horrible or horrifying in the way that, later, 
Amon Goeth will be for Schindler’s List.  
Even the choice of depicting camp life through the rubric of The Great Escape or 
Stalig 17 is determinative.  Though both films try for a realistic depiction of a POW 
camp, in choosing to depict German villainy in this way, the filmmakers turn to these 
examples because they evoke the camps without actually reducing the pathos of 
American virtue through comparison to victims of the Holocaust.  In The Great Escape, 
when workers from a nearby camp in Upper Silesia file out with Charles Bronson 
disguised among them, the audience is supposed to think Bronson diligent and clever; 
they are not supposed to wonder whether the other camp is Auschwitz, also located in 
Upper Silesia. 
In most films, German military personnel are just waiting to be shot by the various 
allied heroes.  There’s no point in analyzing the character of the Germans in The Guns of 
Navarone.  They show up.  They get shot or they shoot.  The heroes eventually kill them.  
If they have any lines at all, they are a combination of the words “Achtung!” (attention) 
or “schnell!” (quickly) always loudly barked at heroes who don’t understand or at other 
military personnel who are unknowingly running towards their death.  Most WWII films
set in combat against Nazi Germany employ this two dimensional variety of German 
(The Battle of the Bulge, The Longest Day, etc.).  What matters is that the heroes have 




Opposite this wartime enemy, these films often include a single character who acts as 
the embodiment of evil.  These characters shoot or torture the innocent, often with a grim 
sense of perverseness about them.  For all the bullet headed targets in The Guns of 
Navarone, the real evil comes in the form of the SS officer Hauptmann Sessler who 
hopes to pull the plans from the heroes using the truth-serum-esque drug “Scorpamaline.”  
Hauptmann’s opposite comes in the form of a Nazi Commandant with whom the heroes 
are forced to leave their wounded in order to complete their mission.  In response to their 
reservations, the Commandant answers, “We don’t make war on wounded men.  We are 
not all like Hauptmann Sessler.”  Thus, the movie is careful to delineate between the 
ideological leaders and the masses they trick into fighting.  
In a later scene, Corporal Miller (played by David Niven) discovers a traitor in he 
midst of their compatriots.  If the mission is to succeed, someone must kill the beautiful 
Greek woman; and this task seems to fall to Miller, because he discovered her.  Mill r, 
however, refuses to kill women, and suggests that the task belongs to the mission’s 
commander Captain Keith Mallory, played by Gregory Peck—whom Miller feels isn’t 
doing enough of his own dirty work.  "Who really is guilty?  The man who gives the 
orders or the one who does them?"(The Guns of Navarone)  Miller thus phrases the moral 
dilemma to spotlight the Nuremberg Trials and the legal and moral rejection of the Nazi 
excuse, "I was only following orders."  He evokes the atrocities but phrases it in terms of 
military valor.  Miller supports the Allied position that following orders confers as much 
guilt as giving orders.  In this sense, he’s ethically better than the German soldiery who 
ought to recognize the problem with pursuing a war that is supported by the various 




clear that the various SS or Gestapo monsters in these movies clearly serve to mak  the 
entirety of Germany’s war efforts demonic.  The villains were sadistic, but this hardly 
makes Nazi Germany a paragon of evil.  The Japanese were, for instance, depict d as 
being just as sadistic. 
Of course, films were made in great abundance about America’s fight against the 
Japanese, but as time wore on, the Pacific theater of the war became decreasingly popular 
with film makers.  In the 50s, most World War II movies depicted naval battles gainst 
the Japanese fleet, during the 60s, the balance shifted, and since that time, the fight 
against Nazi Germany has become an increasingly popular subject for film makers.  The 
fight against Japan has become decreasingly popular in proportion to the increasing 
benevolence between the United States and postwar Japan.  
It’s simply not feasible to suggest that the fight against Nazi Germany was 
popularized because it held some intrinsic value as an American victory alone (other 
victories existed against the other Axis powers).  According to Jeanine Basinger, “Since 
World War II is one of the biggest events of American history, it is natural that films 
about it would continue to be of interest.  However, the same might be said about the 
Civil War, World War I, and even the Spanish America War” (81).  This is simply not a
criterion for the preeminence of World War II as a wartime film setting. It is also not a 
feasible criterion for that preeminence that the war against the Nazis would become an 
oft-employed scenario because of its capacity to avoid the censure of the American 
military.  Again the war as prosecuted against imperial Japan would have made it p st 




WWI all of which would have had as much bearing, if not more, on establishing Korea as 
the enemy and stirring up anti-communist sentiments.   
One of the things that World War II films provided was catharsis for an audience that 
had passed judgment on Nazi Germany for the images it had seen in the camp liberation 
films.  This could not be provided by movies about war with Imperial Japan.  In terms of 
the Russians, the films showed Americans how to handle their postwar enemy in a 
virtuous and righteous manner and allowed Americans to delineate too the Russian 
leadership from the Russian populace in terms of guilt (and through the understanding 
that even the duped Russian people, like the German military, were dangerous).  As the 
popularity of films set in Europe waxed, and films set in Asia waned, it was these 
depictions which were became increasingly useful to Americans in understanding their 
enemies.  Its vision of dystopia depended upon an understanding of a totalitarian mindset 
and not a world quartered off by the essential divisions of race.  Depictions of Nazi 
Germany provided Americans with a necessary description of evil after fascism had all 
but robbed them of a viable essentialist definition of good. 
As utopian visions, however, commercial World War II combat films had very little 
to offer.  They suggested, ultimately, that America had already peeked as a utopian ideal 
some time between 1942 and 1945.  This was especially true of films set in the Pacific 
which could only show Americans fighting bravely for the war effort and could not 
provide a definition of evil that would last beyond the war.  The failure of anti-
Communist sentiments when used as a basis for film suggests that no path to a utopian 
vision was possible through the paranoia of the Second Red Scare either.  The lessons of 




enemy of Communist Russia, and the lessons learned from fighting Nazi Germany were 
all negative.  Through the fight against Hitler, one could define evil—good had to be, and 
could only be defined as the thing that had defeated that evil.  
In effect, the record of box office success and failures suggests that America, in 
fighting Nazi Germany could remain good in fighting enemies that were like the Nazis, 
but the result of a fight against the Communists, if not bolstered by the fight against the 
Nazis, had no utopian value whatsoever.  This sentiment began as a simple preference in 
mass culture for a particular variety of patriotic rhetoric, but began to grow into a critique 
of American culture.  For if America could only be heroic when fighting the Nazis, then 
the patriotic attitudes suggested in official anti-Communist propaganda were at best 
tragic, and at worst hypocritical, in their description of what America would have to 
sacrifice in order to fight against the Communist threat. 
The “The Port Huron Statement” written in 1962, capitalized on this hypocrisy by 
contemplating America’s sacrifice of a utopian vision for its Cold War mindset.  The 
authors of the statement, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), wrote:  
[T]he message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present. 
Beneath the reassuring tones of the politicians, beneath the common opinion that 
America will "muddle through", beneath the stagnation of those who have closed 
their minds to the future, is the pervading feeling that there simply are no 
alternatives, that our times have witnessed the exhaustion not only of Utopias, but 
of any new departures as well. Feeling the press of complexity upon the emptiness 
of life, people are fearful of the thought that at any moment things might thrust
out of control. They fear change itself, since change might smash whatever 
invisible framework seems to hold back chaos for them now. For most 
Americans, all crusades are suspect, threatening. (8) 
 
The basic indictment by the SDS is clear:  Americans have no reason to believe in the 
possibility of a better tomorrow because they believe all crusades are suspect.  Their 




cannot put faith in a model of reality that is based on endless succession of other models, 
none more or less real than the last.  America, according to the SDS, has no real model 
with which to approach social change because their previous models, and those that hold 
them, have become exhausted.  Essentialism has become soured through Nazism, but its 
opposite, context dependent evaluation, cannot exist alongside the American nationalism 
of the cold war.  Moreover, the products of mass culture suggest in this malaise a 
growing fear that the new enemy of communism has caused America to become 
entrenched in this nationalism and, therefore, have made it prone to resemble its old 
enemy, Nazi Germany. 
This fear was perpetuated by the characterization of the Nazi menace as a form of 
invasive imperialism shared with the Russians.  If Russia was like the Nazis for wanting 
to take over the world, then the growing narrative of American imperialism was cause for 
suspicion.  As the Nazis wanted to incinerate civilian populations, so too would those 
who launched nuclear weapons at each other—whether they were Russian or American.  
Nazi metaphors were useful in demonizing Russia precisely because American 
propaganda, official and unofficial, had never interrogated the evil that had driven the 
Germans to commit the atrocities at places like Buchenwald.   
Because the American media had universalized the victims, it encouraged the 
understanding that the Nazis were dangerous because of their desire to take over the 
world, but these encouraged anti-American rhetoric to utilize the Nazis in metaphor as 
well.  Because Russia didn’t have to kill 6 million Jews to be like the Nazis, neither did 
the United States.  For the “no nukes” movement, for instance, many of their prefered 




rocket, Werner von Braun and the crematorium which would equate the Nazi atrocities of 
history to the nuclear holocaust of the terrifying and possible future—a new kind of fire 
which would punish all people no matter what their race.  Obviously, in such a scheme, 
the mushroom cloud of the atom bomb, reminiscent of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are 
metaphors which have a direct corollary to nuclear destruction, but the use of Atomic
weapons occurs after the nation’s fight against the Nazis—their use as symbol for 
nuclear Armageddon is anachronistic and inappropriate, except for the meanings implied
through genocide. 
Moreover, the vague definitions of Nazism encouraged by dominant culture in order 
to bring Nazism and Communism together for indictment under the banner of 
totalitarianism also invited the criticism of the counter culture.  After all, if the dominant 
culture needed Nazism to indict their communist enemies, if in short, communism could 
not be indicted on its own faults, then the charges against communism were suspect for 
not being able to stand on their own, as was the justification of the American military 
industrial complex which had been empowered by those charges.   
The language of that criticism is interesting though in that it too took on the metaphor 
of Nazism in order to show the dominant culture’s rhetoric as problematic.  The reason 
for this is rather simple.  Nazism had been employed with such regularity that he pattern 
had become rote within the culture.  Evil was compared to Nazism, to be noble or 
virtuous was to be in opposition to Nazism.  Thus, the anti-war movement took on the 
model by putting themselves in the place of the noble opponents of Nazism, and by 
painting their enemy, the war-sponsoring excesses of the dominant culture, as Nazis.  




other metaphor for evil was as immediately available and recognizable nationally, for 
criticism to have success in mass culture, it too would have to employ Nazism through 
analogy. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this rhetoric was the 1964 dark comedy, Dr. 
Strangelove, in which director Stanley Kubrick gave the American public his strangely 
successful depiction of the Nazi as a figure of nuclear Armageddon.  Strangelove himself, 
played by Peter Sellers, represented a new kind of Nazi who has joined forces with the 
U.S. in their attempts to keep up an arms race with the Soviets but who has not, and has 
not had to, give up his old loyalties to Nazism.  He repeatedly catches and corrects 
himself as he makes reference to President Merkin Muffley, also played by Sellers, as his 
Fuehrer, and he accents his speeches with Nazi salutes. 
Strangelove is disturbing.  He is alien to the film’s other characters.  Physicall , he is 
an exaggerated caricature:  wheelchair bound and adorned with impenetrably dark glasses
as if his science had already rendered him cybernetic. He is, at once, embroil d in the 
conflicts of the film’s “war room” and also above the paltriness of the dilemma.  He does 
not, for instance, join in on the others’ prayer of thanks for deliverance “from the wings 
of the angel of death” (Dr. Strangelove).  When it is clear that the B-52 has dropped its 
cargo of hydrogen bombs, he is not upset, but excited.  He jubilantly outlines his plan to 
save the human race, or at least members who will be saved from the fires by their
fulfillment of certain criteria.   
Strangelove meets the disaster of America’s accidental first strikeand the involuntary 
nature of the Soviets’ counter-attack always with a strained smile.  His body seems under 




tries to strangle him.  His German accent and the accidental inclusion of Nazisms in his 
speech betray his affiliation to the Third Reich.  His position as director of the President’s 
weapon program, reveal the importance of his role for the postwar world and also hint at 
his prominence within the Nazi regime.   
The character of Dr. Strangelove is most likely a parody of Werner von Braun, the 
designer of the V-2 rocket who was, post-war, relocated to America to help pioneer the 
space program and through it, America’s rocket technology.  Like von Braun, Dr. 
Strangelove is also an ex-Nazi scientist whose past affiliations (and their continued 
presence) are suspect.  General 'Buck' Turgidson offers his racist cautionary against 
forgetting Strangelove’s past in the film when he says, “A kraut by any other name” (Dr. 
Strangelove).   
Von Braun, like Strangelove, could not simply put aside his Nazi past either.  “In the 
years after the war, when von Braun and other Peenemünde veterans had risen to 
responsible positions in the American space program, accusations regarding their role in 
the Mittelwerk slave labor production rose occasionally” (Dunar and Waring 9).  Von 
Braun was asked to explain his role in the SS, a promotion which Dunar and Waring 
claim von Braun “accepted only after he and his colleagues agreed that to turn it dow
might risk Himmler's wrath” (10).  The issue was also raised as to how much von Braun 
knew concerning the atrocities committed at the concentration camp Dora where “20,000 
died as a result of execution, starvation, and disease” while helping to build the V-2 
rocket (Dunar and Waring 7).  How could von Braun not have known that the rocket 




The amnesty offered von Braun and the other scientists brought over as part of 
Project Paperclip gave them a limited reprieve from suspicion.  Aside from the occasional 
surfacing of his controversial background, von Braun became a limited scientific a d 
political celebrity.  He worked for Disney as a technical advisor and narrated Disney’s 
1955 short film, Man in Space. As the U.S. required top rocket scientists to build their 
nuclear arsenal, it had to look to Nazi Germany where rocket pioneering had been at the 
forefront of war research.   
By officiating the claim that these men were simply scientists with no responsibility 
for the crimes committed in the nearby camps, the U.S. government whitewashed Nazi 
affiliation and even membership in the SS.  Clearly, the film Dr. Strangelove offered 
another way to interpret the background of the Project Paperclip scientists which ran 
counter to the official established narrative.  By obviating the Nazi elements, Strangelove 
did not directly indict, but it did aggravate worries about the relative guilt of men like von 
Braun for the Nazi atrocities.  Dr. Strangelove’s Nazi background, his alien attitude 
towards human fear, and his position as the President’s expert on nuclear weaponry pay 
tribute to the suspicion that our weapons program was founded upon Nazi philosophy, 
politics, and worst of all, ethics. 
Dr. Strangelove is a dystopian vision of a world which becomes its worst nightmare 
so as to fight its enemies.  In the film, America has learned nothing from its encounter 
with the Nazis—it is as driven by its own rampant nationalism as were the followers of 
Adolph Hitler.  Through its parody of Von Braun, Dr. Strangelove suggests that nuclear 
war itself is the byproduct of Nazi Germany.  In taking up its arms race, America 




General Turgidson recommends that the president order a first strike on the Russians, 
President Merkin Muffley retorts, “I will not go down in History as the greatest mass 
murderer since Adolf Hitler,” because he understands the implication of starting nuclear 
war:  that the ensuing death he would cause would be comparable ethically to the 
Holocaust (Dr. Strangelove).    
The use of Nazi metaphors to depict America’s nuclear proliferation is exemplifi d in 
the film by the explanations offered by Brigadier General Jack D. Ripper for his dering 
‘Wing Attack Plan R’ (the order that sends bombers into Russia).  Ripper offers, “I can
no longer sit back and allow communist infiltration, communist indoctrination, 
communist subversion, and the international communist conspiracy to sap and impurify 
our precious bodily fluids” (Dr. Strangelove).  Ripper is obsessed with eugenics and like 
many Americans in the 1950s, afraid of the implications of national fluoridation.  His 
belief is that fluoridation is a “postwar commie conspiracy”:  an attempt to biologically 
corrupt the purity of the American people and his reaction equates anti-Communis with 
Nazism through nuclear holocaust (Dr. Strangelove).  
When it becomes clear that Ripper’s attempt to purify the American race has failed, 
Ripper shoots himself in his bunker in a manner reminiscent of the suicide of Adolf 
Hitler.  In his article on Dr. Strangelove, Charles Maland offers a reading of the scene:  
“By portraying this paranoid officer willing to obliterate the world because of 
fluoridation, Kubrick lays bare the irrational American fear of Communism as once 
source of the cultural malaise of the early 1960s” (706).  Maland, like many of the 




of Nazism, the purifying of the natural bodily fluids of America against the communist 
threat and purifying the Aryan race against the biological basis for the “Jewish problem.”  
 Through the character of Dr. Strangelove, Kubrick complicates his critique of 
postwar culture beyond a simple didacticism against anti-Communist attitudes.  The 
prominent inclusion of Nazis through the character of Strangelove and the general 
willingness of the Americans to cooperate with their Russian counterparts suggest that 
Dr. Strangelove is attempting to divert fears away from the danger of the Communists 
and onto the Nazi-like behaviors of those whom America considers its allies. Before the 
final scene of destruction can be played out over the song, “We’ll Meet Again,” Dr. 
Strangelove suggests his master plan with a barely concealed exuberance.  Strangelove 
advises the President, “I would not pass up the chance to preserve human specimens” 
(Dr. Strangelove).  If the new Holocaust offered in this film is to have survivors, it will 
be necessary to decide who will live and who will die.   
Strangelove, himself, is happy to make this decision with a computer that will choose 
the survivors using various criteria such as “youth, hair color, sexual fertility, 
intelligence, and a cross section of necessary skills” (Dr. Strangelove).  In choosing the 
survivors of this worldwide catastrophe, Strangelove is capable of creating his master 
race, and he is finally freed of his need to hide his Nazi tendencies; he actively celebrates 
them through bodily expression.   
If Strangelove’s strange physical comedy can be seen as a man wrestling with his 
need to express his Nazism, then the final scenes of the film must be read as the Nzi
eugenicist finally winning control and refusing, thereafter, to be suppressed.  At the end 




as praise for the miraculous recovery, “Mein Fuehrer, I can walk!” but it is unclear 
whether he is now thanking Hitler or Muffley (Dr. Strangelove). 
If films like The Great Escape and The Guns of Navarone make a differentiation 
between “good” Germans and “bad” Nazis so as to help a cold war audience to exonerat 
its new alliance with postwar Germany, and to help understand the nature of the 
totalitarian enemy, then Dr. Strangelove, released during this same era, complicates this 
view.  Strangelove is good because he is on our side.  Strangelove is bad because his 
views are based on Nazi eugenics and therefore support genocide.  Strangelove is good 
because he helps America build missiles that protect the nation.  Strangelove is bad 
because having nuclear weapons around, despite ideologies, causes nuclear war, which is 
akin to the Holocaust.  Taken as a whole, Dr. Strangelove makes it not only impossible to 
tell “good” Germans from “bad” Nazis, but also to tell Nazis from anti-Communist 
patriots.   
America is depicted in this film as the next Nazi power by virtue of its involvement 
with nuclear weapons, a technological breakthrough engineered by Nazi scientists.  
However, the Nazi corruption of America is not ideological.  It is clear that General 
Ripper has gone insane, and has not suddenly seen the wisdom of Nazi eugenics.  It is the 
audience that is meant to see his madness as akin to Nazi philosophy; he would make no 
such claim.  The resolution of the movie, the nuclear annihilation that occurs despite 
cooperation between Soviet and American powers, suggests that the existence of nuclear 
weapons alone is the only necessary component for disaster. 
  The rocket technology of the ICBM is introduced by ex-Nazis whose participation in 




utilizing Nazi technology automatically creates the drive to complete the Nazi plans of 
extermination.  Once these plans are in motion, a master race can be chosen to survive 
underground, reemerging a century later to complete Hitler’s vision of a world free of 
inferior races. 
Dr. Strangelove’s hints at Nazi ideology run parallel to its concerns with nuclear 
weaponry.  Nazis and nuclear weapons are dangerous.  Their existence cannot be 
tolerated, and their exoneration cannot be justified. This view seems to suggest a 
reluctance to investigate the past even at the risk of xenophobia.  By parodying von 
Braun in this way, Strangelove seems to be asking what it means to be guilty or innocent 
in those circumstances, and comes up with no easy answers. The fruits of Nazismhave 
made the ideology contagious and universally evil.  Motivations in Strangelove have 
nothing to do with evil precisely because Nazism has created its own morality through 
extreme example:  one need not try to be like a Nazi in order to be like a Nazi.  
Accidental resemblance to Nazism is enough to warrant castigation. 
This message of the movie, however, complicates simple xenophobia and renders it 
into an anti-patriotic paranoia.  The film makes it clear that all things Nazi must be 
avoided, but at the same time, Dr. Strangelove equates the Nazi with the American, and 
the Holocaust with Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.).  Its use of a scenario that is 
particularly American to explain the problems with a scenario which other films have 
declared uniquely German allows the audience to investigate the Holocaust as something 
that they themselves might be a party to if they are not cautionary.   
Dr. Strangelove, however, offers no means by which to recognize this caution, as 




Authoritarianism.  The film ascribes mass murder to terms of circumstantial c on and an 
ideological corruption of the very nature of cause.  Nobody in Strangelove’s war room 
fits the profile of the authoritarian mindset and yet, they still commit a holocaust.  What 
should one do to avoid the tragedy of Dr. Strangelove except prohibit the German 
scientists from making their weapons?  Once nuclear weapons have been created, the 
cause of Dr. Strangelove is nearly inevitable. It awaits only one factor: Ripper’s 
conversion to a genocidal philosophy in the name of biological purity.  After the 
American paranoid vision is embraced, the end result of Dr. Strangelove is achieved 
circumstantially. 
The anti-nuclear war novel Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) by Thomas Pynchon presents a 
similar stance to that taken by Dr. Strangelove regarding the effacement of cause through 
the imposition of Nazism.  Through the fractured narrative of the novel’s hero, Tyrone 
Slothrop, Pynchon links up nuclear annihilation with the postwar cultural detritus that 
results from the acclamation of Nazi rocket technology by the United States and the 
creation of what Pynchon calls the Rockatenstadt—a strange golden age city reminiscent 
of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis that stands in for the dreams of the postwar future shared by, 
or fed to, the American public through Cold War utopian visions.   
The narrative is suffused with scenes that suggest the cinematic appearance of reality 
(Slothrop looks exactly like Bing Crosby, scenes are interrupted by dance numbers and 
singing, flashbacks and asides are described as film montages, etc.) as a way of 
producing a history that is not based in facts but in film trivia and states of cultural 
titillation indistinguishable from pornography (wherever, for instance, Slothrop achieves 




Americans know about history except what they learn from film?’  As a result, how could 
America’s history be anything but schizophrenic when its films include musicals like 
White Christmas, all those Road To… movies with Bing Crosby and Bob Hope, as well 
as countless war and spy movies, and films devoted to the excesses of Nazi brutality.  
For Pynchon, cause is not diffused across a coincidental string of events, but in a 
string of details, none more real than a matinee or suggestive of anything more than a 
distraction, but which, collectively, produce the postwar death-urge of nuclear 
annihilation through the egotism created by believing one’s experience as a viewer of an 
event to be the same as one’s experience as a participant in the event.  The desire to b  
destroyed by thermonuclear weaponry is necessary precisely because it is th logical 
repercussion of a war that film has turned into a joke.  It is from this collage of 
irrelevance that the nuclear annihilation is conceived and carried out as simply the next 
thrilling chapter in human barbarism.    
 At the novel’s end, the reader is introduced to an audience full of people who have 
been watching the midnight movie version of Gravity’s Rainbow60—they, like the reader, 
have been witness to the madness that ensues from chasing after the rocket and the 
attempt to attain the Nazi weapon. The race to build a postwar arsenal has becomea 
simulation of itself that is sometimes disturbing, but just as often funny and musical.  The 
audience that watches the novel-turned-movie can’t help but be excited by how the 
arsenal will be created and how its architects will be recruited.  They do not react to the 
simulation of their destruction as destruction, but as a fantasy, despite the very ral threat 
of nuclear annihilation under which they live.  The audience of Zhlubb’s theater sees the 




apt to see their naïve enthusiasm as horrifying precisely because it is the audience’s lack 
of horror that encourages the disaster.  They become a strange mix suggesting 
Baudrillard’s confusion of origin implied by the hyperreal:  the audience responds t  the 
disaster, but it is their inappropriate response that acts as the disaster’s cause. They are a 
fictional creation, but they create for the novel’s readers a description of real cause for the 
rise of the military industrial complex that is rooted in the culpability of American culture 
for its own demise.  What’s more, the reader of the novel reacts to all three worldsat the 
same time reacting enthusiastically to the narrative (like the audience), reacting with 
horror for the audience (and thus residing outside their ranks), and acting with fascination 
and alarm at the correlation between the novel’s tone and the very real annihilatio  it 
attempts to describe.  Perhaps the most discomforting feature of Gravity’s Rainbow is 
that as Pynchon describes the likely reason for nuclear annihilation, the first raction he 
invites is laughter.  As suggested by Baudrillard, the reader’s reaction to the simulation is 
to lose a sense of scandal, in this case, the capacity for dread or outrage.   
Pynchon’s characters in Gravity’s Rainbow are just as unlikely to act appropriately as 
the novel’s readers—precisely because they do not seem to know that they are in a movie 
and that the differentiations between the various depths of their worlds (spiritual o  
fictional versus real, for instance) are an illusion. Carroll Eventyr, for instance, is a 
medium who contacts other dead psychics who in turn contact the spirit of the V-2 rocket 
which resides in an afterlife ruled by its creator:  Dominus Blicero, but of course, it’s an 
illusion (Pynchon 30).  The different spiritual existences are all the same in that they are 
all part of Pynchon’s fiction—just as the fiction of the novel is an artifact of the real and 




universe into a real theater, but it’s no more real to the reader than the postwar zones of 
Pynchon’s Europe, but then how much more real is a real phenomena from an unreal 
description that happens to be accurate—Gravity’s Rainbow may be ludicrous, but if it
describes the postwar death urge accurately, then its lack of realism is irrelevant.  
Pynchon seems to be asking what reality has to do with the danger of being killed by a 
nuclear bomb—if you’re in ground zero, no matter how much sense it makes or not, 
you’re dead. 
By the novel’s finale, when the fictional audience of Zhlubb’s theater enters i o the 
narrative, Slothrop has already disappeared for some two hundred pages.  It is not clear 
whether the character has gone mad, become the novel’s omniscient narrator, or has 
disappeared because he is no longer needed by the narrator to account for the narrative’s 
continuance (he, himself, has become yet another insignificant detail of his story).  
Slothrop becomes the myth of Slothrop for much of the last third of the novel and in 
doing so, mirrors the myth of the Second World War (that it was a good war, that it was a 
war to stop evil, that those who opposed evil were made naturally good, etc.).  Slothrop, 
who was never very real even when he was the main character of the novel, goes on to 
become a rallying cry for patriotism against an invisible ‘They.’ Theot r characters of 
the novel, known collectively as “The Counterforce,” search for the rocket in the name of 
Slothrop, but in vain.  By the novel’s end, the evil Nazi super-scientist Blicero launches 
the rocket as the various icons of American heroism (the Lone Ranger, Plasticman, etc.) 
arrive “alas, too late.”  The valor which they inherit from Slothrop is made problematic 
by the idea that there never had been a Slothrop, that he was a myth, but if so, so too is 




At its conclusion, the audience for that film (and for the novel) sits waiting for the 
final moments after Blicero (another von Braun stand-in or at the very least, one of von 
Braun’s Peenmünde crowd) launches the infamous 00000 rocket and Blicero’s love slave, 
Gottfried, into the sky to follow the arc of gravity’s rainbow,  Gottfried, who is enveloped 
in a shroud of sexually responsive plastic called Imipolex-G, will guide the rocket 
through the strength of his passion/death urge to a moment twenty five years after the end 
of the war, to Southern California and the Orpheus Theater owned by Richard M. 
Zhlubb—a character generally acknowledged as Pynchon’s stand-in for President 
Richard Nixon. 
Unfortunately, the film has broken in this final scene.  The reader is left among the 
crowded movie theater along with an audience chanting, “Come on, Start the Show!  
Come on, Start the show!”  As the projectionist attempts to fix the movie, the break in the 
continuity of the film’s passage is mirrored by a break in the passage of time for Gottfried 
and the 00000 rocket.  It hangs just over the theater, waiting to fall and being urged on by 
an audience, whose exuberance over the a-historical World War II filmic version of 
Gravity’s Rainbow is leading them to invite their own nuclear annihilation. 
To put it bluntly, Gravity’s Rainbow is an odd book.  It’s slippage from fantasy to 
reality; its cinematic portrayal; its characters who have other people’s daydreams for 
them, who cause bombs to fall by getting erections, and who talk to rockets through 
Ouija boards all serve to make the novel confusing, and at times equally humorous and 
horrifying, but its mannerism are meant to fit the subject matter it describe.  The 
ridiculousness of Gravity’s Rainbow comes from a postwar attempt to encapsulate in 




musicals.  It is the strange notion that one can watch World War II period movies in order 
to bolster patriotism and not risk feeling so morally superior that possession of the b mb 
does not seem dangerous.  The horror of postwar culture, as critiqued by Pynchon in 
Gravity’s Rainbow, is that the Andrews Sisters and the Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of 
Company B can be associated with the Blitzkrieg and the bombing of Britain without 
raising issue as to compatibility.   
Slothrop’s fears, his ridiculous Hawaiian shirts, the fact that he looks just like Bing 
Crosby mark him as the devil-may-care-GI of so many romantic comedies set in World 
War II, but Slothrop will move through the carved up Germany, he will see the Dora 
work camp, and tour the Mittlewerke bomb factory.  When he meets the Russian and 
American forces searching everywhere for the scientist responsible for the rocket, he will 
see that the atrocities the Nazis have committed are immaterial to the future superpowers 
as they search fort the rocket technology and the scientists necessary for the construction 
of their new weaponry.  They will be the same in that both America and Russia will be 
nonplussed by the atrocities they are willing to overlook in order to get ahead in the arms 
race.  Faced with this vision of the postwar world, Slothrop will go insane.  
The book suggests that its reader too, given with hindsight the ability to know all that 
Slothrop knows, should confront the madness of war that drives patriotism and through it 
nuclear annihilation.  They are invited to face the lies of a history created through 
matinee representations and television docudramas.  The oddities and fractures of the 
narrative are attempts to undermine the value systems that link the fight against evil, to 
the presence of good, to the validation of nuclear annihilation.  Gravity’s Rainbow 




not history.  At the same time, however, it is precisely the understanding of evil through 
the metaphor of Nazism that is responsible for destruction through nuclear war.  His 
choice of Nazis in this role is at odds with the choice of Nazis for the role of enemy i 
American pro-war rhetoric.  Its central position in both sides of the argument is not 
arbitrary. 
Neither Gravity’s Rainbow nor Dr. Strangelove locates the most prominent feature of 
the Nazi enemy as racism but a drive towards brutality that is continued by America 
through its attempt to incorporate Nazi rocket technology into the postwar American 
arsenal.  Moreover, the brutality of America and its nuclear arsenal (which even now, 
after the Cold War has ended, and the stockpile has waned, numbers more than 9000 
warheads) was not evil enough on its own, but had to be associated with the Nazis in 
order for its danger to be conceptualized.  What need is there for characters like Dr.
Strangelove and Blicero unless it is to make the audience understand that the real 
problem with this technology is that it was inherited by evil Nazis?  The logica fallacy 
here is plain:  had we developed rocket technology without the help of von Braun, would 
ICBMs be any less dangerous?   
These examples have been chosen to illuminate the systematic process of an 
expanding thematic scope for the rhetoric.  First Nazism was used as a metaphor for evil 
in order to demonize the Nazis themselves.  Then it was used to demonize America’s 
next wartime enemy: expanding its scope from wartime enemy to peacetime rival 
followed soon after by the use of Nazi analogy to justify America’s domestic policy.  
Eventually, the rhetoric ceased to be controlled by the state and became used in critiques 




enemies to all state enemies to all political enemies including those defined outside of 
official state politics.  This particular example, Nazism in relation to the rhetoric related 
to communism, has provided a description of the methodology by which the Nazi 
analogy broadens scope to finally prove ubiquitous—imminently appropriate for all 
American definitions of evil. 
The analysis made through the example of anti-communism, however, has not been, 
and could not have been, exhaustive.  The choice of examining anti-Communism in terms 
of its anti-Nazi rhetoric was a selection made by favoring extremes.  America should 
have been able to demonize communist Russia based on its ability to infiltrate, its human 
rights violations against its own citizens, and the very real danger it posed in the nuclear 
stalemate.  Likewise, analogies to Nazism are absolutely unnecessary in order to depict 
racism and war as dangerous social ills.   
These are subjects where the definition of right and wrong should have been rather 
self-evident…and yet, they fall back on analogies to Nazism to make their point precisely 
because right and wrong have ceased to be self-evident.  Only Nazism works to establish 
the definition of evil.  The solidity of right and wrong positions, otherwise, denote 
dystopia for the post World War II world.  The definition of utopia became, after the 
Second World War, liberal in the sense meant by Richard Rorty:  virtue defined as open-
mindedness and freedom from prejudice.  The singular vision of the world and its values 
as supplied by Nazism all but demands, in its demonization postwar, that singular visions 
be abandoned as dystopian. 
These extreme examples imply an ever-enlarging scope:  a suggestion of just how far 




single theme, it, unfortunately, risks the impression of limited scope:  analyzig Nazi 
analogies as they were used to further the various political causes defined by America’s 
relationship to Russia risks excluding other causes, both those equally political and those 
a-political.  What I have tried to suggest though is a reasonable description of whyand 
how the Nazi analogy comes into usage, what it does to the ethical argument into which it 
is summoned, and what it does to causes or individuals who are the subjects of the 
comparison.  In short, it acts as a description of Nazi analogies and their effect on 
American ethics by looking at a specific ethical problem from which a general case can 
be made to extrapolate out to other ethical problems. 
If, however, ubiquity throughout American ethical rhetoric is the goal of this analysis, 
then the argument must, by necessity, expand beyond the borders of the Cold War.  It 
must address crypto-Nazis, and safety Nazis, soup Nazis, and femi-Nazis.  It must deliver 
up some reason why Charles Manson carved a swastika in his forehead, why “Spring 
Time for Hitler” doesn’t offend an American audience, and why sado-masochists dress 
up in SS regalia for sexual titillation.  What has been described, thus far, is how to 
analyze analogies to Nazism, their use and their scope, in a scaled down feature of 
American culture—ubiquity demands that the analogies, and their implications, be 
discussed in the state we now find them: suffused throughout American culture, 
synonymous with evil, imminently appropriate to the point of being obligatory, and 









NAZISM, MCCARTHYISM, AND THE COUNTERCULTURE:  THE PLACE OF 
RACE IN NAZI ANALOGIES 
 
Injustices measured through comparisons to Nazism should remain injustices 
regardless of Nazism.  Russia’s ability to fire nuclear missiles at America during the Cold 
War was a dire threat regardless of the resemblance it shared with Nazi Germany.  
Political evil was, however, described consistently during this era using this particular 
analogy though it was neither necessary nor consistently appropriate.  The ubiquity of 
this comparison, its frequent usage as well as the obligatory nature of that usage, suggests 
that Nazism served, not only as an example of the evil enemy for Cold War culture, but 
as the example:  a reliable description of villainy when all other descriptions were 
becoming more and more subject to dismissal through contextualization.  In attaining this 
unique position, Nazism also gained the position of synonymy.  Nazism served not only 
as America’s exclusive example of evil against which all other evils appealed for 
comparison during the Cold War, but also, in being unique, Nazism became definitive of 
that evil. 
What should also be clear from the preceding chapters of analysis is that the actual 
definition of Nazism evoked in analogy has been fluid and subject to change over the 
years leading up to, during, and following the Second World War.  Nazism might imply a 
tendency towards authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, fascism, communism, or imperialism.  
It could be evoked to stir American patriotism towards the cause of military agg ession, 
or it could be used to critique military aggression.  But even in the arenas of usages I 




in Cold War propaganda, World War II films, and the rhetoric of the anti-war movement, 
I have only shown a small fraction of the ways in which American rhetoric had brought 
the Nazi analogy to bear for whatever cause it attempted to endorse or decry.  By the time 
Dr. Strangelove and Gravity’s Rainbow were released in the late 1960s and early 70s, the 
Nazi analogy had made its way into a multitude of other political movements as well.  
My hope has been that by showing how Nazism operated through mainstream culture in 
mass cultural movements, the mechanisms might be made plain and their operation 
extrapolated to include movements with less mass cultural appeal. 
The most salient feature of this mechanism is that, because Nazism could be mae to 
stand-in for a general definition of evil through example, the specific ideology of Nazism 
was less important to its function than the images associated with it through camp 
liberation.  What was of utmost importance when calling someone a Nazi or referring to a 
cause as rooted in Nazism was that the camps had made such a designation pejorative.  
Race and racism as charges were far less important, and in many cases, needn’t be 
evoked at all, when making the analogy.  Dr. Strangelove, for instance, accentuates the 
evil of nuclear proliferation through Nazi analogy without mention of Jews or anti-
Semitism.  Likewise, the evil of communism is made plain through an analogy to Nazism 
in Cold War propaganda films implying that both ideologies are totalitarian, not that they 
are both homicidally racist. 
What must also be added to the description of this cultural mechanism is that the 
inclusion of racism in analogies involving Nazism was complicated and not always self 
evident.   Whatever the mass media said about the Nazis, it was clear that another 




Nazis had been the result of their essential belief in the superiority of the Aryan race and 
the prejudices against all other races inherent to that belief.  This included, esp cially, the 
anti-Semitism that went part and parcel with Americans’ understanding, if ot their 
representation, of Nazism.  Americans knew that the Nazis were racists, but they 
demonized them in the mass media as brutally bent on world conquest.  Nonetheless, 
racism continued to undergird America’s postwar understanding of Nazism even when it 
went unspoken.  It was impossible to ignore, but it was also difficult to recognize as 
central particularly because America was a segregated society with a Southern region that 
still operated on a caste system designated by race and legalized by Jim Crow laws.  For 
Americans, to say that the Nazis were evil because of their racism would have been to 
implicate America’s attitudes as well.  To remove racism from the description of 
Nazism’s evil would, however, have been to exclude what was popularly, if silently, 
understood by the American populace at large.   
The results of this conundrum were two-fold.  First, as already discussed in previous 
chapters, racism was attached to other features of Nazism which could be openly 
discussed in the mass media without fear of hypocrisy: the Nazis became totalitarian, 
authoritarian, etc.  The terms, though they did not ordinarily imply racism, began to take
on racist connotations because of their association with Nazism.  Thus, though the 
Russians needn’t be racist to be totalitarian (and, therefore, like the Nazis)because they 
were like the Nazis, the implication was that they were racist as well. In Dr. Strangelove, 
for instance, though racism has nothing to do, normally, with the dangers of nuclear 
proliferation, because it is depicted as Nazi-like in the film, the narrative of race (racial 




Second, because one of the preeminent meanings of Nazism as a cultural symbol is its 
capacity to reflect America’s self-image as anti-Nazi, objection to Nazism began to take 
on the connotation of patriotism and to imply an American definition of virtue.  This 
meaning made more sense, of course, when it was America’s enemies which were being 
compared to Nazis:  when Russia was made to seem like Nazi Germany, objection to 
communism was made as patriotic as a fight against Nazism.  It made less sense, 
however, once the loose definition of Nazism allowed the analogy to be made in political 
arguments unrelated to American nationalism, or when rooted in nationalism but 
implying an analogy between Nazi Germany and America itself.  When, for i stance, 
America’s self image of superiority for having defeated the Nazis is criticized by making 
America appear Nazi-like, as in The Third Man or O’Connor’s Wise Blood, the 
implication is that it is more patriotic not to believe in the superiority of America than it 
is to uphold an idea of national virtue.  Anti-Americanism, when voiced as anti-Nazism, 
paradoxically, becomes patriotic. 
At the same time, critiques of social custom or attitudes that utilized the Nazi analogy 
naturally implied the mantle of patriotism in much the same way as analogy to the Nazis 
implied racism.  When William Baldwin wrote, in a letter sent to Angela Davis while she 
was in jail, “You look exceedingly alone—as alone, say, as the Jewish housewife in the 
boxcar headed for Dachau, or as any one of our ancestors, chained together in the name 
of Jesus, headed for a Christian land,” (13) the obvious implication is that the 
incarceration of Davis is comparable to what the Nazis did to the Jews, and just as 
comparable is what the American system of chattel slavery did to Africans.  Moreover, it 




fight against Nazism and is therefore patriotic:  Davis is, in Baldwin’s letter, cast in the 
role of the housewife which she would otherwise be were it not for the fascist system of 
American racism.  The last point is illustrated further later in that same letter when 
Baldwin writes: 
Only a handful of the millions of people in this vast place are aware that the fate 
intended for you, Sister Angela, and or George Jackson, and for the numberless 
prisoners in our concentration camps—for that is what they are—is a fate which 
about to engulf them, too. (Davis 16) 
 
His sentiments imply a mass struggle against rampant nationalism, though in this case, 
the rampant nationalism that has imprisoned millions of people is America’s dominant 
culture of racism.  Moreover, the millions of people in jail, like Angela Davis and George 
Jackson, are not criminals, but victims of nationalism—a point which is mirrored quite 
often in the writings of prison reform activists from the late 60s and early 70s.  
In 1970, to give but one more example among many, in a letter openly addressed to 
his brothers and sisters, Fleeta Drumgo writes:   
It seems at times that the oppression and violence inflicted upon us here in the 
maximum security is more intense than that inflicted upon us in the minimum 
security , but really it’s utterly impossible for me or any of us here to distinguish 
the oppression and violence we are all victimized by.  I am constantly thinking 
about unemployment, under-employment, poverty and malnutrition that are the 
basic facts of our existence; it’s this which sends persons to these concentration 
camps; it’s this which causes so-called crime in general. (Davis 115) 
 
Drumgo, one of the ‘Soledad Brothers’ accused of killing a prison guard in 1970 and 
acquitted in 1972, confuses, in this letter, meaning in a manner reminiscent of Borges’s 
Tlön or Orwell’s Newspeak by unjustifiably making imprisonment a state synonym us 
with otherwise unrelated conditions. All prisons, according to Drumgo, are the same and 
the world outside the prison is also a prison.  Moreover, all of these prisons are 




they are victims.  My goal here is not to meet these attempts at synonymy with 
cynicism—they are the natural repercussions of Drumgo’s analogy:  as soon as the 
prisons become concentration camps, the guards must become Nazis, and the criminals 
must become innocent victims of a fascist government.   
Furthermore, because the Nazi analogy has been evoked, the entire criminal justice 
system must become racist and the fight against it must become patriotic (despite the fact 
that it is a fight against the American legal system).  Drumgo continues i the letter 
offering:  
The decadence and corruption in the present day society and in these 
concentration camps must be dealt with by the people, and the only way we can 
deal with it is uniting, becoming as one!  Because people who are oppressed, 
exploited and deprived are one.  What I am trying to relay is the fact that we are
all prisoners, and under the yoke of fascist enslavement.  Anyone who can deny 
this fact isn’t really concerned about liberation; he considers himself free and the 
attitude relates directly to the petty-bourgeois class of society. (Davis 116) 
 
The final point in this statement is interesting because it begins to assume the mantel of 
patriotic rhetoric as implied by the analogy to Nazism.  If the American legal system is 
Nazi-like, then a fight against it must necessarily mean patriotism, but as that patriotism 
is directed against America, it necessarily blurs the line between the anti-fascist and the 
anti-American.  As a result, Drumgo necessarily takes on the mantle of the enemy of 
America and begins to talk like a communist. 
But what Drumgo, interestingly enough, doesn’t invoke is the rhetoric of racism 
itself. The omission is glaring, precisely because one expects some mention of race, and 
precisely because the solidarity evoked by Drumgo requires that he leave race out 
(“Because people who are oppressed, exploited and deprived are one”).  It is not enough 




socialist revolution, Drumgo has allowed himself the vehicle of Nazism as a metaphor 
because it is, otherwise, quite natural that Drumgo mention Nazis even had he 
concentrated only on the oppressiveness of racism.   
What Drumgo’s rhetoric, and the rhetoric of other writer’s like him, suggests is that 
Nazism, when employed in analogies, can’t mean just racism.  It must mean these o her 
things as well precisely because the term ‘Nazi’ has been made to point to so many ther 
attitudes besides racism that its usage links it, as a symbol, to all the other ins ances of 
evil to which Nazism has been compared in order to validate their condemnation.  What’s 
more, Nazism itself has a strange history involving its use as a tool for racial oppression 
such that it cannot simply be used as a condemnation of racism without implying that 
history of connotations as well. 
What Nazism means in terms of racism, even when used in such an extreme case as 
with Fleeta Drumgo, then, is informed by what it has meant for race relations s arting 
particularly just after the war when its usage allowed oppression of minority groups 
domestically without acknowledging racist attitudes which the confrontati w th Nazism 
had rendered taboo.  In particular, the usage of Nazism in mass culture in lieu of a 
narrative of racism began with the anti-communist movement as it was prosecuted 
domestically to oppress American Jews, homosexuals, and civil rights activists. 
The analogies used to describe America’s enemies at home in the mass media of the 
Cold War era naturally mirrored comparisons used in America’s anti-Communist foreign 
policy.  The subject of the comparison was shown to have some characteristic in common 
with the Nazis which, generalized, tended to produce synonymy with Nazism for the 




(1950), the authors of the work (Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunkswick, David 
Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford) conducted surveys to determine the potential for an 
outbreak of fascism in America61.  The idea of fascism as an “outbreak” fits with the 
work’s overall theme that an authoritarian personality is a syndrome, a social dise se.  
Thus, the authors’ concentration on anti-Semitism defined racism as a symptom of 
fascism by suggesting that the tendency towards anti-democratic ideology was 
synonymous with anti-Semitism.  According to Daniel J. Levinson:  
[T]hese considerations, which suggest the advantage of making anti-Semitism a 
point of departure for research, were also some of the hypotheses that guided the 
research as a whole. The study of anti-Semitism may well be, then, the firs  step 
in a search for antidemocratic trends in ideology, in personality, and in social 
movements. (Adorno 57)  
 
The researchers in this study conflated fascism with Nazism and as a result int rpreted 
the anti-Semitic attitudes of those interviewed as warning signs for not just Nazi, but 
fascist tendencies in general.  The scholars also defined racism through a further 
conflation with Nazism by describing anyone with racist attitudes as anti-Sem tic, and 
therefore, fascist and, consequently, Nazi.   
The assumptions made by The Authoritarian Personality were innocuous enough to 
pass without objection—racists are like Nazis in some ways and historical Nazis were 
fascists—but the comparisons, nonetheless, confusedly prescribed the issues they hoped 
to describe.  The study, in making all racists into Nazis, described the problem with 
racism in terms of its inevitable link to Nazism—the cart was put before the hors .  In 
like manner, the problem with fascism was that it, too, was like Nazism:  American 
fascists were only dangerous if they resembled Nazis by being anti-Semitic62.  Lastly, it 




authoritarian tendencies which it made equivalent to anti-Semitism though the two t rms, 
autocratic personality and racism against Jews, have wholly different meaings. Thus, 
people who demanded unflinching authority were, according to the authors of The
Authoritarian Personality, anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, fascist, and Nazi-like.   
This view of Nazism in which the Nazi’s dictatorial attitude is emphasized over their 
racist attitudes and policies would fall in line with larger postwar definitions of Nazism 
such as those which described Nazi Germany as totalitarian.  It would also serve as 
means for using Nazis and Nazism as a comparative metaphor.  Anyone who demanded 
adherence to procedure could be considered Nazi-like and thus all bureaucratic 
mechanisms had a vulnerability to analogy.  Later, Hannah Arendt would strip this 
condition of its glamour in Eichmann In Jerusalem by describing the authoritarian 
personae of the Nazi as the banality of evil and then demonstrating it through the 
plodding dullard character of Adolf Eichmann, the petty bureaucrat who had provided the 
Nazis with their “final solution.”  Later, Jerry Seinfeld, in the show, Seinfeld, would go 
one step further by turning the authoritarian Nazi into comical material throug his 
infamous Soup Nazi character—considered Nazi-like precisely because of hi 
unswerving adherence to procedure.  When his customers order soup incorrectly, the 
soup Nazi denies them service and banishes them from his restaurant.  The Soup Nazi is 
neither German, nor racist.  It is only his authoritarian personality that recommends him 
for comparison to the Nazis. 
In The Authoritarian Personality, the demonization of fascism and racism requires 
their association with Nazism, even though, of course, racism and fascism were, and 




accepted in mass American culture, was fallacious and served to produce false 
vindications and confused relationships.  If fascism required Nazism in order to be 
vilified then fascism was made to seem a subset of Nazism, marking all fascists as Nazis 
for the authors and those influenced by this seminal work on American Anti-Semitism.  
Once Nazism was considered a necessary component of dangerous racism then racist 
attitudes that lacked a particular resemblance to Nazism naturally came to seem more 
tolerable.  
The study addressed a particular problem with reconciling American racism with the 
racism of their defeated enemies. In a limited sense, Th  Authoritarian Personality, 
revealed the paradox even as it established an alternative reading of the Nazis as evil 
(authoritarian rather than racist).  Postwar America responded to the obvious similarities 
between its attitudes concerning race relations and those of the recently defeate  Nazi 
Germany by emphasizing characteristics of racism that were different between America 
and the Nazis63. Because American racism lacked the pageantry, the politics, and 
ultimately, the extent of brutality associated with the Nazis,64 America could see its own 
racist attitudes as tolerable even though racism was used as a criterion for the nation’s 
vilification of Nazi Germany and was, therefore, part of the growing usae of Nazism as 
the epitome of evil.  The assumed differentiation worked, but only so long as the subject 
of racism could be sublimated and removed from conversations about American identity 
within the mass culture.  When, for instance, resistance to school desegregation suggested 
comparisons between Southern racists and Nazi Germany within the mass media by civil 
rights activists, the differences between the racism of Nuremberg and the racism of Jim 




Until that point, however, mass media relied on the definitions of totalitarianism that 
had helped demonize communism abroad to subdue talk of racism at home:  if the 
designation “totalitarian” implied anti-Semitism, then a government that was not anti-
Semitic (or which would give no voice to its anti-Semitic attitudes) lacked the obviation 
of their racism necessary for its designation of totalitarian.  Consequently, no matter how 
it further defined totalitarianism, because America did not consider itself to be anti-
Semitic in the same way that the Nazis were, it couldn’t conceive of its attitudes as 
resembling those of the Nazis.  When McCarthy and his supporters began to round up 
Jews, to provide but one example, the excesses of the era appeared anti-Communist, 
which obfuscated their anti-Semitic tenor (in many cases erasing them entirely), and 
complicating obvious analogies to Nazism by explaining racism in terms of political 
ideology.   
The resultant view of the Second Red Scare as a product of rampant American 
nationalism is prevalent throughout popularly accepted historical analysis of the era. As 
an explanatory narrative, it allows little analytical room for discussions of McCarthyism 
according to its other, less obvious, characteristics.  Because of this prevalence, 
McCarthyism is rarely analyzed in relation to its effect on the American Jewish 
community even though American views of communism and anti-Communism depended 
heavily on their prejudices against Jews.  Thus, those who rounded up Jews for 
questioning as suspected communists were not compared to Nazis, but the Jews they 
rounded up, because they were accused of being communists, were vulnerable to 




In E.L. Doctorow’s novel, The Book of Daniel (1971), for instance, the main 
character Daniel—a liberally fictional caricature of one of the Rosenberg’s sons—reflects 
upon the life of his parents, including their trial, execution, and the ensuing backlash on 
American society.  Though Daniel’s parents are part of a thriving Jewish community, and 
though he recognizes everyone targeted as communists as also belonging to that 
community, the presence of anti-Semitism as recognized by Daniel is almost non-existent 
in the novel.  The Isaacsons (the novel’s name for the Rosenbergs) are victims of anti-
Communist hysteria. They are punished for their sympathies with worker’s movements 
and are presented by Doctorow as communists through and through—especially Daniel’s 
father, Paul.  Neither Daniel nor Doctorow seems to really know what to do with the 
story as a Jewish narrative, even though the communists in the novel all happen to be 
Jewish.   Even scholarship that sees the novel as working towards a kind of religious 
model, turning Daniel into a confessor, has trouble evoking Daniel within a Jewish, or 
even religious context.  Robert Dotweiler, in his analysis of the religious aspects of 
Dotorow’s novel, claims, for instance, that Daniel’s, “confession in this secularized 
environment has little to do overtly with religion” (70).  Dotweiler’s argument places 
Daniel’s narrative as a continuation of the biblical Daniel, an interpreter of dreams—but 
in this case, the power to divine mysteries is not a function of religious insight, but the 
character’s position within a unique political and cultural climate—first, the son of 
America’s enemies killed for their communism, and second, a member of the hippy 
counter-culture personally set against the government that betrayed his family.  The 
Issaacson’s as Jews is only a further mode of indicting them—the Jewish community of 




both their religion and their country.  Daniel’s only support comes from the community 
of people who share his parents’ subversive leanings. 
While The Book of Daniel criticizes the anti-Communist forces of America as fascist, 
it does so in terms of dialectical opposition to communism; they are indicted as fascists 
because they oppose the Communist’s attempts to help workers.  The depiction of 
fascism takes no account of the Isaacson’s Jewish ethnicity except in a scant few scenes 
in the novel.  The protesters who attack Paul Issaacson during the Paul Robeson concert 
incident in 1949 yell, “this will teach you, you commie bastard kikes!” (49). The 
comment is indicative of the role Jewish ethnicity plays in anti-Communist fervor:  they 
are persecuted for being communists, but assumed to be Jews, and since everyone on 
Daniel Isaacson’s bus is Jewish, the angry mob that attacks resembles anti-Semitic 
fascists.  There is no indictment of their violence for its resemblance to Nazism by 
Rochelle and Paul Issaacson, though, despite their deep criticism of the anti-Communist 
establishment.  Daniel himself makes mention of the connection between Nazism and 
anti-Communism only briefly: 
when it [the surveillance of the anti-Communist state] reaches us, like the prison
searchlight in the Nazi concentration camp, it will stop…And our blood will hurt 
as if it had glass in it.  And it will be hot in that beam and our house will smell 
and smoke and turn brown at the edges and flare up in a great, sucking floop of 
flame.  And that is exactly what happens. (108) 
 
Though Daniel Isaacson describes his parents’ arrest and execution as a second Holocaust 
in this passage and links it to an offense against his blood, the novel (true to its subject 
matter) shies away from making an indictment of America and its execution of the 
Rosenbergs on the grounds of anti-Semitism.  Daniel is much more likely, for instance, to 




Port Huron statement, he accuses America of equating Holden Caulfield with Che 
Guevara because both are equally living outside the America’s limited view of accept ble 
behavior.   
What accusations the novel makes about the American establishment as state funded 
racism come from an Abbie Hoffman-inspired character named Artie Sternlicht, ot 
Daniel (nor even his more radical sibling, Susan).  Artie doesn’t care about the 
resemblance between America and Nazi Germany in its treatment of the Isaacsons.  The 
appalling condition of America’s ghettoes is reason enough for his outcry.  
Because of The Book of Daniel’s concentration on communism and radicalism, it 
avoids the subject of America’s oppression of Jews during the Second Red Scare.  
Though, clearly, Doctorow recognizes that America’s prejudices against Communism are 
often motivated by assumptions it makes about Jewish politics, and though Doctorow 
himself depicts the communist community as entirely composed of Jews, the rhetoric of 
anti-Semitism is lost in what Douglas Fowler has called one of the novel’s many blind 
alleys (Fowler 53).  
This deliberate avoidance is fundamentally the result of Doctorow’s accurately 
treating the actual tenor of the postwar Red Scare.  Complications in depiction, l ke the 
strange way ethnic identity is always sublimated to political identity in The Book of 
Daniel, are demonstrative of America’s anti-communist policy precisely becaus  
America’s vision of communism in the late 40s and 50’s was guided by two 
irreconcilable principles.  The first was that communists, in being totalitari n, were like 
Nazis and were, therefore, anti-Semitic.  The other was the very same prejudice aga nst 




belief that Jews, because of their inability or unwillingness to assimilate, wer  naturally 
drawn towards radical politics.  The natural image of the communist for Americans, just 
as it had been for Nazi Germany (and much of the rest of the Western world), was built 
upon this prejudice against Jews often referred to as “The Jewish Problem” 65.  Because 
of these conflicting views, in their attempt to discover communists hiding in their midst, 
“Red Baiters” often singled out Jews as Communists and then accused them of having 
anti-Semitic tendencies so as to establish their communist sensibilities.  Because of the 
Jewish problem, Jews were prosecuted as communists, and because of totalitarianism, 
Jewish Communists were prosecuted as Nazis.  
Owing to this prejudice, the agencies themselves never appeared Nazi-like because 
their interrogations were conducted in a search for Communists and were thus part of a 
fight against anti-Semitic totalitarianism.  In fact, the relationship betwe n depiction and 
belief complicates this procedure beyond the point of culpability:  if HUAC’s 
investigators or the FBI, naturally thought of Jews when they thought of communists 
because of the way American culture caricatured communists, were their motivations 
inherently anti-Semitic when they brought people before the committee to give testimony 
or did they just think of themselves as investigating communists (who just happened to be 
Jewish)?  Were the rioters at Peekskill who shouted, “go back to Russia, nigger” and “go 
back to Russia, kike” racist or anti-Communist (“Paul Robeson”)?  Protesters were 
certainly inspired by Paul Robeson’s pro-communist sentiments but what, exactly, were 
they protesting against?  How should history remember the violence:  as a dark day for 




This subtle confusion of race for politics sublimated the actions taken against Jews 
during the Red Scare to an issue of national security against Communists and buried any 
possibility for interpreting McCarthyism as Jewish persecution.  It’s perfectly 
conceivable that many of those who persecuted Jews never recognized themselves as 
persecuting anyone as Jews.  Doctorow’s Daniel (even as late as 1971) certainly never 
makes the connection.  The sentiments of the fictional character seem indicative of the 
real world culture of Cold War America that the novel is attempting to critique.  
Because of America’s tendency to conflate Jews and Communists, however, any 
action taken against communists in the United States was likely to target Jews, 
consciously or not. When Roy Cohn, McCarthy’s chief prosecutor and a Jew, learned, for 
instance, that the engineers of Fort Monmouth had received legal council from B’nai 
B’rith, he seems beside himself in the transcript of the hearing:  ‘‘well, that is an 
outrageous assumption. I am a member and an officer of B’nai B’rith’’ (Historic Senate 
Hearings vol III 2175).  After the witness, Allen J. Lovenstein, explains to Cohn that of 
the sixteen defendants, fifteen were Jewish and one was married to a Jew, Cohn answers: 
“This is all news to me. I don’t know the religion of these people, and I don’t care. It 
doesn’t matter whether out of 530 people there are 530 Jews or Catholics or Protestants” 
(Historic Senate Hearings vol III 2176).     
Communists, conflated with Jews, were, however, still conflated with Nazis through 
an understanding of totalitarianism.  As such, the SPSI and Cohn routinely asked 
questions to establish the anti-Semitic attitudes of their witnesses, including witnesses of 
Jewish ethnicity.  In the SPSI interrogation of Sol Aurbach, for instance, Senator 




in the countries behind the Iron Curtain?  Do you approve of that?” (Executive Sessions 
volume II 10).  Aurbach’s interrogation is indicative of a general line of questions 
reserved for Jewish defendants concerning their feelings about Russia’s Jewish purges66.  
Their aim was to besmirch the defendants’ ethnicity by depicting them as having become 
apathetic concerning the plight of Soviet Jews due to their Communist affiliation.  
Many of these witnesses knew more about the subject than the party line allowed.  In 
William Marx Mandal’s testimony (he was a noted political scholar on Russia and Asia) 
the rebuff of communist anti-Semitism is quite pronounced:   
Senator JACKSON. What is your opinion of the anti-Semitism in the Soviet 
Union? 
Mr. MANDEL. Being a Jew, I have certain standards on the basis of which to 
judge that. I have never encountered an anti-Semitic government in history tha 
had a Jewish member of its cabinet. 
Mr. COHN. Who is the member of the Jewish Cabinet? 
Mr. MANDEL. Kaganovich, K-a-g-a-n-o-v-i-c-h. 
The CHAIRMAN (McCarthy). What is his position? 
Mr. MANDEL. He is one of the vice premiers, one of the members of the five 
inner cabinet under the present administration. 
Mr. COHN. I think Senator Jackson’s question was addressed to these purges. Do 
you approve of the anti-Semitic purges? 
Mr. MANDEL. I think that is utter nonsense. 
Mr. COHN. That is just counter-revolutionary propaganda? 
Mr. MANDEL. It is not counter-revolutionary propaganda. It is nonsense. I went 
down and bought a copy of True, Soviet Labor party. I bought copies of Pravda at 
the library next to the main public library on 42nd Street. Four days after this 
thing happened, that comes over by air mail, when our post office doesn’t stop it.  
And on the same front page of the same paper which presented the indictment of 
these physicians, there was an announcement of the meeting the previous evening 
of the committee of Judges for Stalin prize awards in the literature and science for 
this coming year.  Among the eleven judges are two men who are well-known to 
be Jewish. 
Mr. COHN. And that is that? 
Mr. MANDEL. And many similar things. If you want a lecture for an hour and a 
half, I would be glad to give it to you.  
 
Interestingly, William Mandel’s complaint against the government that interrogates him 




events and government of communist Russia, and second, by evoking Pravda and the fact 
that the U.S. Postal service stops the magazine’s distribution, they are engged in the 
very same kind of censure that is part of their own indictment of communism as 
totalitarianism.  It is difficult to read Mandel’s assertion that he has “never encountered 
an anti-Semitic government in history that had a Jewish member of its cabinet—wh her 
it is a slight at Roy Cohn, or whether he means the phrase without irony, and simply does 
not recognize SPSI as a tool for anti-Semitic oppression. 
Questions regarding opinions about the Russian purges represented a line of 
interrogation uniquely reserved for Jewish defendants, but for the SPSI, any activit that 
bespoke a prejudice against Jews was immediate grounds for suspicion of communist 
sympathies— whatever the defendant’s ethnicity.  Against Alfred Puhan, then program 
manager for “Voice of America,” the SPSI makes a case for communist sympathies based 
on Puhan’s cutting off of the Hebrew Language Service in his agency.  Cohn asks: 
If you cut off Hebrew Language Service, you are not only cutting off the Jewish 
language service to Israel, but to Jews all over the world. Because is it not a fact 
that the platters and broadcasts going to Israel were also used as a basis for 
broadcasts to other Hebrew areas throughout the world?” (644) 
 
During their interrogation (presumably to discover Puhan’s communist sensibilities), the 
SPSI never accused him of anything but cutting service to Hebrew speakers.  Essentially, 
even if Puhan had deliberately cut this service (which he didn’t), and they had proved that 
Puhan was anti-Semitic (which they didn’t), they would have proved nothing about his 
communist sensibilities at all.  For the SPSI, however, Puhan’s anti-Semitism would have 
meant his communism and vise versa.   
Interestingly enough, Puhan is exonerated before the committee because of the SPSI’s 




home to a large number of communists (according to the committee).  After this baseless 
assertion, the committee finds it reasonable that Puhan should have ended translation of 
the broadcast into Hebrew so as to help stop the spread of coded messages to Israeli 
communists.  It is unclear, from the transcripts, why the committee suddenly deme  
Israel a potential communist threat, whether they have unspoken grounds for their 
allegations (such as the domination of Israel’s labor party in that country’s national 
politics) or whether they simply believed that Israel, as a Jewish nation, was naturally 
vulnerable to communism, for instance.  It was immaterial to the committee, finally, th t 
Puhan had only been following directions from a superior who had been forced to cut the 
program due to a lack of funds, that Puhan’s responsibility was only in putting that order 
into practice, or that cutting Hebrew translation of V ice of America didn’t, one way or 
the other, have any bearing on Puhan’s communism unless the conflation of Communism 
and Nazism had become so native to American thinking that it had begun to guide 
domestic policy.   
McCarthy’s assignment of Roy Cohn to the position of his chief counsel may have 
been a case of ethnic tokenism meant to defuse allegations of anti-Semitism in the 
practice of red baiting (a tactic which some biographers attribute to Cohn himself), or he 
may have become part of McCarthy’s investigative committee based on his work with the 
prosecution against the Rosenbergs and, earlier, Alger Hiss67.  Whatever the reason for 
his dramatic rise, once put into position with the Senate subcommittee, Cohn turned out 
to be a wunderkind at McCarthyian interrogation tactics.  
With the introduction of a Jewish interrogator, the methods of McCarthy’s 




homosexual, and anti-woman) as those practiced by HUAC where there was no 
significant Jewish presence on the investigative board.  To charges of anti-Semitism, Roy 
Cohn commonly answered for the SPSI by saying that it wouldn’t matter to him if 
suspects were Jewish, or Catholic or Protestant…even though the testimony collected by 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations indicates a tendency to single out 
minority groups for harassment, especially Jews and homosexuals.   
For many Cold War historians, the inordinate number of Jews called before the House 
Un-American Activities Committee (the House of Representative’s morepublicized 
version of SPSI) to present testimony is simply incidental or related to the hig  
percentage of Jews working in the entertainment industry at the time of the 
investigations68.  Those accused had their careers ruined for accusations (often false) 
concerning their political affiliations in America where the right to one’s political 
opinions are supposed to be guaranteed by law.  Because of this injustice, the fact that the 
majority of HUAC’s targets were Jews is sublimated to the greater issue of HUAC’s 
flagrant disregard for the basic tenets of a democratic society.   
Even in histories devoted to chronicling American anti-Semitism, the persecution 
signified by HUAC or McCarthyism in general against Jews simply isn’t discussed.  
According to most historians, there was nothing particularly anti-Semitic about the 
postwar Red Scare.  Many historical volumes describe American sentiments and actions 
taken against Jewish immigrants and communities before WWII, but few exist to 
describe anti-Semitism in the Fifties.  In The Jewish Threat (2000), for instance, only two 
of eleven chapters are given over to describe anti-Semitism in the postwar United States 




Tarnished Dream (1979) only covers anti-Semitism up until the late 1920s.  The sixth 
volume (“Anti-Semitism in America”) of The American Jewish Historical Society’s 
American Jewish History Series has only one entry out of 38 that dates into the 80s 
(1980), one that covers the 70s, and only one that specifically covers the 60s.  The 
volume does not mention the House Un-American Activities Committee, its entry on 
Joseph McCarthy suggests that he was a supporter of American Jews, and the history 
suggests ultimately, that the anti-communist movement was supportive of Jew/Gentile 
relations. 
Because of his influence in defining American domestic policy, McCarthy himself 
did not (or perhaps could not) provoke analogy.  To accuse McCarthy of acting like a 
Nazi would have required that America ignore the differentiation it routinely used to 
sublimate differences between democracy and totalitarianism—a differentiation upon 
which also depended America’s self image as a virtuous nation whose racial prejudices 
radically different from those held by the Nazis.  Obviously, the immunity afforded 
McCarthyism is evidence of the Cold War relationship between American nationalism 
and the deployment of Nazi analogies; censuring America’s enemies required reference 
to Nazism, but McCarthy, once his reputation fell, was censured through the metaphor of 
th  e witch hunt.   
The picture painted, by scholarship at least, is that widespread anti-Semitism all but 
ends with the Second World War.  America had learned from the lesson of Hitler’s 
Germany to be, at least, civil to its Jewish population.  Even Holocaust historians face the 
central question of why the decades of the Fifties and Sixties in America have trouble 




worldwide Jewish consciousness.  The view of Jewish American cultural history most 
often relied upon is that Jews projected an unnamed ambivalence towards their suffering 
due to a need to assimilate69. According to Hilene Flanzbaum, “For American Jews to 
identify with the Holocaust would have meant a substantial reversal; they would first 
have had to extract themselves from the well-blended composite of American identity 
into which they had seemingly melted” (20). The discourse of Jews as Jews, Jews as 
victims, or Jewish suffering in relation to public policy has a historical blind spot starting 
in 1947 and continuing until 1961 without explanation for the omission.  Certainly 
America did not suddenly find itself cured of the anti-Semitism which seemed 
pathological in The Authoritarian Personality. HUAC, SPSI, anti-communism, and the 
inherent anti-Semitism of red baiting present a context for that historical blind spot:  it 
was not safe to appear Jewish in America lest one risk being singled out by the state as a 
communist and punished as a Nazi.  The need to assimilate for safety was more than just
a holdover reaction to Hitler’s Germany.  Nor was it safe, if called to testify, to mention 
anti-Semitism before a committee that was sensitive about its public imageand which 
recognized such accusations as a communist trick.   
The abundance of Jewish witnesses forced to give testimony (and whose careers we  
subsequently ended), the predilection of the McCarthyist tribunals for accusing Jews of 
anti-Semitism, and the complete lack of any mention of anti-Semitism related to he 
McCarthy hearings or the House UnAmerican hearings is to say the least odd. If the 
practice of accusing people of acting like Nazis was already in place (as clearly it must 
have been if anti-Semitism had become a telling symptom of communism), then the fact




to round up and harass Jews is worthy of note.  It is even more interesting that in the 
years since, history has made no charge of anti-Semitism against McCarthy or his forces: 
despite the preponderance of Jews as victims of the Red Scare, the Red Scare has nothing 
to do with America’s treatment of its Jews.   
Ultimately, what this lack of Nazi analogy to the Red Scare suggests is that the ability 
to make the charge of being like the Nazis rested firmly in the hands of dominant 
American culture which held itself to be opposite of totalitarianism, and therefor , 
Nazism.  McCarthy could be (and was) critiqued through the analogy of the witch hunt 
(sadly, a very American metaphor), but for McCarthyists to have been compared to Nazis 
in American popular culture would have undermined anti-Communism and the national 
values upon which the Cold War was built.  If McCarthy was like a Nazi in his fight 
against communism, then communists couldn’t be portrayed as resembling Nazis and 
America could not validate its fight against communism through its defeat of Nazism.  
Again, none of this was particularly conscious; in popular culture, America had been 
charged with the job of defending the world against totalitarianism.  America’s heroism 
as well as its enemies were defined and had taken their roles:  its communist enemies 
could be like Nazis, its anti-communist forces simply and definitively could not. 
While Holocaust and Cold War historians are reluctant to mention Jewish and anti-
Jewish sentiments in the Fifties, the actual historical records of those involved in 
McCarthyism and those who were called to testify tell a different tale. Of the Hollywood 
Ten (called before HUAC in 1947), for instance, five were Jews as were over a third of 




blacklisted). President Truman, in a memo written to himself, said of Herbert Hoover’s 
FBI, “we want no Gestapo or Secret Police.  FBI is tending in that direction” (Kiel 62).   
According to Alexander Stephan, prominent emigrants who had fled Nazi Germany 
were put under surveillance by numerous intelligence agencies, especially the FBI.  
Stephan’s work, Communazis:  FBI Surveillance of German Emigé Writers, though 
comprehensive, seems to miss an integral point in that the political oppression which 
forced many of the Germans to flee Nazi Germany was a reaction to their Jewish ethnic 
background70.  Herbert Hoover ordered surveillance for Jews who had become prominent 
members of America’s cultural community, and then handed all of that information off to 
Joe McCarthy to power his Red Scare.  Federal investigators brought before th  SPSI 
commonly confused Jewish meetings, civil rights meetings, and communist meetings.  
Undercover FBI investigator Joseph Mazei goes so far as to indicate to the SPSI that the 
Jewish Community Center in Pittsburgh was a training ground for communist saboteurs 
(“Historical Senate Hearings,” Volume V 452). 
Critiques of the practices of the anti-communist community were rare at the time of 
the Red Scare both because of the ensuing national hysteria caused by media coverage 
which made it seem as though anyone could be a communist, but also because much of 
the testimony given to the committee was neither actively made public or given clearance 
that would have allowed the public to investigate on their own71.  Thus, though the state 
was spying on Jews, hauling them from their homes, putting them before the nation’s 
leaders, questioning their citizenship, sending them off to prison, deporting them72, and in 
the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executing them, McCarthyism never took on the 




therefore more public, often cited the committee as a threat to freedom of speech, but it 
was rare indeed for the critics of J. Edgar Hoover, Joseph McCarthy, and HUAC to trace 
out similarities to Nazi Germany (Truman only made the connection in that memo to 
himself)—similarities which should have been fairly apparent.   
But if nowhere in the mass media of the McCarthy era were parallels drawn bet een 
the various institutions of McCarthyism and Nazi Germany, the rhetoric existed on the 
floor of the House of Representatives and in front of the SPSI itself.  Many of those 
forced to defend themselves before congressional committees and sub-committees voiced 
their belief that they were singled out, not only as possible communists, but also as Jews.   
When American actor Lionel Stander was called before the committee for his testimony 
in 1953, he began his statement: 
I know of a group of fanatics who are desperately trying to undermine the 
Constitution of the United States by depriving artists and others of Life, Liberty, 
and the Pursuit of Happiness without due process of law.... I can tell names and 
cite instances and I am one of the first victims of it.... [This is] a group of ex-
Fascists and America-Firsters and anti-Semites, people who hate everybody 
including Negroes, minority groups and most likely themselves.... [T]hese people 
are engaged in a conspiracy outside all the legal processes to undermine the very
fundamental American concepts upon which our entire system of democracy 
exists. (Belton 202) 
 
Stander’s indictment of those who interrogated him pointed out his concerns about the 
committee itself; they were Nazis in congressional garb73. 
In reference to his prolonged stay in Russia, Langston Hughes appeared before the 
SPSI on March 24th of 1953 to explain his visits to Russia and to answer charges of his 
either being a communist or having communist sensibilities.  During this interrogation, 
Hughes was accused by Roy Cohn of having anti-Semitic sensibilities evidenced by his 




Mr. COHN. We have an awful lot of your writings we want to go over. Just let me 
ask you about this one thing here. You are concerned about minority rights in this 
country, is that right? 
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, I am. 
Mr. COHN. You are concerned about the rights of Jews as well as the rights of 
Negroes? 
Mr. HUGHES. Yes. 
Mr. COHN. Did you write a poem called ‘‘Hard Luck’’? ‘‘When hard luck 
overtakes you, nothing to offer, nothing for you to do, When hard luck overtakes 
you, nothing to offer, nothing to do, Gather up your fine clothes and sell them to 
the Jew.’’ Did you write that? (United States Senate volume 2, 993) 
 
The accusation is troubling because, of course, Hughes was not called before the SPSI to 
answer charges of racism, but communism.  Nonetheless, he was forced by a Jewish 
interrogator to answer charges of anti-Semitism which would have had the effect of 
branding him a Communist—not because of communist sensibilities but because of his 
attitude towards Jews. 
If the subcommittee’s charge was racism, then the irony is, of course, even mor  
troubling: Hughes’s appearance before the committee had as much to do with his raceas 
anything else, and especially his role as a prominent artist within the African American 
community.  Hughes didn’t, after all, work for the State Department.  His work was being 
used as an example of American Culture abroad in a campaign to show foreign nations 
that America respected the contributions of its African American citizens—that it was 
proud of their achievements and open to their value as citizens.  American embassies 
proudly displayed volumes of Hughes’s poetry in their libraries.  As a result, he fell under 
the jurisdiction of McCarthy and Cohn and had to stand trial for being a racist and a 
communist. 
McCarthy’s harassment of Hughes acts as an example of the methods employed by 




minority rights and other political issues supported outside mainstream culture.  D ing 
Hughes’s hearing, the poem “Hard Luck” was made to seem equally damning by the 
SPSI as more obvious communism-inspired poetry like “Goodbye Christ,” “The Ballad 
of Lenin” and “Put One ‘S’ in USA.”  It is clear from the particular poems and lines of 
poetry concentrated on by the SPSI that the committee was not solely concerned with 
Hughes as a communist.   
“Hard Luck” is written by Hughes in the style of a blues song, with lines repeating 
over and over again.  In essence, it tells the story of a man who is down on his luck; he 
takes his clothes, sells them to a Jew, uses the money to buy whisky, and then bemoans 
his condition which he recognizes as lower than a mule’s.  The poem is fairly simple and 
absolutely bereft of communist, or any other political sentiments, whatsoever.  There is 
simply no reason for the SPSI to have brought it up, and certainly no reason to bring it up 
along with poems like “Put One More S in U.S.A.” which includes lines like:   
But we can’t win by just talking. 
So let us take things in our hand.   
Then down and away with the bosses’ sway— 
Hail Communistic land. 
So stand up in battle and wave our flag on high,  
And shout out fellow workers 
Our new slogan in the sky: 
Put one more S in the U.S.A. (Hughes 238).  
 
If Cohn’s goal was to indict Hughes as a communist, he could easily have concentrated 
on this poem with its obvious implications, or on any of a number of poems with equally 
open Communistic sentiments.  In “The Ballad of Lenin,” Hughes writes:  Comrade 
Lenin of Russia/ Speaks from the marble:/  On guard with the workers forever--/ The 




“Hard Luck” to indict Hughes is a sign that the SPSI had other intentions than simply 
revealing communists when calling their witnesses forward. 
By fueling accusations against Hughes through poems critiquing the relationship 
between African Americans and the Jewish American community, the SPSI wanted to 
condemn him as an anti-religious hypocrite.  The hearing served to accuse Hughes of 
being flippant about minority rights because his poetry, one poem to be exact, suggested 
that he didn’t care about Jews.  Thus, Hughes, as an advocate for minority rights, was 
undermined by the SPSI as an anti-Semite, and through him, the issue of minority rights 
dismissed as being supported by communists whose own interests in minority rights were 
only a hypocritical cover for communist indoctrination. 
Because the injustices committed against America’s minorities were committed under 
the guise of anti-communism America could oppress its minority groups without inviting 
comparisons between the racist attitudes of Nazi Germany and the racism tolerated by the 
government of the United States.  This contextualizing of racism (and the removal of race 
from that narrative) ultimately proved necessary because culturally, in a segregated 
America, the presence of racial prejudice was simply too obvious to avoid.  Both before
and during the war, the Nazi propaganda machine had struck its chords against America’s 
own racist attitudes as a demonstration of America’s hypocrisy.  According to Michael 
Birdwell, “The Fuhrer declared that Americans had no right to criticize the Reich or its 
racial policies because the United States practiced similar discriminatory acts” (14).  
After the war and the images of the camps, the United States simply could not appear 
racist, either to itself or to other members of the global community for whom its 




The subject of racism, however, did not simply go away, and as McCarthyism waned
and issues of race gained national attention, the guise of anti-communism increasingly 
failed to conceal the nation’s injustices.  National narratives began to develop from the 
nation’s counter-cultures which accentuated the commonalities between America and the 
totalitarian regimes it claimed as its adversaries.  Their goal was not to show Americans 
acting badly or unjustly, but to repudiate them for acting like Nazis.  The reminder, it was 
hoped, would correct the nation’s ill treatment of its ethnic minorities.   
The analogies to Nazism being made by civil groups and advocates continued from a 
narrative concerning the war and Hitler that had been quelled, temporarily, by the anti-
Communist movement.  Whereas the mass media surrounding camp liberation had 
inadvertently confused the image of Nazism and modified its racist connotation (by 
overemphasizing the political and national identity of the victims of the Nazis’ crimes as 
well as their imperial motivation), for many Americans, especially Americans from 
minority groups, the main evil of Hitler, and therefore, the reason we had gone to war in 
the first place, was to attack a nation which epitomized state-sanctioned racism.  As Joe 
Louis supposedly once said, “There may be a whole lot wrong with America, but there’s
nothing that Hitler can fix” (Carson 36).  Langston Hughes (in 1943, nearly a decade 
before being interrogated by the SPSI) described America as a place wher  things were 
getting better for African Americans, and was, therefore, a place worth defending by 
African Americans: 
This segment [America’s racists], however, is not all of America.  If it were, 
millions of Negroes would have no heart for this war in which we are now 
engaged.  If it were, we could see no difference between our ideals and Hitler’s, in 
so far as our own dark lives are concerned.  But we know, on the other hand, that 




The hope of World War II entertained by groups who had seen America’s own 
essentialist attitudes, especially its attitude of white supremacy, as predominately 
dystopian prewar, was that the nation’s encounter with the Nazis would force America to 
recognize the faults inherent to dealing with its minority populations through the lens of 
traditional power structures and definitions.  Postwar, as racism and oppression continued 
to flourish, the entrenchment of Cold War America’s racism began to become more 
apparent even when sublimated in the rhetoric of anti-Communism and especially when 
the political machine of the Second Red Scare began to fall apart with the downfall of Joe 
McCarthy after the infamous Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954 in which Joseph 
McCarthy’s tactics came under public scrutiny resulting in the senator’s censure.   
When the resistance to change its racist attitudes became apparent, it caused deep 
tension between proponents of racist American structures, advocates for civil rights, 
advocates for the fight against communism, and the increasing momentum building 
behind the movement for minority rights in institutions like the Supreme Court and the 
White House.  As Kenneth B. Clark pointed out in 1966: 
The competitive struggle between world Communism and the American concept 
of democracy demanded an American response to this embarrassing and easily 
exploited violation of democratic ideals.  America risked standing before the 
world as a hypocrite or resting its claims for leadership on might alone, 
subordinating any democratic ideological basis of appeal.  The international 
struggle for the first time clearly placed racists on the defensive, in grave danger 
of being classed as subversives in their threat to America’s ideological power. 
(272) 
 
As issues of race were forced to the surface, first through the failures of McCarthyism 
and second, by decisions of American lawmakers which granted greater rights to 
America’s ethnic minorities, they demanded redress and critique from those who began 




enemies.  At the same time, these issues of race required their being defined by racist 
America in such a way that segregation and its supporters did not appear anti-democratic 
(and therefore, fascist).  Often, this tension manifested as a rhetorical fight between civil 
rights advocates on one side and racists on the other with the former group attempting to 
remind the latter that such attitudes were reminiscent of Nazi Germany and with the latter 
group accusing the former, as Cohn had Hughes, of being communists or socialists 
(implying, as well, Nazism through a totalitarian designation). 
 Civil rights advocate Ben H. Bagdikian, for instance, in his article “We Went 
South:  October 1957” wrote: 
While Hitler’s 1935 Nuremberg marriage laws defined “a Jew” as “anyone who 
descended from at least three grandparents who were racially Jews…” the racial 
laws of some Southern states make the Nuremberg edict sound like wild 
liberalism.  In Alabama, a “negro” is defined as “a person of mixed blood 
descended on the part of the father or mother from negro ancestry without 
reference to or limit of time or number of generation removed. (Carson 395) 
 
By citing the Nuremberg Code, Bagdikian recognizes that, as racist as the Nazis had 
been, Alabama was worse.   
What Bagdikian finds truly disconcerting about the laws in Southern states is not, or
not just, that they are unfair or ridiculous, but that they are more unfair and ridiculous 
than America’s measurement for oppression:  Nazi Germany.  The state had employed 
Nazis in its metaphor for the danger of un-American dissidents and the dissidents 
responded by using Nazis in their metaphor for the dangers of the American state.  The 
use of Nazism for ethical comparison was becoming increasingly universal in political 
language outside the auspice of the American government. 
Universality, however, produces problems.  In general, situations that were made 




Howard Griffin, in Black Like Me (1961) assessed the experience of being black in 
America, his goal was to get closer to the subject and to become the people he studied.  A 
comparison to Nazi Germany in such an experiment would be totally out of place.  It 
leads in the exact opposite direction of Griffin’s intended goal.  Rather than his trying to 
give the black perspective as if he were black, it ends up having the effect of his giving 
the black perspective as it would be were he a Jew in Nazi Germany.   
In the heat of his description, however, Griffin naturally falls back on just this 
kind of analogy:  
What do we fear?  I could not say exactly.  It was unlikely the Klan would 
come riding down on us.  We merely fell into the fear that hangs over the 
state, a nameless and awful thing.  It reminded me of the nagging, 
focusless terror we felt in Europe when Hitler began his marches, the 
terror of talking with Jews (and our deep shame of it).  (Griffin 72)   
 
Griffin’s prose certainly does not require stilting so as to convey the horrors of racism.  
When one reads passages such as, “The white boys would race through too fast. They 
would see a man or a boy or a woman alone somewhere along the street and the lust to 
beat or to kill would flood into them.  Some frightful thing had to climax this accelerating 
madness,” there is no need for a reference to Nazism to see the inherent terror in the 
situation as it is described (Griffin 70).  Part of the success of Black Like Me is the beat-
like elegance of Griffin’s language.  Up until the point where he mentions Hitler and the 
Nazis, he had described in powerful detail taking a bus from New Orleans to Hattiesburg, 
Mississippi, being forced to stay on the bus during the bathroom stop, having to find a 
friendly place so as to get himself off the street, and the horror of a neighborhood where, 
at any moment, a truckload of white men might arrived with a desire to do harm against  




Mississippi, as described by Griffin, is terrible all in and of itself.  Yet, Griffin falls back 
on the comparison to Germany, if not out of necessity, then out of rote validation.  
Reference to Hitler is necessary because it is the language of American political culture’s 
condemnation.  The invective depends upon the comparison for the degree of moral 
outrage which it implies. 
 Perhaps the most famous of all civil rights advocates, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
wrote concerning his resistance to state laws, in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” 
“We should never forget that everything that Adolf Hitler did in Germany was “legal” 
and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was “illegal.” It was 
“illegal” to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler’s Germany” (Young 337).  With the powerful 
rhetoric of King, the analogy to Nazism becomes a rebuke—a reminder to his critics that 
laws do not have ultimate authority which belongs, instead, to the human conscience.  
Laws, particularly the laws of the Nazis, may actually be used to defend iniquity instead 
of justice.  In that same letter, King goes on to say:   
How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust?  A just law is a man-
made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God.  An unjust law is a 
code that is out of harmony with the moral law.  To put in the terms of St. Thomas 
Aquinas:  An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and 
natural law.  Any law that uplifts human personality is just.  Any law that 
degrades human personality is unjust. (336) 
 
In his attempt to separate one kind of law, the just, from the other, the unjust, King 
illustrates the necessary difficulty in differentiating between the essential and the context 
dependent.  The law is just if it “uplifts human personality,” but such is obviously 
dependent on the context of the particular human—segregation uplifts the personality of 
the bigot after all, but it is not just.  Thus, the law must appeal to a higher authority, some 




“natural law”—but those two are open to interpretation.  This is not a failure on King’s 
part.  His rhetoric here is devoted to reminding his readers of eternal values and 
otherworldly standards against which segregation cannot hold.  It’s the rhetoric of Paul 
the apostle, not of Hegel the dialectician.  Nonetheless, for those who find themselves 
predisposed to a real world example of the unjust law against which to measure other 
laws, King offers an example.  Not surprisingly, he cites Nazi Germany. 
King’s position exemplifies the rhetoric of civil rights in its capacity to expose 
injustice. The assumption underlying “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” or Black Like Me 
is that if racist Americans were simply forced to confront the similarities between their 
own thinking and the thinking of Nazis they would realize that their racism was 
intolerable.  It worked to a certain degree, but failed in important points.  Civil rights 
laws were passed, but often those who attempted to act under the protection of those laws 
were violently abused or murdered.   
What did it matter of the South’s voter registration laws were repealed if those who 
went to Mississippi to register African Americans to vote were murdered without 
repudiation?  It meant that, despite the acknowledgment of the Federal Government that 
the laws of the South were unjust, there was still not acknowledgment by racists in 
America that there attitudes were in need of change.  Moreover, as the Federal 
government refused to intervene to uphold its laws, it meant that the laws existed on 
book, but not in the streets.  The result was a growing uneasiness with dominant power 
structures and an increased skepticism concerning the mechanisms of civil rights activists 
like King.  Part of this uneasiness manifested in a change in the Nazi metaphor—it did 




the point of view of those who saw civil rights as ineffectual, racist Americans didn’t 
seem to care that they were acting like Nazis. 
In his examination of ghettoization in the American north in “The Harlem Ghetto,” 
James Baldwin argues against the validity of Nazism as a means of ethicalcomparison by 
setting it against its standard cultural usage.  He harangues those who required a 
reference to Nazism in order to see the iniquity of the situation under their consideration.  
In doing so, he makes an argument against essentialist validation by endorsing a morality
totally dependent on context and examined on a case-by-case basis.   
If Bagdikian’s depiction of African American life in the American South had clearly 
made the comparison to the experiences of Jews in Nazi Germany; Baldwin’s sentiment 
is comparable for African Americans in the North.  However, by divorcing the issues 
Baldwin criticized the northern white community for its dissociation from the issue  of 
civil rights because of the feeling that the situation in the northern states ws not as bad 
as it was in the southern states.  The injustice is unconscionable, he argues, no matter if it 
is incomparable; it should be protested on its own basis. “Even if Birmingham is worse, 
no doubt Johannesburg, South Africa, beats it by several miles, and Buchenwald was one 
of the worst things that ever happened in the entire history of the world” (Baldwin 69).  
The situation in the North is not comparable to Buchenwald, but it is still bad.  Moreover, 
as Buchenwald is one of the worst things, marking it as an ethical pole, nothing will ever 
be comparable to Buchenwald. A society can still be cruel, unjust, or ridiculous on its 
own merits.  
Baldwin’s writing describes an anti-essentialist, context dependent point of view. His 




and structures for meaning, but which do not create truth.  In his essay on Stowe and 
Wright, “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” Baldwin writes:  
But that battered word, truth, having made its appearance here, confronts one 
immediately with a series of riddles and has, moreover, since so many gospels are 
preached, the unfortunate tendency to make one belligerent.  Let us say, then, that 
truth, as used here, is meant to imply a devotion to the human being, his freedom 
for fulfillment; freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be 
charted.  This is the prime concern, the frame of reference; it is not to be confused 
with devotion to Humanity which is too easily equated with a devotion to a 
Cause; and Causes, as we know, are nutritiously blood-thirsty. (15) 
 
The message is clear enough even before he begins to link up certain characteristics to 
their sentimental, essentialist definition by capitalization.  Truth depends.  It epends on 
situations, it depends on relationships, and it is never the same between people and 
between experiences.  In the terms Baldwin, here, describes, the Nazis, in believing in a 
Cause, created one of the worst things ever:  Buchenwald.  Thus, belief in a Cause, with a 
capital C, is the real danger. 
Baldwin’s examples of Johannesburg and Buchenwald, however, show the same logic 
underpinning the kind of comparison made by Griffin, Bragdikian, and King.  
Johannesburg, South Africa is a natural extension of his argument because he is 
discussing racism against Africans.  He might also have talked about the Herero g nocide 
or the atrocities committed by the Belgians in the Congo, or any number of other foreign 
examples of violence against Africans (Mussollini in Ethiopia provided a more cogent 
example than Hitler), but it is still a freedom (or lack of freedom) that can be legislated, a 
fulfillment (or total absence of fulfillment) that can be charted.   
The reference to Buchenwald, then, is entirely alien to the argument.  It isn’t
obviously part of the frame of reference for African Americans living in the North at all 




but their essentialist counterparts (Oppression and Racism with capital letters).  
Buchenwald is summoned precisely because it is an epitome, an iniquity that can be 
charted as “one of the worst things.”  Thus Baldwin marks Nazism as an ethical
benchmark utilized even in his argument against ethical benchmarks.  Even for an author 
who sees the search for the contextualized truth as the novelist’s primary concern, 
Buchenwald is singled out as a place that epitomizes inhumanity.  
Baldwin argues against appeals to essential values by anticipating and countering the 
essentialist position as a counter-argument, but the anticipation implies that he already
knows how an essential value will work against his argument. His allowance for an 
ethical epitome, by making reference to Buchenwald, means that he, too, at least 
understands Nazism as an evil (perhaps the only evil) independent of context.  At the 
same time, he recognizes that a belief in essential value endangers the chance for change 
in America’s attitude towards race.  He is attacking all belief in essential value, save the 
kind that makes Buchenwald “one of the worst things,” because Buchenwald is a 
landmark for injustice.   
Moreover, Baldwin knows that his audience will accept the logic of his argument and 
not deem his seemingly innocuous inclusion of Buchenwald as paradoxical to his 
rhetoric.  In fact, the use of Buchenwald as an example acts as validation for an argument 
in which its embedding is unneeded complication.  As the epitome of racism, 
Buchenwald, and by extension Nazism, is always appropriate, even in arguments agai st 
essentialism and epitome.  Baldwin’s argument, made in the early 60s, anticipates the 
kind of argument that will soon become the prominent rhetoric of context dependency, as 




also anticipates the problem with this context dependent rhetoric:  the need to appeal to 
an essential value for validation to keep it from slipping into pure babble. 
The point, here, is not to provide a history of racism in America from Red Scare to 
Civil Rights to the Black Power movement.   Rather I mean to point out the consistency 
of the rhetoric between these disparate groups and conflicting viewpoints. As King, for 
instance, attacks Southern laws through the analogy of Nazism, King himself is attacked 
through that same analogy.  Kenneth B. Clark, for instance, wrote of the civil rights
movement and its policy of non-violent protest, “The willingness of an oppressed people 
to protest and suffer, passively or assertively, without bitterness or with ‘love for the 
oppressors’ seems to have influence only where the conscience of the majority of the 
society can be reached.  In Hitler’s Germany the Jews suffered nonviolently without 
stirring Nazi repentance” (Young 287).  Again, Hitler is the measure of injustice.  
Writing in 1967 of the Watts riots, Andrew Kopkind writes, “The ‘power structures’ of 
the Mississippi Delta may have trembled when they heard ‘Aint Gonna Let Nobody Turn 
Me ‘Round,’ but the one in Cook County was unmoved.  It had better weapons: an anti-
poverty program, an Uncle Tom congressman, available jobs, and huge stores of 
tolerance.  When that failed, as it did, there were armies of police and soldiers prepared 
for final solutions” (300).  Where King attempts to remind American racists of the 
similarities between their laws and those of the Nazis, Kopkind drops the repudiation 
through example and makes the statement an equivalence:  the attitude of dominant white 
America is Nazism.  Reminding Americans that they are acting like Nazis for advocates 




to be reminded that theirs is a fight against fascist oppression, the very same kind that le
to the camps. 
These anti-fascist sentiments are suffused throughout the speeches and manifestos of 
the Black Power movement and are central to the basic tenets upon which the Black 
Power movement was founded.  Stokely Carmichael, a protégée of Martin Luther King, 
Jr, and chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), coined the 
phrase Black Power in 1966 to designate a kind of resistance to oppression alternative to 
the passive resistance preached by Reverend King.   In a speech given at U.C. Berkeley 
later in the same year as the phrase’s introduction he explained the need for Black Power 
as self liberation to a crowd of students and social activists.  During that speech, h  
employed Nazism to describe the unlikelihood of white America to recognize its own 
racism and, therefore, the need for African Americans to force the change themslves.  
According to Stokely: 
 Any of the Nazi prisoners who admitted, after he was caught and incarcerated, 
that he committed crimes, that he killed all the many people that he killed, he 
committed suicide. The only ones who were able to stay alive were the ones who 
never admitted that they committed a crime against people - that is, the ones who 
rationalized that Jews were not human beings and deserved to be killed, or that 
they were only following orders. (Say It Plain) 
 
Stokely’s argument is explanation of the ambivalence of white Americans who cannot, 
like the Nazis, admit to their racist crimes or else risk their own self-definition as 
virtuous. If they admit to the appalling condition of African Americans in the United 
States then they will have to simultaneously admit to their own wrong doing—deeds so 
horrible that acknowledging them will necessitate suicide to escape the guilt.  
Stokely’s sentiments are mirrored among other African Americans who began to tire 




social conditions of African Americans.  Leroi Jones, who changed his name later to 
Amiri Baraka, offered in his 1964 essay “the last days of the American empire (including 
some instructions for black people)”: 
You know what ‘Germans’ still means.  First of all, now, it means liar.  No matter 
what the man can tell you, e.g., ‘I was head of the anti-Nazi forces, etc., etc.,’ the 
word “German” is sufficient to give any story the shakes.  What you will say. 
What…are you talking about…aren’t you a German?  And that’s the end of that.  In a 
few years, ‘American’ will have that connotation, for the rest of the world. (194) 
 
Jones’s point here is that the culpability of America as a nation will extend to its 
individuals, that they will be unable to excuse their individual action because of the 
inequities committed by the nation to which they belong and that it will be impossible for 
white Americans to differentiate themselves from other white Americans who oppress, 
segregate, lynch, and otherwise treat the African American community with violence.  
The model for this inevitable association is Nazi Germany—thus, the Germans cannot
claim to be outside of national responsibility for the horrible crimes there, and white 
Americans will not be able to claim individual responsibility for crimes committed 
against African Americans in the United States.  Why Nazi Germany?  Becaus  the 
crimes committed there are equivalent, according to Jones, to the crimes committed in 
America. 
The employment of Nazism by the civil rights and, later, Black Power movements 
was a continuation of a process that had been ongoing in American culture since the end 
of the Second World War.  It is dangerously compelling to think that Nazism, as 
implying homicidal racism, had finally come to the fore when used by Carmichael, t t 
the previous implications of Nazism as communism, authoritarianism, global 




Stokely Carmichael, Angela Davis, Huey Newton, or Leroi Jones /Amiri Baraka were 
righting the mistakes of twenty years of bad argument through analogy, or that Nazism 
belonged to arguments about race relations and that its mismanagement was simply the 
result of its being used in appropriate arguments. This is simply not the case.  
Employment of the Nazi analogy was used in arguments about racial politics fr the 
same reason that it had been used in other political arguments:  it was the only available 
metaphor for evil which was recognizable in mass culture and, therefore, the only viable 
symbol of evil against which an entire culture could rally.  It continued, however, to carry 
the same connotations and imply the same logical problems when it was used by Black 
Power revolutionaries and Black nationalists as it had when it had been used to sell Korea 
and Nuclear proliferation to American culture at large.  Moreover, when it began to be 
used to also imply racism, it did not cease to imply fascism, totalitarianism, anti-
Semitism, nationalism, authoritarianism, global imperialism, or any other political 
characteristic for which it had previously been called upon to describe. 
It would be fallacious to lump Black Power groups and leaders together under one 
banner as there were significant differences in the aims and rhetorical strategies even 
within a single group or even a single figure in the movement over time.  The metaphor’s 
political operation is, perhaps, best exemplified when it is employed to discuss race, 
because it is at that point when the various factors of the symbol seem most at odds with 
one another precisely because so many of the features that are implied by th  Nazi 
analogy seem to have no business being involved in questions of race, and yet, they 
continue to be implied by the metaphor just the same.  An evocation of Nazism was, 




to critique America meant that one had to simultaneously understand one’s self as th  
enemy of Nazism and the enemy of America.  It is no wonder, then, that many Black 
Power revolutionaries considered themselves socialists and therefore opposed to both 
fascism and American capitalism.  They were far less likely to identify themselves as 
communists because Communism continued to carry the totalitarian, and Nazi, 
connotation. 
The term ‘nationalism’ was used frequently by Black Power revolutionaries, and was 
one of the cornerstone arguments for the rhetoric of Malcolm X.  In fact, the Black Power 
movement could as easily be described as a Black Nationalist movement—though te 
meaning of the two phrases, even in their usage in revolutionary rhetoric was quite 
different.  Black Power was used to imply self determination; Black Nationalism implied 
the desire for land to be awarded by the American government in order to create a 
sovereign state, sometimes discussed as separate from the United States, other times 
discussed as part of the United States.   
The two terms were often used interchangeably. Nationalism was generally emp oy d 
without implying a connection to fascism--partly because of the spirit of pan-Africanism 
that accompanied the gaining of independence by a large number of African countries. 
Martin Luther King had phrased the problem in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” 
before civil rights had turned into a revolutionary spirit, “We have waited more than 340 
years for our constitutional and God-given rights.  The nations of Asia and Africaare 
moving with jet-like speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at 
horse-and-buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter” (335).  Of 




sovereignty in Israel—the victims of the Nazis had succeeded in their nationalist dreams, 
why then shouldn’t the victims of the American Nazis succeed through the spirit of 
nationalism as well?  
But if nationalism was, for many African American nationalists, a term free of the 
fascism against which they fought, it crossed the line occasionally to its mre dire 
implications.  In an interview with The Movement from 1968, Black Panther’s leader 
Huey Newton explained the meaning behind Revolutionary nationalism and its 
differentiation from Cultural nationalism, as follows:  
There are two kinds of nationalism, revolutionary nationalism and reactionary 
nationalism.  Revolutionary nationalism is first dependent upon a people’s 
revolution with the end goal being the people in power.  Therefore to be a 
revolutionary nationalist you would by necessity have to be a socialist. (370)  
 
 Cultural nationalism, or, as Newton calls it, “pork chop nationalism” represents the 
cultural reclamation of an African past and identity through culture (370).  His example is 
Papa Doc in Haiti.  Thus, nationalism, in its cultural form, doesn’t mean a new nation, as 
it did for Malcolm X, but a recognition of the need to acknowledge one’s roots in the 
nation of one’s ancestors.  For Newton, revolutionary nationalism doesn’t mean a 
separate state either—he obviously implies nationalism to mean a revolution that destroys 
the old state of American democracy by instituting a new state, within the borders f the 
old, that operates through socialism.   
His rhetoric is interesting in that he makes this revolutionary nationalism equivalent 
to socialist nationalism and sets it up as the enemy of the people and then finishes the 
equivalency with the proclamation, “The Black Panther party is a revolutionary 
Nationalist group” (371).  To wit, one must wonder the difference between a ‘socialit 




Newton was not a Nazi—but how easily, nonetheless, even a figure of revolutionary 
nationalism, like Newton, falls prey to the obvious roles that the Nazi metaphor 
requires—if the Black Panthers wants to be the enemy of America then they must wear 
the trappings of the role.  They must arm themselves, they must wear the uniform, and 
they must, strangely enough, be socialist nationalists.   
Looking at the path taken in describing race relations in the United States following 
World War II and America’s fight against a racist enemy, the implications are quite clear.  
The Nazis served as an example of social evil even when more profound examples 
existed.  Moreover, there reference dramatically shaped the arguments into which they 
were evoked.  If White America is a Nazi state, then its prisons are concentration camps, 
and the convicts incarcerated inside them are suffering under oppression and not 
punishment.  The fight against such a state is naturally virtuous, and socialism is justified 
under the banner.  Moreover, glaring inconsistencies can be, and must be, navigated.  To 
be the enemy of America as a Nazi country, one must find a way to play the part of 
America’s Nazi enemy simultaneously by playing the part of the enemy of the Nazis.  To 
evoke the metaphor is to step into this complex and strange game of symbols and 
implications, and it is made no less clear just because the issue is race and the nature of 
the Nazis’ evil was their racism. 
Lastly, the issue of race is just one example among many into which the Nazis were 
evoked.  Like the anti-war movement, the issue of Black Nationalism had to find a way to
make meaning anew out of the Nazi symbol while contending with previous meanings 
and meanings that were being made concurrently in disparate political arens.  The Black 




the anti-war movement often made arguments concerning race.  But even when these 
arguments didn’t specifically reference each other, their definition of Nazism was culled 
together from the same cultural store, which they altered through their usage.  McCarthy, 
for instance, had made it impossible not to evoke Communism when referencing Nazism 
despite the gulf of difference between the two political philosophies.  Outside the 
examples I have illuminated here, other examples exist as well in other political arenas.  
Analysis of the American slavery system evoked Nazism in Stanley Elkins work Slavery 
(1959) as did analysis of the American housewife in Betty Friedan’s The Feminine 
Mystique (1963).  When Charles Manson inaugurated himself as America’s nightmare, he 
entered a courtroom with a swastika carved into his forehead. 
The examples I have chosen are meant to illuminate the systematic nature of the 
process by which an evocation affects the rhetoric into which it is evoked.  Moreover, in 
order to describe the way that America’s definition of Nazism affected its nation sense of 
utopian values, I have attempted to follow the use of Nazism through a specific theme.  
First Nazism was used as a metaphor for evil in order to demonize the Nazis themselves.  
Then it was used to demonize America’s wartime enemies after World War II, followed 
by an expanding of its scope from wartime enemy to peacetime rival followed soon after 
by the use of Nazi analogy to justify America’s domestic policy.  Eventually, the rhetoric 
ceased to be controlled by the state and became used in critiques of the state.  The circle 
of its usage grew ever larger from wartime enemy to all foreign enemis to all state 
enemies to all political enemies including those defined outside of official state politics.  
These particular example, Nazism in relation to the rhetoric related to communism, anti-




methodology by which the Nazi analogy is used in an ever broadening scope to finally 
prove ubiquitous—imminently appropriate for all American definitions of evil. 
The analysis made through the example of American politics, however, has not been, 
and could not have been, exhaustive.  The choice of examining these political movements 
in terms of their anti-Nazi rhetoric was a selection made by favoring extremes.  America 
should have been able to demonize communist Russia based on its ability to infiltrate, its 
human rights violations against its own citizens, and the very real danger it posed in the 
nuclear stalemate.  Likewise, analogies to Nazism are absolutely unnecessary in order to 
depict racism or war as dangerous social ills.   
These are subjects where the definition of right and wrong should have been rather 
self-evident…and yet, in each case, analogies to Nazism are relied upon to make their 
moral points and to describe a dystopian world view.  This is precisely because, as 
Richard Rorty suggests in his concept of a liberal utopia, right and wrong have ceased to 
be self-evident.  Only Nazism serves to establish a stable definition of evil; th  insistence 
upon solidity in regards to other definitions of right and wrong increasingly is taken as 
denoting dystopian evaluative structures in the post World War II world.  The definition 
of utopia became, after the Second World War, liberal in the sense meant by Richard 
Rorty:  virtue defined as open-mindedness and freedom from prejudice.  The singular 
vision of the world and its values as supplied by Nazism all but demands, in its 
demonization postwar, that singular visions be abandoned as dystopian. 
These extreme examples imply an ever-enlarging scope:  a suggestion of just how far 
reaching the usage of Nazi analogies may be utilized, but as the analysis center on a 




analogies as they were used to further the various political causes defined by America’s 
relationship to Russia or through America’s discussion of race risks excluding other 
causes, both those equally political and those a-political.  What I have tried to suggest, 
though, is a reasonable description of why and how the Nazi analogy comes into usage, 
what it does to the ethical argument into which it is summoned, and what it does to 
causes or individuals who are the subjects of the comparison.  In short, I have provided a 
description of Nazi analogies and their effect on American ethics by looking at a specific 
ethical problem from which a general case can be made to extrapolate out to other ethical 
problems. 
If, however, ubiquity throughout American ethical rhetoric is the goal of this analysis, 
then the argument must, by necessity, expand beyond the political borders (foreign and 
domestic) of the Cold War.  It must address crypto-Nazis, and safety Nazis, soup Nazis, 
and femi-Nazis.  It must deliver up some reason why the enemy of Indiana Jones must be 
a Nazi, why “Spring Time for Hitler” doesn’t offend an American audience, and why 
sado-masochists dress up in SS regalia for sexual titillation.  What has been described, 
thus far, is how to analyze analogies to Nazism, their use and their scope, in a scaled 
down feature of American culture—ubiquity demands that the analogies, and their 
implications, be discussed in the state we now find them: suffused throughout American 
culture, synonymous with evil, imminently appropriate to the point of being obligatory, 





CHAPTER 7   
THE REPERCUSSIONS OF UBIQUITY:   
A CONTEXT FOR EVERY EVIL AND AN EVIL FOR EVERY CONTEXT 
The intersection of Jean Baudrillard’s concerns about simulacra and Richard Rorty’s
concerns about a liberal utopia are ominous for a definition of national ethics.  Clearly, 
the move towards increasing open-mindedness in American culture is both a result of the 
nation’s encounter with the Nazis and also supported by rhetoric which evokes the Nazis 
through analogy.  The liberal utopia, as described by Rorty, is, then, a reaction to a 
definition of evil derived through the example of Nazism.  For McCarthy and his 
followers, for Angela Davis, for protesters against nuclear war, and for the audi nce of 
World War II movies and who then supported America’s aggressive foreign military 
policy in the name of the patriotism that those movies inspired, the goal as express d in 
their arguments and entertainment was clearly to act in ways opposite to their
understanding of Nazism.   
Even as all these groups shared the same goal, they did not share the same 
understanding of Nazism.  Moreover, the definition of Nazism used in each case had been 
developed from the numerous contexts into which it had previously been evoked.  
Nazism had become, to use the term coined by Baudrillard, hyperreal—it was not Nazism 
itself that was evoked, but a model of Nazism that was in the process of continuous 
manufacture and revision by the national culture.  “Real” Nazis had very little to do with 
this model, except in their capacity to evoke the nostalgia of an actual definition of evil.  





Rorty’s analysis describes the general tenor of American society such that tolerance 
towards others’ beliefs and cultures is heralded as the key for utopian social thought.  The 
mechanism for this tolerance is, for Rorty, irony: the ability to respect a belief that is 
opposite one’s own even when it precludes one’s belief.  Irony is “to be achieved not by 
inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow
sufferers.  Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created” (Rorty xvi).  Rorty’s 
irony differs chiefly from earlier models in that it does not present a particular belief as 
right and others as in need of revision (the way that Kierkegaard does with Socrates 
versus the Sophists, or Christ versus the Romans), but rather, posits right and wrong as 
obsolete terms—all cultures and beliefs have equal claim to the value of being right 
depending upon the context in which they are utilized based on a kind of intuition about 
right and wrong developed through experience of alternative viewpoints.  According to 
Rorty: 
“For the liberal ironists, there is no answer to the question, ‘Why not be 
cruel?’—no noncircular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is 
horrible… Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded theoretical 
answers to this sort of question—algorithms for resolving moral dilemmas 
of this sort—is still, in his heart, a theologian or metaphysician. (Rorty xv)  
 
The point here isn’t that liberal ironists are cruel, but that they avoid cruelty through an 
ethical sense trained by irony. 
What Rorty loses in this analysis is the sense of the incorrect or, to be more precis , a 
description of the position of evil.  The ironic mode was posited as the domain of moral 
instruction:  it suggests that one speak the language of the morally offensive so as to 
educate them and change their ethics.  If every epistemology is equally deserving of 




context), and there can be no morality to instruct; there is no evil.  Baudrillard claims that 
such a system is likely to become nostalgic for fascism precisely because, he reasons, it is 
a fascist impulse to make definitive assertions:  to become in Rorty’s terms a 
metaphysician or a theologian by appealing to values that are above context.  A system 
without notions of good and evil, but based, rather, on propriety, is a system that yearns, 
according to Baudrillard, for another, and opposite, system in which ethical valuesare 
predetermined.   
What a culture wants when it acts simultaneously in accordance with Rorty’s concept 
of liberal utopia and Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal is for something to be evil no 
matter how or when it is referenced.  They desire such a value precisely because of its 
capacity to stabilize the ever shifting moral judgments of a mercurial ethical system 
dependent constantly on immediate and unique contexts for validation.  What it creates 
are works that promote that vision of hyperreality so that the works from which the 
culture draws its ironic intuition are already manufactured to complicate that ironic vision 
in their need for criteria for ethical evaluation 
As I’ve pointed out in previous chapters, Orwell described in his essay “Politics and 
the English Language” that the characteristic of evil, after the war, became associated 
with the term “fascism” and became a ubiquitously available term throughout political 
rhetoric to describe a system which one did not agree with.  It was useful in both 
providing invectives and for validating one’s prejudice against whatever form of 
government or political behavior one needed to castigate.  Thus, if one did not like the 




provide a denunciation of their politics as well as validation for the denunciation (after 
all, what could be worse than to say that a political group was acting like fascists?). 
Orwell’s complaint echoes Walther Benjamin’s observation about the degradation of 
presence through over contextualization.  The impossibility of art retaining its capacity to 
connect, through personal experience, the individual to transcendent meaning is a 
product, for Benjamin, of art’s capacity, in the age of mechanical reproduction, to be 
shown in contexts in which it was never intended.  Art, put to use in political contexts, 
becomes propaganda, but regardless of the particular context, over-contextualization has 
destroyed original transcendent meaning.  Orwell applies this principle to the evils of 
fascism:  over-contextualization has made fascists into papier-mâché Mephistopheleses—
a process whose mechanisms would later be described by Baudrillard under the term 
“hyperreal”. 
Orwell’s argument about fascism is that after the Crown, Communism, the policies of 
France, the immigration policies of the United States of America, and the traffic cop 
down the street have all been denounced as fascists, what could the term ‘fascist’ 
possibly mean except only that it is an insult?  Resemblance to historic fascism (like the 
kind practiced by the recently defeated enemy) ceased to be prerequisite for the term’s 
usage.  In fact, the ubiquity of the comparison had two functions: it made the particular 
evil of the comparison unimportant next to its resemblance to fascism and it belittled the 
danger of fascism by universalizing it. 
Baudrillard describes this deterioration of historical precedent as a condition in which 
historical accuracy is traded for a kind of continuity of depiction.  It ceases to matter in a 




historical events, people, or movements to which they are presumed to refer.  Instead, and 
it is upon this point that Baudrillard chiefly differs from both Orwell and Benjamin, what 
is important is that the simulacra are consistent with the other elements of reference—that 
they maintain the same tenor, the same tone, that they carry the same connotation, or that 
they present the same information.  Their validity is no longer a function of their 
comparability to the real, but to the hyperreal.  Correct or incorrect is only a matter of 
acting in accordance with what has already been said or depicted; accuracy, in the sense 
of correctly employing the analogy, is utterly meaningless. 
Ultimately, the stable definition of evil as a thing exemplified by the Nazis is lost, and 
as it is this particular definition that anchors ethics for a liberal utopia, with it goes the 
ethics in total.  When a reference to the Nazis is made in American culture, what actually 
is being evoked?  The Nazis of Schindler’s List?  Knowledge gleaned from a visit to the 
Holocaust museum in Washington D.C.?  The images of the atrocities canonized by camp 
liberation films?  Movies like Swing Kids, Hellboy, Wizards, Apt Pupil, The Raiders of 
the Lost Ark, or Marathon Man?  Even if someone insists that the Nazis to which they 
refer to are those of history, it remains unclear as to who is responsible for supplying that 
history, and who is capable of supplying it in its pure historical form?  Documentaries 
which describe the occultism of Himmler?  Post war propaganda?  The preeminence of 
Mengele in America’s consciousness to the exclusion of all the other Nazi doctors?  
Where does the “real” history of Nazism come from in a culture that is saturated by 
references to Nazism, real, metaphoric, and outright fictional?  Is it subject to change, and 
does it have the capacity to develop independently of the popular culture that explains the 




the Lost Ark tell us that Hitler is fascinated by the occult—was he, or is that something 
that simply drove the plot of a movie?  Forced to flee Germany after the Nazis began 
liquidating opposition in the party, Otto Strasser told the American Office of Strategic 
Services that Hitler forced his niece to urinate and defecate on him—is that more 
accurate74?  
In American film, the United States wins the war and rescues the world.  In reality, 
the sacrifice of the Russians far outweighed that of America; when Americans speak of 
the defeat of Hitler and the Nazis are they thinking of the victories shared with the 
Russians in the real world or the victories America gained single-handedly as depicte  in 
our cinema?  These aren’t questions of accuracy between an image of Nazism and actu l 
events, but rather the ability for an image to agree with public knowledge of actual 
events—which are often generated by previous images and which, just as often, refuse to 
yield to new data, and remain misinterpretations motivated by politics ratherthan history 
and information which is simply incorrect.  Anything that disagrees with public 
knowledge is aberrant and controversial; it doesn’t matter whether it happens also to be 
historically true.  Ultimately, this means that in describing ‘postwar’ America, we are 
describing both American culture as it follows from its fictional World War II gainst 
equally fictional Nazis and the culture as if follows from its historical and real war 
against Nazi Germany.  As to their effect on American culture, the two wars (one real, 
one fictional) are interchangeable. 
Rorty’s description of utopia and its mechanisms all but demands the Nazis become 
the American national metaphor for evil.  If evil is necessary, and good is described as 




of evil must be drawn from the most intolerant figures of history.  The Nazis are perfect 
candidates for this role because, not only is their intolerance widespread, but it is also 
homicidal.  Moreover, the Nazis were depicted as defeated by America, marking them 
not only as a figure of evil but also marking their defeat as an act of goodness.  Thus, the 
Nazi stands for both a figuration of personal evil and as justification for the virtues of 
patriotism.   
The figure of the Nazi isn’t necessarily unique in this system—Rorty’s system marks 
all intolerance as evil, but Rorty’s system also invites, through irony, toleranc  of the 
intolerance:  if we are to approach utopian ideals than we must be tolerant of all possib e 
viewpoints (including those that are not tolerant of ours)—this complication is the very 
reason that the tolerance to be practiced is deemed ‘ironic’.  The evil of the Nazis is 
immune to this irony precisely because of its intensity (or the intensity of is
representation which quickly becomes indistinguishable from the thing it represents), its 
belief in nationally regulated value (as opposed to individual evaluation), and because 
liberalism’s shift from dystopian to a utopian mindset is partially resultant from the 
horrors of the camps and the general understanding of the rigid, anti-liberal mindset that 
motivated the murder of Europe’s Jews.  
Are other evils intense enough to stand in for the evil of intolerance?  Possibly, 
though such models would have a difficult time rivaling the unique position of Nazism 
for this role.  Even the American Southern plantation with its infamous history of slavery, 
abuse, and murder is not as perfect a model for intolerance as Auschwitz and the Final 
Solution; those who want to discuss racism in the American South are at odds to do so 




molestation, or murder, spousal abuse, the narrative is at odds to describe them as evil 
and not simply a psychological or sociological aberration—the man who beats his wife 
comes from a home in which his father beat his mother; his behavior is unacceptable but 
it is hardly Evil.  
The result of this particular intensity and causality is that reference to a position as 
evil encourages an obligatory comparison to the tenets, figures, people, or places 
associated with Nazism.  The destruction of humanity by radioactive fire must, of course, 
be called a nuclear holocaust.  No other name would do it justice.  As these references 
become more and more widespread, as they seep into different facets of American 
rhetoric, they must understandably succumb to the dangers posited by Baudrillard under 
the term hyperreal.  They cease to be only references to the Nazis themselves and become 
references as well to references to Nazis, copies of copies.   
Historically, the Nazis are defeated in 1945, but rhetorically they continue on even 
until today through analogy.  Each incarnation of their reference has altered thei  
definition subtly so that Nazis now can refer to totalitarian politics, a drive towards world 
domination racism, apathetic bureaucracy, irresponsible science, sexual deviancy, 
Satanism and occultism, chemical dependency, male dominance, feminist excesses, 
warlike attitudes, docility towards the policies of one’s government, etc.. This isn’t a case 
of adding a more accurate description (or at least, not necessarily), since these 
redefinitions are not validated by historical accuracy but by consistency with previous 
depictions.   
The question of accuracy with a film like Schindler’s List, for instance, is 




determined by actual events transpiring just as they happened or whether the accuracy is 
measured through the mimetic recreation of the general horror, hopelessness, and 
eventually mercy and gratitude associated with being Oscar Schindler or one of 
Schindler’s Jews.  How much more unreasonable a question of accuracy is for a film like 
Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981), The Rocketeer (1991), or Wizards (a 1977 animated film 
that explores the presence of Nazism among fairy creatures of the post-apocalyptic 
future), and yet, sources such as these (as well as all the World War II combat fil s, 
shows like Hogan’s Heroes and Band of Brothers, and any number of other sources) are 
what create the history of this era for the mass media—Colonel Klink is taken by the
audience as indicative of what the Nazis were like (and he wasn’t even originally 
supposed to be a Nazi75).   
The psychology of the Nazi villains is a product of what the audience learns through 
their use in comparisons.  In some ways, the Nazis Americans hate are a compil ti n of 
all manner of Nazi-like villains.  They are the kind of villains that threaten us with 
nuclear weapons, lynch African Americans in places like Mississippi and act as petty 
bureaucrats who won’t give us what we want because of some inane complication.  The 
Nazi becomes an amalgamation of all these things and more, and in doing so is equally as 
capable of implying facile or even contradictory meanings.  If the Nazi at the RMV wants 
a third item proving my identity before he or she will supply me with a driver’s license, 
then the evil of Nazi atrocities is cheapened by my comparison. 
For Orwell, the ubiquity and widespread availability of fascism for metaphor was 
dangerous enough to the impact of the very real crimes that had been committed in 




in political arenas.  His analysis ends in that milieu, leaving the reader to suppose that 
fascism never became, in a significant way, a metaphor for personal trauma rather than 
for political argument.   
As stable definitions of evil fall away, however, subsumed by the open-mindedness 
that Rorty associates with a liberal utopia, what remains as a stable definition must be 
forced into employ with greater frequency, regardless of its appropriateness.  McCarthy 
needed Nazism to vilify communism in the middle of the Second Red Scare—this is not 
arbitrary or incidental.  Communists alone just didn’t go over well enough with the 
American public.  Ronald Reagan attempted a similar vilification, without the Nazis, in 
his Evil Empire speech76 and became the subject of ridicule in pop culture for his naiveté 
(he was accused repeatedly in punk music of being a Nazi77) just as the President as a 
cinematic character began, during that era, to appear as the instigator of a nuclear 
holocaust78.   
If a definition of evil is needed, and the Nazis fill that role, then the Nazis will be, and 
must be, used to that purpose.  The more exclusively they fill the role, the more 
frequently they will be employed.  Historically, the metaphor became useful for 
describing America’s wartime enemies, the nation’s new enemies, domestic dis idents, 
the state itself by the counter culture, and American culture as Nazi-like by those who 
craved drastic social change.  Finally, it came to be used to empower apolitical personal 
metaphors as well. 
Historians and scholars of Holocaust awareness note that the narrative of the 
Holocaust in American popular consciousness, what happened and what it meant, 




most notably it was the first time a high ranking Nazi had taken the stand to explain, in 
mechanical detail, the method of genocide.  Sylvia Plath, watching coverage of the trial 
in London, used Eichmann as a kind of muse for her poem “Daddy” which has since 
suffered under various kinds of criticism and controversy, mostly associated with Plath’s 
self identification as a victim of an overbearing father with a Jew suffering in the 
Holocaust.  In this way, Plath became the first evidence of this new consciousness:  it 
became unacceptable to simply associate one’s self with the victims of the Holocaust and, 
instead, such analogies began to imply deep seated egotism and narcissism.  ‘How dare 
you,’ one might ask, ‘associate your suffering with theirs?’ 
While McCarthy could associate Jews with Nazis through a definition of 
totalitarianism and hunt down organizations for refugee relief as covers for communist 
indoctrination (and to persecute the leaders of those organizations under the complaint of 
anti-Semitism), the conditions of the victims within that analogy lost its plasticity with 
the trial of Eichmann.  Jews began to take ownership of the Holocaust narrative and to 
extricate it from its relation to the metaphor of Nazism.  They began to tell heir stories, 
to write them down, and to end the decades of silence.  As the stories become public, the 
metaphor of Holocaust victimhood simply became less available for non-Jews like Plath.  
The Nazi atrocities had come to be understood as largely motivated by racism and were 
no longer available for arbitrary usage.   
The metaphor’s value became its ability to imply racist implications and 
repercussions.  While Plath may have come under critique for self-identifying herself 
with the Jewish victims of the Nazis, leaders of black power and black nationalist 




way available to their predecessors in the civil rights movements, but their invectives 
against white American power structures were empowered by the metaphor and its 
exclusivity.  Thus, the various hard felons incarcerated in California’s prisons could 
became political prisoners held hostage in concentration camps despite their guilt in 
serious and violent criminal offenses. 
Strangely enough, whereas Plath suffered criticism for self identifying as a suffering 
Jew in Dachau, no one really took much offense at her representation of her father, Otto 
Plath, whom she called a Nazi and compared to Hitler (Plath 57).  There was little 
objection when Plath described her father, “With your Luftwaffe, your 
gobbledygook./And your neat moustache/ And your Aryan eye, bright blue.  Panzer-man, 
panzer-man, O You—,” despite the fact that the description makes Otto Plath appear to 
be a perfect stand-in for Hitler, matching his physical description with the Aryan ideals 
and sprinkling that description with referents to military violence (Plath 57).  This double 
reaction suggests that one can be like Hitler without anyone being like his Jwish victims: 
Plath’s critics didn’t seem to mind that she had compared her father to Hitler except that 
she had become a Jew, but then, what made Hitler so horrible if it wasn’t his treatment of 
the Jews?  Hitler’s infamy rested equally on his depictions within postwar cultu e, 
depictions which were, at the time Sylvia wrote “Daddy,” more rooted in the totalitari n 
than the genocidal.  Hitler not only could be a villain without reference to his Jewish 
victims, it was preferable that he be depicted that way for analogies to Nazism not 
involving racism.   
The trial of Adolf Eichmann had made identification with the Jewish victims of the 




comparisons as appropriate or inappropriate.  The subject ceased to be universal. 
Thereafter, except in very specific issues involving racial oppression, one could be, and 
had to be, like a Nazi completely independent of a Holocaust analog.  Though the Nazis 
still represented a definition of evil for American postwar ethics, the crimes that earned 
them this extreme position had become, not only unnecessary, but culturally unavailable 
for reference without crossing the line into political irresponsibility and extremism. 
The castigation of Otto Plath without objection was demonstrative of just how liberal
the appropriation of the epitaph of Nazism had become, particularly because Otto Plath 
hadn’t really done anything wrong to invite the analogy.  He neither physically or 
sexually abused his daughter Sylvia.  The only thing he seems to have done to her offense 
was to mis-diagnose his own treatable disease and to die as a result, leaving her 
fatherless.  He was bedridden for much of Sylvia’s young life, and was dead by the time 
she was eight.  Before such time as he was wholly incapacitated by his condition, he went 
to work as a professor of entomology to earn income for his family, returning home 
devastated by the strain where he spent much of the remainder of his time in bed.   
Surely, the situation was less than optimal and obviously traumatic for young Sylvia, 
but blaming Otto Plath for the tragedy is somewhat ridiculous, and labeling him a Nazi 
for it is relatively unthinkable (if labeling something as a Nazi were ever unthinkable); 
this excess, however, failed to raise the concerns of even Plath’s most unflatteri g  
critics.  Plath could call her father a Nazi without raising any eyebrows because, even by 
the early 1960s, the comparison was rote. Severity of behavior had ceased to be a factor 
in deciding whether or not something deserved the degree of criticism implied by being 




decreasingly exclusive and approached a condition of ubiquity—Nazism was 
increasingly evoked to describe any transgression or tragedy—irrespective of i s intensity 
or nature.  Otto Plath, having been presented as having done something wrong, must, by 
necessity, be presented as a Nazi.   
This ubiquity is demonstrated in Plath’s poem, “Daddy” as being consuming.  What 
is it that “Daddy” has done, according to the poet, that makes her want, as the poem 
suggests in the opening of its second stanza, to kill him.  Certainly, as the poem centrs 
on the tragedy that has befallen a daughter because of her father, the poem’s reader  
desire some resolution—some suggestion as to Daddy’s crimes, but that suggestion is 
replaced by the image of the Nazi.  Being a Nazi is presented by Plath as the only sin 
“Daddy” has committed.  Plath begins her indictment of “Daddy” by complaining that 
she cannot find her heritage because of difficulties locating the place in Europe from 
which her family came:  “But the name of the town is common./  My Polack friend/ Says 
there are a dozen or two.”  This initial tragedy is rooted in the violence inflicted upon 
Poland by the Nazis.  First it is “scraped flat by the roller of wars, wars, wr ” and then 
Sylvia begins her sympathetic metaphor of her being a resident of the town where she is 
forced to give up her native tongue and forced to speak German (“The tongue suck in my 
jaw/ It stuck in a barb wired snare.  Ich, ich, ich, ich, I could hardly speak”).  Finally, she 
is shipped off  “like a Jew.  A Jew to Dachau, Auschwitz, Belsen” (Plath 56).  The 
metaphor, however, is one-sided.  Sylvia, who identifies as Polish and Jewish in the 
metaphor, is oppressed like the Poles and the Polish Jews by the Nazis by her father 
because he…  But there is no next step to the comparison.  The Nazi image does the work 




That there is no transgression is immaterial.  Once Plath’s poem makes Otto into a Nazi, 
her indictment is complete.  Once we accept, without evidence or reason, that Otto Plath 
is a Nazi, then it becomes reasonable for her to suggest that his abhorrent behavior 
(whatever it is) has traumatized Sylvia to repeat the trauma by marrying a model of her 
father who is equally abhorrent (and for the same reason:  he is equally a Nazi). 
Beyond the poem’s artistic merit, there its implied biographical and moral evaluation 
of Otto Plath, and if one assumes that the poem’s success depends, at least in part, on an 
ability for its readers to translate Plath’s pain into their own, then one must assme a  
well that Otto Plath has stood in for other fathers whose crimes have, as well, rendered 
them like Nazis.  In fact, Sylvia Plath’s poem “Daddy” sets a precedent for what 
constitutes valid comparison to the Nazis.  After all, if Otto Plath can be reasonably 
compared to Hitler because of his crippling and ultimately fatal illness, then who exactly 
can’t be compared to Nazis?  What sort of wrongdoing is not susceptible to comparison 
to ultimate evil?  Otto’s “crime” was involuntary and during this period, he managed to 
continue to work as a professor in order to support his family even though the strain of 
his day to day life was ultimately too much for him.  Why doesn’t he deserve the reader’s 
sympathies? 
But Otto Plath’s castigation has been accepted.  Even Plath’s numerous biographers 
are quick to follow suit with the attitude demonstrated in “Daddy” against Otto.  Even as 
they describe the severity of his illness, and even as they discuss Plath’s problematic 
psychological history, her biographers still take Plath’s side against her fat .  In Connie 
Ann Kirk’s biography of Sylvia Plath, for instance, she describes Otto’s illness as he 




could not be quenched, and severe leg cramps that doubled him over in pain until he 
grabbed his calves and called out” (20).  In this same biography, in reference to the 
relationship between Aurelia and Otto, she writes “Before long, Otto would make even 
more demands on her that pushed her own dreams for herself back even further” (16).  
This sentence which paints Otto as an oppressive patriarchal force dashing hi  wife’s 
dreams and keeping her potential under lock and key is a reference to Otto’s falling ill;  
his “demands” are that his wife care for him as he is dying.  Why phrase this tragedy in 
this way?  The answer is simple.  The biographer is predetermined to think of Otto in 
negative terms.  The man is, after all, like Hitler. 
 The point here is not to denounce Sylvia Plath, her critics, her supporters, or her 
biographers.  The point is to define the lower limit of necessary resemblance to the Nazis 
needed in order to make a comparison to Nazis.  Otto Plath, fatally ill and sequestered by 
that illness, bears no resemblance to Hitler at all.  He has committed no crimes.  He 
shows no sign of the homicidal racism related to Nazis.  He does not seem to be a conduit 
of banal evil (to use Arendt’s terms for the emotionless bureaucratic mechanism of 
killing).  He was not even alive when the Nazis committed their most notorious of 
crimes.  Aside from being speaking German, he is utterly unlike Hitler.  These are all
moot points.  Irving Howe commented on the morally reprehensible nature of the 
comparison between Plath’s domestic childhood life and the Holocaust, but not on Otto 
and Hitler.   
The logic of the indictment is not native to the poetry of Sylvia Plath.  She simply 
followed rules of conduct that had been made available to her through her culture.  If 




Vietcong in Southeast Asia all were vilified, at one time or another, as Nazis, then why 
not an absent father or an overbearing husband?  The very definition of the Nazi 
proclivity had since its outset been described psychologically:  The Authoritarian 
Personality suggested that a certain personality trait, authoritarian and dominant, was a 
precursor to fascism and anti-democracy.  In a very real sense, Sylvia’s father, if 
authoritarian, was associated with the Nazis according to the arguments in early att mpts 
to define the dangers of Nazism.  Plath, with “Daddy” is only unique because the poem 
was inspired by the particular event that changed the cultural rules for the kind of poetry 
she was attempting to write.  “Daddy” was written at the moment when America’s 
consciousness of the Nazis as evil changed.  They remained evil without a need to 
reference their crimes, but their victims had become impossible to use in metaphor except 
in a very limited sense:  the Holocaust victim/survivor had become a symbol of racism.  
The Nazis, in their ability to be evoked without reference to their victims, becam  a 
reference without a referent, and were to be, thereafter, primarily defined in analogy by 
the effect of their symbolic use. 
Analogy is, unfortunately, a nearly limitless term in the Baudrillardian sense: it can 
come to mean anything. When culture is deduced from copies of copies, then the 
understanding of Nazism by American culture is itself an analogy for real Nazism.  In 
this sense the scope of describing Nazi analogy is not simply a description of smple 
simile like that used by Sylvia Plath, but is, simultaneously, a commentary on all 
depictions of Nazism and therefore much of what we consider in our definition of evil.   
Americans reading William Goldman’s novel Marathon Man (1974) or watching its 




Szell who, as Christopher P. Tourney points out, “is modeled on Dr. Josef Mengele, the 
real Nazi scientist, and is described as Mengele’s protégé, Mengele’s col ague at 
Auschwitz, and more brilliant than Mengele” precisely because  Mengele, for the work’s 
audience, has the capacity to stand for the excessive cruelty of the Nazi doctors (412).  
Even with the horrors of Mengele, the choice to link Szell to Mengele suggests celebrity, 
and has the property of breeding myth and ease of reference (as it does for Marathon 
Man).  It is uncertain, then, whether the audience of the work, when asked to think of the 
evil dentist’s mentor will think of the real Mengele, or the Mengele as he has become 
through popular culture.  One cannot know whether a reference to Mengele refers to the 
male doctor of Auschwitz with his penchant for twins and medical experiments, or the 
myths that surround him (one of those myths being Goldman’s work) and elevates him to 
a stand-in for all Nazi doctors and all of their crimes.   
In the Ira Levin novel, The Boys From Brazil (1976), for instance, Mengele 
masterminds the plans of the remaining Nazis in hiding.  His mastery of the science of 
genetics has allowed him access to the science of cloning.  By exercising th  forbidden 
science, Dr. Mengele stands in for an entire army of evil mad Nazi scientists (making him 
a cousin to Dr. Strangelove, the Red Skull, and later, real world advocates of stem cell 
research) and even for mad science itself.  Because of his celebrity, and its corresponding 
mythology, he is a quite natural cinematic attendant among the little Adolphs that he has 
created to further the ends of the Nazi Reich, still secretly in operation and threatening 
the world.  Mengele is made to order for this movie.  The film’s \success suggests that the 
audience approves of the description of Mengele and the assumptions surrounding him 




Mengele of Auschwitz.  The artifice of these Nazi celebrities, however, is notco fined 
only to characters who are clearly fictional or fictionalized. In some sense, ven in films 
like Schindler’s List or The Pianist in which the narrative is founded upon eyewitness 
testimony rather than the presumed desires of the audience, that the Nazis one sees 
haven’t been modified by the culture’s expectations.   
 In Schindler’s List (1993), the director of the camp, Amon Goeth (played by 
Ralph Fiennes) not only kills Jewish prisoners indiscriminately, but the film inti ates 
that he contemplates raping a female servant named Helen.  As a character in the film, 
Goeth is horrifying, a trait he shares with the historical figure upon which he is based:  
the real Goeth was, by all accounts, a monster.  But was he also a rapist? 
 The Nazis of Schindler’s List are representational, culled together from the 
various horror stories of those who survived the camps.  In this way, Amon Goeth’s 
character in the film approaches non-fiction.  He is also, however, a culmination of 
cultural values associated with Nazism, one of which happens to be, strangely enough, 
the sexuality that comes with the position of dominance of the Nazis over their helpless 
Jewish prisoners, as well as the tendency to conflate insanity with deviant sexuality 
(consider, for instance, all the strange rumors that abound of Hitler’s sexual practices).  
Susan Sontag discusses this conflation of Nazism and deviant sexuality in the last section 
of her essay, “Fascinating Fascism,” in which she comments that the garb of 
sadomasochists is also the garb of the SS, chosen because it signifies a tightening of the 
body but also the strange relation of domination and submission associated with Nazism 




 Did it turn sexual with the real Goeth, or is that an implication of the film that was 
allowed to slip in because it fits the mold of what a Nazi ought to be?  Are Goeth’s 
feelings towards his servant historical or cinematic?  And how is an audience member 
supposed to tell the difference from one to the other?  If Goeth hadn’t raped female 
Jewish prisoners, he would have been more than capable of the act in the imaginations of 
anyone viewing Schindler’s List….because he is evil, and because evil rapes.  Spielberg, 
in his depiction, stops Goeth after the implication of the possibility.   
 The Pianist offers a similar problem with the character of the German officer 
who, near the end of the film, finds Szpielman hiding in an abandoned building that is to 
be turned into a German military headquarters.  In a scene which suggests that the
German officer Hosenfeld has become jaded by the pain and suffering caused by his 
people against the Jews, he atones for his nation’s crimes by hiding, feeding and clothi g 
Szpielman until the Russian army can come to his rescue.  The film presents this 
conversion as a product of a closing defeat that finally allows the German officer to act 
humanely.  What it neglects to point out is that the historical Hosenfeld had rescued 
numerous Jews from certain death before running into Szpielman.  According to Richard 
J. Evans, “Another rescuer, the Catholic German Army officer and former schoolteacher, 
Wilm Hosenfeld, also began employing Poles and Jews in army sports administration to 
protect them from arrest” (557).  Many of the Jews he rescued wrote letters on his behalf 
to the Russia where Hosenfeld spent his last years as a prisoner of war.  His experience 
with Szpielman wasn’t unique, nor was it the result of conversion, but to have depicted 




Interestingly, if the Nazis have become imminently available for comparison, The 
subject of their victims has become sacred.  Even questioning the validity of films like 
Schindler’s List or The Pianist is tantamount to broaching the line crossed, in the opinion 
of some of her critics, by Sylvia Plath.  Schindler’s List is the cinematic account of Oscar 
Schindler and the Jews whom he saved from extermination at the hands of Goeth.  Its 
drama is produced through survivor testimony and as such is taken as factual.  It is not a
documentary, but it does attempt to present an account that approaches non-fiction.  As 
such, the film becomes part of the story of the meaning of the Holocaust for its viewers, 
and in this way, acts as a history lesson for the most tragic event of the twentie h century, 
a character sketch of the Nazis and a validation for conceptualizing Nazism s evil’s 
epitome.  It is to be watched reverently.  
Commenting on the Seinfeld episode “Raincoats,” in which Jerry Seinfeld is caught 
kissing during a screening of Schindler’s List, actor Jerry Stiller offered in an on-location 
interview:  “The storyline I felt was really over the top and I almost wanted to say to 
everybody, ‘you can’t have them necking in the balcony while they’re watching 
Schindler’s List.’  I just felt that they had gone over the line with that one and then I said, 
well, Jews go over the line.” (Seinfeld, Season 5: Commentary) 
Stiller’s commentary is interesting because it notes two specific reactions to the 
Holocaust, both of which are directly challenged through the comedy of the show.  First, 
that there is a line of sacredness and that Schindler’s List is over that line because of the 
material it treats and the manner in which it treats it.  Second, that the ability to access the 
sacred is available and acceptable exclusively for Jews.  Stiller’s response to Schindler’s 




reveals assumptions about the Holocaust as a text.  In particular, his attitude, and attitudes 
like it, suggest that the sacredness of the Holocaust, are the property of the Jews whose 
collective trauma is to be popularly understood as qualification for assigning them the 
role of gatekeeper against misuse of the Holocaust—especially against its use a  
symbolic, rather than historic, value.   
Responsibility for access to the Holocaust is assumed to be a function of suffering 
and the reverence that results from that suffering: Jews will guard against poetry after 
Auschwitz becoming, in the words of Theodore Adorno, “barbaric,” or at least poetry tha  
attempts to use the Holocaust as a symbol.  After all, it belittles the value of th  
Holocaust when someone’s childhood under a dictatorial father is described as an event 
like the Holocaust.  The most telling critique of this trend is Mel Brooks’s film and 
Broadway play The Producers (1968) in which the character Max Bialystock assumes 
that a play which makes comedy out of Hitler (Springtime for Hitler) will be in such poor 
taste that it will offend its audience and flop at the box office.  Part of the comedy of The 
Producers is that Bialystock is, of course, wrong.  The play is a smash hit precisely 
because of the Jewish character Bialystock and his own ethnically attained pow r over 
the Holocaust and his transference of that power to non-Jews through comedy80.  
Bialystock’s plan depends on his failure to comprehend the power that he, as a Jew, holds 
over interpreting the tenor of the Holocaust.  In the end, he can not only utilize that 
power, he can also give it away—allowing, for the span of the play, his audience to 
laugh. 
Of course, what the audience in The Producers really laughs at is not the Holocaust 




sacredness, but the absurdity of the Nazi.  Even in another, later Mel Brooks film, To Be 
or Not to Be (1983), in which the audience is invited to laugh at both the Jewish theater 
company and the Nazis, they are not invited to laugh at the consequences should the 
Jewish theater company be discovered by the Nazis.  In a scene particularly o t of place 
for the film’s comedy, an escaping old Jewish woman dressed as a clown freezes as she 
realizes she’s surrounded by Nazis and risking the cover under which the rest of th  
Polish Jews are making their escape.  As she freezes, the comedy of the situation is 
interrupted and changed to horror.   
If the Nazis discover that she’s actually an escaping Jew, she and her compatriots will 
be caught and murdered. Brooks does not make light of this horror.  He allows it, and 
surrounded by comedy, it is amplified.  When the woman is finally rescued, it is by a 
clown assuming the role of the Gestapo, he slaps a fake yellow star on her and prete s to 
arrest her.  Of course, Brooks’s version of T  Be or Not To Be is a remake of the 1942 
version starring Carole Lombard and Jack Benny.  The original film crossed too many 
lines to enjoy the success of its remake. The Nazis, in 1942, were not to be made the 
subject of comedy, and the movie made many in its audience uncomfortable.   
When the remake was released some forty years later, there were few such objections.   
In a 1983 review of Mel Brooks’s version of the film, Vincent Canby of The New York 
Times begins his review by offering, “Everybody can relax. Mel Brooks's remake of 
Ernst Lubitsch's 1942 classic, ''To Be or Not to Be,'' is smashingly funny.” His opening 
signals the kind of awkwardness that surrounded the comedy of the original film.  The 
war decades over by the time Brooks releases his version, that awkwardness is gone and 




“when the Lubitsch film was released in March 1942, the terrible realities of World War 
II and the death of Miss Lombard made it difficult for audiences as well as critics to 
respond to the film's brilliant comedy. I hope that nothing will come between today's 
audiences and this exuberant delight.”   
The scene of the escaping clowns in To Be or Not to Be, full of both dramatic and 
comedic pathos, is typical of the way the Holocaust works out in representation:  the 
horror of the victims remains sacred, but there is no such sacredness for depictions of he 
Nazis (who would stand up for them in protest and who would take such protests 
seriously?) whom the film depicts as buffoons.  In like manner, Szpielman’s story in The 
Pianist must be portrayed with due reverence, but Hosenfeld, his Nazi rescuer, is 
modifiable.  The stories told by the Jews saved by Oscar Schindler are carefully d picted 
as accurately as possible, but Amon Goeth is modified so as to seem worse than his 
already horrible historic counterpart. 
The comedy of Seinfeld and Jerry’s kiss in the balcony at a screening of Schindler’s 
List seems to fly in the face of this model.  Jerry is not giving the Holocaust the revernce 
it is due, but then the scene isn’t really a commentary on the sacredness of the Holocaust, 
but on the sacredness which American culture awards the film Schindler’s List.  It is only 
irreverent if the film Schindler’s List is inseparable from the Holocaust it represents (so 
that a slight on the film would then be a slight on the sacredness of the Holocaust), but 
the Seinfeld scene is equally a commentary on news reports of African American high 
school students in Oakland, California who were thrown out of the Grandlakes Theater 
for laughing during Schindler’s List—an act so unspeakable that it sparked critiques of 




In his response to the media outrage of Americans, Kevin Weston wrote, in a 1994 
article for the Los Angeles Times, that the students were laughing, not at the horror of the 
Holocaust, but at the undue reverence the movie was meant to invoke in African 
American students who had been oppressed by America’s white dominated society for 
hundreds of years.    He asks and then answers the question:  
How could anyone laugh at the extermination of the Jews and other minorities by 
the Nazis all over Europe?  Answer: They were laughing not at the Holocaust but 
at the movie.  The truth is, few African Americans go to the movies--even 
"serious" movies like "Schindler's List"--expecting a $7 epiphany. We're used to 
distancing ourselves from what we see on the screen, not identifying with it. 
We're used to laughing. How else can we deal with the absurdly degrading 
portraits of ourselves we see on the screen--or with our total invisibility? (“Why 
Would Anyone Laugh at 'Schindler's List'?”) 
 
The showing of the film, a school fieldtrip on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday, was
meant to remind the students of the problems of racism in their own country.  Thus, the 
reaction to Schindler’s List, its meaning, and even its sacredness, is contextualized.  Were 
the students laughing at the Holocaust, the reverence assigned the Holocaust, the 
reverence assigned the Holocaust by a movie that went out of its way to attain tha 
reverence, or were they laughing because they were kids who have become so jaded by 
violence that they could no longer see it as real?  And of course, the issue of how much 
the Holocaust acts as a metaphor for racism everywhere, or whether its sacedness, by the 
time of the release of Schindler’s List, had made the subject of the Holocaust no longer 
available to anyone (whether they be African American teens from economically 
depressed Oakland, California or famous poets like Sylvia Plath). 
 The incident at the Grandlakes Theater has become part of the mythology 
surrounding Schindler’s List, just as Schindler’s List becomes part of the mythology 




transfer such that the incident at the Grand Lake Theater is now a part of the myths that 
surround the Holocaust (in Beaudrillardian terms, this questions whether a modificati n 
of a copy modifies also its original model).  If not, then Jerry Seinfeld’s kiss in the 
balcony during Schindler’s List is a commentary on Schindler’s List only.  He is not 
using the Holocaust as comedic material—only Schindler’s List by questioning its 
sacredness, and the sacredness afforded it.  Otherwise, the reaction of the teenagers at the 
Grand Lake Theater bears no relation to the film they watched, but only to the Holocaust 
itself—but then, Seinfeld too becomes a commentary not only on Schindler’s List, but the 
Holocaust as well.   
Is Schindler’s List part of the sacredness of the Holocaust, or part of the iconography 
that surrounds that sacredness?  Is it a metaphor for racism, or is it just a movie?  If it is 
just a movie, can the Holocaust still be evoked to talk about racism, and if so, what 
happens when those who are oppressed by their race fail to associate themselves with 
Europe’s Jews or feel that their own suffering is undermined by comparison to the trauma
suffered at the hands of the Nazis?  Is America’s African American population justified 
in assuming that though their situation is not as bad as Bergen-Belsen, it is still bad 
enough to require address?  Were the Oakland students taken to Schindler’s List to be 
shown the dangers of racism (as if they had no idea), or were they taken there to learn 
that things could be worse?  The confusion of these symbolic meanings is native to the 
growing complexity of the Nazi metaphor as it becomes increasingly derive  f om 
popular media and divorced from its historical meaning through the sacredness and 
exclusivity of the metaphor of the Holocaust.  Its confusion is evident even to the actors 




List.  Jerry Stiller felt that the subject of the comedy was sacred; Larry Dvid, co-writer 
for the episode, felt that the comedy centered on the assumed sacredness of Schindler’s 
List only—in an interview, he likened the subject of the scene to wanting to touch his 
wife’s breast during Synagogue (Seinfeld, Season 5: Commentary). 
Later in the episode, when actor Judd Hirsch, playing Elaine’s close talking paramour 
Aaron, bemoans how much more attention he could have given Jerry’s parents during 
their stay in New York, the scene is a drawn out melodrama of Oscar Schindler’s final 
speech in Schindler’s List.   
Aaron:  I could have done more.  I could have done so much more. 
Elaine:  You did enough 
Aaron:  No.  I could have called the travel agency, got them on another flight to 
Paris.  I could have got them out. 
Jerry:  You tried Aaron.  It was too expensive. 
Aaron: This watch.  This watch could have paid for their whole trip.  This ring.  
This ring is one more dinner I could have taken them out to.  Water, they need 
some water. 
Elaine:  Why? 
 
Elaine’s question is evocative of problems with Aaron’s relation to Schindler’s List in 
general.  Aaron hasn’t been a part of the Schindler’s List/make-out plotline.  Inst ad, he 
has been escorting Jerry’s parents around New York for reasons that no one can quite 
comprehend.  When they leave and he mimics the speech given by Liam Neeson as Oscar
Schindler it makes Aaron into a Schindler stand-in, the Seinfelds into the Schindler Jews, 
and their visit to New York becomes akin to surviving Nazi occupation in Poland, but as 
Aaron isn’t involved in the particular sub-plot driven by the sacredness of Schindler’s 
List, the scene becomes non-sequitur. 
What it means that Aaron is like Oscar Schindler is entirely unclear.  Is Seinfeld 




making light of the film Schindler or the real Schindler)?  Is he, ultimately, saying that 
Aaron, because he’s helping out a Jewish couple, thinks that he’s Oscar Schindler?  Or, 
and this seems more likely, is the Seinfeld episode still just poking fun at how seri usly 
everyone takes Schindler’s List without really considering the message that Aaron’s 
speech creates, as if to say, “so what if the character belittles Oscar Schindler?  What 
does it really matter anyway?” 
Seinfeld’s choice of Schindler’s List as the subject for the show’s attack on sacredness 
is not, however, as arbitrary as the final scene with Aaron would suggest.  Schindler’s 
List and The Pianist represent Nazism (and the assumptions about their representations of 
Nazism) at an extreme in terms of the responsibility one expects from the film makers 
(and authors, as well) concerning accuracy.  Such mass cultural products concerning the 
Holocaust have a need to bear witness to the suffering of European Jews, to essentially 
tell it like it was—and while this responsibility seems to be present in describing the 
suffering of the victims in works that have taken on a kind of sacredness in American 
Culture, there effect is not above some cajoling precisely because their medium r quires a 
double reaction.  Seinfeld and the Oakland students at the Grand Lakes Theater are 
laughing not at the Holocaust, but at its filmic version, but it’s hard to mark the 
difference, and so Aaron seems irreverent and the teenagers seem callous.  Despite these 
films’ focus on horrible scenes of brutality, indifference, torture, and murder, their need 
for accuracy impedes the works’ attempts to portray the Nazis as evil enough.  Liberties 
with the depiction of Nazis are taken so as to make the evil Nazi more evil than even their 
real crimes would suggest81.  In the name of salvation, these liberties are taken so as to 




imply on-the-spot conversion rather than a hidden and constant desire to subvert the 
genocidal racism of their kinsmen. 
If the goal of these works is accuracy, then these liberties are out of place and must be 
explained, but interestingly enough, explanations do not readily present themselves.  Why 
should the evil of the Nazis need to be exaggerated at all?  If, for instance, it is assumed 
that the Nazis in these films are exaggerated as an attack on Nazi sadism by 
immortalizing an exaggerated version of it in film, then an irresolvable dilemma is 
evoked.  Such exaggerations include the Nazi commander from The Pianist who, in 
reality, has earned a place in Yad Vashem, the Israeli memorial to the right ous gentiles. 
Adding fictional crimes to the real crimes of Nazi monsters like Amon Goeth  risks 
fictionalizing the suffering caused by the monsters even though it is precisely accuracy in 
depictions of this suffering that define the aesthetic philosophy of these films and earns 
their sacred position in American culture.  Obviously anyone attempting to depict Nazis 
is expected to make them as bad as possible, but to make them as bad as possible within 
the limits of history is to accentuate the suffering caused by the Holocaust; making them 
as bad as our imaginations will allow undermines the historical realism of the
victimization and in cases like Schindler’s List changes also what is taken as history.  
Amon Goeth should be immortalized as a sadistic madman who fed people to his dogs, 
shot the helpless, and murdered children in cold blood:  that’s who he was.  
Remembering him as a failed rapist complicates the revelation of his crimes and 
diminishes their effect, even if it makes him a better fit for American culture’s Puritanical 
sense of what it means to be evil: not only homicidal but sex-crazed and violent towards 




Moreover, as filmic versions of the Nazis are fictions, in the strictest sen e, they open 
the filmic Holocaust up to criticism.  Aaron in the S infeld episode is a satirical look at 
the character of Oscar Schindler in Schindler’s List—if he were anything more, his 
laments about his watch and his ring would be in incredibly poor taste.  But Aaron as 
Schindler doesn’t make the audience uncomfortable at all—he’s just parodying a movie.  
He doesn’t tread on the sacredness of the event itself.  
This does not, however, explain away the complicated nature of filmic Holocaust to 
its historical counterpart.  Schindler’s List can be mocked as a representation of the 
Holocaust even though its goal is accuracy, but part of the reason that it can be mocked at 
all is precisely on the point of inaccuracy to which the filmic version must succumb 
because they must include Nazis and because the definition of Nazism upon which they 
must rely is fluid.  As the exaggeration of the Nazis’ evil is counterproductive to th  
aesthetic and ethical aims of works that attempt frank depictions of the Holocaust, their 
exaggerated as embodiments of evil must be the result of cultural obligation.  It simply
does not do, according to cultural expectations of what Nazis are, to depict a Nazi as 
having women slaves and have him not be tempted to rape them. It does not work that a 
Nazi commander should have used his position to secretly help political prisoners and 
Jews throughout the war escape persecution and murder.  It would not fit what American 
culture has come to expect of evil and therefore must expect of Nazis. Evil has become 
hyperreal, and has become confused with its model: the Nazis.  The relationship is 
reciprocal:  just as the Nazis take on all the connotations of evil, Evil takes on all the
connotations of Nazism.  Is it any wonder, then, that Nazism has been attached to such 




personalities, spousal abuse, petty bureaucrats, methamphetamine, abortion, AIDS, and 
Satanism?  If these things are evil, then they must be relatable to Nazism, or else they are 
not evil. 
This trend extends to, and is, indeed, better represented, in texts which have no 
particular responsibility to describe the atrocities accurately (such as political statements 
or propaganda).  When protesters against the war in Iraq called George W. Bush a Nazi, 
they meant that he was like a Nazi in some way, that he shared characteristics of a Nazi in 
the minds of the protesters—not that he was actually a member of the Nazi party sworn to 
secure the supremacy of the Aryan race.  Accuracy had no real stake in their sta emen  
and so use of a model for evil, exaggeration, conflation, and false similarities wer to be 
expected.  On the other hand, Schindler’s List is sacred: when people laugh during the 
movie, it makes national news, and in such a venue, it is unexpected that Nazis should 
become mass cultural versions of themselves. 
 Moreover, if Americans model evil after their assumptions about Nazism, then 
Schindler’s List and The Pianist are cultural sites where that model is supposed to be 
created.  When someone is compared to Nazis, they are, in a sense, being compared to the 
Nazis they know.  For many people, those Nazis come from Schindler’s List.  If the Nazis 
in Schindler’s List are, themselves, models, then models begin to be built on models.  
Accuracy, as derived through a comparison to an original increasingly loses its power as 
a criterion for confirmation as the model produces greater instances for its own usage.  
Eventually liberal usage leads to universalization which, having already exempted 
accuracy as a criterion for confirmation, discards also  the propriety of context.  As 




become, finally, obligatory. The thing being confirmed through these hyperreal models is 
American culture’s definition of evil.  In other words, the definition of evil is created 
through models of an epitome, Nazism, which is based on sources like Schindler’s List 
which is, in turn, constructed through models based on the culture’s definition of evil.  
The modeling is recursive, self perpetuating, and moves steadily away from historical 
connotations.   
Ironically, the Nazis are picked for this function because their definition is assumed to 
be stable:  their evil is inherent. What the example of films like Schindler’s List and The 
Pianist clearly indicate, however, is that the definition is far from stable.  It can be made 
to mean whatever it needs to mean so long as it doesn’t include identification with 
victims in the Holocaust: this is the only context in which the analogy is inappropriate.  
In fact, Schindler’s List and The Pianist are revisions of earlier models of the Nazi 
atrocities which did not emphasize the Jewish ethnicity of the victims.  The result of this 
transitive definition is that evil, based on these shifting values of Nazism, has come to 
have no inherent meaning at all.  It only inherits and supplements meanings that are 
already part of the model.  Evidence of this amorphousness can be seen in works that 
attempt at, and are judged in relation to, historical accuracy where one expects the 
approach of non-fiction to stifle ad hoc definitions of evil.  It is even more prevalent in 
works that have no stake in portraying the Holocaust at all. 
 In the NBC show Chuck [2007-2010], for instance, the title character falls in with 
a young genius named Lazslo who has escaped from his secret government prison in an 
episode titled, “Chuck Versus The Sandworm” (aired October 29th, 007).  The show 




computer expert who accidentally has all of America’s espionage information 
downloaded into his brain, forcing him into the life of a spy.  After Chuck and Laszlo 
watch the James Bond movie, A View to a Kill, the two characters begin to discuss the 
Bond film.  Chuck comments that Max Zorn, the Bond villain, is “the best bad guy ever.” 
Laszlo disagrees because he doesn’t think that Zorn is a bad guy at all.  According to 
Lazslo, who has been kept underground all his life in service to the state, “The Nazis used 
Zorn for his superior gifts, the way our government uses me and you.”  In the Bond film, 
Zorn is the result of a Nazi experiment in breeding super-geniuses who, after World War 
II, began to work with communist Russia.  Laszlo identifies with Zorn as a victim of the 
Nazis and in doing so makes the obvious analogy:  the United States Government is 
acting like Nazis in their treatment of Laszlo. 
 In the background of the discussion between the two characters, the viewer can’t 
help but see the very serious issue of political prisoners, topical at the time of the show’s 
premier.  Obviously, Laszlo’s having been imprisoned for reasons of national security is 
reminiscent of the captives incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay or in secret jails like Abu 
Ghraib.  Laszlo is, in fact, an extreme example of this kind of imprisonment.  The 
character of Laszlo acts as a criticism of the U.S. government and its then current policy 
of suspending habeas corpus in order to imprison terror-suspects for reasons of national 
security.  Laszlo validates his critique against this practice, not by citing his own 
hardships, but by evoking Nazism.  Now, the real world United States government is 
acting like Nazis because of the way it treats prisoners of Abu Ghraib and the parall l the 
viewer can make to Laszlo, who is drawing a parallel between himself and Max Zorn as 




 Strangely enough, the ethical rhetoric of Chuck, concerning Laszlo as a political 
prisoner (and a stand in for detainees at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib) is mirrored exactly 
in the real world rhetoric concerning these same issues.  In the opening paragra h, of 
Alexander Cockburn’s column in The Nation titled “Green Lights for Torture,” (2004) 
Cockburn makes a direct reference to Nazi Germany as the precursor to the torture tactics 
used by the U.S. Government.  The reference occurs as a descriptive clause in his 
statement: “the long and copiously documented record of U.S. torture, with many of its 
refinements acquired by the CIA from the Nazis after World War II” (9).  He goes on to 
describe prisoners being sodomized by flashlights, kept awake all night in cells, led 
around on dog leashes, having their genitals threatened by dogs, and executed.  Is it r ally 
necessary to know that this is reminiscent of Nazi Germany in order for the public to 
appreciate that such torture is wrong?  The reference to Nazism implies that these acts 
lack the proper ethical value in their own context. 
 In a 2004 article published in The New England Journal of Medicine concerning 
the propensity for doctors in places like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay to become 
desensitized to suffering, Robert Jay Lifton drops out of the topical issue of U.S. torture 
to discuss the socialization of Nazi doctors: “The Nazis provided the most extrem  
example of doctors' becoming socialized to atrocity,” and continues a description of this 
process in detail; in a 13 paragraph article about the involvement of doctors in U.S. 
military torture, he devotes 2 entire paragraphs to doctors in Nazi Germany.  Had the 
U.S. doctors become acclimated to the pain of the tortured terror suspects would it n t 




In the USA Today’s coverage of the 2004 D-Day anniversary, the Abu Ghraib/Nazi 
torture comparison is present in reverse.  In a discussion of France’s feelings towards 
commemorating their American liberators, the interviewer, Knox Noelle, asks Jaques 
Marcellin, “a French Jew who spent three years hiding from the Nazis in the South of 
France,” what he thinks about the Iraq war and about Abu Graib in particular (08a).  
Clearly, the juxtaposition of Abu Ghraib with Nazi Germany in this interviewer is 
suggesting the question:  are the Americans acting like Nazis in Iraq?  The emphasis is 
again put, not on the torture or injustice then being perpetrated but on the degree to which 
America’s attitudes in its prisons for terror suspects resemble those of the Nazis in 
running their death camps. 
 In the July 2005 edition of Washington Monthly’s jargon watch, the staff writer 
reminds us “once again of what should be a hard and fast rule of politics:  Nazi/Hitler 
comparisons—while always tempting—are never a good idea” (11).  He then goes on t 
quote a number of politician’s statements (and the length of time to their retractions) 
concerning political comparisons between various issues and Nazi Germany (one of 
which is, of course, the offenses at Guantanamo).  The writer here is right and wrong:  
comparisons to Nazi Germany probably should be off limits, but as they are one of the 
few definitions America has for evil, they have come into use with greater frequency and 
less responsibility.  He echoes Godwin’s Law of Nazi analogies by speaking to their 
appropriateness, but misses their inevitability and ubiquity.   
In Chuck, Laszlo’s identification of himself as being like a victim of Nazi Germany 
(but not a victim of the Holocaust itself) was made on national television, on NBC at 8 




particular episode, saw Laszlo, and either made the correlation themselves or were told 
the correlation by Laszlo:  the U.S. Government, in locking people up for reasons of 
national security, is essentially acting like the Nazis.  Yet, even in the higly public arena 
of national primetime television, the comparison failed to stir a reaction.  What 
commentary there is concerning the episode centers on the shows two female stars 
scantily clad in their Halloween costumes and is mostly located within the public forums 
of Internet posting boards.  Otherwise, the comparison simply passed by without much of 
a stir. 
And of course, if it had any chance of causing a stir, NBC would never have aired the 
episode.  Chuck and Laszlo’s conversation is not NBC’s attempt at a kind of back handed 
critique of U.S. foreign policy.  Chuck clearly isn’t supposed to be controversial.  
Moreover, Chuck isn’t controversial…even when it implies that the U.S. government is 
acting in the same manner as Nazis.  The implication is, of course, that if such a 
comparison, mass produced and distributed, isn’t controversial then such a comparison, 
itself, simply isn’t controversial by its very nature.     
But if comparing the U.S. government to Nazi Germany isn’t meant to instigate 
controversy, then why make the comparison at all?  As with Schindler’s List and The 
Pianist, the specific function of Nazism as a model is not to exaggerate meaning, but 
rather is meant to appeal to Nazism as a method for creating ethical meaning.  For the 
character Chuck, it forces him to realize that Laszlo’s situation isn’t just unfortunate—
that this isn’t just another issue where there are multiple sides and no one is truly right or 




essentially evil: it is not a thing that does evil (and might do otherwise) but a thing that is 
evil in everything it does no matter what it does.   
Chuck is, himself, both a servant and captive of this government that is now being 
compared to Nazi Germany.  One of the show’s recurring problems is that Chuck must 
give up his normal life, including romantic involvement, so as to be at the beckon call of 
the information he houses.  When Laszlo compares his situation to that of Zorn, he is also 
comparing Chuck’s situation by saying that the control the government holds over 
Chuck’s life is another sign of the U.S. Government’s resemblance to the Nazis: the 
Nazis control sex, as they do with Amon Goeth and as they do through the breeding 
experiments that result in Max Zorn.  The constant surveillance too, becomes subject to 
the Nazi analogy so that the numerous surveillance devices that surround Chuck in his 
personal life, hearken back to the Patriot Act which also becomes implicated as Nazi-
esque by Laszlo’s association. 
This shift in understanding of the government and the control it exerts over private 
lives is indicative of the way a comparison to Nazism immediately shifts a discourse from 
one in which meaning is derived from context to one in which meaning is essentially and 
inherently part of something’s nature.  Before the comparison to Zorn, Laszlo’s plight is 
unfortunate, but its tragedy, as well as its political implications, depended on thevalues 
used in its consideration.  If one values national security, for instance, over the rights of 
the individual, then Laszlo’s plight is sad, but ultimately necessary for the good of the 
country.  If one values personal freedom over national security then of course Laszlo’s 
plight is extraordinarily tragic and reason for political disillusionment.  I the end though, 




correct?  There is no position beyond the context dependent rhetoric where conflict 
between the rhetorical systems can be decided: no meta-context.  An appeal outside this 
ethical system is necessary to judge its ethics: a noncircular theoretical backup, according 
to Rorty83. 
If we re-examine Zorn for a moment we see the problem further elucidated.  Zorn is 
attempting to destroy California and to kill millions of people for money.  Is he evil?  Is 
he a victim?  Even with a crime this dastardly, it is not possible to simply levy ethical 
judgment on him.  His guilt is up for debate; in fact, it causes the debate between Laszlo 
and Chuck within the framework of the episode.  Unless his actions can be compared to 
the Nazis’, there is always the possibility of some context that will explain or even 
exonerate him (such as his having been the victim of a Nazi experiment).  Liberal irony 
cannot answer this question; even a well trained moral intuition will fail as it hasno 
basis. 
The ethical evaluation is not dependent on whether or not wrong has actually been 
done.  Imprisoning Laszlo is not inherently evil in a morally relative ethical system such 
as one in which context is key, nor is Chuck’s enforced celibacy, nor is Zorn’s dropping 
California into the ocean.  These actions may be bad, but we cannot condemn them 
unequivocally without a comparison to Nazism—that’s precisely why the comparison to 
Nazism is made.  Otherwise, we are simply commenting on the action and its relation to a 
context. 
To complicate this matter further, the entire discussion between Chuck and Laszlo is 
based on a comparison to a Bond villain and his fictional Nazi history.  The ethics of 




even to real Nazis.  The Nazis that make the fictional Zorn are as fictional as Zorn.  The 
U.S. Government’s treatment of Laszlo and Chuck is compared to how a fictional Nazi 
Germany treats a fictional human being. 
Yet, despite the fictional nature of the Bond Nazis, the fictional Nazis are as 
functional as real Nazis in terms of comparison.  What it means to be like fictional Nazis 
is already understood throughout mass culture and accepted as having a kind of validity.  
The show’s writers didn’t feel it necessary to have Laszlo explain this extraordinarily 
complex relationship.  The American audience, inundated from having heard it hundreds 
of times before, already gets it.  But if the fake Nazis aren’t comparable to real Nazis then 
the fictional Nazis inherit the evil of the real Nazis only because of their name.  They are 
never shown so that the viewer might see any other resemblance; the audience 
experiences Zorn’s Nazi past secondhand.  These Nazis might be anything.  In the movie 
Hellboy (2004), for instance, Nazis are Satanists.  In The Boys From Brazil (1976), the 
Nazis are masters of genetic super science. In Apt Pupil, (1982) Nazis live next door and 
are trying to forget their pasts but are addicted to the smell of burning flesh.  In Captain 
America, Nazis fight superheroes.  In To Be Or Not To Be (1942 and 1983), Nazis are 
clowns.  In Hogan’s Heroes (1965-1971), they are incompetent buffoons.  In Star Trek 
(1968), they’re aliens84.  In The Dirty Dozen (1967), they are just there to be slaughtered.  
In X-Men, they persecute mutants. The fictional Nazi has many faces; which one is like 
the U.S. Government in this comparison?  Yet, even faceless, Laszlo’s Nazis force the 
ethical dilemma.  Even the presence of Nazis in name only elevates the force of the 





Pausing briefly to put a face on the Nazis in the Bond movie, we see that there is little 
to help determine their character (they are only mentioned secondhand).  The narrative of 
A View to a Kill assumes that the audience will know enough about Nazi Germany to 
know that, even defeated, it is still capable of propagating its evils.  The world can only 
wait for the repercussions of Nazi Germany to pop up from time to time with the same 
vile nature as their progenitors, the Nazis themselves.  Max Zorn’s relationship to Nazi 
Germany is that of a time bomb ready to detonate on the enemies of a dead saboteur.  
Even without a single scene depicting Nazi Germany, A View to a Kill establishes this 
message:  we are not yet done with the Nazis.  The propagation of the Nazi throughout 
mass culture reinforces this message.  
The movie creates another message about the fiction of its Nazis.  Nazi Germany 
never perfected genetic science to such a point that they could create super geniuses like 
Zorn.  He is a fiction.  This particular breed of super-science is chosen because it is in 
keeping with a view of the Nazis as having a vested interest in the science of 
reproduction (as with Mengele and Dr. Strangelove). The notion of superior and inferior 
races, the Nazi policies of eugenics and genocide, and the Nazis’ concentration on 
physical genetic characteristics as markers for self worth all pointto an ideology that is 
obsessed with breeding.  Zorn’s Nazis are like the comic book versions of their histor c 
counterparts. 
While there are real historical reasons for this viewpoint, its vision in mass culture is 
only loosely motivated by those notions.  The view of Nazi science has become 
bastardized in mass culture into the twin notions of the Nazi as super-scientist 




instance, the reasons Chuck gives for staying to watch A View to a Kill; it includes Max 
Zorn but also Grace Jones as a “sex assassin;” the sexual aura of the Nazis is impl cit in 
its henchwomen.  The Nazi government itself becomes, in this movie, the polluted womb 
that produces Zorn, marking it both as a corrupted mother and also as emblematic of 
science’s mastery over nature.     
Finally, after all the viewer’s sympathies have been engaged, and the show has 
offered a scathing critique of the U.S. government, Laszlo reveals himself to b  
dangerous which reverses all of the audience’s earlier suppositions.  Laszlo’s psychosi  
leaves the audience in no position to feel sympathy for him, and his use of the Nazi asa 
mode of comparison makes little rhetorical sense as a commentary on U.S. Domestic 
policy.   The comparison he has made between himself and the victims of Nazi Germany 
(Zorn at least) seems morally irresponsible.  The message of the show switche  from a 
critique of the government for embracing fascist action through indefinite incarceration 
and becomes an endorsement of fascist attitudes under the rallying cry of national 
security so long as the national security targets only Nazi-esque figures like Laszlo.  This 
seems the most likely meaning, but even this moral is a bit unclear.  Perhaps the point is 
that Laszlo’s situation (and the situations of others like him) isn’t so bad; it isn’t, after all, 
the Holocaust. 
Of course, the show is not attempting to vindicate fascism, even in part.  Its inability 
to hold to the moral position that it forces is more of a symptom of some other attitude 
towards Nazism that is prevalent throughout American Culture.  The Nazi is evoked 
because it is a stable position of absolute and unassailable evil, but having been 




over again, the Nazi too, now suffers from the context dependency to which it was 
believed immune and its ubiquity ultimately drains it of the rhetorical power that was the 
initial reason for its evocation.  The image of Nazism is recurrent precisely because it is 
always evil, but having been pulled into cultural arguments in too many guises, it i now 
unclear whether the image of Nazism, and evil itself, always means the same thing.  
If we look again to Chuck as an example of mass American culture’s reaction to Nazi 
analogies the problem becomes abundantly clear.  What do the terms good and evil mean 
inside the narrative of Chuck?  The government has locked up a young and innocent man 
against his will and held him that way for a decade.  How can this situation be seen as 
anything but evil, but when Laszlo mismanages a comparison to Nazism, suddenly the 
acts against him are robbed of all their villainy:  suddenly Laszlo is the villain and not 
worth our sympathy.  Clearly Max Zorn is a villain (he wants to drop the West coast into 
the ocean).  However, because the Nazis are evoked as the creators of Zorn, it is not clear 
whether his condition as either a villain or a victim is above debate.  In short, as Nazism 
becomes unfixed and loose as an ethical signifier, so too must the entire ethical system 
fall into ambiguity if it depends upon the value of Nazism as evil for its stability.   
Unfortunately, that lack of fixity denies analysis.  If Nazis represent a met -ethical 
feature above context dependent ethics, then one must image a meta-meta-ethical 
structure with which to judge the corruption of the meta-ethical:  if we judge contxt 
dependent situations good or evil based on an appeal to Nazism, then how do we judge 
the ethics of Nazism’s transformation into a context dependent situation?  In works of 




ethical framework, but then, how can a critique of that shift be made given that the entire 
ethical structure in general has become universally unrecognizable?    
In terms of the show’s narrative cohesion, Laszlo is the villain.  The characters react 
to him as a villain.  He tries to destroy California.  He tries to kill Chuck. The good uys 
finally defeat him.  The assumption is clearly that the viewer is supposed to see Laszlo as 
the bad guy and his defeat at the show’s conclusion is supposed to be viewed as a moral 
victory.  There is no way to prevent that narrative conclusion (nor reason to see why 
prevention might be necessary).  There is no way to see the appeal to Nazism and takeit 
seriously so as to re-establish the ethics of the show as they perhaps aught to be—to see 
both Laszlo and Chuck as victims of Nazism.  Good and Evil are established within the 
show, by the show, and only for the show so that general rules governing good and evil 
are ultimately lost (they don’t even survive inside the show’s sixty minute time frame).  
Chuck and Laszlo still suffer under a situation with obvious similarities with Nazism 
(fictional Nazis though they may be) but it is no longer important.  Some other context 
now decides the morality for the moment and the show goes on. Morality ever shifts 
within American mass culture as well.   
Outside of the show’s narrative framework, there is no way to determine how the 
audience is supposed to understand Laszlo, the political prisoners he represents, the 
government that locked him away, the government that keeps Chuck and its citizenry 
under constant surveillance, the Patriot Act that is so obviously hinted at by the invasions 
of Chuck’s privacy, etc..  In the end, Laszlo is revealed as having a bi-polar condition.  




 As a nearly ubiquitous term for defining morality, the breakdown of ethics implied 
by Nazi analogy is not simply confined to Chuck.  Without an appeal to a stable position, 
an ethical system simply isn’t possible.  What is evil in one case is not evil in the next—
there are no rules that universally apply.  Chuck reveals this conundrum in the sort of 
blatant moralizing one expects from prime time television, but the problem persists in all 
milieus of mass culture where ethical evaluation is needed.  Failure is total in such 
endeavors because success depends on a stable position which the context dependent 
ideology itself has destabilized.   
This plight is perhaps best represented by satires which attack America’s use of 
Nazism for establishing a definition of evil. In White Noise (1985) for instance, Don 
DeLillo relates the downfall of American values through the main character Jack 
Gladney, a professor and head of the Hitler Studies department in the fictional College on 
the Hill.  DeLillo leaves the subject of Hitler, as it is related by Gladney and his narrative, 
as an open ended designation so amorphously defined that it remains unclear as to what 
the study of Nazism might mean. The novel presents no moral reasons as to why the main 
character has gravitated towards Hitler or what it is he, as an expert, teaches about Hitler, 
except that Gladney is enlarged by his relation to Hitler’s notoriety.  In his explanation 
concerning how he first approached a career of studying Hitler, Jack explains the advice 
given to him by his, then, chancellor:  
He strongly suggested I gain weight.  He wanted me to “grow out” into Hitler…I 
had the advantages of substantial height, big hands, big feet, but badly needed 
bulk, or so he believed—an air of unhealthy excess, of padding and exaggeration, 
hulking massiveness.  If I could become more ugly, he seemed to be suggesting, it 





Hitler, in the novel and in the opinion of its narrator, is little more than a signifier of 
excess—a designation of universal notoriety without a need for specific crimes.  Hitler 
provides bulk to one’s significance without need for specificity; he does not become a 
sacrosanct subject for the crimes of the Nazis, nor do those crimes seem to invite Gladney 
to treat Hitler and the Nazis with outrage or the trepidation appropriate to the Nazis’
horror. 
In one of the novel’s only scenes featuring Jack teaching, for instance, his lesson 
centers on a description of Hitler as a mama’s boy.  The point of the lesson is not entirely
obvious, nor is it particularly relevant given other topics concerning Hitler that seem 
more important (Hitler’s rise to power, the seeming mesmerizing of the German people 
by Hitler, World War II, the Holocaust, etc.).  Jack’s observations only add to the cul ural 
detritus that surround an idea of Hitler that is unfixed from any need of relevance or 
authenticity.  Hitler, through Gladney’s lesson, is reduced to a set of trivia—the person 
who knows the most about the mundane details is the Hitler expert and is acknowledged 
as enlarged by the position.  Jack’s friend and colleague Murray Siskand joins Gladney in 
the lecture by sharing his own knowledge of Elvis Presley so that the lecture ventually 
becomes a dual between the two experts over who knows more trivial details about the 
celebrity at the center of their discipline.  Part of the scene’s power resides in the fact that 
the lives of Hitler and Elvis are remarkably comparable—as if these trivial b ts of 
biographical details add up to a strange formula for the creation of the  powerful 
historical figures of popular culture.  
 Perhaps, the goal of Gladney’s classroom is to show the psychological underpinnings 




theoretical assumptions upon which such a lesson relies reduce evil to a dysfunctional 
childhood (and a rather common one at that), and then, finally, likens those same 
assumptions to the rise of Elvis Presley and rock and roll.  The analogy, having been 
taken too far, makes even the pop cultural icon Presley become like Hitler, or perhaps, 
more precisely, the specifics of both Presley and Hitler are made to seem unimportant 
compared to their shared characteristic of notoriety.  History may have mad  them into 
celebrities, but once they attain that position, their histories become collections of trivia 
and myths. 
Gladney’s teaching scene shows the exploration of Nazism, as a subject for study, at 
its most facile.  DeLillo is satirizing the drive to explain Hitler and evil away, to reduce 
him to a set of contexts, to ultimately cripple the designation of evil altogether, and to 
capitalize on that lack of designation in order to attain a sense of importance and gravity.
Adding Hitler to a discussion, no matter what else the discussion might be, lends it a 
sense of seriousness commensurate with the atrocities of the Nazis.  When Jack provides 
his pop-cultural analysis of Hitler, he reduces the atrocities of Nazi Germany to 
psychosis, robs them of their position as evil, and then universalizes them away from 
deviancy by including all other celebrities suffering from that same psychological profile.  
In reducing Hitler to a position of celebrity, Gladney makes the Hitler’s ci cumstances 
important only in their similarity to the circumstances of other celebritis.  The deaths of 
millions of people, and the extreme moral position suggested by genocide, become 
unimportant in the study of Gladney’s Hitler, or perhaps only as important as Adolf 




Jack’s attitude towards Hitler is in keeping with the novel’s attitude, in general, about 
the modern world and its values.  Everything in the novel has the capacity to be 
interpreted not only by the function it provides, but also by its function as a symbol of 
pop cultural values, as well as its capacity to comment on pop-cultural values, and its 
capacity for recursion:  the novel’s commentary on pop culture’s obsession with itself as 
a subject for comment.  The novel provides a non-stop stream of examples of this endless 
self-absorption such that it is futile to point to one of the novel’s descriptions and mark it 
as the prime example of this tendency.  Other critics, including Baudrillard, have used 
DeLillo’s idea about the ‘Most Photographed Barn in America’ as a way of talking about 
White Noise and its satirical commentary on the fabricated nature of culture.  The barn is 
photographed by present tourists precisely because it is the most photographed barn in 
America; its claim to fame is equivalent to the behavior that its fame invites.   
Murray Siskand, a character who acts as a kind of cultural shaman in the novel, views 
the barn as a touchstone artifact for the study of American culture and spirituality.  He 
offers, “Being here is a kind of spiritual surrender.  We see only what others see. The 
thousands who were here in the past, those who will come in the future.  We’ve agreed to 
be part of a collective perception.  This literally colors our vision.  A religious experience 
in a way, like all tourism” (DeLillo 12).  Part of the tension between Murray Siskand and 
Jack Gladney in the novel is that the falsehood of culture, like that implied by the ‘Most 
Photographed Barn in America,’ is comfortable for Murray.  For Jack it gives no comf rt 





‘The Most Photographed Barn in the World’, however, is only one of many details 
that carry this particular kind of significance (which is, ironically, that e lack of 
significance is, itself, a kind of significance), none more or less important than he barn.  
Jack’s commentary as he tells the story, the skepticism and ignorance of his family, the 
various fascinations of Murray, and even the confusion of official knowledge as 
disseminated by experts (including Jack and Murray) all point to a condition of surfaces 
without depths and references without anything to refer to.  Belief becomes nothing more 
than an empty act: one believes, in White Noise, not because there is something worth 
believing in, but simply because one has to do something.  Belief is less about 
endorsement of a particular view of the world (based on assumptions about underlying 
principles), but about participation in a culture where belief is the only option for agency 
because there are no underlying principles that would validate one view as correct and 
another as incorrect.  Those inherent, essential values that could have validated beliefs 
have been abandoned.   
At one point in the novel, Jack bemoans the loss of essential value through science’s 
eradication of human nature.  His is given cause for complaint because he has learned 
that the fear of death, the primal force that moves people to action, can be manipulated 
through artificial means such as the novel’s fictional drug, Dylar.  While in bed with his 
wife Babette, he laments, “Heinrich’s brain theories. They’re all true.  W’re the sum of 
our chemical impulses.  Don’t tell me this.  It’s unbearable to think about” (DeLillo 200).  
In a way, the complaint is suggestive of a shift from one kind of essential value,




beliefs can be appealed for validation.  Nonetheless, the newer system is totally bereft of 
humanity.  Ethics and emotions are reduced to chemistry.  Jack continues:   
What happens to good and evil in this system?  Passion, envy and hate?  Do they 
become a tangle of neurons?  Are you telling me that a whole tradition of human 
failings is now at an end, that cowardice, sadism, molestation are meaninglss 
terms?  Are we being asked to regard these things nostalgically?  What about 
murdersou rage?  A murderer used to have a certain fearsome size to him. His 
crime was large.  What happens when we reduce it to cells and molecules? 
(DeLillo 200) 
 
If the science of neurochemistry is right, then there is nothing validating one belief or 
behavior over another.  All human attitude and experience can be reduced to value-
neutral chemicals in the brain, as are all questions of social or ethical propriety 
surrounding those attitudes and experiences.  If all values are dependent upon the context 
of neurochemistry then there is nothing to recommend against child molestation, murder, 
or any other of the great evils of humanity—it’s all just as much a function of brain 
chemistry as anything else. 
DeLillo’s use of Hitler in this scheme puts an emphasis on this particular detail above 
all others (of which the novel presents us with multitudes precisely because of the way 
American culture is meant to resemble the meaningless flotsam and jetsam of beliefs 
without validation).  Hitler is marked as the worst evil there could be and because no on  
can react to Hitler as the worst evil, DeLillo is using Jack’s authority as a professor of 
Hitler studies to undermine all ethical evaluations and rationales up to and including 
those that might be used to condemn genocide.  Hitler, in becoming a mama’s boy rather 
than the engineer of the Holocaust, forces all issues of good and evil to be derivative of 
culture and not inherent truths.  Hitler is as much a product of neurochemistry as anyone




By introducing Hitler through Jack Gladney, Nazism, fascism, and even racism never 
become central issues in the novel despite the centrality of Hitler in the life of the novel’s 
main character.  For instance, Murray Siskand, Jack’s best friend, is Jewish, but he sees
nothing disconcerting about studying the trivialities of Hitler’s life or the effect that such 
a study has on the overall depiction of Hitler as an anti-Semitic psychopath.  The basic 
plot points of the novel: Gladney’s family, the toxic airborne event that eventually 
introduces poison into Gladney’s body, and Gladney’s attempt to stem his fear of death 
through the mysterious Dylar drug make no reference to Nazism directly, and seem to 
have very little to do with Nazism indirectly.  Nazism, in the dynamics of the novel, acts 
as little more than a symbolic wild goose inviting the reader to take chase—another 
surface without depth, but this time it is a surface for which the reader all but deman s 
depth.  In this way, it echoes analogies to Nazism in popular culture.   That it is Nazism 
which is brought up by the novel demands some kind of commentary concerning 
relevance, even though the novel denies that relevance at every turn. 
 In White Noise, however, nothing has relevance.  This isn’t simply a matter of 
postmodern skepticism; Gladney’s dilemma isn’t necessarily that there is no fact, only 
opinion.  Rather, this kind of skepticism is seen as one of any number of philosophies 
available to fill the void in Gladney’s life.  None of these theoretical schemes is validated 
by the novel’s narrative.  Whether it be the relativity of Heinrich who cannot be 
convinced of the evidence of his senses or the nuts and bolts answers offered by 
Gladney’s father-in-law who is fine so long as his car works: all are meant to be taken as 
plausible answers to what one should do in order to supply relevance to life.  This is 




a man cannot die if his life has meaning.  Only relevance will keep him alive.  Hitler 
should have relevance because of the horror that surrounds him, this is why Jack chooses 
him, but Gladney’s Hitler ends up being nothing more than trivial details unable to 
signify anything more deeply.  The death that Gladney fears stands in for the presence of 
essential meaning that Hitler has covered up and subverted, both in the novel and in the 
culture that the novel satirizes.  Hitler, in White Noise, critiques the moral position of evil 
that Nazi analogies have replaced and complicated 
Ultimately, Gladney’s study of Hitler has nothing to do with morality.  In fact, 
morality is ultimately missing in White Noise.  The options that are available to Gladney, 
whatever their source, seem already to be considered without reference to right and 
wrong long before Gladney realizes the repercussions of neurochemistry.  After a woman 
tells Jack about a dangerous drug that stems the fear of death, the issues of drug use and 
drug addiction do not factor into his choice to search out Dylar.  Jack’s wife, Babette, has 
had an affair so that she can get the Dylar—she has no consideration of the moral 
repercussions, nor does it seem that Jack, upon hearing the details of the affair, is filled 
with rage for the betrayal.  Strangely though, Jack’s plan betrays that there is something 
real about his need to punish Mr. Gray.  The novel explains first, that he will not shoot 
Mr. Gray because of the affair, then that he will shoot him, and finally that he will shoot 
him with “three bullets in the midsection for maximum visceral agony” in order to steal 
the drugs revealing a kind of narrative of vengeance placidly depicted by Jack who 
refuses to accept the significance of his wife’s adultery (DeLillo 309).  Perhaps the 
murder is to fulfill the suggestion for survival offered by Murray.  During the murder of 




possibility of the murder and the advice given him by his friend:  “This was similar to 
something Murray had once said. Murray had also said, ‘Imagine the visceral jolt, 
watching your opponent bleed in the dust.  He dies, you live’” (DeLillo 308).  Even in the 
midst of absolute moral crisis, Gladney sees no immorality in any of this.  Details such as 
the “suicidal cult messages” he plans to write on “mirrors and walls,” as well as his 
appeal to the wisdom derived by Murray through his obsession with pop-culture, suggest 
that even the murder scene is losing its significance and becoming just another 
manifestation of behaviors contextualized in relation to murder scenes (DeLillo 309). 
Delillo’s satire actively points out what happens when serious moral transgressions 
like those implied by adultery, murder and Nazism are simply imported into a work 
through reference: the casualness of their insertion ceases to be an ethical dilemma and 
begins to threaten ethical definition in general.   DeLillo’s goal in making Gladney a 
professor of Hitler studies is to show that the popularizing of Hitler and Nazism in this 
way is a reduction of significance that carries with it, not just moral consequence, but the 
seeds of destruction for the entire ethical system.  The implication of Jack Gladney’s 
inability to see evil as part of his subject matter extends ultimately to his entire life which 
becomes, as a result, bereft of significance.   
 In the Summer of 2009, in a manner reminiscent of the collapse of ethics implied 
by White Noise, President Barack Obama attempted to create a national dialogue 
concerning health care reform through a series of “town meetings” hosted by members of 
Congress.  The results were a strange melding of national dialogue and national rrative 
that devolved into absolute ethical confusion.  The President’s plans for reform were first 




Sara Palin, and then adopted by other American conservatives), and then, later, blatantly, 
when Americans speaking out about the need for national health care began to hold signs 
with Obama pictured with a Hitler mustache, and then started to accuse speakers at th  
town meetings of supporting Nazi programs.  
 The result of the comparison was jarring.  Massachusetts, Democratic 
Congressman Barney Frank answered one speaker’s question, “why do you continue to 
support a Nazi policy?” by asking her, “On what planet do you spend most of your 
time?”  Frank’s answer was indicative of many American’s concerns.  Where did these 
comparisons come from, and how did Hitler and the Nazis enter into the health care 
debate?  The answer to those questions is, however, rather simple.  The right wing 
opponents of national health care reform wanted to call President Obama’s health care 
plan evil—this is done in the United States by evoking Nazism.  Nazi analogies have 
been used politically to support or attack nearly every war involving the United States
since World War II and to demonize numerous domestic policies.  They have been used 
to support and attack political groups and have even become part of the highly personal 
areas of identity politics, personal opinion and belief.  Nazis not only are evil, they now 
define evil.  
The regular objections one might think to posit (that giving people access to medical 
attention is quite the opposite of killing them, that Hitler would have shunned President 
Barack Obama for his skin color, that Obama is a member of the political left and th t 
Nazis are located at the far right, that if Obama really were like Hitlr dissension 
probably would never have been tolerated) are all immaterial.  They’re based on 




protesting Obama’s “Nazi policies,” few did so based on their knowledge of the T4 
program (the likely referent of ‘Nazi national healthcare’ alluded to by Palin), nd many 
of the protesters were probably encouraged to do so by their ignorance of history.  If 
women calling for free access to birth control pills can be called feminazis, and when the 
right to legal abortion can be called the Baby Holocaust or the Silent Holocaust (as it is 
on numerous Pro-Life websites),  then why not call Obama a Nazi when he calls for free 
health care?  Why not anyone?   
What really is there to prevent anyone and anything from being like Hitler with the 
end result that everything can be denounced as being like a Nazi, without logic or 
capacity to repudiate that logic, and so the Nazi used in the analogy becomes a 
meaningless term?  It does not represent evil, and so nothing does.  Good and evil, as 
defined by this exemplary position, lack definition, but what other way is there to define 
them when all other definitions are subject to context?  History is meaningless in thi  
exchange. 
During that same summer in which the provision of national health care became 
comparable to the atrocities conducted in death camps, director Quentin Tarantino 
tackled the subject of World War II and the Nazi enemy in his movie Inglourious 
Basterds providing a mass cultural example of the value history has in validating Nazi 
analogies.  The movie was, and continues to be, quite popular.  Its plot involves a 
Lieutenant Aldo Raine, a Tennessee moonshiner turned guerrilla warfare expert, who 
leads a group of Jewish volunteers, “the Basterds” behind enemy lines in Nazi occupied 
France before the invasion at Normandy where they perform hit and run missions against




victims, “We’re in the killing Nazi business.  And cousin, business is a-booming.” 
(Inglourious Basterds).   
Part of the reason the Basterd’s operation is so successful is because Aldo and his 
band of assassins don’t really seem to know what a Nazi is.  When Sergeant Donnie 
Donnowitz (nicknamed, the ‘Bear Jew’) is about to execute a Sergeant in the German 
Army, he asks the German “Did you get those medals for killing Jews?” to which the 
German replies, “Bravery.”  The German commander is making a distinction concerning 
his efforts as a German soldier and separating them from the ideological atro ities of the 
Nazis.  His answer suggests that he does not think of himself as a killer of Jews but as a 
soldier defending his country—an attitude which has, at the very least, historical val dity..  
The distinction that has no effect on the Basterds, though;  Donnowitz beats the helpless 
German sergeant’s head in with a baseball bat to the cheers of his compatriots.  In this 
scene it is the American who kills helpless prisoners, but the American is made to seem 
justified by the strange political delineation of the film.  Donnowitz is allowed to kill the 
German soldier because he’s a Nazi, even though he isn’t really a Nazi, he only seems so 
to Raine’s Basterds who are too dead set on delivering Jewish vengeance to take account 
of their victims’ politics. 
The Basterds kill anyone in uniform under the assumption that the German army is as 
composed of Nazis as the country’s political leadership, and it seem that it is precisely the 
uniform that is the problem for Raine’s men.  Raine explains to one of his victims just 
before cutting a swastika into his head, “See we like our Nazis in uniform.  That way you 
can spot them just like that.  If you take off that uniform, aint nobody going to know 




Nazis are just like everyone else—that if they take off their uniform they will have no 
trouble blending in.  It ignores salient defining characteristics such as the Nazis’ anti-
Semitic and homicidal ideology under the premise that those sorts of things can be 
covered up—the Nazi’s identity as a Nazi does not depend upon them.  It depends on 
their uniform, not their attitude. 
Tarantino doesn’t seem to make any sort of real commentary on the problem of why 
the Basterds victims deserve to be victimized. It’s as if Tarrantino doesn’t know, just like 
his Basterds, that the average German soldier wasn’t a Nazi or that such a soldier 
wouldn’t have known, historically, what was happening within the Nazi camp system 
(nor would the Jewish American soldiers).  Lastly, the success of the movie is dependent 
upon catharsis—the desires of the audience are fulfilled by watching ‘Nazis’ get brutally 
beaten to death by the “Jew Bear.”  The goal of the film is to present what the character 
Shoshanna Dreyfus calls “the face of Jewish vengeance.”  This intimates that the film’s 
audience is just as unconcerned as Tarantino and his Basterds with the fact that the 
soldier whose skull is cracked with a baseball bat or the numerous soldiers whom the 
Basterds scalp aren’t Nazis at all.  The catharsis of the violence and the mass appeal of 
the film that depends on that catharsis are reliant upon the interchangeability of German 
soldiers with Nazis.  That these assumptions are repudiated by historical fact is no matter.   
The Basterd’s enemies are called Nazis and no one, in the film’s mass audience anyways, 
calls them out as imposters.  The history that would otherwise subvert the film’s fanta y 
is forgotten.  
The film’s most blatant act of disregard for historical accuracy comes when the 




face with machine guns.  Within the world of the film, World War II is won even before 
the invasion of Normandy, though not before the Wannsee conference—the Holocaust 
has begun by the time the Basterds show up in Europe.  The film, thus, represents a 
fantasy of what Americans might have accomplished had we just been able to drop some 
violent Jewish soldiers behind the line and let them loose on Hitler and his minions.  
History has no bearing on the logic of this fantasy, only that the Nazis (whoever they turn 
out to be) suffer and are destroyed.  When the Nazi high command goes up in flame, they 
die with the face of Shoshanna Dreyfus projected onto the smoke of the burning theater.  
She looks like an Old Testament description of God, the pillar of fire that led Moses 
across the desert, and thus the film creates divine retribution for the Nazis’crimes and 
interprets it within a purely filmic milieu.  The film provides appropriate retribu ion for 
the Nazis just as the projector makes Shoshanna Dreyfus into the face of God. 
It’s easy to dismiss Inglourious Basterds as nothing more than an American postwar 
fantasy about gaining retribution against the figures who define evil in American culture, 
but then the fantasy intrudes even upon itself.  What does it mean to kill Nazis when they 
aren’t really Nazis and why is it so satisfying to watch these imposters die?  Clearly, the 
reason that the Basterds are Jewish is because of the Holocaust: their ethnicity entitles 
them to vengeance—but if the Nazis aren’t real, then how real is the filmic Holocaust 
upon which the film’s vengeful catharsis depends?   
Moreover, the various Germans in the film, who do not identify as Nazis, question the 
logic of their inclusion among the Basterds’ enemies, asking simple questions like why 
their German identity automatically makes them targets for scalpings a d incinerations.  




convince Shoshanna that he is not just a uniform.  She is not convinced, but it is not so 
clear, that the audience is supposed to agree with Shoshanna in her indictment.  Zoller is 
a baby faced soldier.  His main exploit rests in his killing three hundred Americans in 
three days as a sniper in Italy. But despite his prowess (or luck) as a soldier, nothing 
recommends him as particularly bent towards the Nazi ideology.  He’s a kid.  He 
attempts to use his connections with Joseph Goebbels to impress the girl he has a crush 
on.  He isn’t even quite smart enough to understand that as a French woman in occupied 
France, she neither likes Germans nor is impressed with German leadership. 
One thing that is clear, however, is that Zoller isn’t particularly proud of his exploits 
in the military.  As he sits and watches the movie based on his exploits, he seems morose 
and goes to seek out the comfort of Shoshanna, explaining to her, “the fact remains, this 
film is based on my military exploits.  And in this case, my exploits consist of killing 
many men.  Consequently, the part of the movie that’s playing right now…I don’t like 
watching this part.”  The viewer gets the idea that Zoller would much rather be a young 
man attempting to win the affections of a young French woman—he invites the viewer’s 
sympathies and ultimately complicates the idea that all Germans are, in th  words of 
Raine, “the foot soldiers of a Jew hating, mass murdering maniac.”  
After (or perhaps because) the view of Nazi membership supported by Inglourious 
Basterds is called into question by the relative naiveté of Private Zoller, the tenor of the 
film’s commentary through Zoller changes.  In Zoller’s last moments, he attempts to 
force himself on Shoshanna Dreyfus and is shot by her after having finally revealed 
himself as an attempted rapist as the finale to his otherwise uninterrupted role as a young 




Zoller’s attitude throughout the rest of the film that it suggests a problem with the 
ideology of the film itself.  One innocent German in a uniform would, ultimately, make 
the tactics of Raine’s bastards the product of psychosis rather than vengeance, and thus, 
at the last moment, Tarantino turns the nice German kid into a would-be Nazi rapist. 
Zeller’s attempt to de-Nazify himself is probably the movie’s most successful, but he 
is hardly unique in his attempt at sympathy for his cause.  When, for instance, Major 
Dieter Hellstrom of the SS plays a barroom game, the film introduces the notion of 
racism in the film, not through Hellstrom’s anti-Semitism but through his commentary on 
American racist attitudes.  He has been given the identity of a famous character on a card 
which everyone in the table can see except for him and he is to ask questions in order to 
discover the identity of the character.  He asks whether he was from the jungle, whether 
he was brought to America by boat, whether he was brought there in chains, whether he 
was displayed in chains.  Finally, he asks, “Am I the story of the Negro in America?” and 
when the other table members tell him, “no.” He guesses, correctly, that he is King Kong. 
Hellstrom’s quirky mistake acts as a rhetorical ploy on the part of the film. The 
ability to conflate King Kong and the history of slavery in America suggests, first, that 
film creates its message through the creation of a myth.  Thus, Inglourious Basterds is to 
be taken as a myth as well, a rewriting of the evil of Nazism to include, finally, its 
deserved retribution.  What Major Hellstrom’s confusion introduces to the myth, 
however, is complicated by the way the film comments on America’s history of racism 
by putting its chronicle into the mouth of an SS officer.  He is essentially saying that 
Germany is racist and that America is racist—what’s the difference?  In fact, the ease by 




historical counterpart in “the story of the Negro in America,” suggests that it is publicly 
hypocritical, for Americans at least, to condemn the Nazis for their racistideology. 
Later in the film, racism is removed from the argument completely when Colonel 
Hans Lander attempts to negotiate with Lieutenant Raine and Private First Clas  Utivich 
his surrender to the allied forces and the destruction of the four leading members of th  
Third Reich.  Lander, when confronted by Raine concerning his epigram of “The Jew 
Hunter,” betrays deep offense at the nickname. He protests, “I’m a detective.  A damn 
good detective.  Finding people is my specialty so naturally I work for the Nazis find ng 
people and, yes, some of them were Jews, but Jew Hunter…just a name that stuck.”  It’s 
just a job—a job that he does well and that he did well before the Nazis.  Now that the 
Nazis are in power, he works for them.  It has nothing to do with race or ideology; for 
Lander, it is just a simple matter of natural ability.  What’s clear also by his willingness 
to betray the third Reich is that he has no loyalty whatsoever to the leadership of Hitler.  
The war is nearing its end, Germany is going to lose, and so Lander is willing to betray 
his country so as to be on the winning side.  Only the hunt has ever mattered to him. 
What Lander, Hellstrom, and Zoller offer, then, is a serious argument about just what 
it means to be a Nazi and, therefore, to be evil.  Is it racism?  No.  Because Americans are 
racist too.  Is it their devotion to Nazi ideology?  Clearly it isn’t—Zoller isn’t an 
ideologue at all nor, in the end, is Lander.  What the film clearly implies is that some of 
the Germans were just soldiers, that some of the Germans were just doing their jobs, and 
that even the racist Nazis weren’t all that alien from their American cou terparts.  In the 
end, what it is that makes the Nazis worthy of the violent reaction against them, as 




undifferentiated condemnation by Raine and his men as it is a condemnation of Nazi 
Germany, its crimes and its leadership. 
Except that in the end, in a kind of filmic rhetoric true of Raine, none of the 
counterarguments matter.  The film has made an argument for understanding and then 
scalped those whom the audience is supposed to understand.  It blows them up, it carves 
swastikas in their forehead, it opens fire on their faces with submachine-guns at point 
blank range.  The ultimate message of the film seems to be that the logical other side, 
cogently represented, sympathetically rendered, is worthless—so what if the “Nazis” in 
the film don’t deserve to be beaten, tortured, and brutally murdered?  The audience’s 
need for catharsis acts as motivation enough for the brutality, because the film fulfills the 
audience’s need to see the Nazis punished.  The film’s rewriting of history suggests that 
historical fact has failed to provide resolution for the crime of the Holocaust, and so 
Tarantino rewrites history and provides a new narrative where the Nazis that should take 
the punishment for the Holocaust are destroyed.  
The problem with the film’s logic, though, is that these Nazis remain fictional.  
Without a historical reality to help differentiate them, there is no clear sense of who 
deserves punishment and who doesn’t.  Hitler, Goebbels, and Hellstrom are equally as 
guilty as Zoller.  Lander is as guilty as everyone else even though his crime isn’t racist in 
origin, and if the crimes are racist in origin, then America is as guilty, h storically, as 
Nazi Germany for its support of the slave trade and as equally deserving of being scalped 
by Aldo the Apache.  In the end, the Nazi characters’ arguments for why they shouldn’t 




Overall, though, the film betrays a much larger problem with the culture of the 
audience through their popular reception of the film.  If the film is to suggest a fan asy 
about how Nazi Germany should have been dealt with at the close of the war (shoot 
everyone who wore a uniform) then the film suggests that historical Nazis were not bad 
enough in their very real crimes to validate such an intense reaction.  Tarantino’s creation 
of a mythic Nazi to justify the basterds suggests that real Nazis wouldn’t.  So, what 
exactly is the audience of Inglourious Basterds cheering for when the Basterds slaughter 
their victims?  Fake Nazis offering cogent arguments for why they shouldn’t be counted 
among the legion of the film’s fake Nazis confuses the film’s issues to such a point that it 
is unclear where the real Nazi is in the filmic rhetoric.  The audience cheers b cause 
someone has been called a Nazi and then that character indicted as a Nazi has his head 
beaten in.  That the victim is a Nazi in name only is of no matter and not worth exploring.  
In fact, by scratching the surface of the film’s indictment of Nazism, American racism is 
quickly implied. 
These Nazi as they appear in contemporary American culture demonstrate the 
problematic state of evil in American ethics since the Second World War.  In Inglourious 
Basterds, the Nazis are the villains precisely because the film’s heroes are shooting them.  
In fact, they must be particularly bad given the degree of brutality the bast rds employ 
while dealing with the Nazis.  The image matches the confusion of the Nazi metaphor in 
the history of its rhetorical usage.  The use of Nazism to indict national health care, for 
instance, suggests that the public’s stance on altruism itself is dependent on the fluidi y of 
Nazism and its presumed ability to define evil—giving aid to the sick is made to seem a 




 In the end, a context dependent system of ethics built in reaction to the 
essentialism of the Nazis simply cannot be sustained.  The solidity that it would need to 
determine states of morality or immorality are never immune to the very mchanisms it 
uses for its evaluations. In glourious Basterds, for instance, the desire to punish Nazism 
with Jewish vengeance is so strong that it erases historical Nazism in its severity.  Each 
time the Nazi is evoked it changes a bit:  soup Nazis, feminazis, crypto-Nazis, safety 
Nazis, Nazis in Schindler’s List, Nazis in Hellboy, Nazis in Inglorious Basterds, until 
finally their meaning is lost even as their connotation remains—they define the moral 
position of evil but nothing remains constant to define them.  Baudrillard suggests that 
the illusion of scandal is evoked to conceal the fact that there is no scandal.  He stops 
short.  The illusion of evil prevents the definition of evil.  Nazism has become amorphous 
and able to accept any analogy, and therefore, any censure, as valid. Nazismas evil’s 
epitome supplies only the comfort that America knows what evil is, but with the side that 
it otherwise prevents investigation into the absence of moral definition; Americans 
needn’t codify evil when they have the Nazis to use as a universal model for comparison. 
Rorty’s utopia is simply impossible; his assumptions about irony justify qualifications 
for right and wrong that are so liberal as to prevent any value from taking hold at all. 
Every value has the capacity to be interpreted as both right and wrong, since evil is 
defined as being like Nazism, and anything can be compared to Nazism in some form.  
Without an essential position of ethical value, it ceases even to be clear why one should 










1 Stead’s Law is similar in that it suggest that “any discussion between more than 2 Pagans will 
eventually come around to Christianity,” but it doesn’t suggest that reference to Christianity will 
necessarily end the conversation (Skirvin). 
 
2 Emerson here, I think, deserves special mention since it is not at all clear that he so easily fits 
into either the category of essentialism or context dependency.  His designation of “Beauty” clearly points 
to a thing both transcendent and determined by human i gination.  Thus nature’s essential characteristics 
are directly related to the capacity of human beings to consider them:  “Its effect is like that of a higher 
thought or a better emotion coming over me, when I deemed I was thinking justly or doing right.  Yet it is 
certain that the power to produce this delight, does not reside in nature, but in man, or in harmony of both” 
(Emerson 11).  To complicate further, for Emerson, human imagination is a product of the nature which it 
investigates. 
 
3 Rorty’s position is not original.  His use of irony is itself drawn from Kierkegaard’s description 
of Socrates and Christ in The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates.  Furthermore, I 
would be remiss given the first chapter of this work if I weren’t to mention the point-counterpoint of 
Tlönian works of non-fiction in the Borges story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.”  Mark Frisch’s analysis of 
this Tlöninan peculiarity suggests the very same point made by Rorty: 
The fact that all philosophies must give expression to opposing points of view also 
emphasizes that this world allows for multiple, competing perspectives, rather than 
exclusive, monistic visions.  It has implications for a discourse on ideas and freedom of 
expression as well (51). 
 
4 “Genocide” and “Holocaust” have become interchangebl  terms with the systematic murder of 
European Jewry.  However, the history of these terms reveals a deep misunderstanding of the nature of 
Nazi atrocities including the tendency to lump all the atrocities together (all people incarcerated, tortured, 
or murdered in the camps) or to use these terms to den te atrocities and the results of the Nazi war mchine 
(since it so often targeted civilian populations).  The term genocide was available almost immediately after 
the war but its use early on in relation to the Nuremberg trials made it come to denote all Nazi war crimes.  
The term Holocaust was available early on as well but would not come into popular usage as the attemptd 
destruction of European Jewry until the decade of the 1970s. 
 
5 Russia did not necessarily welcome these deportatins.  Many, especially anarchists, were 
rounded up and imprisoned as soon as they set foot on Russian soil. 
 
6 The term nationalist as it was used in the interwar decades is essentially synonymous with what 
fascism would come to mean after the Second World War.  It is important to note, however, that most 
nations that we now consider fascist in retrospect, did not call themselves fascist at the time, but were 
rather nationalists: Nazis were national socialists, and the generals that supported Franco in the Spanish 
Civil War were part of Spain’s Nationalist party. 
 
7 Sacco and Vanzetti were vulnerable to false accusations because of their status as recent 
immigrants. 
 
8 Its directness concerning social issues was a selling point for fascism on the world stage.  Its 
claims for immediacy were often tied to its claims at having constructed a totalized state to maximize 
efficiency.  
 
9 In some cases, policies of forced sterilization were also put in place against Native American 
populations and economically destitute women. 
 
10 In 1920, Lothrop Stoddard made a commercial success with his book The Rising Tide of Color 





11 There is ample reason to believe that Germany was recovering from its financial hardships when 
Hitler began to come to power.  The Nazis simply took credit for the recovery. 
 
12 Interviews with Germans suggest that Germany was as little predisposed as America to take 
belligerent politicians at their word.  In an anonymous postwar interview of a Nazi doctor, referred to by 
his interviewer as Karl K., K. offers: 
There was no one in Germany or in the whole world who had not heard Hitler’s and 
Streicher’s proclamation that the Jews had to be ext rminated…Everybody heard that.  
And everybody “heard past it.”  Because nobody believ d that such a reality would come 
into practice…And suddenly one is confronted with the fact that what one used to, my 
God! take for propaganda verbiage is now totally, completely, wholly matter-of-fact and 
strategically concrete, that it is being realized with 100-percent strategy.  That above all 
shook one.  That one did not foresee…you knew it, and all of a sudden you are standing 
in front of it.  Did you really know it? (Lifton 204) 
If a doctor steeped in Nazi ideology within the national boundaries of Germany could be taken 
aback by the seriousness of the final solution, then what could be expected of people continents away who 
had no real inundation into a crime so heinous that i  wouldn’t even have a name until 1944? 
 
13 At the 1936 Inter-American Conference on Peace held in Montevideo, Uruguay, the twenty-one 
member nations adopted a resolution intended to muzzle the film industry by prohibiting the production r 
exhibition of any feature that might offend another nation or romanticize war. (Birdwell 22) 
 
14 The same year as the release of The Great Dictator, UFA would produce Jud Süss the most 
inflammatory anti-Semitic film propaganda of the Nazi period of German film (and probably the most 
inflammatory produced before or after).  Allies later brought the film’s director, Veit Harlan, to trial for the 
film but like Leni Riefenstahl, he claimed that Goebb ls controlled the production of the film and was 
therefore responsible for its merits as propaganda.  Harlan was acquitted. 
 
15 In 1931, for instance, F. Scott Fitzgerald published “Babylon Revisited” about an American 
returning to Paris after the stock market crash to find the world inhospitable.  The party over, the story’s 
main character, Charlie Wales, is forced to realize that his amorality in Paris has cost him the life o  his 
wife and the custody of his daughter.  His attempt to escape conventional essentialist morality has, as it 
does in most American dystopian fiction from this period, failed. 
 
16 Reports of anti-Semitism began as soon as the Nazis c me to power.  In a 1933 letter written to 
the League of Nations, Michael Williams (editor of Commonweal, a Catholic weekly review) wrote, 
“[w]hat you will decide to do is your concern.  Either harden your hearts and let the worst crime of our age 
proceed in the deliberate extinction of nearly 1,000 0 men, women, and children, or come quickly and 
strongly to the rescue” (Abzug 15).  In an article printed in the Chicago Tribune, 1933, Edmund Taylor 
wrote  
On the nights of March 9th and 10th, bands of Nazis throughout Germany carried 
out wholesale raids to intimidate the opposition, particularly the Jews. As hundreds have 
sworn in affidavits, men and women were insulted, slapped, punched in the face, hit over 
the heads with blackjacks, dragged out of their homes in night clothes, and otherwise 
molested… The arrest of innocent Jews was sanctioned as ‘protective jailing’… This 
party [the Nazis] at its meetings and in its newspapers, books, and pamphlets has made 
the Jew appear loathsome and sinister in the eyes of its f llowers. (Abzug 18) 
 
17 This occurred on June 30th and July 2nd, 1934.  It is known generally as “The Night of theLong 
Knives,” in which Hitler purged the party, through a series of political assassinations, of the influence of 
Ernst Röhm, then leader of the Sturmabteilung (SA, or Brown Shirts).  Röhm had designs to replace 
Germany’s military with the revolutionary volunteers in the SA.  By having Röhm murdered (along with 
other incidiary members of party leadership), Hitler was able to make peace with the Reichswehr and 
eliminate a political rival.  The Nazis also took this opportunity to round up their political enemies 






18 Perhaps the most detrimental stereotype against Jewish migrants was that they could not, or 
would not, be assimilated.  This particular stereotype is referred to as the “Jewish Problem” and it is to this 
problem that Hitler’s “Final Solution” refers. 
 
19 Laws were passed, for instance, to keep unaccompanied minors from entering the country and 
foreign consulates “had strict orders to make entry to the United States as difficult as humanly possible by 
asking for documents that could not be obtained” (Laquer 130).  Roosevelt, who might have otherwise been 
more sympathetic to the cause of the German Jews, went along with this general climate concerning 
emigration because it was politically unsafe to do otherwise. According to polls in 1938, “80% of 
American public opinion …were against the immigration of refugees” (Laquer 129).  \ 
 
20 In Ellie Wiesel’s novel Night, the Jewish community of Sighet, Trannsylvania does not believe 
the description of mass murder given to them by Moessh  the Beadle who has escaped a Nazi firing squad.  
In many ways, Night is demonstrative of the world’s reticence taken to its extreme: like the rest of the 
world, the Jewish community threatened by the Nazis does not believe the stories of Nazi atrocities simply 
because they seem too far fetched to be true in the modern age.   
 
21 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, On-Line, Raphael Lemkin first used the word 
“genocide” in 1944 in his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, ix. 79: “By ‘genocide’ we mean the 
destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” 
 
22 Many also shared the particular Nazi stereotype that Bolshevism and Judaism were intrinsically 
linked.  Thus, in punishing Jews, Hitler was also punishing communists whom America, by and large, saw 
as dangerous. 
 
23 Totalitarianism would not achieve its apotheosis a a dystopia until 1948 through George 
Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four.  Before that time, it is the value of the totalized state that produce 
dystopia and not the means of enforcing those values through totalitarianism. 
 
24 Interestingly enough, the Nazis painted Democracy as dystopian using the same definition of 
dystopia utilized in the United States: dystopia as a state in which contextually dependent ideology had
replaced essentialism and created amorality. According to Nazi Dr. Ernst Hanftstaengl, “Democracy has no 
convictions for which people would be willing to stake their lives” (Why We Fight:  The Nazi Strikes).  
Nazi propaganda posters generally showed America as being both racially integrated and racially 




25 Birdwell points out that “all of the film studios except 20th Century Fox were headed by Jewish 
Immigrants and all but Warner Bros. operated under th  delusion that they could continue to do busines 






26 In 1942, the Warsaw Jewish Bund contacted the Polish Jewish Government in exile and detailed 
the information they had gathered, including the forced ghettoization of the Warsaw Jews.  According to 
Holocaust historian Martin Gilbert:   
The Bund report from Warsaw, which reached London in June 1942 and was broadcast at 
once over the BBC, sought to give a comprehensive summary of what was known to the Jews of 
Warsaw at the time of its compilation, sometime in May.  The report mentioned Chelmno, and, 
thanks to the escapee Yakov Grajonowsky, who had told his tale in Warsaw, it described the 
killings at Chelmno in detail.  Of the deportation f 25,000 Jews from Lublin, ...the report could 
only venture the phrase 'carried off to an unknown destination in sealed railway cars.' (542)     
The information was made public months before the rel ase of Casablanca. 
 
27 Germany referred to this depiction as “the war myth”: that Germany had started World War I 
and that it deserved its fate.  Hitler used the idea of the war myth to rally Germany’s starving unemployed 
to his cause. 
 
28 Peter Lorre, as a Jew, had escaped mistreatment in Nazi Germany by coming to America.  In 
Casablanca, he plays an Eastern European—there is nothing about the character that identifies him as 
Jewish. 
 
29 Rick echoes a sentiment advertised in the New York Times for the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies published June 10, 1940, which read, "We now know that every step the 
French and British fall back brings war and world revolutions closer to US--our country, our institutions, 




31 These two posters are not only the only two posters which actively depict real Nazi atrocities 
committed in Europe, they are also the only two posters designed by Ben Shahn to be accepted as part of 
America’s wartime poster propaganda campaign.  Shahn’s other work was rejected because it lacked the 







33 The enormous documentary “The World At War” begins with images of Oradour-sur-Glane, a 





35 Udet was a World War I German flying ace. 
 
36 Note how closely this mirrors the definition of genocide which is now so politically charged that 
various genocides are denied their definition as such because it would challenge the position of peopl 





United States will not recognize its treatment of the North American Native peoples as genocide despite all 
of the evidence to the contrary. 
 
37 I am presenting this here as the mechanism for the problem at hand, which is the function of an 
ethical epitome within context dependent philosophy and the stability of such an epitome given its being 
embedded in a system defined by the caprices of culture.  Underlying the assumption I make here is an 
incredibly complex set of questions about the interrelation between context dependency, nominalism, and 
essentialism which I cannot discuss here without turning this discussion of depictions of Nazism in 
American culture into a discussion of the essentialism of context, or the context of essentialism.  For further 
reading on that subject, I suggest Jean Francois Lyotard’s The Differand:  Phrases in Dispute, which 
tangentially addresses the place of absolute evil (through Auschwitz) inside of a philosophical point of 
view that that refutes absolutes. 
 
38 There were, of course, still fascists and even fascist nations around after the war.  Spain, for 
instance, had stayed out of the war and so Franco managed to stay in power until 1975.  However, the 
general global climate towards fascism was belligerent.  Certainly no new national governments have come 
to power since World War II under the banner of “fascism” though many political movements have had 
fascist sensibilities. 
 
39 “Fat Man” was dropped on Nagasaki Japan August 9th, 1 45. 
 
40 Russia did not necessarily welcome these deportatins.  Many, especially anarchists, were 
rounded up and imprisoned as soon as they set foot on Russian soil. 
 
41 The term nationalist as it was used in the interwar decades is essentially synonymous with what 
fascism would come to mean after the Second World War.  It is important to note, however, that most 
nations that we now consider fascist in retrospect, did not call themselves fascist at the time, but were 
rather nationalists: Nazis were national socialists, and the generals that supported Franco in the Spanish 
Civil War were part of Spain’s Nationalist party. 
 
42 The melting pot nature of Russia was a particular difficulty for Hollywood to portray.  
Difference in Hollywood relies heavily on stereotypes, and Hollywood simply had no idea what Russian 
ethnic stereotypes were so as to play off of them. 
 
43 One should take note of how easily this rhetoric built on the wartime propaganda of division 
between Axis and Allies.  Near the beginning of Why We Fight:  Prelude to War, the film quotes Vice 
President Henry A. Wallace:  “This is a fight between a free world and a slave world.”  Germany, Italy, nd 
Japan were depicted as turning their nations into slave .  After the war, the totalitarian depiction of Russia 
effectively made Russia a slave-state as well.  
 
44 According to the OED, attributed to B.B. Carter’s t anslation of Sturzo's Italy & Fascismo. 
 
45 A totalitarian war, for instance, indicated a war in which all of a nation’s targets were 
considered military. 
 
46 For instance, “Social Policy in the New Germany,” a globally disseminated piece of propaganda 
for Nazi Germany, attempted to “explain to the foreign r some typical examples of the character and 
content of the German social policy,” and was intended to “serve all those who are minded to estimate the 
new structure of the German State” (3).  In it, the Dr. Bruno Rauecker writes, “The new Germany is a ‘total 
state,’ that is, it claims to be viewed and estimated, both from outside and from inside, as a unit, ad to 
operate, both within and without, as a unit, an undivided whole.  Its supreme standard is the well being of 







47 “The Communist parties, which were very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been 
raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain 
totalitarian control.  Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in 
Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.” (Churcill 804) 
 
48 Popper wrote The Open Society and Its Enemies (published 1945) during the war in which he 
would develop the notion of the Nazism as a misreading of historicism.  This would open an entire realm of 
theorizing totalitarianism of which Leo Strauss is perhaps the most famous proponent (due primarily to his 
link with the neo-conservative movement).  
 
49 Hitler’s rhetoric made plain that Bolshevism was to be seen as a Jewish ideology:  Judao-
Bolshevism.  The Jewish nature of German anti-Bolshevist propaganda is fairly clear in its wartime poster : 
 
This poster displays the obvious markings of the Bolshevik as the German caricature of the Jew as 
vermin with his long nose and rat-like teeth. 
 
50 “By linking the seemingly hostile doctrines of fascism and communism, the term 
“totalitarianism” drew the focus away from the specific content of belief systems to the structure of those 
belief systems.  Totalitarian belief systems were held with a rigid intensity that could accept no oppsition; 
they were the antithesis of tolerance and pluralism” (Alpers 243) 
 
51 The Soviet’s own phrasing of their taking of Eastern Europe had historical basis.  Russia had a 





Furthermore, as Germany had been the military aggresso  in many of those attacks, Russia simultaneously 
wanted a Germany devastated beyond its capacity to make war. 
 
52 In the conclusion to his attack on the pro-Russian philosophy of the war, America’s Second 
Crusade, Chamberlin points out:   
Nor have the Four Freedoms played any appreciable part in shaping the postwar world…But one 
of the main cosequencs of the war was a vast expansion of Communist power in eastern Europe and in East
Asia.  It can hardly be argued that this has contribu ed to greater freedom of speech, expression, and 
religion, or, for that matter, to freedom from want d fear.”  (339) 
 
53 The term “Cold War” is acknowledged as originating  a speech given by Bernard Baruch (and 
written by Herbert Bayard Swope) but became popularized by Walter Lippman’s book Cold War.  Both 
venues brought the term into public notice by 1947 (Gaddis 54) 
 
54 Strangely, Japan was rarely included though it bore as much resemblance to the other axis 
powers as Communist Russia did.  Italy, which actually referred to itself as totalitarian, dropped outas an 
example early on. 
 
55 Hannah Arendt points out that “totalitarian movements use and abuse democratic freedoms in 
order to abolish them” (Origins of Totalitarianism 306).  Still, Hitler was popularly elected after all, nd 
Stalin was not. 
 
56 I’m specifically thinking of “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, 
Seven Missives) in which Derrida attempts to formulate a post-Atomic critical stance.  The article is 
steeped heavily in deconstruction and is interesting for its ability to turn the critical eye on the language of 
nuclear proliferation and disarmament, if not for its innovation. 
 
57 Nietzsche discusses monumental history in the second section of On the Advantage and 
Disadvantage of History for Life 
 
58 One of the most common trope of the Cold War nuclear war film is the pretend attack.  “On A 
Day Called X,” for instance, shows Portland, Oregon calmly evacuating the town.  In the film “1947, Year 
of Division,” the narrator describes the town of Moss ny, Wisconsin which pretends to be communists for 
twenty four hours as an experiment. 
 
59  There are numerous reasons why Anne Frank proves problematic to this discussion (The Diary 
of a Young Girl was released in English in 1951, inspired a play by 1955, and inspired a film by 1959).  
Part of the critical attention these works have had in regards to the Holocaust, whether they engender 
understanding of genocide and whether they are understood as Jewish is obviously important to this 
discussion.  I do not include the story of Anne Frank because it doesn’t explicitly address Nazi brutality nd 
genocide in the way that, say, Judgment at Nuremberg addresses the subject.  The personal nature of the 
work simply did not allow for the scope of understanding for the mass American audience, and there seem  
to be little indication that after watching The Diary of Anne Frank (as Americans surely did) anybody came 
away with the realization that the evil of the Nazis depended upon the millions of other Anne Franks whose 
stories they had not heard, or if this was understood, that these stories were inherently Jewish making the 
crime of Nazism not just wartime brutality but a campaign of extermination undertaken under the 
concealment of war.  This is what Judgment at Nuremberg hints at and what the trial of Adolph Eichmann 
made explicit by describing the Nazi’s “Jewish problem” and their “Final Solution.” 
 
60 My own reading of this scene draws heavily from Scott Simmons reading of the novel in his 
1978 article “Beyond the Theater of War:  Gravity’s Rainbow as Film”.  
 
61 The foreword of the study begins with a recap of the violence committed by the Nazis so as to 
contextualize a study of the authoritarian personality in America according to the repercussions of the 





62 To a lesser extent, the study also looked at its participants’ attitudes towards the conditions of 
African Americans, but the concentration is clearly on anti-Semitism. 
 
63 Political theorists of anti-Semitism Harold E.Quinley and Charles Y. Glock would call this a 
cognitive block towards anti-Semitism—the beliefs held are anti-Semitic, but aren’t recognizable as such to 
the persons who hold such a belief (and who may not think of themselves as anti-Semitic). 
 
64 Obviously, American racism had not, as far as Americans were concerned, resulted in a 
Holocaust.  However, at the outbreak of the Cold War, widespread knowledge of the details of the 
Holocaust was not part of popular public knowledge.  America had been given scenes of the death camps 
so as to inform them of the scope of the Nazi atrocities.  However, those films described the victims of the 
Nazi atrocities in terms of their politics and political action against the Nazis, and not, primarily, their 
ethnicity.  Knowledge of the Holocaust was different from one individual to the next. 
 
65 Michael N. Dobkowski offers a whole chapter (“Don’t Send These To Me”) to the subject of 
American conceptions of a Jewish Problem in his book The Tarnished Dream: The Basis of American Anti-
Semitism. 
 
66 The “purge” is not unique to anti-Semitism.   As a political tool, it’s most infamous usage is the 
Great Purge committed by Stalin against his enemies between 1936 and 1938.  Apropos to the point being 
made here, the Great Purge has been called “The Sovi t Holocaust” by numerous authors, thus equating the 
practices of the communists with those of the Nazis to solidify the definition of a totalitarian enemy.  The 
question remains, however, whether or not the purges eferenced by the SPSI were primarily against Jews 
as McCarthy and his supporters suggested.  Clearly, the  were against the enemies first of Stalin and then 
of Khrushchev—Jewish or not.  Russian anti-Jewish pogroms were common under the Czars; and the 
“doctor’s trials” revealed Jospeh Stalin as an anti-Semite.  The Great Purge of the 1930s under the then-
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and the purge of Lavrenty Baria’s supporters by Khrushchev were not, 
however, anti-Semitic in nature.    
 
67 According to American Jewish History:  “there was an effort made by leaders of the anti-
Communist movement to include Jews in their ranks or at least to claim Jewish support.  The American 
Jewish Committee, for example, was invited to join the All-American Conference to Combat Communism 
in 1950.” (Gurock 587). 
 
68 Of the fourteen essays in “Un-American” Hollywood: Politics and Film in the Blacklist Era, for 
instance, only one deals with the anti-Semitism of the black list: “The House I Live In:  Albert Malz and 
the fight against anti-Semitism.” 
 
69 The argument that Holocaust survivors’ silence result d from a need to assimilate worked in 
direct opposition to anti-Semitic stereotypes which positioned Jews as unwilling or unable to assimilate. 
 
70 Later, Hitler would expatriate the Jews, but in the 30s, Ashkenazi Jews were Germans by 
nationality.  In fact, “German refugees” became cold war code for Jews and refugee organizations, suchas 
“The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee” (one of the so-called communist front organizations to which 
Dashiell Hammett was linked) was viewed simultaneously as Jewish and communist. 
 
71 Occasionally, McCarthy broke procedure by allowing the media to cover some of the tribunals 
that were going to be obviously successful.  Technically, because of the security clearances of those fr m
the State department who were called to testify, he should not legally have been allowed to put the 
testimony either on radio or on television. The lega ity of this practice was never pursued with much 
enthusiasm though, because it would have meant protesting on behalf of kn wn communists. 
 
72 The McCarran-Walter Act, passed in January of 1952, allowed the Department of Justice to 





deportations happened when a person simply could not find work in their field due to one of the many 
blacklists. 
 
73 Part of Stander’s testimony is engraved on the "The First Amendment Blacklist Memorial" at 
University of Southern Califronia dedicated to the victims of the Hollywood blacklist. 
 
74 The formative psychologist of an OSS report on Hitler’s psychology in 1943, Dr. Walter C. 
Langer, in his later book The Mind of Adolf Hitler used testimony concerning Geli given by ex-Nazi Otto 
Strasser, to ascribe to Hitler “an extreme form of masochism in which the individual derives sexual 
gratification from the act of having a woman urinate or defecate on him” (134).  Strasser had been expell d 
from the the Nazi party in 1930 because, according William Shirer, “he had taken seriously not only the 
word ‘socialist’ but the word ‘workers’ in the party’s official name of National Socialist German Worke ’s 
Party” and was, thereafter, an enemy of the Nazis and Hitler himself (147).  His testimony, and the image 
of Hitler as a figure of deviant sexuality, is hardly credible.  Nevertheless, the myth of Hitler’s deviant 
sexuality is sometimes taken as fact. 
 
75 Colonel Klink ran a military camp in Hogan’s Heroes and was, therefore, part of the Luftwaffe, 
not the SS.  In the film, Auto Focus (a film about the sexual addiction of Hogan’s Heroes star, Bob Crane), 
Crane is berated by Ed Begley Jr.’s character, Mel Rosen, for shamelessly making a television sit-com 
about the Holocaust even though Hogan’s Heroes isn’t really about the Holocaust. 
 
76 The term was coined in Reagan’s speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in 
Orlando, Florida on March 8th, 1983.  The exact phrase in which the term is used is:  “So, in your 
discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urgeyou to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of 
blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history 
and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and 
thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.” 
 
77 The number of times Ronald Reagan was evoked as a N zi in American punk music makes it 
impossible to catalog them all here.  Here is one example from The Dead Kennedys remake of “California 
Uber Alles” entitled, “We’ve Got A Bigger Problem Now”: 
Don't forget our house special, it's called a Trickie Dickie Screwdriver/ It's got one part Jack 
Daniels, two parts purple Kool-Aid/ and a jigger of f rmaldehyde from the jar with Hitler's brain 
in it we got in the back storeroom/ Happy trails to you. Happy trails to you./ I am emperor Ronald 
Reagan/ born again with fascist cravings/ still youmade me president/ human rights will soon go 
away/ I am now your shah today/ now I command all of you/ now you’re going to pray in school/  
I’ll make sure they’re Christian too/ California Uber Alles.   
 
78 This was played out in numerous films, notably, The Omen III: The Final Conflict (1981), The 
Dead Zone (1983), and Dreamscape (1984). 
 
79 The assumption is fairly common throughout histories of Holocaust consciousness in America.  
 
80 The same is true of the Holocaust laden comedy like South Park and Sacha Baron Cohen. 
 
81 Ironically, the camp liberation films far outstripped the evils attributed to Nazism in wartime 
propaganda.  The reality of the atrocities was far mo e horrible than its fictional counterpart.   
 
82 Heroes has its own, less obvious link, to Nazi Germany.  One of the show’s characters, Hana 
Gitelman, a “cyberpath,” is the grand-daughter of an anti-Nazi resistance fighter (“Hana Gitelman”). 
 
83 Lyotard calls this deciding factor a Differand, but it is clear from his description that the 
Holocaust, which could fill this role, can not.  It is too horrible to allow for mundane comparisons. 
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